THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

a-2

Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis *A. James Gregor* 425

Pareto and Pluto-Democracy: The Retreat to Galapagos *S. E. Finer* 440

On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power *Richard M. Merelman* 451

Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems *Steven J. Brams* 461

Probabilism and the Number of Units Affected: Measuring Influence Concentration *Bruce M. Russett* 476

The Minority Party and Policy-Making in the House of Representatives *Charles O. Jones* 481

The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll-Call Voting *Michael J. Shapiro* 494

Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress *Lewis A. Froman, Jr.* 518

If, as Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do Then to Save Our Souls? *Lewis Lipsitz* 527

Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology *Carl J. Friedrich* 536

A Nonlinear Model for the Analysis of Judicial Decisions *Fred Kort* 546

Decision Costs in Coalition Formation *Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press* 556

The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture *Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr.* 564

Communications to the Editor 576

Book Reviews and Notes *James W. Prothro (ed.)* 582

Announcements 695

VOL. LXII **JUNE, 1968** **NO. 2**

Published Quarterly by

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

The most important articles to appear in "one of the world's best edited periodicals" (C. P. Snow) are now being used in colleges throughout the world.

You can have samples free

List the five Commentary Reports, on your letterhead, that you would consider for classroom adoption and we'll send them right out.

Special Reports:

☐ **The Dominican Revolt.** Theodore Draper New 64-page paperback based on his administration-shaking article in Commentary $2.50

☐ **American Reactions to The Six-Day War.** Robert Alter, Arthur Hertzberg, Milton Himmelfarb, Martin Peretz $1.00

☐ **Liberal Anti-Communism Revisited.** a symposium: Lionel Abel, David T. Bazelon, Daniel Bell, Lewis A. Coser, Paul Goodman, Michael Harrington, Sidney Hook, Irving Howe, Murray Kempton, Robert Lowell, Dwight MacDonald, William Phillips, Robert Pickus, Philip Rahv, Harold Rosenberg, Richard H. Rovere, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Stephen Spender, Diana Trilling, Lionel Trilling, Dennis H. Wrong ....75¢

Quantity discounts for classroom purchases: 25-49 copies less 10%; 50-99 copies less 15%; 100-299 copies less 20%; 300-499 copies less 30%; 500-1,000 copies less 40%; more than 1,000 copies less 50%.

☐ **The American Presidency**—A Defective Institution?—Andrew Hacker ....50¢
☐ **The Origins of Human Bonds**—Selma Fraiberg ....50¢
☐ **The Legacy of Che Guevara**—Norman Gall ....50¢
☐ **The Shape of American Politics**—Richard N. Goodwin ....50¢
☐ **A Guide to Reagan Country**—The Political Culture of Southern California—James Q. Wilson ....50¢
☐ **"Bonn Is Not Weimar"**—Reflections on the Radical Right in Germany—Walter Laqueur ....50¢
☐ **Counterrevolutionary America**—Robert L. Heilbroner ....50¢
☐ **The President and the Negro:** The Moment Lost—Daniel P. Moynihan ....50¢
☐ **Communism in Asia**—Donald S. Zagoria ....50¢
☐ **The Failure of the Warren Report**—Alexander M. Bickel ....50¢
☐ **The Unremembered Genocide**—Marjorie Housepian ....50¢
☐ **In Defense of 'Black Power'**—David Danzig ....50¢
☐ **Black Power and Coalition Politics**—Bayard Rustin ....50¢
☐ ***Church and State: How High a Wall?***—*Milton Himmelfarb* 50¢
☐ **The Problem of the New Left**—Tom Kahn ....50¢
☐ **The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy**—Norman Cohn 50¢
☐ **The Arab Refugees**—A Zionist View—Marie Syrkin ....50¢
☐ **Conservatism After Goldwater**—David Danzig ....50¢
☐ **The Meaning of Negro Strategy**—David Danzig ....50¢
☐ **The State of Soviet Jewry**—Maurice Friedberg; **Soviet Anti-Semitism:** An Exchange—Bertrand Russell & Aron Vergelis 50¢
☐ **Up From Apathy**—The Woodlawn Experiment—Charles E. Silberman ....50¢
☐ **The Failure of Urban Renewal**—A Critique and Some Proposals—Herbert J. Gans ....50¢
☐ **Five Years of Castro's Cuba**—Theodore Draper ....50¢
☐ **Public School 165**—Richard Schickel ....50¢
☐ **The Watts 'Manifesto' and the McCone Report**—Bayard Rustin ....50¢
☐ **From Protest to Politics:** The Future of the Civil Rights Movement—Bayard Rustin ....50¢
☐ **The American Reading Problem**—Selma Fraiberg ....50¢
☐ **Big Business and the Democrats**—David T. Bazelon ....50¢
☐ **Mutual Aid and the Negro**—John Slawson ....50¢
☐ **The Trial of Jesus**—Paul Winter ....50¢
☐ **China's Strategy . . .** A Critique—Donald S. Zagoria ....50¢
☐ ***The Future of Capitalism***—*Robert L. Heilbroner* ....50¢
☐ **Chinese Visions and American Policies**—Benjamin Schwartz 50¢
☐ **The Negro and the New York Schools**—Midge Decter ....50¢
☐ ***Intermarriage and the Jewish Future***—*Marshall Sklare* ....50¢
☐ **American Catholicism After the Council**—Michael Novak....50¢
☐ **Lessons of the 'Long Hot Summer'**—Bayard Rustin ....50¢
☐ **My Negro Problem—and Ours**—Norman Podhoretz ....50¢
☐ **Negroes and Jews:** The New Challenge to Pluralism—Nathan Glazer ....50¢
☐ **The John Birch Society**—Fundamentalism on the Right—Alan F. Westin ....50¢

Write to: Robert Gladstone
Commentary Reports
165 E. 56th St., New York, N. Y. 10022

Write for the Commentary Magazine Classroom Subscription Plan too.

Notable New Harper Texts

1817

Nations in a Multipolar World

Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. / 702 pages; $11.00

The author examines and analyzes succinctly, yet completely, the basic data needed to understand present-day international relations. Recognizing that the field of international relations is vast and diverse, he utilizes several approaches or principles to make the subject matter meaningful, intelligible and relevant.

American Foreign Policy in the Making

Eleanor Lansing Dulles / 370 pages; $3.95 paper

This new text provides an analysis of the apparatus and history of American foreign policy since the end of World War II and puts into historical perspective the aims of that policy and its degrees of success and failure.

Beyond Ideology:
THE REVIVAL OF POLITICAL THEORY

Dante Germino / 254 pages; $5.00

This new text is a superbly organized and lucid analysis of contemporary political science and modern man's political and social problems. The author presents a trenchant argument against the thesis that political theory is now in a state of decay; he examines the need and prospect for recovering the humanist tradition of political theory and places modern theory in proper historical perspective.

Comparative Government and Politics:
AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Michael Curtis / 265 pages; $3.50 paper

Here is the core volume in the series of political studies of individual countries and areas under Dr. Curtis' editorship. It seeks to introduce the student to the subject of comparative politics through both an analytical and institutional approach.

The Government and Politics of Contemporary Italy

Dante Germino and Stefano Passigli / 212 pages; $3.25 paper

This new text provides a sophisticated framework for an understanding of Italian politics. It illuminates both the achievements and the weaknesses of the Italian political system, without demanding that Italy's form of constitutional democracy pattern itself after the British or the American model. Provides a lasting insight into the mechanism *behind* the changing political order.

French Politics and Political Institutions

Roy Pierce / 275 pages; $3.25 paper

This brief but thorough analysis of French politics is based on the broad range of recent research done by European and American scholars and covers events through the legislative election of March, 1967.

HARPER & ROW, Publishers • 49 East 33d St., New York 10016

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President
Merle Fainsod*
Harvard University

President-Elect
David Easton*
University of Chicago

Vice Presidents
Stephen K. Bailey
Syracuse University

Harvey C. Mansfield
Columbia University

Jack W. Peltason
University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana

Secretary
Harvey Glickman
Haverford College

Treasurer
Max M. Kampelman
Washington, D. C.

Program Chairman
Joseph LaPalombara*
Yale University

Executive Director
Evron M. Kirkpatrick*
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Associate Director
Donald G. Tacheron

Managing Editor, APSR
Austin Ranney*
University of Wisconsin

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officiis*

1966–1968
M. Margaret Ball
Duke University
William Buchanan
Washington and Lee University
H. Paul Castleberry
Washington State University
Herbert Kaufman
Yale University
Charles A. McClelland
University of Southern California
Alfred G. Meyer
University of Michigan
Clara Penniman
University of Wisconsin
Clinton Rossiter*
Cornell University

1967–1969
Holbert N. Carroll
University of Pittsburgh
Charles O. Jones
University of Arizona
Merle Kling
Washington University, St. Louis
Roy C. Macridis
Brandeis University
Paul L. Puryear
Fisk University
Robert A. Scalapino*
University of California, Berkeley
Glendon Schubert
University of North Carolina
Daniel Wit
Northern Illinois University

* Members of the Executive Committee, 1967–1968.

FORMER PRESIDENTS

Frank J. Goodnow
Albert Shaw
Frederic N. Judson
James Bryce
A. Lawrence Lowell
Woodrow Wilson
Simeon E. Baldwin
Albert Bushnell Hart
W. W. Willoughby
John Bassett Moore
Ernst Freund
Jesse Macy
Munroe Smith
Hnery Jones Ford
Paul S. Reinsch
Leo S. Rowe
William A. Dunning
Harry A. Garfield
James W. Garner
Charles E. Merriam
Charles A. Beard
William B. Munro
Jesse S. Reeves
John A. Fairlie
Benjamin F. Shambaugh
Edward S. Corwin
William F. Willoughby
Isidor Loeb
Walter J. Shepard
Francis W. Coker
Arthur N. Holcombe
Thomas Reed Powell
Clarence A. Dykstra
Charles Grove Haines
Robert C. Rrooks
Frederic A. Ogg
William Anderson
Robert E. Cushman
Leonard D. White
John M. Gaus
Walter F. Dodd
Arthur W. Macmahon
Henry R. Spencer
Quincy Wright
James K. Pollock
Peter H. Odegard
Luther H. Gulick
Pendleton Herring
Ralph J. Bunche
Charles McKinley
Harold D. Lasswell
E. E. Schattschneider
V. O. Key, Jr.
R. Taylor Cole
Carl B. Swisher
Emmette S. Redford
Charles S. Hyneman
Carl J. Friedrich
C. Herman Pritchett
David B. Truman
Gabriel A. Almond
Robert A. Dahl

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association

EDITORIAL BOARD

AUSTIN RANNEY, *Managing Editor, University of Wisconsin*

FRED I. GREENSTEIN, *Wesleyan University*
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Columbia University*
WARREN E. MILLER, *University of Michigan*
WALTER F. MURPHY, *Princeton University*
J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College*
JOHN E. TURNER, *University of Minnesota*
VERNON VAN DYKE, *University of Iowa*
MYRON WEINER, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

JAMES W. PROTHRO, *Book Review Editor, University of North Carolina*
MARY H. GROSSMAN, *Madison*

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Managing Editor, APSR
North Hall, University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Executive Director, APSA
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are $15.00 a year ($6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students; five-year limitation). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $3.75 per copy; for *back issues* prior to 1963 address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003; subsequent to 1963 send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the month before publication.

Address correspondence about contributions to the REVIEW to Austin Ranney, North Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 53706. All manuscripts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

Address books intended for review to Richard F. Fenno, 575 Mount Hope Avenue, Rochester, New York 14620; information, including News and Notes, for the Association's newsletter *P. S.*, should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence to the Executive Director at the Washington office.

Articles and notes appearing in the REVIEW before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *International Index to Periodicals* index current issues. Microfilm of the REVIEW, beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms. 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A *Cumulative Index* of the REVIEW, Volumes 1-57: 1906-1963, may be obtained from Northwestern University Press, 1735 Benson, Evanston, Illinois.

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.
Copyright, 1968, by The American Political Science Association

NEW BOOKS FROM PRENTICE-HALL

SOME CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF MODERNIZATION, *by David E. Apter, Director, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley*

This new text presents the development of theoretical concepts useful in the analysis of modernization, particularly in its political aspects. This in turn is related to the broader question of the changing intellectual structure of politics itself. The book stresses a new paradigm of politics which in itself stands as a theory. November 1968, approx. 390 pp., Paperbound $4.95

SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY POWER, *by Frederick M. Wirt, Denison University and Willis D. Hawley, University of California, Berkeley*

Written from two points of view, that of the sociologist and that of the political scientist, this book deals with the description and conceptualization of the structure of power in the American city. It covers the intellectual developments that have taken place in the last thirty years in the study of the city. August 1968, approx. 404 pp., Paperbound $5.25

AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: THE CONGRESS AND THE STATES, *2nd Edition, 1968, by William J. Keefe, Chatham College and Morris S. Ogul, University of Pittsburgh*

"This book proposes to describe and analyze the American legislative process. We have sought to wring the most that we can from a variety of approaches to the study of legislative processes and problems and have drawn upon a wide-ranging assortment of studies—of legal, behavioral, normative and historical dimensions."—From the Preface. May 1968, approx. 544 pp., $8.95

THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE CRISES OF RELEVANCE, *by Abdul A. Said, School of International Service, The American University*

These original essays by outstanding authorities show the reader the influences, operational hypotheses, and emerging directions in international relations theory. The text explores the gaps between science and politics, between traditional concepts and new areas of perception. September 1968, approx. 208 pp., Paperbound $2.95

New in The Foundations of Modern Political Science Series, Edited by Robert A. Dahl, Yale University

THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS, *by Charles E. Lindblom, Yale University*

This book is a brief, highly systematic description and analysis of the policy-making function of government. August 1968, approx. 128 pp., Clothbound $4.95

New in The Contemporary Political Science Series, Edited by David Easton, University of Chicago

OF POWERS AND THEIR POLITICS, *by Arthur L. Burns, Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia*

Criticizing and synthesizing recent theories of relations between the great powers, the author devises models and partial theories in a philosophical context of the politics of the great powers. Fall 1968, approx. 300 pp., Clothbound $5.95

For approval copies, write: Box 903

PRENTICE-HALL, ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, N.J. 07632

The American
Political Science Review

VOL. LXII JUNE, 1968 NO. 2

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE USES OF FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS*

A. JAMES GREGOR
University of California, Berkeley

I. INTRODUCTION

Political science, as an empirical enterprise, shares with the other behavioral or social sciences at least one characteristic feature: partial formalization.[1] For a science to most reliably discharge its two principal functions, explanation and prediction, statements embodying acquired knowledge must be systematically organized in subsumptive or deductive relations. Minimally, a set of such systematically related propositions, which include among them some lawlike generalizations, and which can be assigned specific truth value via empirical tests, is spoken of as a theory.[2] A theory, in a substantially formalized system, includes as constituents (1) an uninterpreted or formal calculus which provides for syntactical invariance in the system, (2) a set of semantic rules of interpretation which assign some determinate empirical meanings to the formal calculus thereby relating it to an evidential or empirical base, and (3) a model for the uninterpreted calculus, in terms of more or less familiar conceptual or visualizable materials, which illustrates the relationships between variables in structural form, an alternative interpretation of the same calculus of which the theory itself is an interpretation.[3]

The virtues of standard formalization need hardly be specified. For our purposes here it is sufficient to indicate that formalization seeks to satisfy the minimal requirements of any serious knowledge enterprise: to provide for syntactical and semantic invariance without which reliable knowledge is simply not conceivable. The language shift, exemplified in any cognitive effort, from ordinary to specialized language style is the consequence of attempting to reduce the vagueness, ambiguity and tense obscurity that afflicts common speech. Semantic and syntactical invariance afford the minimal necessary conditions for drawing out the testable implications of any set of empirical propositions, for identifying the locus in which false propositions are located when a hypothesis fails to meet empirical test, for coordinating research in order that separate findings support each other, for isolating the most strategic propositions for testing and in order to provide the most parsimonious summary of actual or anticipated research efforts.[4] Any putative theoretical effort which cannot achieve, to an appreciable extent, the requisite semantic and syntactic precision can remain substantially insulated against empirical test and is consequently devoid, in large part, of explanatory significance.[5] These are the minimal responsibilities implied in David Easton's injunction that the science of politics, in its efforts at theory construction, attempt to meet the methodological requirements characteristic of the natural sciences.[6]

---

* A much revised version of a communication given before the Symposium on Methodology in the Social Sciences held at the University of Rome, March, 1966.

[1] For the purposes of discussion social or behavioral science is understood as that knowledge enterprise whose subject matter includes that of psychology as well as that dealing with all adaptively behaving or purposively behaving systems or entities. It is primarily on these grounds that the contention is frequently bruited that explanation in the social sciences is characteristically "teleological" while explanation in the natural sciences is "causal." The distinction, while cognitively useful, is not, as will be argued, substantive.

[2] Cf. R. B. Braithwaite, *Scientific Explanation: A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability and Law in Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p. 22; R. S. Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 10.

[3] E. Nagel, *The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), p. 90. This is an obvious simplification; cf. P. Suppes, "What is a Scientific Theory," in S. Morgenbesser, *Philosophy of Science Today* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 55–67.

[4] Cf. H. L. Zetterberg, *On Theory and Verification in Sociology* (3rd ed., Totowa, N. J.: Bedminster Press, 1965), pp. 157–174.

Partially formalized systems lack, in varying measure, the logical and linguistic precision afforded by full or extensive formalization and are consequently suspect. This cannot be construed to mean that scientific inquiry in areas where formalization has not been achieved must cease until such time as extensive or exhaustive formal systematization is forthcoming. Significant empirical generalizations and a wealth of descriptive material have been the product of diligent enterprise in the partially or minimally formalized sciences. All that can be legitimately implied by the recognition that a discipline is only partially or minimally formalized is that self-conscious efforts should be made to identify sources of error—vagueness, ambiguities, reifications and tense obscurities—and the equivocations and vacuities that are their too frequent consequences.

One of the special advantages enjoyed by extensively formalized systems is that the introduction into the system of nonindigenous concepts (borrowed from other disciplines) is accomplished with a minimum amount of hazard. In physics nonindigenous concepts like "all," "not," "or," and so forth are borrowed from logic and employed in its formulations. Chemistry similarly employs nonindigenous physical concepts like "temperature" and "mass." Such concepts are incorporated with minimal obscurity. They enter the system as resource constituents. Since they are fully explicated in their parent discipline their implications for the new can be specified. Thus the hazard of incorporating logical concepts in physics or physical concepts in chemistry is minimal since the parent discipline is formalized and the implications of the use of such concepts can be, for all intents and purposes, adequately characterized.

Unfortunately, in partially formalized sciences[7] there is a tendency to incorporate not only considerable conceptual and resource material from other disciplines, but even what passes as "common sense" or "ordinary knowledge" as well. Explanations in history, for example, manifestly traffic in presuppositions, auxiliary assumptions, and conceptual devices borrowed from an array of attendant areas of knowledge including the various social sciences, popular knowledge and common sense, and "theories" in history tend to be collections of vague and loosely jointed generalizations and speculative hypotheses. Political science, in our own time, has shown something of these features, characterized by a marked disposition to assimilate, in all but their entirety, techniques developed in (but not exclusively by) sociology and related disciplines, particularly those conceptual devices identified as "functional or systems analyses."[8] Similarly, "theory" in political science tends to be identified with everything from typologies, analytic conceptual schemata, confirmed experimental hypotheses and speculations as well as (traditionally) ethical injunctions.

This article will address itself to some of the general problems in theory construction in political science which attend the uncritical assimilation of non-indigenous concepts borrowed from related but minimally formalized behavioral sciences, particularly when those resource disciplines are characterized by their foremost proponents as "fledgling disciplines" lacking some measure of "intellectual maturity" and possessed of but "scant resources."[9] The risks run in borrowing nonindigenous concepts vary in inverse proportion to the degree of formalization of the resource discipline. Sociology, for example, is itself a negligibly formalized enterprise and there is good evidence that functionalist or systems analysis approaches, whatever else they are, are afflicted with most of the disabilities of ordinary language. The substitution of ordinary with literary and academic language styles does not, in itself, reduce vagueness and ambiguity nor produce the conceptual, predicate and logical invariance requisite to theory construction in science.[10]

---

[5] I have alluded to some of these shortcomings of classical Marxist social theory in A. J. Gregor, *A Survey of Marxism: Problems in Philosophy and the Theory of History* (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 261–281.

[6] D. Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 7f.

[7] Partially formalized sciences feature partially formalized theories which are understood, minimally, to exhibit at least one purportedly deductive connection among their constituent propositions or which determine explicitly the use of at least one of their indigenous concepts.

[8] Cf. O. R. Young, *Systems of Political Science* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), chaps. 2 and 3; H. V. Wiseman, *Political Systems: Some Sociological Approaches* (New York: Praeger, 1966); W. C. Mitchell, *Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

[9] R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Revised and enlarged edition, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 6, 7, 9.

II. METAPHORS, ANALOGIES AND MODELS

Every scientific language system, as an essential in its generalizing activities, employs metaphor and analogy. In formalized systems metaphor and analogy are explicated in a variety of ways and the hazards entailed in their necessary use significantly reduced. In partially formalized systems, on the other hand, metaphors and analogies function in special ways—some of which are, at best, methodologically suspect. This is particularly true in the case of what is generally called "systems" or "functional" analysis.

Ernst Haas has aptly characterized much contemporary political science inquiry as governed by a "dominant metaphor,"[11] and it is a public secret that functionalism and systems analysis have their origins in some one or another form of organicism and specifically homeostatic physiology. Recently, for example, James Miller identified the central thesis of general systems theory as one which seeks "formal identities between various physical systems, the cell, the organ, the individual, the small group or species, and the society," a thesis clearly organismic in conception.[12] Similarly A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, in an early exposition of functionalist approaches to the study of society, maintained that "the concept of function applied to human societies is based on an analogy between social life and organic life."[13] Even today, expositions of functionalism employ, in the effort to clarify the conceptions involved, organismic analogies drawn from biological and specifically physiological phenomena.[14] Functional analysis, in effect, employs the techniques characteristic of biological explanation. The object of analysis is some specific item, an observed pattern of behavior or a disposition so to behave (for example, the beating of the heart), occurring in a structurally integrated system (for example, the body of a living vertebrate), with analysis calculated to demonstrate that the specified item satisfies some functional requirement of the system.[15] Analogously, for functionalists any recurrent social or political activity (for example, a funeral ceremony or the exercise of the franchise) functions to maintain some process necessary to the structural integrity of the macro-society or the polity.[16] The explanatory power ascribed to macro- and micro-functionalist analyses derive, in significant measure, from organismic analogies. In this sense there are many suggestive affinities between the organismic analyses of Robert Redfield and those of the orthodox functionalist.[17]

---

[10] The most express criticism of functionalism in this regard is that of C. W. Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), pp. 25–49. Mills is not generally characterized as "objective," but his criticisms about the language shift exemplified in Parsonian functionalism are generally well-taken. More urbane criticism of this sort is to be found in M. Black, "Some Questions about Parsons' Theories," in M. Black (ed.), *The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 279 f.

[11] E. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 5.

[12] J. G. Miller, "General Behavior Systems Theory," in *Chicago Behavioral Sciences Publications*, No. 1. *Profits and Problems of Homeostatic Models in Behavioral Sciences* (Chicago: University of Chicago, n.d.), p. 5; cf. J. G. Miller, "Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences," *The American Psychologist*, 10 (1955), pp. 513–531. Cf. R. R. Grinker (ed.), *Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior* (2nd ed., New York: Basic Books, 1967), particularly "Introduction to the Second Edition." The organismic thesis has found its way into political science literature in accounts of the following sort: ". . . *Systems* have made their appearance as a possible focus, beginning with the smallest cell in the human body as a system and working up through ever more inclusive systems such as the human being as an organism, the human personality, small groups, broader institutions, societies, and collections of societies, such as the international system": Easton, *op. cit.*, pp. 15f.

[13] A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society* (London: Cohen and West, 1956), p. 178.

[14] R. F. Spencer, "The Nature and Value of Functionalism in Anthropology," in D. Martindale (ed.), *Functionalism in the Social Sciences* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1965), p. 2; cf. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Social Anthropology and Other Essays* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 54f.

[15] Cf. C. Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 306.

[16] Cf. Radcliffe-Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

[17] Cf. R. Redfield, *Tepoztian; A Mexican Village* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1930); R. Redfield and A. Villa Rojas, *Chan Kom: A Mayan

The prevalence of organismic analogies in putative explanations in the behavioral sciences has not gone unchallenged. Functionalists, as purveyors of organismic analogies, have been subject to searching and recurrent criticism.[18] In fact, the literature devoted to the analysis of analogies employed in scientific theory construction and explanation is extensive,[19] and that specifically occupied with organismic analogies employed for explanatory purposes tends to be negatively critical.[20] At least since the time of Herbert Spencer, sociologists have become increasingly suspicious of the use of organismic analogies in the explanation of societal phenomena.[21]

Chalmer Johnson quite correctly alludes to the origins of functionalism in such "uncritical use of the organic analogy."[22] He goes on to indicate that "misplaced organic analogies" led analysts to conceive social systems as possessed of life cycles (birth, adolescence, maturity, senility and death) and social systems as entities incapable of reorganizing their internal structure.[23] He argues that the organic analogy is felicitous only in so far as organic "models" are understood to be instances of *systems*. In effect what is suggested is that the critical analogy obtains between "society" and "systems" rather than "society" and "organisms." As a matter of fact it is evident that the disabilities of analogical argument affect the use of "system" as a "model" of society no less than the use of "organism" as its "model." The critical difficulty inherent in the use of metaphorical and analogical reasoning is that there is no clear specification of where and under what circumstances analogy leaves off and disanalogy begins.[24] Recently Walter Buckley has raised significant issues with respect to the application of the "systems" metaphor. He addresses himself to the critical disanalogies which obtain between various "systems," "isolated physical systems," "organic systems" and "higher psychological and sociocultural" systems.[25] Easton has similarly alluded to the same disanalogy between "systems."[26] One can only wonder at what point one can begin to sense that the employment of the characterization "system" becomes as essentially misleading as the metaphorical use of "organic" is now understood to be, particularly when Morton Kaplan recognizes that "systems theory" cannot pretend to afford a "general theory of all systems" since "systems" as disparate as "the smallest cell in the human body," the "more inclusive systems such as the human being as an organism, the human personality, small groups, broader institutions, societies and collections of societies, such as the international system," while they may in some vague sense "be governed by homologous processes," "require different theories for [their] explanation."[27]

To speak of the human organism, the polity, the society, the family, the army, the church, the ecology, the economy, the culture, the personality, the social structure and demography as "systems," as does Talcott Parsons and as does Easton on some occasions, is clearly to talk metaphorically.[28] The use of terms like "input," "output" and "feedback" are simi-

---

Village (Carnegie Institution, Publication No. 448, Washington, D. C., 1934); see also D. Martindale, *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 92.

[18] Cf. Nagel, *op. cit.*, pp. 520–535, and *Logic Without Metaphysics* (New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 247–283; W. P. McEwen, *The Problem of Social-Scientific Knowledge* (Totowa: Bedminster, 1963), pp. 203–208.

[19] For recent discussions see R. Seeliger, "Analogien und Modelle in der Physik," *Studium Generale* (1948), I, 125–137; *Models and Analogues in Biology: Symposia of the Society for Experimental Biology*, No. 14 (New York: Academic, 1960); Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, pp. 107–117; Hempel, *op. cit.*, pp. 433–447.

[20] Cf. J. Rex, *Key Problems of Sociological Theory* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 61–77.

[21] Cf. J. Rumney, *Herbert Spencer's Sociology* (New York: Atherton, 1966), chap. 2.

[22] C. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 49.

[23] This is of course not true of the best organicists. One need only refer to theorists as sophisticated as Corrado Gini, *Organismo e società* (Rome: Ilardi, 1960), to be disabused of the conviction that organicists are all simple-minded. Cf. M. Marotta, *Organicismo e neo-organicismo* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1959).

[24] Cf. V. Pareto, *I sistemi socialisti* (Turin: UTET, 1951), pp. 285f.

[25] W. Buckley, *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 4f., 13–15.

[26] Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

[27] M. A. Kaplan, "Systems Theory," in J. C. Charlesworth (ed.), *Contemporary Political Analysis* (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 154.

[28] Cf. T. Parsons, "Power, Party and System," and D. Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," in S. S. Ulmer (ed.), *Introductory Readings in Political Behavior* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1961), pp. 128, 140.

larly metaphorically employed as patent analogies of better known and better understood cybernetic and servo-mechanical systems. Until such analogies, given the evident disanologies which obtain between them, are unpacked into specific and testable propositions their use threatens to collapse into belletristic and uninformative profusions.

One of the special confusions which result from the uncritical use of metaphors and analogies in partially or negligibly formalized science is their vague employment as "models." Both Easton and M. Landau move effortlessly from "metaphors" to "models"[29] and such substitutions abound in the literature of political science. That metaphors and models must be distinguished in certain significant respects is evident when one considers their distinctive functions in the knowledge enterprise.

Consider in this regard a certain domain of facts, for example those of neurology, and let no theory be known. In the effort to achieve understanding in this domain the investigator intuits that the central nervous system and a digital computer share certain structural features. Such a computer is understood to display certain neurological properties. It is understood to be, in some sense, an analogue of the central nervous system. Such an analogue is spoken of as a "model," and it is evident that the utility of so conceiving it rests upon the assumption that *some* analogy obtains between digital computers and the central nervous system. Thus, an unexplored domain of facts is understood to share some significant features with a familiar domain. The claim is that some significant similarities capable of increasing our understanding obtain between the original, more familiar, phenomenon and the phenomenon it is taken to represent. Thus, the flow of a liquid through a pipe is said to illustrate something about the electric current in a wire conductor. Since we know something of the flow of such liquid we can, by extension, say we know something of the analogous flow of electricity—if the model is felicitous. An analogy to be cognitively useful must function in some such fashion.

Loose references to "models" can be misleading. There are a variety of "models" employed in the knowledge enterprise and each type makes different claims and serves significantly different purposes. Analogies that serve as "models" can be classified into at least three principal cognitive types (literary metaphors are appropriately employed in the domain of emotive and not cognitive discourse): (1) iconic models which in some way resemble the original by reproducing some of its salient features (the color of the vessel's hull, the shape of its sails and so forth); (2) substantive or symbolic models, which represent phenomena figuratively or in suggestive outline; and (3) analogue or formal models which represent the structural features or patterns of relationship of the original.[30]

Fortunately the organismic literary metaphors which characterized some of the social science literature at the end of the last century are but rarely found in behavioral science accounts today. Most of such literature was more concerned with charming if cognitively fruitless description, than with generating testable theoretical propositions. To identify the legislature as the "thinking organ" of the body politic and the railways and roadways as the "nervous system" of the social organism is intellectually perverse and fails to enhance our understanding in any way. Such metaphors can be best dismissed as literary curiosities. Of the analogies used to serious purpose, iconic or scale models serve essentially didactic purposes. Models of molecular structures and scale models of mosquitoes exemplify their use. They are used as instructional aids, mnemonic assists. Substantive or symbolic models, on the other hand, are heuristic aids. Easton and Parsons employ, for example, symbolic representations to indicate, graphically and schematically, the system boundaries, input, output and feedback characteristics of the organized aggregates with which they are concerned.[31] The most critical use of models employed for explanatory purposes, however, obtains when the models employed are formal or analogue models.

Of the cognitively useful analogies the substantive or symbolic models and the analogue or formal models are significantly different. When scientists conceive the flow of an electric current as analogous to water flowing through a pipe, the theoretic yield of such a conception is the consequence of the *nomic isomorphism* understood to obtain between electric current and hydraulic flow. Thus, fluid flowing with moderate speed through a fairly narrow pipe with a circular cross section is represented according to Poiseulle's law $(V=c\cdot[p_1-p_2])$ which has the same form as Ohm's law for the flow of electricity via a metallic conductor $(I=k\cdot[v_1-v_2])$. The laws governing water flow and the flow of electricity are *formally* analogous or isomorphic. They indicate that the same calculus may have more than one physical interpretation. The calculus, for example, of which the kinetic theory of gases is one interpretation, is the same as that of which the theory of elastic collisions in macroscopic mechanics is another. The calculi governing the two sets of phenomena are isomorphic. They are, in fact, the same uninterpreted calculus. Thus we know explicitly in what sense macrophysical mechanics is analogous to, or models, molecular interaction in the kinetic theory of gases. The analogy which obtains does not suffer from the critical difficulty which attends the use of analogical arguments, i.e., the fact that the range of similarities is rarely specified.

---

[29] Easton, *Framework*, p. 2; M. Landau, "On the Use of Metaphor in Political Analysis," *Social Research*, 28 (1961), p. 353.

[30] Cf. M. Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 219–243; G. J. DiRenzo, "Toward Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences," in G. J. DiRenzo (ed.), *Concepts, Theory and Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 248; D. Willer, *Scientific Sociology: Theory and Method* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), chap. 3; M. Brodbeck, "Models, Meaning and Theories," in L. Gross (ed.), *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), pp. 373–403.

[31] Easton, "An Approach . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 137.

Analogies are initially employed in cognitive inquiry to indicate that *some* similarities obtain, but clearly their application cannot be understood to establish an identity. If such were the case, the classes of phenomena under scrutiny would not be analogous but identical, and the continued use of analogy would be misleading.[32] An analogy is a report of a similarity. What is required is a clear indication of the points at which similarity no longer obtains. Until this is specified, the employment of analogy for cognitive purposes is inadequate.

Formal analogies avoid this difficulty. The analogy between water waves and electromagnetic waves covers the syntactical isomorphism, formulated in mathematical terms, which describes discrete aspects of the behavior of water and electromagnetic phenomena. But once such isomorphism has been confirmed, reference to the original analogy is no longer necessary. Explanations and predictive confidence are the consequence of deductive inference employing the appropriate calculus. Water waves and electromagnetic waves are analogous in so far as they are alternate interpretations of the same calculus. A formal correspondence has been established between a set of laws pertaining to a familiar field of inquiry and a corresponding set in the new. Once this is done, the laws can be employed in the explanation of the new domain without reference to the similarities with the more familiar domain which initiated research. Reference to the original analogy, which may have provided the original insight, is no longer necessary and can be dispensed with without prejudice to explanation and prediction. Thus, what is significant in the relatively well-formalized sciences is not mechanistic models of electromagnetic phenomena but the structural relations, in terms of set-theoretical conceptions, understood to map the correspondence between them.[33]

The empirically confirmed laws which link variables in deterministic or stochastic relations are then incorporated into a hierarchical deductive theoretical system in order to provide the explanations we find so satisfying in the formalized sciences. Such an articulation would deliver the "middle-range" theoretical (i.e., explanatory) constituents to be incorporated into the "mathematical formulation of general theory" to which Easton obliquely refers as the "optimum mode" of theoretical expression.[34] Inquiry commences with metaphor and ends with algebra and logical systematization, rendered empirically significant by the coordinating definitions, the semantic rules, which constitute rules of interpretation and which supply the ligaments binding the formal linguistic entity to the object world. Only when a linguistic entity displays such features, which accord it explanatory and/or predictive force, is it appropriate, if one wishes to subscribe to the uses of natural science, to characterize it as "theoretical." "Systems analysis" or "functional analyses" do not pretend to have attained such a level of explanatory competence. They leave us with metaphors and analogies that serve essentially taxonomic purposes, suggesting classificatory affinities between entities in the domain of inquiry, their deployment over the domain remaining a function of the different senses of appropriateness entertained by each investigator.

---

[32] Cf. R. C. Buck, "On the Logic of General Behavior Systems Theory," *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* (Edited by H. Feigl and M. Scriven. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1956), 1, 223–232.

[33] P. Suppes, "A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences," in H. Freudenthal (ed.), *The Concept and Role of the Model in Mathematics and Natural and Social Sciences* (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1961), pp. 436f.

[34] D. Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 9.

Behavioral scientists, and particularly political scientists, consequently remain concerned by and large, with substantive or symbolic models which serve as preliminary moves in the direction of theory construction. Such models attempt to identify certain essential attributes of disparate classes of entities as sufficiently similar to warrant the ascription to them of a common descriptive term. Such uses abound in the literature of functionalism and systems analysis. Such analogical reasoning can be enormously suggestive as *propaedeutic* to the study of an unfamiliar empirical domain. In the effort to orient himself in an unfamiliar domain, the empirical scientist very often finds auspicious analogies invaluable. They provide effective heuristic guidance in the initial search for adequate explanation. A felicitous analogy lends itself to some sort of extension from the old domain of inquiry into the new. Behavioral scientists have, on occasion, intuitively grasped a similarity between certain types of systems, organic or otherwise, and that of society. Such similarities may suggest experiments which confirm the putative similarity. The similarities suggest where one might search for variables and the kind of relationship which might obtain between them. If successful, such experiments are stated in terms (generally) or relationships obtaining between (preferably quantified) variables. Such experiments, suggested by the original analogy, now confirm the intuited similarity without further reference to that analogy. The analogy, in and of itself, does not confirm the similarity. Only empirical inquiry in the domain under investigation can begin to accomplish that. Frequently a system, like the human organism, having specific and specified system requisites is seen as analogous to a society. As a consequence certain requisites are imputed to society. These requisites are frequently identified in vague terms such as "pattern maintenance," "adaptation to the environment," "goal attainment" and "integration." Rarely is any effort made to specify what degree or measure of "pattern maintenance" is requisite to the system before the system fails. In the case of the individual organism the requisites for system maintenance are specified in terms of the values certain critical variables can assume and outside of which the system is no longer viable. In the case of society, or the political system, little, if any, attempt has been made to date to specify, even qualitatively (without falling into tautology), the permissible range of variable variation beyond or below which the system would predictably disaggregate.

A signal instance of the effects of this shortcoming is available in Pierre van den Berghe's study of South Africa.[35] He finds the Republic of South Africa riven by "dysfunctions," a lack of value consensus, multiple economic dysfunctions, maladaptions and frustrated goal attainments. And yet the social and political system persists. He suggests, as a solution to the paradox of system persistence in the face of multiple dysfunctions, that functionalist locutions are not fully adequate and must be supplemented by a neo-Hegelian dialectic!

A more defensible conclusion would be that functionalist analyses are not explanatory at all—they are *analytic* and heuristic—and consequently singularly incapable, in themselves, of providing predictive or explanatory leverage. When Easton defines a "system" as "any set of variables regardless of the degree of interrelationship among them,"[36] for example, one can legitimately wonder when one would be disposed to maintain that a "system," political or otherwise, no longer obtains. Such functionalist or systems analysis locutions can best be understood as analytic or definitional heuristic aids. They can pretend to explanatory power only when the initial suggestive analogy between society and whatever system is made sufficiently precise to render testable the formulation of empirical generalizations relating determinate variables in determinate relations. Functionalist or systems analyses are not, in themselves, *theories* at all.[37] They provide analytic conceptual schemata and, as such, make no truth claims. They provide substantive or symbolic analogies between entities or collections of entities they conceive as systems. Such analogies exhaust their cognitive utility by suggesting something about the phenomena that are the subject of inquiry. But it has not been established that society shares syntactical or nomic isomorphism with any non-societal empirical system. No specific better-known non-societal system maps determinate structural relations understood to obtain between societal or political variables. The substantive or symbolic models advanced by functionalism and systems theory suggest *something* about the societal and political phenomena under scrutiny, the nature of the quasi-mechanical homeostatic processes, which relevant variables might influence each other, and so on. But explanatory and predictive power can only be the consequence of verification studies conducted on the primary object of study itself. In other words, the substantive analogies offered by systems or functional analyses can serve neither as indications of nomic isomorphism between domains of inquiry nor as explanations. Substantive analogies serve as heuristic devices often extremely suggestive for taxonomic purposes, but never in themselves as explanations. They are, at best, "working hypotheses," always instrumental, but never explanations.

---

[35] P. van den Berghe, *South Africa, A Study in Conflict* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1965).

[36] Easton, *A Systems Analysis*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[37] Cf. T. B. Bottomore, *Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature* (London: Unwin, 1962), pp. 39f.

Functionalist and systems analysis postulate similarities between various kinds of entities or collections of entities. Postulating such similarities obviously involves a radical simplification; it neglects a multitude of variables of significant, if indeterminate, weight. As such, the correspondences it suggests are always qualified by a tacit recognition that every analogy involves disanalogies of unspecified but significant kind. Such analyses recommend, in effect, highly simplified conceptual schemata. They constitute research suggestions stated in very general terms and with logical rigor little more demanding than that of ordinary language.

In partially formalized sciences experiments capable of confirming the putative similarities suggested by substantive analogies are only forthcoming after special efforts are made to reduce semantic and syntactical variance and variables are defined with sufficient specificity to permit them to be associated in deterministic or stochastic, sequential or coextensive, reversible or irreversible, sufficient or contingent, necessary or substitutable or interdependent relations which explicate the extent of the similiarities which were originally intuited. Until this is accomplished the argument from one class of objects to another via analogies belongs to an uncritical and unreflecting level of reasoning.[38]

In explanation cognitively useful analogies work, ideally, toward their own exclusion. Neither formal nor substantive analogies are essential parts of explanation. Analogies have at best heuristic and not explanatory function. If an analogy is formal, predictive competence and explanation are served by the use of an uninterpreted calculus which characterizes the structural relationships between variables in two or more classes of phenomena. If the analogy is substantive and describes via analogy some essential feature, hitherto unnoticed or neglected, in an unfamiliar domain, predictive competence and explanation are served by specifying through appropriate verification studies the nature of, and the relationship between, component variables in the specific domain that is the focus of concern.[39]

Formal analogies, analogue models, are characteristic of formalized sciences. Substantive analogies, symbolic models, are characteristic of partially or negligibly formalized sciences. They share with those sciences their vaguenesses and ambiguities and their syntactical imprecisions. To conceive substantive analogies as anything more than heuristic aids, the preliminary to substantive research, is to mistake shadow for substance.

III. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

Functional analysis—and, in general, systems analysis—as cognitive techniques in a partially formalized science, have special responsibilities. They are required to undertake special efforts at rigor and precision. This is particularly true because of their special dependence on analogical reasoning.

Functional explanations in natural science are generally conceived to be a subclass of teleological explanations, and functional statements are conceived appropriate only in connection with those systems, biological or mechanical, possessing self-maintaining mechanisms for given system traits. Such systems manifest the ability to maintain specific system necessary traits although endogenous or exogenous factors vary within permissible magnitudes. Such systems are dynamically or statically self-equilibrating or functional.[40] When functionalists employ terms like "equilibrium" and "function" they imply, in general, that societies, families, personalities, armies, churches, political parties, economies and cultures are such directively organized systems.[41] Again the persuasiveness of such reasoning trafficks on analogy. To illustrate the self-sustaining features of the political system, Easton, for example, refers to the more "familiar biological system . . . the human organism."[42] The human organism is, in fact, known to be a teleological or goal-directed system. But if political systems are to be understood to share critical similarities with such better known systems it is necessary to establish, with some plausibility, that we are capable, at the present time, of adequately characterizing them.

---

[38] A. D. Ritchie, *Scientific Method* (Paterson: Littlefield and Adams, 1960), pp. 61f.

[39] Cf. Hempel, *op. cit.*, pp. 438f.

[40] For an explication of the meanings of "function" as employed by functionalists, cf. Nagel, *Structure of Science*, pp. 522–525.

[41] Young, *op. cit.*, p. 28; Kaplan, "Systems Theory," *op. cit.*, pp. 150–155.

[42] Easton, "An Approach . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 138.

A teleological system, as distinct from a nonteleological system, is one which displays a tendency to move toward some one state or some one class of states out of all its possible states—or to remain in such a state if once achieved. Thus the human body maintains its temperature in a fairly constant state as a consequence of the operation of the thyroid gland, the dilation and contraction of blood vessels carrying blood and radiating heat through the skin, the evaporation of moisture from the body surface, the amount of adrenalin secreted into the blood as well as automatic muscular contractions which produce internal heat—all adaptive or compensatory variations made in response to primary thermal variations in the external environment.

All functional or teleological explanations require the explicit statement or the implicit assumption (1) of a preferred or goal state which characterizes the system, (2) that some conditions or traits are necessary or necessary and sufficient or sufficient but not necessary conditions for the attainment or maintenance of that state, and (3) of a range of values within which condition or trait variations will be compensated for and outside of which the system will fail to attain or display the state description identified as preferred.

Thus an adequate functional analysis of the human organism as a homeostatic system includes a specification of its "equilibrium" or "steady state." Human temperature normally varies from about 97.3°F to 99.1°F and cannot fall below 75°F nor rise appreciably above 110°F without producing probable permanent injury or death. Such temperatures characterize, empirically, the preferred states of the system (the "critical range" of the "essential variables" of the system—to employ Easton's terminology). The ascription of organized directedness to the human organism is warranted by a highly confirmed inductive generalization concerning the disposition of the organism to maintain thermal steady state. Similarly, references to the operations of the thyroid, the presence of adrenalin, dilation and contraction of blood vessels are elliptical references to highly confirmed *consequences* for the given system of the activities of component parts or processes. Function statements refer to consequences for, while causal propositions state some of the *conditions* requisite to, the persistence and characteristic organization of the system. Whatever assertorial force functional explanations have derives from evidence accumulated through the same procedures requisite to any nonfunctional explanation. What makes functional accounts explanatory is the presence in them of generalizations covering initial state descriptions and compensatory intrasystemic variations which maintain a specific goal or preferred state in the system; that is, functional explanation implies the possibility of formulating lawlike statements which relate variables, state coordinates, and their interrelationships in some determinable fashion. Such lawlike statements serve the purpose of predicting the successive states of the system, given variations in its external or internal environment. In other words it is now generally recognized that the explanations forthcoming as a consequence of the application of functional analyses are special cases of deductive or quasideductive nomological explanation not methodologically distinct from paradigmatic explanations in natural science.[43] Yet descriptive theorists, the functionalists foremost among them, would be the first to admit that political science possesses precious few of the well-confirmed lawlike generalizations concerning preferred or goal states, the necessary and/or sufficient institutional or functional conditions or traits necessary to the maintenance of the political system in general, much less the "critical range", the "essential variables" any such system can assume without endangering its viability.

What passes for functional accounts in political science are generally explanation sketches of a singularly elliptical sort. They merely indicate vague conditions, neither empirically characterized nor identified as either necessary or sufficient, for the persistence of the system or for the presence of some event of process requisite to the persistence of the system. To maintain that the function of x is y is, for example, in the majority of instances, no more than to claim that usually x, but not only x (for there are functional equivalents of x), produces or aids in producing y which functions essentially in system S. Such statements can tell us no more, and most frequently tell us considerably less, than their corresponding nonteleological lawlike statements. Where there are no well-confirmed nonteleological lawlike statements functionalist accounts provide, at their very best, heuristic insights—i.e., "useful ways of thinking."

---

[43] Cf. Hempel, *op. cit.*, pp. 297–330; Rudner, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–111; R. Brown, *Explanation in Social Science* (Chicago: Aldine, 1963), p. 110. This is generally recognized by political scientists. Cf. W. G. Runciman, *Social Science and Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 113; V. Van Dyke, *Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 32f.

Functional *explanations* are most appropriate to systems which exemplify some form of self-regulation and goal directedness. Essential to such explanations is the establishment of appropriate hypotheses of self-regulation and goal directedness in an objectively testable form. This is a particularly critical responsibility in cases where so many entities and aggregates are indiscriminately identified as directively organized, as "systems." It must be possible, for example, to unambiguously designate the system boundaries of the putative systems investigated. How difficult this is, is evident by the dearth of convincing attempts to specify system boundaries for the political system or culture in social science literature. Herbert Spiro speaks of "complex, intricate, overlapping networks of political systems . . . ," of "kaleidoscopic patterns of expanding and contracting political systems, that overlap with one another. . . ."[44] Moreover any effort to characterize the conditions for survival of a society, a culture or a personality is extremely difficult, but functional explanations can hardly be conceived adequate unless such initial determinations are forthcoming. Frequently functional statements are rich in connotation but offer no specific empirical referents for terms like "society," "political culture," "personality," "economic system" and the like or the characteristics which identify system survival or disaggregation. Unless such intrinsically vague concepts are given some specific denotation the entire enterprise is threatened with equivocation and the knowledge enterprise is defaulted.[45]

The absence of denotation precise enough to unambiguously characterize the state variables which are required for the persistence of a social or political system, much less the system itself, insulate any purported explanation from empirical control. Anything said would be compatible with almost any conceivable matter of fact and with every outcome of empirical investigation into social and political affairs. Once the subject system is adequately specified and the dynamic or static equilibrium supposedly maintained by any constituent item or process, the functionalist is required to specify the set of state variables whose operation maintains the system in the requisite state and to discover just how those state variables are interrelated to each other and to other endogenous and environmental variables. These relationships can only be specified in lawlike generalizations whose warrant is empirical evidence. Only if all these specifications have been met can the elliptical locution "x has the function y in system S" be truly informative. It would have no more assertorial force than the unpacked formulations very summarily alluded to above. An adequate functional explanation would minimally include an unambiguous description of x; a specification of the constituents comprising the functional subsystem Y; evidence that x is a constituent of Y; a specification of the state variables of Y; an empirically warranted affirmation that some state properties are properties of x and possibly other entities or processes of Y; an indication of the permissible values that can be assumed by constituent state and environmental variables and the values that would constitute the goal states of the system S of which Y is a functional component.[46]

Statements which assert that the occurrence of an item x in a cultural, political or personality system is explained by x serving the function y in Y constitute at best the first tentative efforts at classification and are never themselves explanations. They have neither explanatory nor predictive power. In order to serve explanatory or predictive purpose such propositions would have to be condensed statements of an indeterminate set of lawlike propositions and the initial conditions which give them empirical significance. The popularity of functionalist or systems analytic accounts can be explained neither by their explanatory power nor the present measure of their empirical confirmation. Such accounts in political science are, for the present, no more than promissory notes on such explanations. The popularity of such functional accounts is the consequence of their essentially typological or classificatory, and not their explanatory, functions. They constitute programmatic typologies employed in collecting and coding research material. They offer "working hypotheses" which can be best construed as exhortations to treat society, political systems and personality, for example, as self-regulating systems.

Functional analysis serves primarily as an exhortation to conceive the entity, entities, process or processes under scrutiny as teleological, that is, as having some systemic properties. It is a recommendation to so construe the object or objects of political study. The truth or falsity of such a construction can be established by determining whether in fact the objects in the universe of inquiry do in fact display those properties. The recommendation so to construe them is, in itself, neither true nor false. It makes no truth claims.[47] Such exhortations serve as heuristic aids, to incline the investigator to entertain hypotheses concerning the existence of functional systems, self-regulating and goal-directed entities, and the occurrence of functional relationships among the objects of research.

---

[44] H. J. Spiro, "An Evaluation of Systems Theory," in Charlesworth, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

[45] Cf. R. S. Peters, *The Concept of Motivation* (New York: Humanities Press, 1958), pp. 19f.

[46] Rudner, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

This seems to be clearly understood by Easton. He refers to his "systems analysis" as a "conceptual framework" which is a "preliminary" to the development of theory, as a way of formulating "appropriate questions" and devising "appropriate ways for seeking answers" rather than providing the substantive answers themselves.[48] Similarly, I. C. Jarvie, analyzing functionalist approaches in anthropology, concludes that functionalist accounts, as such, are not explanatory. Their uses are heuristic.[49] William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, in their analysis of functionalism in political science, maintain that functionalism has made heuristic, rather than substantive, contributions to the discipline.[50] There is, in fact, a general agreement among social science practitioners that functionalist approaches, now and for the foreseeable future, can serve heuristic and not explanatory purposes in their enterprise.

IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS AS A HEURISTIC AID

Precisely how functional analysis serves as a heuristic aid is best illustrated by a consideration of the work of Talcott Parsons, who is universally recognized as one of the principal proponents of functionalism in social science and whose influence among structural-functionalists and systems analysts is well attested. All share sith Parsons a common language as well as a common conceptual apparatus. A brief review of Parsons' enterprise affords considerable insight into what can be expected from functionalist and systems analysis as well as some of the confusions which attend it.

Parsons employs the phrase "theoretical device" to suggest that functionalist locutions serve as "useful tools." In various places he speaks of "cognitive maps," in which the "concepts," "function" and "system," serve to emphasize "connectedness" between "an ordered aggregate embedded in, and in interaction with, a fluctuating environment" and the mechanisms by virtue of which that aggregate maintains its relative integrity and "defends" itself against extreme environmental fluctuation.[51] In other words, Parsons seems prepared to grant that functionalism is, at its best, a programmatic guide to research. Functionalist locutions are heuristic devices and not attempts at explanation. Parsons indicates that "our conceptual framework guides us to take note of specific system problems and to expect specific system mechanisms or, in their absence, specific system pathologies. . . . What more can be asked," he continues, "of a 'cognitive map' but that it direct attention of the analyst to relevant questions and to the loci of relevant problems while supplying a conceptual framework wherein 'facts' and the answers to questions and the solutions of the problems become meaningful?"[52]

Functionalist locutions, therefore, cannot be understood as answers to questions nor solutions to problems. They do not pretend to answer questions, afford explanations and provide predictive control. They are not essentially concerned, in Parsons' words, with the "*how* and *on what terms* and *with what consequences for each other* things are connected." Functional analysis provides the context in which the answers to questions and the solutions to problems become "meaningful." Parsons and the functionalists influenced by him, then, can be best understood not as providing explanations but as (1) issuing implicit or explicit exhortations to social (and consequently political) scientists to so conceive their domain of inquiry that references to "system," "system maintenance" and "function" are appropriate and (2) suggesting some sort of programmatic orientations in empirical research. Functional analyses are, on the one hand, non-theoretical linguistic entities destined for ultimate inclusion in some general behavioral science theory when the relationship between state coordinates of the putative functional system are specified in confirmed empirical relationships and, on the other hand, programmatic research designs. As such, functional analyses as they are suggested by Parsons are clearly not explanations. Still less are they theoretical in the *strict* sense. They serve as heuristic working hypotheses *preliminary* to empirical inquiry and theory construction.

---

[47] Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

[48] D. Easton, "Categories for the Systems Analysis of Politics," in D. Easton (ed.) *Varieties of Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 154.

[49] I. C. Jarvie, "Limits to Functionalism and Alternatives to it in Anthropology," in Martindale, *Functionalism in the Social Sciences*, *op. cit.* pp. 18f.

[50] W. Flanigan and E. Fogelman, "Functionalism in Political Science," *Ibid.*, p. 125

[51] C. Ackerman and T. Parsons, "The Concept of 'Social System' as a Theoretic Device," in DiRenzo, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–29.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 39f.

Parsons is, unfortunately, never quite clear on these issues. The preceding references have been to his last definitive statement about his "theoretical devices" and/or "cognitive maps." He moves freely between complex concepts like "frames of reference," "conceptual schemata," "models" and "theories" without any real effort at establishing their respective differences. Thus he speaks of his concern as one involved with the articulation of a "conceptual scheme for the analysis of social systems in terms of the action frame of reference," a concern he nonetheless identifies as a "*theoretical* enterprise in the *strict* sense."

The distinction between an analytic conceptual scheme and a theory is that an analytic conceptual scheme makes, in itself, no empirical knowledge claims while a theory does. An analytic conceptual scheme is a non-theoretical classificatory or taxonomic device. It is useful for descriptive purposes but is not itself an empirical or theoretical linguistic entity. It does not seem that the functionalist "frame of reference" can be both an analytic conceptual scheme, an "abstract formula," *and* a "theoretical enterprise in the strict sense" at the same time. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that Parsons insists that he is not concerned with "empirical generalizations as such nor with methodology. . . ."[53] Functional analyses would be non-theoretical formulations which are, in the strict sense, either definitional schemata or analytic conceptual schemata.[54]

This analysis appears to be borne out by Parsons' claim that functionalism as a general theory of action aids "in the codification of our existing concrete knowledge."[55] This seems to mean nothing more than that whatever knowledge is available in the various social sciences can be rephrased to render it compatible with the taxonomic analytic scheme suggested by Parsons. When he turns his attention to psychology, for example, Parsons explicitly states that "the general theory of action . . . does not purport to discover or state new psychological knowledge, but to show that certain main lines of known psychological analysis can be stated and systematized in terms of the theory. . . ."[56]

The knowledge delivered by special empirical investigations can be reformulated in the language of functional analysis. Such reformulations can serve as significant aids to the storage and retrieval of information. As such their uses would be didactic and mnemonic. But Parsons further insists that functionalist formulations act as guides to research and provide hypotheses to be applied and subject to test.[57] These latter claims are intrinsically more interesting and important and much of functionalism's claim to special heuristic merit turns on their plausibility.

Such claims can be most effectively considered when the functionalist apparatus is applied to particular problems. Parsons (as do functionalists and systems analysts in general) has identified four analytically distinct interactive systems in his general theory of action: the organic, the personality, the social system (with polity as a constituent subsystem), and the cultural system. Psychological systems, or personality systems, organize and control the behavioral organism, social systems organize and control personality systems and cultural systems organize and control social systems. The image is of a nesting series of interpenetrative but analytically distinct systems. The implications of such imagery include the assumption that each constitutes an ordered aggregate of some sort with specified or specifiable state boundaries, system prerequisites and requisites and system-endemic mechanisms of static or dynamic restabilization or re-equilibrization.

---

[53] T. Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 3.

[54] Parsons refers to his systematizations on the one hand as "analytically descriptive" and yet elsewhere talks vaguely of "one of the primary tests" his "theoretical scheme" must meet as "usefulness in prediction." T. Parsons, "An Approach to Psychological Theory in Terms of the Theory of Action," in S. Koch (ed.), *Psychology: A Study of a Science* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 699, 694. This confusion between analytic conceptual schemata and theoretical linguistic entities seems to afflict functionalists and systems theorists generally. Easton speaks of the "new theories" of contemporary political science as "analytic, not substantive" and yet in the same sentence characterizes them as "explanatory": Easton, *Framework*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[55] T. Parsons, *et al.*, *Toward a General Theory of Action* (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), p. 3.

[56] Parsons, "An Approach . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 645.

[57] Parsons, *et. al.*, *Toward a General Theory of Action*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

With respect to biological organisms it would seem that one has an intuitive grasp of system boundaries. One can further specify something of its biological system prerequisites and requisites. One has some conception of the limits with respect to the essential inputs required by the system and the environmental variations such a system can tolerate. But when the transition has been made even to the personality system, for example, we are at once involved in what Parsons admits are far "subtler problems." What is required is not only a relatively precise specification of system boundaries, but a specification of the conditions necessary for maintaining the "minimum stability of personality." We are told that there are, in fact, "minimum conditions of socialization with respect for instance to the relation between affectional support and security, without which a functioning personality cannot be built up. . . . These minimum needs of individual actors constitute a set of conditions to which the social system must be adapted."[58]

What this means in terms of a programmatic guide for verification studies is very difficult to determine. We are told that "personality systems are governed," as are all systems, "by the general prerequisite of maintaining the system" which in the case of personality is the "optimization of gratification" and "minimum stability." We are told of "drives" and "need dispositions" which are satisfied or activated, and we have an elaborate descriptive vocabulary for identifying various putative mechanisms of adaptation, goal achievement, tension management and pattern maintenance, but it is difficult to determine in what sense all this assists in actual applied research.

As Parsons clearly appreciates, any formulations which involve functionalist vocabulary must specify dynamic or static equilibrium conditions for the system under scrutiny in terms of a range of input and output values in relatively well defined categories over the boundaries of the system. This is an inherently quantitative consideration. Yet Parsons has made no attempt (nor have those who operate with variants of functionalism) to provide even approximative quantitative specification of the values any of the state coordinates of the system can assume without becoming dysfunctional or throwing the entire system into disequilibrium or disaggregation.

A system suffering "system pathologies" is understood as that system which makes dysfunctional response to situational stimuli. What makes any response dysfunctional can, however, only be indicated when some behavior x is accurately described and some specification of the constituents which comprise Y, the functional subsystem, are given along with a specification of all the possible states those constituents can assume and the subset of those possible states which are identified as goal states of Y in system S. How enormously complicated such specifications would be with respect to any system is immediately evident. What Parsons' functionalist account of "system pathologies" or "systemic dysfunctions" requires is an effective, even if nonscalar, conceptual distinction between systemic "normality" and "pathology." All of Parsons' discussion of "boundary maintaining equilibrium" carries us not a whit closer to such an effective distinction than do qualitative expressions like "emotional maturity," "reasonable independence," "healthy defense mechanisms," and "good work adjustment" when they are applied to personality as a "system."[59] Nor do Parsons' formulations seem to offer more adequate research guides when the polity is construed as a "system." As a consequence the claim that the functionalist conceptual schema offers testable hypotheses is singularly unconvincing. If we are correct, and what Parsons is offering is an analytic conceptual schema, his formulations make no existential claims and consequently suggest hypotheses only in the vaguest sense of "suggest."

For purposes of empirical research, terms like "eufunctional" and "dysfunctional," for example, are no more instructive than "normal" and "abnormal" or "pathological." The treatment of personality as a system, of interpersonal interaction as a system, of the functioning of the social system as a system,[60] and polity as a subsystem seems to have no more to recommend it in so far as guiding research is concerned than the profit attendant upon the consistent use of a particular literary and academic language style. The significance of the adoption of such a style seems to be heuristic only in the sense that minimum vocabulary is provided by which to classify elements and to suggest relationships between elements which must then be independently discovered to obtain in the putative systems studied in the various behavioral sciences.

---

[58] Parsons, *The Social System*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[59] Cf. D. Offer and M. Sabshin, *Normality* (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 19 and *passim*.

[60] T. Parsons, "The Superego and the Theory of Social Systems," in T. Parsons, R. Bales and E. Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (New York: Free Press, 1963). p. 16.

The major cognitive advantage provided by functionalist language is as a mnemonic convenience servicing the general storage and retrieval of information. This mnemonic use may be by no means inconsequential. Any technique which assists the storage and ready retrieval of the chief results of empirical research is obviously more useful, for example, than empty speculation or the unorganized collection of individual bits of data.[61] Nonetheless such uses do not support the contention that functionalism, as such, provides the research scientist with testable hypotheses.

The strongest claim that can be made in behalf of functionalist approaches in the behavioral sciences is that they offer nontheoretical conceptual schemata which conduce the research scientist to construct experimental designs in which instances of "relatedness" and "connectedness" will prominently figure and in which "system" and "function" will be exemplified. At its best functionalism provides a language in which the findings of the various social sciences can be rephrased for storage and recall. As an analytic conceptual schema functionalism can have few empirical pretensions. In itself it can make no truth claims and offer no explanations. At its best functionalism affords the opportunity for the reformulation of available knowledge in the standardized language of systems analysis, best exemplified in works like William Mitchell's *American Polity*. At its worst functionalism is an effort to purchase a syncretic unity in the behavioral sciences at the cost of employing vague and ambiguous terminology and an obscure syntax. Whatever else it is functionalism is not a theory, for as an analytic system it cannot, of itself, tender knowledge claims.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Political scientists, as practitioners of a negligibly formalized discipline, tend to be accommodating to formulations and suggested techniques developed in related behavioral sciences. They even tend, on occasion, to speak of psychology, sociology and anthropology as "hard core sciences." Such a characterization seems hardly justified. The disposition to uncritically adopt into political science nonindigenous sociological and general systems concepts tends, at times, to involve little more than the adoption of a specific, and sometimes barbarous, academic vocabulary which is used to redescribe reasonably well-confirmed or intuitively-grasped low order empirical generalizations. When revolutions are characterized as the consequence of "multiple systemic dysfunctions" or as occasions when "sub-systems outside the political subsystem disrupt or substitute [themselves] for its ultrastabilizing activities," for example, what seems to be meant is little more than, "When some reasonably well organized aggregate of men becomes restive because its needs are not being met and that restiveness reaches a certain critical level it tends to react violently against the conceived source of its cumulative frustrations." These are low order generalizations and would have to be significantly qualified if they were to be employed in any verification study. What is initially required, should such affirmations aspire to the status of theoretical propositions, would be a specification of biological, personality and general "system" needs and some (even if nonscalar) measure of frustration, a determinate individual or collective tolerance threshold, as well as a catalogue of intra- and extrasystemic countertrend influences. Redescribing the intuitively recognized causal variables and their vague relations in terms of "system," "function," "eufunction" and "dysfunction" is not particularly helpful.

At its worst, what results in such instances is a runic explanation, a redescription in a singular language style, i.e., no explanation at all. At their best, functional accounts as they are found in the contemporary literature provide explanation sketches, the type of elliptical explanation characteristic of historical and psychoanalytic accounts. For each such account there is an indeterminate number of equally plausible ones, the consequence of either the complexity of the subject matter, differing perspectives, conceptual vagueness, the variety of sometimes mutually exclusive empirical or quasi-empirical generalizations employed or syntactical obscurity, or all of them together.

The prevalence of such equally satisfying accounts is one of the principal causes of contending schools in political science. Explanatory accounts in political science, as is the case with respect to such accounts in history or psychoanalysis, tend to be plausible, most effective in accounting for past occurrences, but largely devoid of predictive power. Such accounts are calculated to provide some measure of intellectual satisfaction, at least the seeming abatement of puzzlement. But this kind of satisfaction can be obtained via a variety of both reputable and disreputable means. Certainly psychological satisfaction, the felt resolution of puzzlement, cannot constitute the test of adequacy for an explanation. Our world abounds in men psychologically satisfied by cognitive absurdities.

---

[61] G. Mandler and W. Kessen, *The Language of Psychology* (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp. 242f.

The adoption of nonindigenous concepts in any particular science is an obvious necessity. The adoption of such concepts from a formalized empirical or nonempirical discipline entails minimal hazard since the implications of such assimilation are maximally specified. Borrowing concepts from a partially or negligibly formalized science, on the other hand, involves considerable risk. The disposition on the part of some political scientists to be uncritically accommodating to such borrowing threatens to burden political science as a knowledge enterprise with an inventory of vague and ambiguous concepts little calculated to further the efforts to explain and predict.

Functional explanations have been most reliable in biology and physiology (where they originated) and in the analysis of servomechanical and cybernetic systems (to which they have been effectively extended). In these areas we possess a well-standardized body of lawlike generalizations that provide the warrant for such explanations. Neither sociology nor political science has as yet the same resource of well-confirmed lawlike statements. Certainly sociology has few more than political science. What passes for functional explanation in sociology is all too frequently parasitic upon suggestive analogy and metaphor, trafficking on our familiarity with goal directed systems.

What is advanced as "theory" in sociology is frequently a nontheoretic effort at classification or "codification," the search for an analytic conceptual schema which provides a typology or a classificatory system serviceable for convenient storage and ready retrieval of independently established empirical regularities. That such a schema takes on a hierarchic and deductive character, imparting to the collection of propositions a *prima facie* theoretical appearance, may mean no more than that the terms employed in the high order propositions are so vague that they can accommodate almost any inference and consequently can be made to apply, without profit, to any conceivable state of affairs.[62]

---

[62] ". . . Parsons' principles are close to the level of proverbial wisdom. Now it is characteristic of proverbs, and one reason for their use as a substitute for precise thought, that they embody ambiguities making them indefinitely adaptable to almost any circumstances": Black, "Some Questions . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 280.

PARETO AND PLUTO-DEMOCRACY: THE RETREAT TO GALAPAGOS

S. E. Finer
University of Manchester

(Sartre to Camus): You blame the European proletariat because it has not publicly stigmatized the Soviets, but you also blame the European governments because they allow Spain into UNESCO; in this case I can see only one solution for you: the Galapagos Islands.*

Vilfredo Pareto completed his *Treatise on General Sociology* in 1912, although it was not published till 1916. It is a vast work of one million words; sprawling, disorderly, and stuffed with minor masterpieces of often pointless erudition. The first three-quarters attacks the scientific status of practically all the various political and moral theories that have sought to pass themselves off as scientifically grounded and it is worth noting that even the most dedicated critics of Pareto have acknowledged the effectiveness of his onslaught.[1] Among the positive contributions of the *Treatise*, five propositions stand out. First, Pareto affirms that social phenomena are not "caused" by any single factor but that all elements in society influence one another reciprocally. Secondly, social phenomena recur in cycles. Thirdly, the bulk of human behavior is not "logical" but only "logicalized", or, as we should say today, not rational but merely rationalized. Fourthly, irrespective of constitutional forms, every society consists of the minority elite governing (leading?) the majority non-elite. Fifthly, parliamentary democracy, or to speak more accurately, "pluto-democracy", is no exception: it comprises a governing elite of highly skilled operators who contrive to remain in power by persuasion and manipulation of the masses. Principally it is for the last three contentions that Pareto is today remembered, or, as I shall show, misremembered, as a "proto-fascist".

Though many circumstances conspired to weaken the intellectual impact of the *Treatise* when it was first published, the odium in which the majority of Western intellectuals and academics have held Pareto's political views must be reckoned as the most potent.

The middle of the First World War was an unpropitious time to launch such a work. Even after the war, the fact that it was available only in Italian and French limited its appeal: Italy was not noted for its interest in sociology, and after 1922 the dead hand of Fascism stifled any free thinking in this field, while France had its own sociological tradition in the school of Durkheim to which the Paretian approach is entirely alien. When the book finally appeared in English in 1935 (as "The Mind and Society") the timing could not have been more unfortunate. For one thing the very core of Pareto's contribution to sociology, the discovery that made him regard all the previous works in the field as "nothing but romances"[2], i.e., the overwhelming importance of the non-rational in human affairs, was now universally accepted, but thanks to Freud, not Pareto. Furthermore, the way in which Pareto had established this proposition, his concept of the "residues" (the root human impulses) and the "derivations" (the rationalizations thereof) seemed strangely quaint and old fashioned and very unscientific compared with the experimental basis on which Freudians claimed their theories were based.

But on the political level, Pareto's work fared even worse. He had the misfortune to be revered by Mussolini and the Fascists therefore officially claimed him as one of their precursors. Western critics took them at their word; and Pareto's persistent malice for pluto-democracy, his contempt for humanitarianism, his apparent—I repeat, apparent—glorification of violence, could not have come more amiss to western democrats at a time when Mussolini was invading Abyssinia and Hitler was torturing the socialists and liberals whom Pareto had so despised. Most of the notices and critiques of the newly translated *Treatise* were hostile and some of them are little better than polemics.[3] Some sociologists did indeed take a favourable view, chiefly the members of the seminar which Professor Henderson established at Harvard to study Pareto's work, notably Homans and Curtiss, and especially Talcott Parsons.[4] But except among a handful of scholars, the hostile criticisms have prevailed. They are today the received doctrine on Pareto.

---

* Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (London, 1959), p. 52.

[1] F. Borkenau, *Pareto* (London, 1936), pp. 82–84; M. Ginsberg, *Reason and Unreason in Society* (London, 1947), pp. 97–98.

[2] In G. De Rosa (ed.), *Vilfredo Pareto: Lettere Maffeo Pantaleoni* (Rome, 1960 3 vols), 9 April 1897. This collection will henceforth be cited as *MPP*.

[3] Among these, particularly: F. Borkenau, *op. cit.;* E. Faris, *The Nature of Human Nature* (New York, 1937), Ch. XVI; M. Rader, *No Compromise* (London, 1939), pp. 55–93, 198–201; and F. Alexander, *Our Age of Illusion* (New York, 1942), pp. 81–102.

In the English-speaking world, with few exceptions, there has been no recent attempt to re-appraise Pareto.[5] So it is that for commentary and criticism we are forced back on views expressed thirty years ago about a book that itself had been written nearly thirty years earlier. But in Italy, since the fall of fascism, there has been a steady re-discovery.[6] Furthermore, when the British and American scholars of the inter-war period were writing their critiques, nothing was known of Pareto's life except a bare handful of dates (most of them wrong). Since 1948, however, not only have many articles appeared, but five collections of Pareto's correspondence,[7] all meticulously edited. These letters alone compel a re-appraisal of Pareto's thought. But so, for that matter, does a rereading of the *Treatise*, especially in the light of Pareto's other writings, none of which have yet been translated into English. The received opinions begin to seem to require a great deal of qualification. In this paper I shall confine myself to two particular issues. The first is to challenge the current views as to *why* Pareto felt impelled to develop his peculiar theory. The second will be to re-examine his theory of the governing elite and notably his conception of pluto-democracy.

I. THE SOURCES OF THE THEORY OF PLUTO-DEMOCRACY

All the nineteen-thirties knew of Pareto's life and the development of his opinions was briefly this. His family was aristocratic Genoese. His father, the Marquis Raffaelle Pareto, fled to France as a young man in 1835 or 1836 on account of his republican and Mazzinian opinions. In exile he pursued the profession of civil engineer, married an obscure Frenchwoman, and had two daughters and one son. This was Vilfredo Frederico Damaso Pareto, born in Paris in 1848. Raffaelle Pareto returned to Piedmont in 1855 and took employment as civil engineer in the Piedmontese civil service. Vilfredo, bilingual in French and Italian, followed his father's profession, studying in the Polytechnic at Turin, and graduating as an engineer in 1869. He immediately secured a post as director of the Rome Railway Company until 1874, when he became the managing director of the Societa Ferriere Italiana, an iron producing company with its headquarters in Florence. In 1889 Pareto married a penniless Russian girl, Dina Bakunin, threw up his managing directorship of the company for a consultancy, and for three years wrote articles and made speeches against the Italian government's protectionist policy at home and militarist policy abroad. These activities led to his acquaintanceship, which soon became a warm friendship, with the economist Maffeo Pantaleoni; this in turn led to an interest in pure economics in which Pareto proved outstanding, thanks to his earlier mathematical training; and this in turn again led to his nomination in 1893 as Professor of Political Economy at Lausanne University, in succession to Walras. His appointment was made permanent in 1894. In 1896 he published a *Cours d'economie Politique*. In 1898 Pareto inherited from an uncle a fortune which I estimate at about $500,000 to $750,000 in today's prices and began to think of retirement so as to be able to pursue research.

His views soon changed radically. From being a crusader for democracy and free trade he became indifferent to active politics and an increasingly bitter enemy of parliamentarism and democracy. The first sign of the change appears in a lengthy article for the *Rivista Italiana di sociologia* in 1900, and then in his *Les Systèmes Socialistes* (1902).[8] The theory of irrationalism and of the governing elite, exexpounded in these works, foreshadow the developed system in the *Treatise*. He carried the two notions further in his next book, the *Manuale d'economia politica* 1906, translated and somewhat revised in the French edition of 1909. In 1907 Pareto resigned the Chair of Political Economy but continued to deliver his sociology course until 1916. For some time he had been suffering from heart disease and now confined himself almost exclusively to his Céligny home, the Villa Angora, where he lived surrounded by eighteen angora cats and ministered to by one Jane Régis, thirty years younger than himself, who had come into his life after his wife had left him at the end of 1901. He began writing the *Treatise* in 1907 and completed it in 1912. It was published in Italian in 1916 and in a later French edition. After the war two collections of his articles were published: *Fatti e Teorie* (1920) and *Trasformazione della democrazia* (1921). In 1923, after securing a divorce from his wife Dina, he married Jane Régis (to whom he had dedicated the *Treatise*). He died later in the year, aged seventy-five.

---

[4] Cf. L. J. Henderson, *Pareto's General Sociology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935); G. C. Homans and C. P. Curtis, *An Introduction to Pareto's Sociology* (New York, 1934); and T. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937), pp. 178–193.

[5] Cf. C. Madge, *Society in the Mind* (London, 1964); and H. S. Hughes, *Consciousness and Society* (London, 1959), pp. 78–82, 249–274.

[6] E.g., the work of W. Bobbio, F. Burzio, P. Jannacone and La Ferla. In particular: G. Braga, *Forma ed Equilibrio Sociale* (Bologna, 1959), pp. ix–li; T. Bagiotti, "Del Giornale Paretiano, etc.," *Giornale Degli Economisti* (Jan.-Feb., 1958), 1–32; and T. Giacalone-Monaco, *Pareto e Sorel*, 2 vols. (Padua, 1948).

[7] G. Sensine, *Corrisponenza di Vilfredo Pareto* (Padua, 1948), henceforth cited as *SP;* T. Giacalone-Monaco, *Vilfredo Pareto dal Carteggio con Carlo Placci* (Padua, 1951), henceforth cited as *PP;* T. Giacalone-Monaco, *Pareto-Walras, 1891–1901* (Padua, 1960), henceforth cited as *WP;* G. De Rosa, *MPP* (see footnote 2); and G. De Rosa, *Carteggi Paretiani* (Rome, 1962), henceforth cited as *Carteggio.*

[8] *Les Systemes Socialistes* (Paris, 1902; 2nd. ed., 1926).

The key problem in this record is why Pareto, an extremely radical and republican democrat, should have changed so abruptly in the years 1899–1900 to become what his critics have claimed to be an anti-egalitarian, anti-democratic apostle of violence—in short a "proto-fascist". The record is exiguous—and indeed even more exiguous than the above, since I have filled in certain important particulars which were not known in the 1930's. But this did not prevent commentators from erecting on it the most fanciful theories. One of these explains Pareto's mature opinions as the fruit of an oedipal reaction against his father's Mazzinianism.[9] The correspondence shows that Pareto was proud of his father and devoted to his memory. It shows that he did indeed react against his father's views but that those views, on the return to Italy when Vilfredo was *only seven years old*, were not only not Mazzinian anymore but the reverse. The father had become reconciled to the House of Savoy, his opinions were orthodox or even conservative, and he ended his life full of honors and awards as a faithful servant of the royal house. The son, in contrast, became a fervent admirer of the French Revolution and of democracy, and did not change these views until he was *fifty* years old. A very odd Oedipus complex!

According to another view,[10] Pareto's elite concept and his hatred of democracy are explained by his being a "decayed nobleman". Now in the first place this is to misinterpret his notion of the elite. Not only is it not identical with the titled aristocracy, it is set up in contradistinction to this. The elite consists of the ablest in any walk of life: given completely unrestricted vertical mobility (i.e., unrestricted "circulation of elites") those who held office would be identical with those ablest to hold office: in real life, however, factors like hereditary title, property and the like, impede the circulation of ability, so that the capacity of those in office does not correspond to their "label". There is thus a distinction between the elite of merit and the elite by "label"; and Pareto's theory of social change and revolution turns precisely on this difference.

Furthermore, Pareto positively loathed the Italian titled aristocracy. Throughout his life he showed nothing but contempt for what he blisteringly described as "non-rational deference towards some cretin born of princely stock, or some scoundrel who has reached the top of the social pyramid."[11] His early letters, in the "Florentine period" (1874–1893), are full of even more savage references to the "gilded youth" and the families who "sucked the blood" of the Italian poor.[12] Throughout his life he detested being addressed as "*Marchese*" and insisted on his titles of *merit*—"*Signore Ingegniere*" or "*Signore Professore*". In short, the theory is not only wrong but upside down. Pareto developed his theory of elite—of a meritocracy—not because he was a friend of the hereditary aristocracy but because, as a meritocrat, he was its bitter and contemptuous foe.

Recently, in a most stimulating and excellent book, H. S. Hughes has also interpreted the meagre factual record. In this case he seeks to explain the origin of Pareto's theory of non-logical action and the "residues", i.e., his theory of irrationalism. This argument is as follows: Pareto, qua economist, was a free-trader and was convinced that protection must necessarily impoverish Italy: instead it made Italy prosperous; and therefore Pareto was forced to account for this by arguing that individuals were moved by non-logical considerations, not the logical ones which economics assumes.[13]

---

[9] Borkenau, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–11, and taken over by H. S. Hughes, *op. cit.*, pp. 260–261.

[10] W. Stark, *The Sociology of Knowledge* (London, 1958), p. 53.

[11] *PP*, 9 February 1894.

[12] *PP*, 11 November 1894.

[13] Hughes, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

Now it is true that the *Treatise* utilizes the theory of nonlogical actions to show how protectionism may in certain cases come to cause the creation of more wealth than it destroys; but this does not prove that Parato invented the theory of non-logical actions *in order* to make such an explanation. This is a *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacy, and the correspondence shows the facts to be precisely the reverse. For Pareto was still an orthodox free trader as late as 1900, whereas he discovered his theory of non-logical actions in 1897. Furthermore, in 1897 he did not consider that protection had made Italy prosperous. On the contrary he maintained that it had caused the widespread misery and starvation which culminated in the May revolt of 1898. And in that black year of uprising and iron repression he actually published all the forecasts made by himself and his free trading friends in a book, *"La liberté economique et les évenements d'Italie"*,[14] to vindicate the free trade principles he was still advocating.

Now I have not rejected these various theories out of simple pedantry, but because so long as they persist unchallenged they obscure and prejudge the content of the *Treatise* and the post-*Treatise* writings, and bring us to them in quite a wrong state of mind.

If it is possible ever to reduce the piecemeal and subtle alchemy of intellectual and emotional processess to two crude factors, we can describe the first as Pareto's *temperamental* reaction to state intervention, and the second as his *intellectual* reaction to Marxism.

Temperamentally, Pareto was a supreme egotist. Among the six classes of his "residues" there is one called the residue of "the integrity of the individual and what pertains to him"—effectively the root impulse to defend one's life, liberty, possessions, expectations and status against social changes which threaten them. Such an attitude underlies Pareto's outlook and behavior throughout his whole life and to an altogether extreme degree. It explains alike his hypersensitivity to criticism, his high sense of personal honor and obligation, his craving for financial independence (and hence his attachment to his uncle's legacy). It also accounts for his political attitudes—hostility to state intervention in economic and also in intellectual life (the latter is witnessed to in his attack on attempts to censor "obscene" literature in his *"The Virtuist Myth and Immoral Literature"*).[15] It explains too the long train of negatives of which his political attitudes came to consist. Pareto was anti-socialist and anti-state-interventionist. He was anti-colonialist and anti-militarist. He was anti-racialist and anti-anti-semite. He was the perennial foe of *"prepotenza"*, i.e., overwhelming arrogance and bullying, no matter from whom or for what purpose. The great change in his attitude in 1899–1901 was due to the fact that, as he saw it, the persons of the *"prepotenti"* had changed. Up to 1898 they were what he was calling (from 1891 onwards)t he *"classe governante"* or *"classe dirigente"*[16] of Italy, the accursed bourgeoisie, battening on the poor with their protective tariffs:

> Whom do I call the bourgeoisie? I call bourgeois all those who live comfortably and enjoy protective tariffs, get government jobs for their children and make money through the contractors, and, when the occasion arises, plunder the banks; and besides these, many rich and well to do persons, honest in their private lives but who think it necessary, so as to support their own class and not dry up the sources of money for their friends, to support any knavery on the government's part.[17]

But despite his efforts and those of his friends the advance of protectionism and state subsidies continued inexorably and by 1898 Pareto recognised defeat.

> There is not the slightest hope of possible victory for economic freedom for the time being. Earlier I had my doubts about the cases of Switzerland and England; now I maintain, not even in Switzerland and England. Hence any practical activity for free trade is useless. One must limit oneself to scientific activities.[18]

But at the very moment of apparent triumph for the bourgeois oppressors, Pareto took a second look at the oppressed. "The socialist gentlemen in Italy," he observed, "seek nothing but liberty. Here [i.e., in Switzerland] they have it and immediately take to bullying. They cease to be victims only to become persecutors".[19] Protectionism and socialism were two sides of the same coin. The first was bourgeois socialism, the second popular socialism (a thought to be developed in the *Systèmes Socialistes* of 1902). Both were equally restrictive of personal liberty. "There are only three parties in Italy: (i) the thieves in power, (ii) the socialists, and (iii) the clericals. I don't want to go along with any of them."[20] "I used to be a liberal. Now I recognise my mistake. The choice is simply between one oppression and another."[21] In this last sentence lies the key to Pareto's change of heart. The thought is expanded in an important article of 1905.

---

[14] (Lausanne, 1898).

[15] On this work H. S. Hughes comments that "in his view of public morality Pareto was extremely rigorous; in his ideas on private morality he was playfully permissive": *op. cit.*, p. 261. But anybody who cares to consult Pareto's views on the family and on education (*Le Mythe Vertuiste et la Litterature Immorale*, Paris, 1911, pp. 146 ff) will find this to be the very reverse of the truth. He was the perfect square.

[16] *MPP*, 6 December 1891.

[17] *MPP*, 23 December 1896.

[18] *MPP*, 22 February 1898.

> The man who used to believe in all sincerity that he was campaigning for liberty was really, and quite unwittingly, bringing about its destruction. In the past all restrictions [on liberty] served to assist the bourgeoisie and work against the people. Consequently the man who fought against them could honestly believe that he was exerting himself in order to establish an impartial order which would grant no privileges either to one side or to the other. I do not see how such a view could be proved wrong *a priori* and it seems to me that only the results, today, are capable of providing such a proof—as indeed they have. They show that we have not paused, even for a short moment, at that middle point where no privilege exists; but that on the contrary the privileges of the bourgeoisie have been abolished only to make way for those of the people. . . . The person who was combating privilege as such really succeeded . . . in substituting one kind of privilege for another . . . .[22]

Thus one half of the explanation of Pareto's altered attitude lies in his personal and intensely individualistic reaction to the substitution of the *prepotenza* of organized labor for that of the bourgeoisie. The other half lies in a sudden flash of intuition provoked by the burgeoning popularity of marxism especially in Italy. He rejected Marxist theory while respecting and co-operating with the marxists during his free trade agitation;[23] but very early he recognized the almost mystically religious nature of their commitment:

> *Capital* is the gospel of an ever increasing number of men[24]
>
> These other believers, who call themselves Socialists . . . . At Milan I saw youths . . . sacrificing their whole lives to become apostles of the new religion and who have a faith in the principles of Marx equal to that of the early Christians for the Gospel . . . .[25]

Brooding over the apparent contradiction between the intellectual falsity of Marxist theory and the devotion of its followers he was suddenly illuminated by one of those flashes of intuition that sometimes occur to men and after which they never see facts in the same inter-relationship again. In his own words:

> Men think they are choosing their opinions, but on the contrary these opinions are imposed on them by their mode of life just as fish have to breathe through their gills whereas for mammals it is through the lungs.[26]
>
> Reason is of little or no importance in shaping social phenomena. The operative forces are different ones . . . .[27]
>
> The principle of my sociology rests precisely on separating logical from non-logical actions and in showing that in most men the second category is larger than the first.[28]

From these two sources—Pareto's outraged individualism and his intellectual conviction of the importance of irrationalism in human behaviour—spring the main characteristics of the *Treatise:* the transcending of Marxism, the debunking of ideology, and the contempt for the bourgeois state.

II. THE THEORY RE-EXAMINED

The *Treatise* is crammed with Pareto's personal prejudices, but these are not only not essential to his scientific theory—they obscure it. They are there simply because Pareto enjoyed baiting his intellectual opponents.[29] The fact is that the *Treatise* totally abdicates from recommendation. Anyone who has the patience to read through it will find that remarks favourable to one course of action in one place are qualified or negatived somewhere else. The *Treatise* is, indeed, a sociological system; but it was conceived as, and largely is, a system to end all systems. It is, in fact, an anti-system. It is anti-marxist but also anti-bourgeois. It is anti-rationalist, but also anti-ideological. It is anti-parliamentarian, but also anti-authoritarian. And naturally so from what has gone before. Against the strict canons of Pareto's mid-nineteenth century liberalism, his individualism, the world no longer had anything to offer.

---

[19] *MPP*, 20 July 1898.

[20] *MPP*, 16 May 1898.

[21] *MPP*, 16 May 1898.

[22] V. Pareto, "Il Crepuscolo della Liberta," *Rivista d'Italia* (February, 1905), quoted in *MPP*, Vol. II, p. 436.

[23] *MPP*, 23 February 1892.

[24] *MPP*, 18 April 1893.

[25] *MPP*, 18 April 1893.

[26] *MPP*, 10 April 1898.

[27] *MPP*, 11 November 1897.

[28] *MPP*, 7 May 1897.

[29] Cf. "I know that in this way I will provoke the indignation of the humanitarian-democratic sect, but that is precisely my aim": *MPP*, 2 March 1907.

The *Treatise* is an anti-system, first, in that it is a gigantic retort to Karl Marx. Interestingly, however, it does not contradict, it denatures. Pareto's technique is not confrontation but envelopment. Marxism claimed to be a full and final explanation of society; the *Treatise* tries to show that it is merely a set of particular cases of a much wider and hence completer theory. Marx's class domination theory is shown to be but a special case of the general law of elite domination. Class exploitation is merely a particular case of the more general theory of "spolation" of the "rentier" or fixed income groups by the "speculators", the active entrepreneurial types. The Marxist theory of ideology as a "false consciousness" deriving from class interest and doomed to disappear with the classless society is shown to be a special case of the general theory of irrationalism, i.e., of the residues and the derivations (rationalizations) based thereon—by which token Marxism itself is reduced to the status of the irrational; of an ideology amongst others.

But although it is anti-marxist, this does not mean that the *Treatise* is proto-fascist. Far from it. There is a second sense in which the *Treatise* is an anti-system: as the debunker of all ideology. This follows from Pareto's distinction between logical and non-logical action. In the first, the state of affairs which the actor seeks to bring about coincides with the end actually brought about as *seen by a detached outside observer.* It is not simply logical but (in Pareto's terminology) logico-experimental. Economics, technology and the natural sciences comprise most of the "logical" areas of human conduct. All others are non-logical. In some cases this is because the actor is acting on an erroneous hypothesis. In others, however, it is because the actor's aim is "an *imaginary* end outside the field of observation and experience" (*Treatise*, §151). In such a case no outside observer can say whether it has been reached or not. It is for this reason that Pareto treats religion and metaphysics as non-logical; not because they are erroneous but because they are unverifiable, not because they are unscientific but because they are non-scientific. They spring from "residues" and "interests", i.e., from internal psychic states. And on this basis Pareto had little difficulty in demonstrating that all the great or fashionable moral, religious and political systems of his day and of the past were non-logical, without any scientific basis whatsoever. Some three-quarters of the *Treatise* is, directly or indirectly, concerned to demonstrate this and so well did he do his work that if the *Treatise* achieved nothing else it killed stone dead the tradition of rationalist-positivistic theories of morals and politics.

But Pareto did not stop at showing that what he called these "pseudo-intellectualist" theories were devoid of scientific basis and were, properly speaking, ideologies. He continued by pouring contempt upon the nakedly *anti*-intellectualist ideologies—upon the various theories that "we have within us ideas, notions, concepts that are superior to experience, that 'intuition must take the place of reason', that 'conscience must assert its rights in the face of positivistic empiricism', that 'idealism must replace empiricism, positivism science', etc." (*Treatise,* §2340). Among these Pareto specifically names such manifestations as anti-semitism, nationalism, clericalism and imperialism (*Treatise,* §2389–§2390)—in short the ideological foundations of what we nowadays style as Fascist-type regimes. Here the critics of the thirties were misled by their own pre-occupations. They failed to realize that the *Treatise* is a pre-1914 work, and that Pareto was concerned with the ideologies of his own day—which were predominantly those of progress and optimism and democracy. In 1935 these "pseudo-intellectualist" ideologies were on the defensive against the fascist philosophies of blood and faith and intuition. From the critics' point of view Pareto had been attacking the wrong ideologies, i.e., the liberal ones; indeed, even worse, he had demonstrated that they *were* ideologies! In the heat of the battle they overlooked his equal contempt for the anti-liberal, the "fascist" ideologies. The simple truth is that Pareto was a profoundly a-religious man, moved neither by patriotism nor any other kind of faith: as he acknowledged, "I am, as Papini says, an atheist of all religion."[30]

But there is another very important respect in which Pareto was the enemy of what later was to be called fascism: his dislike of what he called the "crystallized" or "Byzantine" state, a managerial autocracy whose governing elite is of the conservative-disciplinarian-aggressive type described by him as rich in class II residues (the residues of "persistency of aggregates"). Herein the governing elite is a tight-knit and identifiable group, from which all sectional or territorial leadership derives its powers; in which status and functions are rigidly defined and conserved; and in which all authority emanates from the governing group. For Pareto, in 1912, his paradigm case was the Byzantine Empire. In our own times it is Mussolini's Italy, Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, in short, the totalitarian state. Thus, the *Treatise* is not proto-fascist at all, but implicitly anti-fascist; implictly (whereas the anti-marxism is explicit) because marxism was in Pareto's here-and-now, fascism still in the future.

---

[30] *SP*, 23 April 1917.

There was still one other alternative for Pareto—the regime in which he had lived, the parliamentary bourgeois-democratic state.

Now this, in Pareto's schema, is conceived as the opposite of the Byzantine states, and all actual regimes are conceived as lying along a continuum between the two polar extremes. Unlike the Byzantine state, democracy is conceived as based upon the relationship of client to patron. The governing class is a polyarchy, a loosely textured network of the patrons of the various clienteles. Their characteristic traits are the opposite of those of the Byzantine governing elite. The latter were of the conservative, disciplinarian, idealistic and aggressive type. The governing elite of the democracy is rich in the Class I residues, those of the so-called "instinct of combining". They are materialistic and individualistic, innovating and risk-taking, pacific and reliant on persuasion and guile ("*combinazioni*" in the Italian sense) rather than on force. They are the "Athenians" or "foxes", those governing Byzantium are the "Spartans" or "lions". Now Pareto spends far more time criticizing parliamentary democracy than he does over Marxism or Byzantinism. Furthermore he laces his criticisms with a passionate and embittered polemic. Entire passages are nothing but diatribe. It is from this scorn and hatred for the parliamentary regime that critics, especially those of the thirties, have concluded that he was a protofascist.

This conclusion is erroneous. In the first place, the critics of the inter-war years—and some recent ones—have written from the standpoint of their own democratic commitment as though Pareto in his *Treatise* also had a commitment. The whole point of the *Treatise* is precisely that it has none. It is the correspondence that puts us on the right track. The critics felt that since Pareto was against one of the main alternatives the world was facing in the thirties, he must be in favor of the other, or at least of *an*other. But by the time he came to write the *Treatise* Pareto had long despaired of anything the world had to offer. As early as 1896 he had told Pantaleoni that he had given up "trying to straighten the legs of the crippled."[31] "My dear chap", he wrote, "we are like the fish that was asked 'Do you prefer to be baked or boiled?' 'Neither the one nor the other'. 'Fish! Fish! You're evading the question.' "[32] Look at the Sartre-Camus conversation at the head of this paper—the dilemma is the same but there is this difference: Sartre never meant his advice about the Galapagos Islands to be taken literally, but this is precisely what Pareto did. His Galapagos was the hermitage at Céligny, and the *Treatise* is the monument of his abstentionism.

What obscures this withdrawal is the passionate language he used about democracy. But this is a trap and by falling into it the critics drew a false conclusion; for it is not only possible but necessary to separate Pareto's vitrolic asides from his scientific theory, and it then appears that his analysis of the governing elite and of pluto-democracy is not nearly as charged with proto-facist implications as might be thought, if indeed it is so charged at all. And this provokes the further question: why then did Pareto express himself with such emotion? The failure to ask this question constitutes yet another reason for the critics' drawing a false conclusion about the *Treatise*. These are the points I now propose to elaborate.

III. WHY PARETO IS MIS-INTERPRETED

In the bourgeois democracy, the governing elite or governing class (Pareto uses both terms synonymously) is far from being the close-knit conspiratorial clique that always gets its own way over the expressed opposition of the masses. These are the characteristics of the governing elite of the "Byzantine" or spartan state, not the client-patron state of which the bourgeois democracy is the limiting case. Pareto's portrait of the governing elite of such a regime is painted from life: the Italian "*consorteria*" of parties that governed in his day. It is conceived as a great polyarchal structure, an interconnected web of the "patrons" each of which has clienteles consisting of sub-patrons and so on, down to the largely indifferent masses. There is nothing inherently "anti-democratic" about such a conception. The best translation of Pareto's "*classe governante*" is, as Sartori has pointed out, "leading minorities"—"*minoranze guidatrice.*"[33]

---

[31] *MPP*, 20 May 1896.

[32] *MPP*, 19 November 1899.

[33] G. Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit, 1962), p. 131.

To begin with, the "governing class" is a very wide category indeed. Pareto's examples span whole historical epochs: the era of the later Roman Republic and the era of the rise and collapse of the Roman Empire; likewise, one governing class, the "pluto-democratic", spans the whole era from 1789 to his own day. *A fortiori* the governing class must never be conceived as identical with one or other of rival parties. For Pareto parties fell into two main types: the "intransigent" parties of fanatical idealists who refused to work in or with the parliamentary system (e.g., the syndicalists of his own day) and the "transformist" parties like the constitutionalist wing of the Italian Socialist party. The latter merely supply a variant leadership to his very broadly conceived "governing class". It is absurd to equate his elites and counter-elites with the struggles of Labour and Conservative, or Republican and Democrat. Both are parts of their respective governing classes.

The governing class is a "connexion" of centers of influence and patronage; and in the modern state, these are increasingly based on economic interest. These various power centers are forever quarrelling and competing with one another but nevertheless have sufficient cohesion to warrant calling them a "class." How does this come about? Emphatically not by conspiracy. Pareto goes to strenuous lengths to deny that the governing class is a "concrete unity" or a "person". "It does not know what it wants, it does not execute preconceived plans by logical procedures", he wrote. Its principal characteristic is "The order, or system, not the conscious will of individuals who may, indeed, in many cases, be carried by the system to points they never would have gone to by deliberate choice. The road . . . followed . . . is the resultant of an infinity of minor actions" (*Treatise* §2255). Such cohesion as it possesses comes about in three ways. In the first place, all the principals, i.e., the heads of each cluster of influence and patronage, live to some extent by taking in each others' washing. Next, insofar as they are all actuated by economic self interest they naturally tend to act in a common direction without any preconceived design. Finally they are made the more coherent by their "inner government"—a political party, or a cabinet—which controls the public authorities.

How does this "inner government" give it this cohesion? Not by coercion but by "management", by manipulation. The typical pluto-democratic governing class eschews the use of force—increasingly so, according to Pareto, who sees in this a tacit abdication of its capacity to govern, a kind of suicide. The men of the pluto-democratic governing class are those saturated with the Class I residues, those of "combining": they are the "foxes," not the "lions," and their characteristic mode of governance is of this kind. The role of the "inner government", i.e., the political leadership proper, is to keep as many clienteles as possible satisfied at the same time. If it can do so, it will retain office; if not it will be ejected for a group who can and will. Bribery and corruption—either by "honors" or material rewards—are the least important of the means at its disposal, though they attract most censure. The significant method, which shocks nobody's morals, is to "look after" the various clienteles. There need be no explicit understandings with them in this manner. A protectionist government will receive the support and confidence of manufacturers (and as we today know, of workpeople) without necessarily coming to any explicit agreement with them, though it may do so with certain outstanding individuals (*Treatise* §2257). But governments have all kinds of other means to dispose of, quite apart from tariffs: contracts, shipbuilding, public works, nationalized enterprises, tax policy, social welfare benefits—all provide means to keep the various clienteles sweet. (*Treatise* §2265). No mere rogue can manage such a system; on the contrary it demands rare political skills. "Ministers do not have coffers that they simply have to open to procure handfuls of cash to dole out among their partisans. They have to survey the field of business with shrewd eye. . . ." (*Treatise* §2268).

Who then composes this governing class? Here Pareto's answer altered as the regimes from which he drew his picture altered with the extension of the suffrage and the rise of organized labor. In the beginning he identified the Italian "*classe governante*" or "*classe dirigente*" with the oppressive Italian bourgeoisie—using this term in a loose Marxist sense. But after his great volte face in 1899–1901, the perspective alters. He sees it then as an alliance of bourgeoisie and working people against the fixed-income groups of the community. Finally, after the war, the perspective alters again as he recognizes that in this alliance, the working classes are obtaining the upper hand. This becomes clear as we examine his final views on pluto-democracy as they appear, not only in the *Treatise*, but also in the *Trasformazione della Democrazia* of 1921.

According to this last work, three great tendencies characterized the industrialized societies of the west in the past century. First, wealth had greatly increased; second, it was still very unevenly distributed; and third, the dominant classes in the state had come to be the bourgeois entrepreneurs (the "speculators") and the working classes, at the expense of the military and the various fixed-income groups in the community. If attention were focussed simply on the rise of the bourgeoisie to dominance, the regime ought to be styled "plutocracy"; if it were focussed instead on the rise of the working man, then "democracy" would be the right term. Since both are involved, Pareto coins the expression "pluto-democracy".

Certainly the interests of the two dominant classes conflict, but they have contrived to live in symbiosis and this is expressed in a tacit alliance for both political and economic objects. Its political purpose is to sanction a "new feudalism", i.e., to permit the trade unions and employer associations jointly to "get the upper hand over the State". These are the bodies that make the fundamental decisions; the public authorities and parliaments increasingly come to act merely as ratifying bodies. Its economic purpose is to permit these associations of "producers" to exploit the fixed-income groups of the community. For jointly-agreed wage settlements are simply passed on to the rest of the public in the form of increased prices. Jointly agreed or supported tariff policies, subsidies and the like have the same effect—to exploit the fixed-income groups; and so of course do inflationary policies. Parliament is a necessary part of this arrangement, for it acts as a forum in which these transactions and arrangements between the various clienteles on which government is dependent are "aggregated" and it also acts as a platform by which the masses are persuaded to assent to them. So essential is Parliament to the system that Pareto asserts that the life of one is bound up with that of the other (*Transformazione*, pp. 73–78).

Thus the governing elite of a modern industrialized democracy is very wide indeed. It comprises the leaders of the unions as well as those of the employer associations, of the pressure groups as well as the political parties, of social democrats as well as conservatives. The result is a wide, untidy, and impersonal order of things—a system. Personalities enter into it only insofar as one party leader or set of leaders is more successful in conciliating the various clienteles than another leader or set of leaders. Nor should we believe that when this wide governing class, the web of patrons, despoils certain sections of the community of their property, it does so simply to enrich itself (*Treatise* §2267). It does so to reward its supporters among the masses, i.e., to retain itself in power. It stands towards them as a patron to his clients. Furthermore we are not to suppose that either patron or client is "wholly aware" of violating the moral rules of their society. "In fact", asserts Pareto, "some of them in all honesty identify [their continuance in office] with the best interests of the country" (*Treatise* $2267). (The implication, of course, is that some of them *don't*.)

There are serious shortcomings in this analysis. It overrates the "alliance" between capital and labor and underrates their antagonism. It muddles up "speculator" and "rentier," who are supposed to be psychological types, with "bourgeoisie" and working class, which are socio-economic categories. It escapes from the pitfall of ascribing leadership to a narrowly organized and conspiratorial elite to fall into the alternative of making the "governing class" so wide as to reduce it to all who visibly govern—so denaturing it. Furthermore, it defines pluto-democracy so broadly that though it shows the common characteristics of, say, the U.S.A., France and Britain, it affords no criteria for distinguishing among them. But for all this, is there really a great deal in the analysis to shock or even disillusion the democrat—particularly one who argues that even if matters are indeed as Pareto described them, they are nevertheless preferable to the marxist or fascist alternatives?

Yet Pareto clearly hated this alternative. He hated it with a passion that often comes near to hysteria. Why? He hated it not for what it was but for what it might have been. His rage and chagrin is that of the lover betrayed by his mistress. The key is the sentence already quoted: "*We have not paused, even for a short moment, at the middle point where no privileges exist.*" Until he was fifty, Pareto had dedicated himself like a fanatic to tearing down the privileges of the Italian bourgeoisie. He had stood as a radical candidate against them in 1882. He had written over one hundred and sixty articles against them in the four brief years 1889–93. His meetings had been closed down by the Italian police and he himself had become a marked man. He had given money and shelter to the Italian socialist refugees in 1898. He had espoused the cause of Dreyfus. And at that precise moment his idol crumbled:

> After the victory of the Dreyfusards, however, I was amazed to see them employing against their opponents the same villainous methods that they themselves had denounced. At that point I comprehended in all its fullness that if certain persons like myself had been following principles, most people had done just the opposite, and had

their eyes fixed on their interests. And I saw the same thing happen when the workers obtained freedom of association. What in today's language is styled "freedom" grew as what in yesterday's language was "freedom" diminished—by which I mean the power to act: which shrinks every day, save for criminals, in the so-called free and democratic countries. And from that I learned one additional thing: namely that the former liberals [sc. Pareto himself] had been toiling to obtain the exact opposite of what they desired.[34]

The pluto-democracy had simply changed the nature of exploitation and the person of the exploiters. "Is there a land", he exclaimed in a private letter, "where one section of the population does not rob the other? I do not think so."[35] And furthermore, the future of the pluto-democracy was even darker than its present. The working classes were to become more and more dominant in their tacit alliance with the "speculators," and as they did so they forced on their partners one concession after another in the direction of the crystallized, the Byzantine, society. The closed shop, the control of capital movements, the municipalization and nationalization of private industries, the limitation on freedom of personal movement, the erosion of local and federal liberties were signs he noticed well before the war (*Treatise* §2553). After it he remarked the sharpened animosity of the "have nots" for the "haves" which was intensifying all these Byzantine tendencies (*Transformazione*, pp. 86–99, 106–109).

Along with pluto-democracy, he naturally rejected the governing class which had sold the pass to his own brand of liberal democracy—the hated bourgeoisie. Up to 1900 he had detested it because it used its privileges to feather its own nest and oppress the working people. Now he detested it all the more because when the time had come to call a halt to the reversal of this process it had refused to do so. Here again his private values came into play. Pareto was a very forthright person. He was scrupulously honest, abstemious, and, both physically and morally, most courageous. Once when it appeared that the Italian government was intent on silencing him by sending some hired ruffian to attack him, he welcomed the opportunity: for, as he told his friends, he shot mice with the pistol, while his skill at fence would give any bravo a very bad quarter of an hour.[36] "When all the world bow their heads to the bullies (*prepotenti*)", he wrote to Pantaleoni on another occasion, "it becomes a duty for the independent man to raise his head and give back blow for blow."[37] But this was precisely what the governing class, the cowardly bourgeoisie, refused to do. Confronted by proletarian violence, they responded by continuing their former policy of blandishment, manipulation and surrender. Hence Pareto's furious onslaught on their "humanitarianism". He denounced it not for what it intrinsically was, but because it robbed them of their *capacity* to retain a grip on power. There is plenty of evidence in the *Treatise* to show conclusively that Pareto never advocated violence as a substitute for "manipulation". He went out of his way to demonstrate that no government could govern by force alone (*Treatise*, §2205). His point was simply that force *as well as* persuasion was necessary if any governing class was to maintain itself. This, of course, was implicitly or explicitly denied by most of the liberal democratic or social democratic theories of his time. And it was for their failure to realize that on occasion violence must be met by violence that he castigated the bourgeoisie of the pre-war epoch. As a result of their humanitarianism they were facing violent overthrow by a counter-elite drawn from the bellicose conservative disciplinarian masses, and with it social convulsion and the rise of a new fully-fledged Byzantine state. And so his anger against the bourgeoisie—including their bourgeoisified social democratic allies—was a compound of rage at the value of what they had yielded, contempt for their weakness, and *schadenfreude* at their humiliation. And yet he realised they could not, being what they were, do otherwise: "To win, [the bourgeoisie] would have to change its state of mind, to cease to be humanitarian, to cease to be anti-clerical, to cease to be democrat."[38] And so his mood varies from insulting their weakness in one passage to enjoying their defeat in others: "My dear fellow, it is urgent that the syndicalists or a like courageous rabble should surge up from the depths and sweep our degenerate elite away."[39]

IV. CONCLUSION

"To maintain my independence, which is also the most precious thing in life." Thus Pareto had written in one of his first letters in the published correspondence; and this sentence contains the clue to his personality. It is also, however, the clue to his political ideal: "Our goal", he was writing at about the same time, "is to have the minimum of government activity—to free ourselves from the clutches of the people who bleed the country white."[40]

---

[34] A. Antonucci (ed.), *Alcune Lettere di V. Pareto* (Rome, 1938), pp. 21–26.

[35] *MPP*, 30 November 1899.

[36] *MPP*, 20 January 1892.

[37] *MPP*, 12 January 1898.

[38] *MPP*, 26 October 1907.

[39] *MPP*, 28 January 1908.

By this canon, nothing was to be gained by marxist socialism or by what the world today calls fascism. But at that time, democracy still offered a hope.

"I am not blind to its defects", he had then written, "but it seems that the lesser evil lies on this side. At least it is something to try whereas the trial of the aristocratic regimes (in the true sense of the word—'of the best') has been made and has turned out very bad."[41] On this democracy, then, he pinned all his hopes; it was tried; and it, too, had "turned out very bad". And here the very ardour with which he had embraced it made his disillusion the more embittered. His disgust with democracy was not that of the fascist who rated liberty too low, but of the lover, the outmoded individualist, who rated it too high. Fenced in with what he regarded as a choice of evils he turned his back on all of them—and made his journey to the Galapagos Islands.

---

[40] *MPP*, 23 February 1892.

[41] *MPP*, 22 December 1891.

ON THE NEO-ELITIST CRITIQUE OF COMMUNITY POWER[1]

RICHARD M. MERELMAN
University of California, Los Angeles

I. INTRODUCTION

The process of inquiry occasionally exhibits a dialectical pattern in which a series of assertions is advanced and then attacked. A third phase, which consists of an attempt to salvage the first set of assertions, often ensues. The study of American community power has followed this sequence almost classically, and today we find ourselves in the third phase of the dialectic. The first period marked the contemporary emergence of community power as a distinct field of study, mainly through the investigations of Hunter, Mills and their followers. These observers contended that communities were controlled by "elites," usually economic, who imposed their will, often covertly, on non-elites. The second phase was marked by the challenge of another group of observers, the "pluralists." Pluralists contended that the methods and premises of the "elitists" predisposed them to conclusions about community power which were unjustified. Elitists commonly reached their conclusions either by investigating the reputations for power of various members of the community or merely by assuming that all who possessed certain presumed sources of power were in fact powerful. The pluralists claimed that reputations did not guarantee control and demanded evidence that community *decisions* on political issues, major and minor, were controlled by a reputed elite. The pluralists, after studying community decisions on a variety of subjects, concluded that shifting coalitions of participants drawn from all areas of community life actually controlled local politics. Rarely could a single elite be discovered imposing itself in each area of decision, policy, and conflict.[2]

Many observers felt that the pluralists had won the day. Their methodology studied actual behavior, stressed operational definitions, and turned up evidence. Most important, it seemed to produce reliable conclusions which met the canons of science. Recently, however, new considerations have been introduced which intend to prop up the elitist Humpty Dumpty on a more substantial wall of theory than the one from which it had previously tumbled. The beginnings of a new position on community power appear in the work of those responsible for the third phase, the "neo-elitists," as I shall call them.[3] That position forms the subject of this analysis.

---

[1] I am indebted to Stephen Stephens, Fred Greenstein, and James Eisenstein for cogent comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

[2] For good statements of positions, see Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); Delbert C. Miller, "Democracy and Decision-Making in the Community Power Structure," in William V. D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich (eds.), *Power and Democracy in America* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), pp. 25–73; Robert A. Dahl, "Equality and Power in American Society," in *ibid.*, pp. 73–91; Raymond Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," in Nelson Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 703–712. The literature in this area is voluminous. Obviously, not all those who use the reputational method come to elitist conclusions, nor do all those who use the decisional approach come to pluralist conclusions. For example, see Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich and Bert E. Swanson, *The Rulers and the Ruled* (New York: Wiley, 1964). However, it is fair to say that most investigators using the reputationalist approach start off with elitist premises and most investigators using the decisional approach begin with pluralist assumptions. Hence, I will oversimplify a bit and consider approach and premises as coextensive. Indeed, as John Walton shows, decisional theorists do tend to find pluralist power situations and reputationalists elite situations. This is only partially due to the different arenas they have examined. See John Walton, "Substance and Artifact: The Current Status of Research on Community Power Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, 71 (January, 1966), 430–439. It is important to note that, for the most part, in the discussion to follow I take the notion of "elite" as given and meaningful. The substance of my argument does not turn in any crucial way on the obvious difficulties, which have been explicated elsewhere, with definitions of community power elites.

[3] The neo-elitist critique relies primarily on the notion of non-decision-making. In particular, I will be treating the writings of Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," this REVIEW, 56 (Dec., 1962), 947–952; Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Non-decisions: An

Generally speaking, neo-elitists differ with pluralists over the conclusions which can legitimately be drawn from the study of community decisions in issue areas. Such decisions, say the neo-elitists, actually represent much less than the pluralists suspect. Decisional methodology and pluralist premises are alleged to be deficient in the three following major respects:

1) Pluralists misunderstand the way influence expresses itself in the community. According to the neo-elitists, non-elites are encased in values foisted on them by the elite. Elites transmit these values to non-elites by a conscious and unconscious "mobilization of bias."[4] Therefore, non-elites are not even conscious of having major differences with the elite. A "false consensus,"[5] created by the elite, limits conflicts and decisions in the community to unimportant matters which do not threaten the elite.
2) Pluralists are most successful in assessing power when conflict is occurring. However, there are many situations in which individuals, despite their disagreements with the powerful, anticipate that they have no chance to profit by raising an issue. They realize that their powerful opponents would crush them. In this case, the power of the opponents expresses itself through the phenomenon of anticipated reactions.[6] Under these conditions, there is no conflict, no visible issue and no decision and the decisional methodology is useless. According to Bachrach and Baratz, the major figures among the neo-elitists, "To measure relative influence solely in terms of the ability to initiate and veto proposals is to ignore the possible exercise of influence or power in limiting the scope of initiation."[7] In another context, Bachrach and Baratz define power solely to cover situations in which individuals act or do not act in anticipation of the sanctions others may exert upon them.[8] We shall accept this definition to facilitate discussion.
3) Pluralists unduly stress decisions made in the governmental realm. However, such emphasis is unwarranted. Even if the anticipation situation breaks down and issues are initiated, they may never reach the stage of governmental decision-making. A variety of coercive devices and sanctions—organizational, ideological and procedural—may be used to prevent such concerns from being acted on by government. Threats by and anticipation of the powerful give way to the application of sanctions which obliterate alternatives to desisting. Bachrach and Baratz define this situation as one involving the actual application of force.[9] Again, we will accept this definition for discussion.

In summation, non-elites are not even conscious of important differences with the elite. Even if they are, they anticipate that they could only lose by making trouble, and so they bow to the power of the elite. Or the application of force prevents them from having their concerns acted on by government. Each of these situations occupies a position on a "non-decision-making" continuum. "When the dominant values, the accepted rules of the game, the existing power relations among groups, and the instruments of force . . . effectively prevent certain grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which call for decisions, it can be said that a non-decision-making situation exists."[10]

Analytical Framework," in *ibid.*, 57 (1963), 632–642; E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); and Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960). These writings relate closely to theory exemplified in Felix Oppenheim, *Dimensions of Freedom* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), chap. 3; and Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), chap. 3. Recent influential writings which embody traces of "non-decision" theory include Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: Wiley, 1962), *passim;* and Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 110–111, *et passim.*

[4] Schattschneider, *op. cit.*, chaps. 1–3, *et passim.*

[5] "False consensus" is a term borrowed from Robert Dahl, "A Critique of the Power Elite Model," this REVIEW, 52 (June, 1958), 463–469, at 468.

[6] For complex examples of the phenomenon of anticipated reactions, see Robert Dahl, "The Power Analysis Approach to the Study of Politics," unpublished, April, 1965, 27–28; and James G. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," this REVIEW, 49 (June, 1955), 431–451, at 443–444.

[7] Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces . . .," *op. cit.*, 952.

[8] Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions . . . ," *op. cit.*, 637.

[9] *Ibid.*, 636.

[10] *Ibid.*, 641.

II. THE "FALSE CONSENSUS" ARGUMENT

The argument on the problem of "false consensus," as it is presently stated, is not an empirical argument, though it makes certain dubious empirical assumptions. Rather, it is a purely deductive, tautological theory which, if one accepts its empirical assumptions, does not admit of empirical proof or disproof. Therefore, it is of limited utility in the actual exploration of community power structure. Furthermore, the peculiar structure of the argument incorporates a logical fallacy which is inadmissible. Finally, any conditions which can be introduced to make the argument subject to empirical validation indicate its lack of utility. These are serious charges; let us see if they hold.

The argument claims that the conflicts studied by the pluralists are unimportant. Why are they unimportant? Because they do not threaten an elite. We need not consider the conflicts studied by the pluralists unimportant if we don't presume the existence of an elite. But the presumption itself is not justified unless the theory specifies some independent reasons for us to believe an elite exists. The argument specifies no such independent reasons. Therefore, we need not believe an elite exists and, without an elite, we cannot have a false consensus.[11]

More generally, the terms of the argument make it impossible to disprove the existence of an elite under conditions of conflict and, as we shall see, under any conditions. If a conflict is unimportant (i.e., "does not threaten an elite"), an elite exists. If a conflict *does* threaten an elite (impossible under the terms of the theory), then an elite also exists, but in this case it will probably be observable since it will be threatened into action. In all cases of conflict an elite exists. Therefore, *only by definition*, the existence of an elite in cases of conflict is "proved."

The set of problems outlined stems directly from the general nature of the argument. The *absence* of an event, conflict which threatens an elite, is taken as the evidence for the existence of an elite. However, we have no reason for accepting the absence of an event as evidence for any particular cause, unless it can be demonstrated that the cause (in this case, an elite) produced the absence of the event (threatening conflict). To do so, some threatening conflict must precede the coming of false consensus. But such threatening conflict is incompatible with false consensus as defined. Therefore, false consensus does not admit the evidence to support itself. To put the point differently, no conflict existing under conditions of false consensus threatens an elite; therefore, no such conflict will cause an elite to show itself. We can never get empirical evidence that an elite exists. The argument reduces itself to a statement of faith.

Furthermore, the argument does not allow us to distinguish between "real" and "false" consensuses. Presumably, a "real" consensus would be defined as a non-elite-controlled consensus. However, since non-elites, under the terms of the theory, are controlled by the mobilization of bias from an elite to them, a real consensus is impossible unless an elite does not exist. But the theory presumes the existence of an elite. Therefore, there can be no "real" consensus. Finally, joining the two sides of our argument, elites exist in all cases of consensus and in all cases of conflict. The argument cannot be falsified.[12]

The theory also suffers in its chief empirical assumption. It contends that non-elites are encased in a series of values which they assimilate from the elite. No evidence for this assertion is proffered. We now have, instead, good reason to doubt the presence of consensus on many fundamental rules and values of the democratic system.[13] Whatever consensus on fundamental values exists, therefore, seems to pertain to values so far not studied. Is it possible that political scientists could have ignored completely those values which *are* shared and which produce false consensus? Possible, certainly, but unlikely.

Finally, another premise of the argument needs to be explored. The argument assumes that the mobilization of bias operates only downward, from elite to mass. Since little actual *behavior* of the elite is considered in the theory, it is understandable that no specification of mechanisms whereby the elite transmits its values is forthcoming. Therefore, within the bounds of the argument, no evidence to support the downward mobilization of bias is adduced. But a more fundamental problem exists. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is just as plausible that any consensus we *do* find is not controlled by an elite. One can argue that non-elites do not differ with elites precisely because the formers' values are so well embodied by the latter.[14] The neo-elitist critique provides no reason to reject this assertion. Indeed, as Vidich and Bensman admit in their study of "non-decision-making," when elite members do not reflect and conform to widely held values of non-elites, significant conflicts may erupt, in which case power and force come to control.[15]

---

[11] For a similar criticism of the elitists, see Polsby, *op. cit.*, 24.

[12] On the criterion of falsifiability in theory construction, see Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Hutchinson, 1959), chap. 4.

[13] See especially Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," in Edward C. Dreyer and Walter Rosenbaum (eds.), *Political Opinion and Electoral Behavior* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1966), pp. 37–64; and Robert Dahl, *Who Governs* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), chap. 28.

Because the false consensus argument is deductive, non-falsifiable and ridden with undemonstrated assumptions, it is necessary to imagine empirical conditions which might produce an elite-controlled false consensus. In the real world, what conditions are necessary for an elite to erect a successful false consensus? The logic of the argument suggests that the following conditions must hold:

1) The elite must succeed in producing consensus on values within the community as a whole.
2) Such values must control policy choice.

What factors affect the attainment of these conditions? First, there must be consensus on a wide variety of points within the elite. Value cleavage within the elite may encourage elite factions to look for support outside. If such conflict extends itself, consensus on community values will disintegrate rapidly. Also, value consensus within the elite must control policy choice. If a particular set of approved values does not dictate policy choice, conflicts can again be extended beyond the elite to the community. Should values continue to permit policy conflict, the way lies clear for the introduction of competing values to justify and express policy conflicts. In order to attain value and policy consensus, the elite must adhere to some procedure designed to obtain agreement on values and priorities, thereby preventing differences from affecting the community. The substantive and procedural elite consensus required here defies complete and continuous attainment. Conflict within the elite is likely.[16]

Elite consensus is itself partially dependent upon a second factor, system autonomy. Individuals in the system, either elite or non-elite, who have some of their needs provided outside the system, may develop competing allegiances and alternative values. Outside contacts offer new means for obtaining goals, new goals, and new models of behavior. External contacts thereby loosen elite controls wherever they exist.[17] And conflict will probably erupt, shattering whatever false consensus exists.

The legal relationships between local, state and Federal governments in the United States, as well as the informal political connections emanating from these arrangements, break down the system autonomy necessary for attainment of false consensus. These arrangements not only provide a forum for the airing and institutionalization of value differences in a community, but also *introduce* competing value sets, priorities and procedures into communities. Lack of political autonomy for communities lessens the opportunity for local elites to construct a false consensus. Lack of community economic autonomy, increasingly characteristic of American towns and cities, produces a similar effect.[18] In short, neither economic nor political self-sufficiency exists in most localities; therefore, this determinant of false consensus is absent also.

Of course, lack of autonomy is intimately related to community stability at its most fundamental levels. The preservation of elite consensus and local autonomy depends partially upon the extent to which demographic, ecological and sociological characteristics of the community can be controlled. Changes in birth and death rates, economic patterns, and life expectancies are in varying degrees uncontrollable by political leadership in the United States. Such social changes make demands upon local political systems and leaders as constantly and significantly as, in their turn, local political leaders structure community needs. Often, they require dependence of local organs of government upon national levels.[19] I do not assert, however, that temporary consensuses on policy are impossible or even improbable; I merely suggest the likelihood that any consensus we do find is not "false."

---

[14] For a discussion of a variety of constraints on elites, see Polsby, *op. cit.*, pp. 128ff. Put in a rather simplified form, the neo-elitist critique accepts a "Great Man" theory of leadership much at variance with current studies of leadership which indicate the extent to which leaders are constrained to conform to group values. See, for example, the theory of E. P. Hollander: "Emergent Leadership and Social Influence," in *Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior*, ed. Luigi Petrillo and Bernard Bass (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 30–48.

[15] See the discussion of the challenge to the village elite launched by James West in Vidich and Bensman, *op. cit.*, 162–171. I will rely heavily on the Vidich and Bensman study, not through a a paucity of other useful material, but rather because it is interpreted primarily as support of the non-decision argument.

[16] The major difficulty stems from specialization of leadership roles which leads to conflict. The most obvious example is the conflict inherent between staff and line in a bureaucracy. Even the insular, homogeneous elite in Springdale could not continually maintain consensus: *ibid.*, pp. 46–53.

[17] For a theoretical statement of the same proposition, see Richard Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (1962), 31–41, at 32.

[18] For a case study see Robert O. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City," in Morris Janowitz (ed.), *Community Political Systems* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 19–81.

III. THE POWER ARGUMENT

The conditions for the creation of a successful false consensus seem unattainable, and the logic and assumptions of the false consensus argument are faulty. Therefore, we may conclude that power and force control most community decision-making. Let us look at the next alternative, that of the application of power to prevent community issues from being initiated. This argument, like that of false consensus, suffers both in its statement and in its application to the real world.

The neo-elitist critique suggests that power cases of non-decision are most characteristic of situations in which those with little, anticipating reactions from and responding to threats from those with much, do not act. In fact, however, the application of power to forestall action involves all sorts of groups. Therefore, we can conclude little from the mere existence of non-decisions arising from the application of power. For example, the logic of the deterrence formula in American military policy, as Snyder demonstrates,[20] is based on a virtually infinite regress of anticipated reactions. Why are so many anticipated reactions, and the inaction based on such anticipation, necessary? Precisely because the parties to the deterrence situation view themselves as equally able to decimate each other. Nor may those with much ignore the possible reactions of those with little. Under most conditions, as Blau shows,[21] those with much buy legitimacy by anticipating possible unfavorable reactions to their behavior. When such reactions seem imminent, those with much may well not act. Therefore, power cases of non-decisions provide no criteria *by themselves* for saying anything meaningful about community political patterns.

On the other hand, even if those planning to initiate policies hostile to an "elite" become subject to its power and are constrained to desist, they have still exerted power of their own. The elite has been forced to anticipate *them* and exert power in return. The power to get others to veto behavior has policy consequences for the others, a fact which neo-elitists often ignore. For all these reasons, the existence of power cases of non-decisions tells us less about community power than the neo-elitist suspects.

Granting the ubiquity and inconclusiveness of power cases of non-decision-making, the neo-elitist may shift the grounds of his argument. He may contend that those with much need desist only on issues in which they have relatively little at stake. On the other hand, he might say, those with little must desist when they have relatively much at stake. If we accept this contention, we now have a way of measuring power by examining what was at stake for each group controlled by the anticipated sanctions of others. But this argument leads us in an unfortunate direction. Must we conclude that a group's power varies whenever it is involved in decisions or non-decisions of varying import? Surely not. Rather, we are concerned with the ability of a group to get what it wants no matter what the character of the encounter in which it finds itself.

Furthermore, we may argue that power cases of non-decision-making for *all* are equally likely to occur when only marginal gains and losses are at stake. Power cases of non-decisions require that there be sufficient precedents to guide all participants, so that they can assess meaningfully whatever threats are made. In cases where there are such precedents, more often than not established programs already exist, thereby restricting current actions to marginal gains and losses. Wildavsky's discussion of the budgetary process provides many examples of the importance of anticipated reactions in governing marginal allocations for well established programs.[22] Normally, few ordinary citizens or creative leaders are interested in such areas. Therefore, we need not conclude *a priori* that groups subject to power cases of non-decisions are losing much.

---

[19] This has become especially true of American cities and metropolitan areas, but is also becoming true for smaller towns wishing to make use of urban renewal funds available from the federal government. On this point see the figures of Martin Anderson, *The Federal Bulldozer* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962), p. 44.

[20] Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 9–53.

[21] Peter Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: Wiley, 1964), chap. 8.

[22] Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), chaps. 2 and 3.

We might also argue that when there are new programs at stake designed to meet pressing problems which yield few guidelines for policy makers, control by anticipated reactions often gives way to applications of force. Not only are these issues crucial to group survival, thereby necessitating vigorous action, but also they are lacking in those precedents which might provide meaningful assessments of threats. To sum up, those with much anticipate those with little, those with little those with much, and they relatively equal each other when both important and unimportant matters are at stake. The power argument cannot be reformulated to tell us anything *a priori* about community power.

The logic of the power case has two further weaknesses that require exploration. Elites, we are told, are able, through the application of power, to prevent issues which threaten them from being initiated. But one might argue the exact contrary of this position, using the logic of the argument itself. If the major concern of the elite is to keep threatening issues from being initiated and reaching government, then only the most conflictful, the most intense, the most pressing will be able to mobilize enough support to pass the barriers of power and force erected by the elite. In this case, one could perfectly well argue that the neo-elitist critique strengthens rather than detracts from the pluralist emphasis on governmental decision-making. As presently stated, the power argument leads as plausibly to this conclusion as to the conclusion adopted by the neo-elitists. The point is, of course, that the neo-elitist interpretation of the power case takes only that side of the phenomenon which supports its conclusions.

But suppose we assure ourselves that the issues which are decided through one governmental agency are relatively harmless to an elite and of little interest to the non-elite. Suppose, further, that the elite has threatened the non-elite with sanctions if it pursues issues which might change the *status quo*. May this set of facts be taken as validation of the neo-elitists' power argument? No. After all, the initiators may anticipate not only that they will not get a hearing from an agency, but also that the agency is too weak to help them. For example, in some large cities the great number of decision-making organs produces as much inaction and non-decision-making as does the application of power aimed at preventing initiation.[23] In addition, one could only affirm the importance of the non-decision-making process in this case if the non-elite were unable to find a hearing in other governmental agencies which could aid it. In Springdale, for example, the unwillingness of the village board to handle potentially threatening issues ultimately was purchased by the availability of competent state, local and national agencies to which recourse was had successfully.[24]

More generally, even though a group attempts to prevent an issue from reaching a governmental agency and the issue does not, we need not assume that the group has succeeded. The availability of other outlets limits the extent to which we can say that an "elite" has succeeded in applying power to prevent decision. The American political system maximizes outlets for decisions, thereby lessening the ability of an elite to produce non-decision-making through the application of power.

So much for ambiguities, unjustified assumptions, and problems of interpretation in the power argument; equally as serious are the difficulties that remain when we attempt to apply the argument to the conduct of research. Ironically enough, both the study and the logic of anticipated reactions as a phenomenon drive us back to research premises virtually identical to those already employed by the pluralists.

In order to meet the problem of anticipated reactions, the pluralist focus on decisions must be expanded to cover patterns of *communication* within policy areas. If power, defined by Bachrach and Baratz as being based on anticipation, is exercised to "limit the scope of initiation," the powerful must communicate policy preferences and threatened sanctions to the less powerful. Bachrach and Baratz themselves specify that power exercise requires communication.[25] A few non-decisions might be based on inferences about elite preferences in the absence of contemporaneous communication, but such situations seem unlikely. If preferences are initially strong enough, potential initiators will make certain that the current desires of those who count are ascertained through some sort of overt communication. Communication is an empirically investigable phenomenon and can be studied through an expansion of the pluralist framework.

---

[23] See especially the case of New York: Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City* (New York: Norton, 1965), chap. 19.

[24] I speak here not only of governmental agencies, to which reference will be made later, but to the role of the Community Club at the local level: see Vidich and Bensman, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–135.

[25] Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions . . .," *op. cit.*, 634.

But by expanding the scope of inquiry from decisions to communications, we do not skirt all our problems. Having discovered the pattern of communication, we still must infer the controlling pattern of anticipated reactions. Merely knowing who communicated with whom in an issue area over a period of time and who threatened sanctions or promised rewards does not reveal whose anticipated reactions actually carried weight. How can we solve this problem?

We could, of course, simply ask those involved in an issue area what their actual anticipation of reactions is, or, in cases of retrospective research, was. But this procedure is both incomplete and unreliable. We know that many people are often unclear about the influences to which they respond. Many simply forget; others have good reason to lie. Still others rationalize in such a way as to convince themselves that decisions thrust on them from external sources were really their own. For example, Bachrach and Baratz have no difficulty believing that economic dominants who take no role in a decision do so from their own disinterest in the issues at stake.[26] However, it may instead be true that, anticipating a defeat they downgrade the importance of the issues. Rationalization is a ubiquitous and powerful defense mechanism.

We are unable to draw the sorts of conclusions about community power from an investigation of communication that would satisfy either the neo-elitists or others. Is there no way of supplementing the study of communication with an additional factor which will allow us to identify, at least fairly well, the determining pattern of anticipated reactions? I submit that we can use the pattern of actual, observable, past and present force applications as a guide to the present pattern of anticipated reactions. These applications of force will occur most often in community conflicts. Such conflicts, of course, are those most likely to be uncovered by a traditional pluralist methodology.

Why should force situations provide our springboard? The answer is that the reactions of a group are anticipated mainly when current or past experience with the group demonstrates that its reactions must be reckoned with. Such experience comes only from the actual application, rather than simply the threat, of sanctions. As Dorwin Cartwright laconically observes, "It appears . . . that if a person possesses power he will be inclined to use it."[27] Nor was Machiavelli insensitive to the importance of demonstrations of power through sanction application.[28] Even Bachrach and Baratz concede this piont. " . . . [T]he *use* of force in one situation increases the credibility of *threats* to use it in others."[29] However, as we have seen, the major thrust of Bachrach and Baratz's argument runs counter to these notions. To repeat, *we have little reason to expect that any group will be listened to unless it has been tested and been forced to apply some of the sanctions it threatens.* We must conclude that the only answer to the problem of anticipated reactions in non-decisions is to rely, in practice, on the pluralist investigation of forceful conflict. The power argument in the neo-elitist critique does not suggest a viable alternative.

But, it may be argued, even if we find, either in the community's political history or present political life, a rough index of the operative pattern of anticipated reactions, our problem is not solved. The essence of the anticipated reactions problem, the argument goes, is that no two situations are alike. For example, labor leaders may demand publicly that politicians press legislation governing working conditions. Politicians remember that in the past business leaders, though threatening sanctions, actually did little to impede similar labor legislation governing wages and hours. Nor have they done more than threaten in the current case. But the past and present are unreliable guides to the future. Perhaps business leaders feel more strongly about working conditions. Therefore, we cannot use either past or current experience as an infallible index to present, controlling patterns of anticipated reactions or to subsequent behavior.[30] This argument is true as far as it goes; strictly speaking, of course, we cannot.

---

[26] Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces . . . ," *op. cit.,* 950.

[27] Dorwin Cartwright, "A Field Theoretical Conception of Power," in Dorwin Cartwright (ed.), *Studies in Social Power* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959), p. 202. Here it seems clear that Cartwright is thinking about the disposition to demonstrate power forcefully and visibly when such demonstration is feasible and inviting.

[28] "And men have less scruple in offending one who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared; for love is held by a chain of obligation which, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose; but fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never fails": *The Prince and the Discourses* (New York: The Modern Library, 1940), p. 61.

[29] Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions . . . ," *op. cit.*, 636.

[30] Of course, no index is "infallible." What we look for is an index which will be reliable under

But let us look at the matter from the perspective of the politicians caught in the middle. They are faced with public pressures from labor leaders who have made commitments to their followers. Against this present pressure the neo-elitist critique assumes that politicians will weigh more heavily the private threats of other groups in the community who have a history of failing to carry out their threats. We may grant that politicians will consider such threats, but we may wonder how seriously they will view them. One may argue more plausibly that they will heavily discount these threats because they doubt that they are meaningful. Lacking demonstrations of seriousness by those business leaders with whose motives and intentions they are concerned, politicians would rationally support labor. When the businessmen commit themselves and actually apply pressures and sanctions, they make their threats credible. By so doing, of course, they also bring the conflict into view of pluralist methodology. In politics, as in poker, "put up or shut up" expresses a major formula for decision-makers. Also, in politics as in poker, bluffs work consistently only with novices and for short periods. The actions of politicians tend to redeem the utility of pluralist methodology.[31]

IV. THE FORCE ARGUMENT

It would appear, from the analysis of the power argument, that force holds the major empirical relevance in the area of non-decisions. As a matter of research strategy, it appears clear that applications of force are both easier to study than any behavior falling under the power case and also more likely to structure the pattern of anticipated reactions. A traditional pluralist approach uncovers applications of force which produce non-decision-making; therefore, we need be concerned only with the implications and interpretations of the force argument. The neo-elitist interpretation of the force argument is, I feel, neither entirely justified nor complete.

Suppose we discover that the application of elite force prevented some of a certain group's major concerns from reaching the stage of governmental policy-making. Few would deny that this process occurs. Indeed, a variety of techniques can be used to assure this outcome. Procedural tactics can be employed to side-track issues. Talk about whether to put a matter on the agenda can go on endlessly. Resort to precedent can be used to deny the legitimacy of an issue for governmental decision. Access to precedents, records, and other useful material can be denied the initiators. In extreme cases, intimidation of the initiators may be undertaken. Channels of communication can be closed.[32] All these applications of force coerce the initiators into acceptance of the *status quo*. However, inferences about these tactics are not as straightforward as the neo-elitists suggest.

We may, of course, infer that the neo-elitist critique has been confirmed. However, we may also infer something else, namely, that the elite has been coerced into exerting sanctions. Initiators have severely restricted the elite's alternatives. Should we not consider this situation evidence of the strength of the initiators as well as of the elite? The neo-elitists may dismiss this interpretation by suggesting that, regardless, the governmental process continues to favor the elite. But the process rewards the the elite, as far as one can tell, only when the elite asks nothing from it but protection from outside interference. Whether in fact the governmental process would favor the elite, should it want *positive* concessions from government, remains a moot point.

Of course, the neo-elitist might reply, "So what? Those who get the most of what there is to get won't need government to aid them, but only to prevent others from hurting them. Only losers go to government actually to get something positive."[33] This reply, it should be immediately apparent, is an assertion, not a demonstration. Indeed, we have good reason to suspect that government is an aid in getting

---

most circumstances. To put it another way, past and present demonstrations of power are a less fallible index of present anticipations on policy matters than any other index we could use.

[31] Theory underlying these formulations is drawn primarily from David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), chaps. 4–6; and Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. 2.

[32] For examples of many of these and other techniques, see Vidich and Bensman, *op. cit., passim.* For an examination of the ways in which rules governing decisional priorities are generated and operate in a decision-making body, see James David Barber, *Power In Committees* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), chaps. 2 and 3.

[33] Schattschneider makes this argument about intra-business conflict: "It is the *losers in intra-business conflict who seek redress from public authority. The dominant business interests resist appeals to the government*": Schattschneider, *op. cit.*, p. 40. Italics his.

things for both winners and losers. If so, we may wonder why the elite itself chooses not to use government for something positive. There are two possible answers to this question. First, we may argue that elites, because of their favored positions, have fewer needs than those who wish to use government. But, on the other hand, their great power should make it easier for them to work through government to get what little they still want. Second, we may argue that the elite members do not feel they could win in attempts to use government. If in fact elites can only prevent others from using government, but feel themselves similarly unable to use it, few of us would wish to label the situation truly "elitist."[34] Therefore, we can conclude little from the force argument, unless and until the "elite" itself succeeds in gaining something positive from government.

Neo-elitists ignore the fact that non-elites can often enhance their power by forcing their opponents to use force against them. Non-elites may try to force elites to deny them access to government, hoping that they will gain public sympathy, publicity, and ultimately, political support. What may at first appear to be simply an instance of an elite forcing non-elites into acquiescence may, on deeper examination, turn out to be the opening wedge in a campaign to unseat the elite. No responsible analyst should ignore all the possible interpretations and aspects of force application.

The neo-elitist may wonder if the situation just described bears any relation to the real world. Why, he may say, should individuals be attracted to a cause which has just been forcibly denied even a governmental hearing? The neo-elitist formulation of n-decinosion-making conceals the answer to this question, because it emphasizes only those values which contribute to elite control and support the *status quo*. But are there no "dominant values," no "accepted rules of the game" which favor the initiators of issues? Are there no Americans who feel that the role of government is to handle grievances put to it? Is not one "rule of the game" that government officials should handle legitimate protests which arise within society, and not conspire to force initiators of such protests to desist? Though we do not have conclusive evidence, there is reason to believe that values and beliefs favoring initiators do exist.[35] They constitute both a check on the non-decision-making process and a lever by which those groups discriminated against by non-decision-making acquire supporters and resources. Such groups can occasionally activate these values by forcing elites to deny them the use of government. We need not assume that all the "values," all the "rules of the game" favor the *status quo*.

What has so far been said leads to another deficiency in the force argument. The argument ignores the political costs of non-decision-making, especially by force but also by power. Such costs affect governmental agencies, public officials, and members of the elite itself. Ultimately, they undercut rule by forceful non-decision-making.

Perhaps the major cost of continued forceful non-decision-making is the lessened possibility of *any* sort of positive decision-making by the governmental agency in question. Taking an extreme example, Vidich and Bensman note that, as a consequence of its continued unwillingness to hear grievances, " . . . the [Springdale] village board is not usually in a position to act when pressing action is required."[36] There are two reasons why continued non-decision-making, whether by force or power, decreases the possibility of positive decision-making.

First, the refusal of one agency to exercise its legal jurisdiction means that other governmental agencies supplant it and, despite legalities, expand their own operative spans of control. Vidich and Bensman indicate that this reorientation of power occurred even in insular Springdale.[37] As organizational and bureaucratic theory would suggest, competing centers of power tend to expand their jurisdictions as much as possible.[38] Second, and equally costly to agencies engaged in non-decision-making, the effect of an agency's inaction tarnishes its image. Officials of the agency, as well as the general public, lose faith in the decision-making process. Vidich and Bensman report of the members of the Springdale village board:

---

[34] This formulation is reminiscent of Riesman's "veto groups" concept. See David Riesman *et al*, *The Lonely Crowd* (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, n.d.), pp. 246–251.

[35] Evidence is only suggestive and scattered. However, we can note that more Americans (22%) preferred firm and aggressive leadership, honesty and sincerity, to other leadership qualities in a 1960 Roper poll (see Roper Commercial Poll, No. 101, question 21). Similarly, we may note the familiar upsurge of support for a President after his forceful intervention in foreign affairs. This response was most recently exploited by President Johnson in the Tonkin affair. Nor is it any accident that most of those who write on "great" Presidents ordinarily talk about activists such as Lincoln, Roosevelt, etc. The evaluation of greatness arrived at by scholars is reflected in the opinions of most Americans. Support for governmental initiators may well reflect a deeper support for initiators throughout the system.

[36] Vidich and Bensman, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

[38] For a sophisticated treatment of conflict strategies and expansionist tendencies in govern-

> They are not . . . able to assess their relationship to a constituency, and this lack of skill leads to the indecision which results in incompetence. What is more, the picture of their performance which emerges to the public level is generally regarded as reflecting a do-nothing, incompetent government agency. The incompetence of the board members is an open and widespread subject of public discussion among all groups in the community, and elected board members are themselves quick to admit to the outside observer that they 'don't know much' about village government.[39]

The good burghers of Springdale seemed not at all unhappy to preside over the dissolution of village board authority and power in the town. At the behest of economic notables they aided in destroying the power and prestige of village government. Most politicians, however, will not contemplate so passively and sanguinely either their own stained images or the decayed prestige of their organization. They, perhaps even more than the general public, share those values which suggest that the role of a political body is to decide, pro or con.[40] These values provide an important check on their propensity to practice non-decision-making. It is at least possible that, at some point, public officials will act to protect their dying prestige. One of the ways they can do so is by assuring groups with grievances that they will at least receive an official decision, should they reactivate their demands. In so doing, whatever non-decision-making process formerly existed would be destroyed.

Nor do the costs of forceful non-decision-making fall easily on the elite. Unanimity within the elite is relatively easy to maintain when only threats are involved. But actual application of sanctions, with all the unforeseen consequences of such application, will not elicit so unanimous a response. Indeed, once force is necessary to prevent issues from reaching government, it is quite possible that the elite will be on its way to dissolution. It is not as easy to conceal actual sanction application as it is threats. Nor is it easy to ward off reactions to overt, forceful non-decision-making. We can therefore conclude that the costs of non-decision-making to governmental agencies, public officials and local elites assure that control by forceful non-decision-making will be inherently unstable and, probably, of short duration.

V. CONCLUSION

The neo-elitist critique of community power focuses on the problem of "non-decision-making." Non-decision-making may proceed through the application of power, force or the construction of a "false consensus." However, the neo-elitist statement of non-decision-making has logical and empirical problems as formulated. The false consensus argument is non-falsifiable and, therefore, not amenable to scientific investigation. The power and force cases are construed in ways which lead to unwarranted conclusions. A pluralist methodology must be adopted to meet the major contentions raised by the power case, because anticipated reactions will be based upon observable instances of force application. However, applications of force are not always understandable in the terms posited by the neo-elitist critique; nor can we expect that forceful non-decision-making will provide conclusions that support the critique. For these reasons, we have reason to believe that research based on pluralist premises leads to a reasonably accurate picture of community power. We also have reason to believe that no "elite" can operate for long solely on the basis of non-decision-making.

---

mental bureaucracies, see Matthew Holden, Jr., "'Imperialism' in Bureaucracy," this REVIEW, 60 (Dec., 1966), 943–952.

[39] Vidich and Bensman, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[40] Indications are that political activists are much more likely to be strongly ideological than their followers. Therefore, they will be even more likely than their followers to use the political process actively as a vehicle for obtaining their values. See Herbert McClosky *et al*, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, 54 (June, 1960), 406–427. Also, see Lester Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), chap. 3, for a review of the literature relating political participation to the development of ideological thinking. Finally, Warner *et al* note the idealistic, activist self-conceptions of federal bureaucrats: see W. Lloyd Warner *et al*, *The American Federal Executive* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), chap. 13. Such role identities seem entirely incompatible with perpetual non-decision-making.

MEASURING THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

STEVEN J. BRAMS
Syracuse University

I. INTRODUCTION

The unequal distribution of power among the members of a political system is one of the most pervasive facts of political life. Yet, while many studies have confirmed the fact that a few members exercise disproportionate control over many others in most systems, the configurations of power relations that occur *among* the few have generally not been subjected to systematic comparative analysis. In a few notable empirical studies, attempts have been made to compare the exercise of power in different issue-areas and across different decisions.[1] Comparative analyses have suffered, however, from the lack of any means to make tractable and compare, except in a qualitative way, schematic representations of power relations either in different political systems or over different issue-areas in the same system.[2] When diagrams of power structures become complex and unwieldy, it is easiest to forget about making precise comparisons about the way power is distributed among decision-makers somehow identified as being influential in the political process.

In this article I shall develop a quantitative index that measures the *degree of concentration* of power among the actors in a political system. For this purpose I shall assume that three things can be said about the political system (which might comprise anything from a committee of people to a group of conglomerate actors like nation-states) under consideration:

(1) Which actors have influence (or power) over what other actors;
(2) For each pairwise influence relationship, whether or not the influence is symmetrical (two-way) or asymmetrical (one-way);
(3) If asymmetrical, the direction in which influence flows.

The only restriction placed on the influence relation is that no actor can influence himself.

Most systems of actors and relations about which the above things can be said can be considered *partly ordered structures*, by which I mean loosely structures that are not completely chaotic: they have elements of both order and disorder.[3] The task of this article is to suggest one way to make perspicuous the element of order embedded in a system of organized complexity like that defined above—and, in the process, to show how modern mathematics, in its focus on questions of order and relation instead of questions of magnitude and quantity, can serve as a powerful tool in revealing the anatomy of political systems, just as it has illuminated structures of elements and relations in the natural sciences.[4] The articulation of the structural order or form of a system whose actors have nondesultory relations with each other makes possible the explanation of recurring patterns of behavior within it, and I shall conclude by suggesting some possible factors associated with power concentration patterns in political systems.

---

[1] See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); and Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, *The Rulers and the Ruled: Political Power and Impotence in American Communities* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964).

[2] For an imaginative effort to develop a classification of generalized issue-areas relevant to different political systems, see James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27–96. See also Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, 16 (July 1964), 677–715.

[3] See Lancelot L. White, "Atomism, Structure and Form: A Report on the Natural Philosophy of Form," in Gyorgy Kepes (ed.), *Structure in Art and in Science* (New York: George Braziller, 1965), pp. 20–21; and more generally, Lancelot L. White, *Essay on Atomism: From Democritus to 1960* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

[4] For some examples of the use of modern mathematics in the social sciences, see John G. Kemeny, "Mathematics Without Numbers," *Daedalus*, 88 (Fall 1959), 577–591.



Hierarchical System

FIG. 1a



Mutual Adjustment System

FIG. 1b



Mixed System

FIG. 1c

II. SIMPLIFYING RELATIONAL POWER STRUCTURES

To illustrate the analysis which follows, consider as examples three types of decision-making systems postulated by Charles E. Lindblom.[5] As depicted in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c, $x \rightarrow y$ means x has influence over y, or in Lindblom's terminology y's decisions are adjusted to x's decisions. Symmetrical influence relationships are indicated by double arrows between two decision-makers and asymmetrical relationships by a single arrow.

As suggested by the diagrams, and discussed by Lindblom, the hierarchical structure can be considered as one extreme form and the mutual adjustment structure, characterized by a variety of symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships, as another; in between we find a mixture of central and non-central decision-making, in which, for example, L in Figure 1c is both a central supervisor (of *d*, *b*, and *k*) and a mutual adjuster (to *a*, *g*, and *k*). From the figures it would appear that power in the mixed system is more concentrated than in the "disorganized" mutual adjustment system and less concentrated than in the "organized" hierarchical system.

At a conceptual level, the identification of different types of decision-making systems, and the power structures associated with each, has considerable heuristic value. But if we were asked to measure and rank the degree of centralization of decision-making, and concentration of power, in several mixed political systems (few systems in practice are pure types), the qualitative categories set forth above would be useless. Can we summarize a diagrammatic power structure in an intuitively reasonable quantitative index of power concentration?

Let us start by grouping into sets those decision-makers in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c who can influence (directly or indirectly), and be influenced (directly or indirectly), only by every other decision-maker in their sets. These *mutual influence sets* (or more properly subsets, if we regard the universe as the union of all decision-makers in a system) are given in Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c. At a collective level these sets are defined by the above property that all of the sets possess, and at an individual level by a list of the decision-maker members in each set. These are respectively intensional (or connotative) and extensional (or denotative) definitions of mutual influence sets, and both are necessary to the analysis that follows.[6]

The mutual influence sets are disjoint, for if there were a common member of two different sets this member would connect together all members of the two sets into a single mutual influence set.[7] Further, as well as having a geometric representation these sets have a clear and unambiguous substantive interpretation, which clusters of units generated by statistical (e.g., factor analysis) and interactive grouping and ordering procedures often do not possess.[8]

---

[5] *The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making through Mutual Adjustment* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1965), pp. 25–28.

[6] See Irving M. Copi, *Introduction to Logic* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1953), pp. 100–105.

[7] This verbal explanation of a mathematical theorem does not, of course, constitute a formal proof. Instead of encumbering the exposition of the analysis which follows with mathematical derivations, I have endeavored wherever possible to give references where a rigorous treatment of relevant points can be found.

[8] For a review of some of the recent literature on "cluster seeking techniques," see Geoffrey H. Ball, "Data Analysis in the Social Sciences: What about the Details?," *Proceedings—Fall Joint Computer Conference, 1965*, pp. 533–559; also, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Statistics and Politics: The Need for Causal Data Analysis" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 5–8, 1967, Chicago).



Hierarchical
System

FIG. 2a



Mutual
Adjustment
System

FIG. 2b



Mixed
System

FIG. 2c

As Stephen C. Johnson remarked in setting forth criteria for the application of hierarchical clustering methods to similarity measures between pairs of objects:

> There should be a clear, explicit, and intuitive description of the clustering; i.e., the clusters should mean something. Some of the published clustering methods have nice algorithms, but when they have been carried out it is difficult to see exactly what problem has been solved.[9]

Most mutual influence sets consist of only one decision-maker, who is not in a mutual influence relationship with any other decision-maker. There are some sets of two decision-makers, and one which contains seven! Since each decision-maker in this latter set in Figure 2b is connected in a closed sequence with every other decision-maker (including *d*, which forms a cycle with *l*, so that the closed sequence, *heigldlbh*, includes the cycle *ldl*), each can ultimately influence and be influenced by, every other.[10]

Grouping decision-makers into mutual influence sets constitutes the first step in the analysis.[11] These sets, each of which can be influenced (as an entity) by power being exerted on only one of its members, now become our new units of analysis. In approaching a definition of the concept of power concentration, our next step is to find a principle that would somehow allow us to describe the "concentration" of flows of influence occurring between or among these mutual influence sets.

To this end, let us define an influence relationship between these sets to be *concentrated* if one mutual influence set can directly influence one or more other mutual influence sets that together contain more constituent decision-makers than the influencing set.[12] Clearly, what we mean by use of the term "concentrated" influence relationship is one characterized by the exercise of minority control—that is, where the "few" influence the "many." Given this notion of power concentration, it now remains for us to define what we mean by the *degree* of power concentration.

To do this, we must find a way to count up the number of times minority control is exerted between mutual influence sets. (Recall that control between mutual influence sets can never be reciprocal, because our mutual influence sets subsume all instances of symmetrical influence relationships between decision-makers.) We shall do this by defining a mutual influence set to be a *minority control set* if it directly influences one or more other mutual influence sets containing a total of more constituent

---

[9] Stephen C. Johnson, "Hierarchical Clustering Schemes," *Psychometrika*, 32 (Sept. 1967), p. 242. I am indebted to Rudolph J. Rummel for this reference.

[10] A formal definition of a closed sequence and cycle in the theory of directed graphs (digraphs) is given in Frank Harary, Robert Z. Norman, and Dorwin Cartwright, *Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 40–41. The remainder of the analysis is devoted to showing how a digraph can be behaviorally coordinated with, or serve as a model of, a simplified political system.

[11] Since the construction of mutual influence sets is equivalent to the condensation of points of a digraph with respect to its strong components (with the mutual influence sets points of the condensation), the construction is unique. See *ibid.*, p. 55, Theorem 3.2.

[12] Cf. this concept of concentration with the concept of *evenness*, or lack of concentration, of a nation's transaction flows in my "Trade in the North Atlantic Area: An Approach to the Analysis of Transformations in a System," *Peace Research Society: Papers*, VI (1967), pp. 149–152. Another related concept is that of *cosmopolitanism* in my "A Note on the Cosmopolitanism of World Regions," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1968, No. 1, pp 87–95.



FIG. 3a



FIG. 3b



FIG. 3c

decision-makers. (Instances of indirect forms of minority control will be considered later.) In Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c, we have drawn dashed lines around all mutual influence sets that are also minority control sets. In Diagram 3c, for example, the minority control sets $\{a,m\}$ and $\{g\}$ influence both $\{b,h\}$ and $\{L,k\}$ with a combined total of four constituent decision-makers; $\{L,k\}$ is also a minority control set, because it influences $\{b,h\}$ and $\{d\}$ with a combined total of three constituent decision-makers.

III. AN INDEX OF POWER CONCENTRATION

Let us assume that there is at least one nonempty minority control set in a political system.[13] Given this assumption, we now define an index of power concentration (PC) as follows:

$$\text{PC} = 1 - \frac{N_{MC}}{N_T} \qquad 0 < \text{PC} < 1,$$

where

N_{MC} = the number of decision-makers in all minority control sets,

N_T = the total number of decision-makers in the political system.

We see that when N_{MC} is small relative to N_T, control will be concentrated in the hands of relatively few decision-makers and PC will be large. ($\text{PC}=1$ only when $N_{MC}=0$, which is the many-controlling-the-few case we have restricted from the present analysis.) On the other hand, when N_{MC} is large relative to N_T (it will never equal N_T), control will be concentrated in the hands of a relatively large number of decision-makers and PC will be small.

Do values of PC for the hierarchical, mutual adjustment, and mixed systems conform to our previous commonsense notions of the concentration of power in each of these systems? The answer seems to be no: $\text{PC} = .85$ for the mutual adjustment system, .75 for the hierarchical system, and .44 for the mixed system. While we would have expected power to be least, not most, concentrated in the mutual adjustment system, inspection of Diagram 3b reveals what intuition does not—that just two decision-makers (a and m) have direct or indirect influence over all other decision-makers in the rest of the system (except j).[14] Nevertheless, though this would explain the mutual adjustment system's higher concentration of power vis-a-vis the mixed system—in which a total of five decision-makers, a, m, g, k, and l, exercise influence over the rest of the system (and themselves)—does the mutual adjustment system really outrank the hierarchical system in its concentration of power?

IV. HIERARCHICAL LEVELS OF INFLUENCE: THE INDEX REFINED

It does only if we do not take account of the fact that in the hierarchical system there are two different *levels* of minority control sets. In this system, unlike the other systems, one

---

[13] Presumably, this condition will hold in most political systems of interest.

[14] Decision-maker j's exclusion suggests that we should not count j in N_T, the denominator of the PC index, because he is not directly or indirectly influenced by the minority control set, $\{a, m\}$. Accordingly, we define a revised power concentration index,

$$\text{PC}' = 1 - \frac{N_{MC}}{N_T - N_U} \qquad 0 < \text{PC}' < 1,$$

where

N_U = the number of decision-makers (not in minority control sets) *uninfluenced* by any minority control set.

PC′ is the same as PC for the hierarchical and mixed systems (because $N_U=0$ for these systems), but PC′ $(=.83)$ is slightly less than PC$(=.85)$ for the mutual adjustment system.

minority control set $\{T\}$ influences *all* the other minority control sets, $\{L\}$, $\{m\}$, and $\{n\}$. As only intermediaries between $\{T\}$ and the mutual influence sets, the sets $\{L\}$, $\{m\}$, and $\{n\}$ hardly qualify as minority control sets in the same way that $\{T\}$ does. Since decision-maker T influences directly or indirectly *all* other decision-makers in the hierarchical system, $\{T\}$ in an important sense can be considered to be the *only* minority control set. Provisionally accepting this interpretation of a minority control set, the value of the PC index for the hierarchical system would be .94, which would make it the highest of the three systems and more consonant with our intuitive ranking of power concentration in the systems. Diagrammatically, this interpretation would mean that the hierarchical system would be equivalent to a system in which $\{T\}$ influenced $\{a\}$, $\{b\}$, . . . , $\{n\}$ directly.[15]

In the mixed system there is a related problem in determining which mutual influence sets should be considered minority control sets. As can be seen from Figure 3*c*, two of the three initially-postulated minority control sets, $\{a,m\}$ and $\{g\}$, influence *both* a mutual influence set and another minority control set which together have a total of more constituent decision-makers. Thus, in this system there are not even clear-cut hierarchical levels of minority control: two minority control sets exercise influence at both lower and higher levels, and the argument given above for excluding lower-level minority control sets in the calculation of the PC index is not applicable to these mixed-level sets.

Consistent with our previous interpretation, however, we shall adopt the provisional rule that minority control sets which are influenced *exclusively* by other minority control sets, regardless of the hierarchical level (or levels) of the sets which they in turn influence, will not be counted in the calculation of the index. Thus, because $\{L, k\}$ is influenced exclusively by $\{a, m\}$ and $\{g\}$ in the mixed system, we count only the three members of the latter two (mixed-level) minority control sets in the N_{MC} term of the index. The value of the PC index then becomes .67 for the mixed system, which still leaves it lowest in power concentration behind the hierarchical system (.94) and the mutual adjustment system (.85), though not by such a wide margin as before (when its value was .44).

Even interpreting the index according to the above rules, the PC index as it stands is not entirely satisfactory as a descriptive statistic. In a decision-making system with more than two hierarchical levels, the index may mask important information about influence relations among lower-level minority control sets which are influenced exclusively by higher-level minority control sets and thus are not counted in the numerator of the index. To arrive at a more refined index that illuminates the configuration of influence relations at *all* levels, it is first necessary to show how different hierarchical levels can be distinguished.

To do this, consider the condensations of the digraphs of the three decision-making systems in which the mutual influence sets (and minority control sets) are points and only the directed lines between the mutual influence sets (and minority control sets) are preserved.[16] As we previously noted, all influence relations between mutual influence and minority control sets are asymmetrical and acyclic (free of cycles of influence), so the reduced diagraphs with these sets as points are themselves acyclic. If p is the length of a longest path of such a digraph—that is, the maximal number of directed lines along which influence may be transmitted from one point to another—each mutual influence or minority control set (point of the reduced digraph) can be assigned to one of $(p+1)$ hierarchical levels in such a way that it receives influence only from higher levels and transmits it only to lower levels.[17] The procedures set forth below make the level assignments for each point unique.

For the three decision-making systems, hierarchical levels are numbered in descending order from the highest (#1) to the lowest in Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c, with the solid and dashed rectangles (points of the reduced di-

---

[15] A system in which all influence relationships are asymmetrical and never flow "upward" can also be described as one in which (1) a decision-maker cannot be both the superior and subordinate of another, and (2) a subordinate of a subordinate is a subordinate. A necessary and sufficient condition for these requirements to hold is that the digraph of the system be free of cycles. See John G. Kemeny and J. Laurie Snell, *Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences* (New York: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 103–104.

[16] If there is more than one directed line between two mutual influence or minority control sets, which is not the case in any of the Lindblom systems, only one is preserved. Some of the consequences of this simplification for the PC index are discussed in Footnote 23, where a refinement in the index is suggested.

[17] Harary, Norman, and Cartwright, *op. cit.*, p. 270, Theorem 10.2.



Hierarchical
System

FIG. 4a



Mutual
Adjustment
System

FIG. 4b



Mixed
System

FIG. 4c

graph) circumscribing the members of the mutual influence sets and minority control sets, respectively, of Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c. In Diagram 4c, for example, a longest path in the digraph includes a path of length 1 from $\{a,m\}$ to $\{L,k\}$, a path of length 2 from $\{a,m\}$ to $\{b,h\}$, and a path of length 3 from $\{a,m\}$ to $\{c\}$; there is also another longest path of length 3 from $\{g\}$ to $\{L,k\}$ to $\{b,h\}$ to $\{c\}$. Since the two paths of length 3 are the longest paths in the digraph, there are four hierarchical levels in this system (#1, #2, #3, and #4), with each point in a longest path assigned to a different level as shown.

Each point not in a longest path of the reduced digraph, but influenced by a point in a longest path, is given level assignment $\#(q+1)$, where q is the length of a maximal path of the digraph terminating at the point in question. Thus, $\{L,k\}$ of level assignment #2 in Figure 4c, which is in a longest path, influences $\{d\}$, which is the terminal point of two maximal paths of length 2, so the level assignment of $\{d\}$ is $\#(2+1)$, or #3.

On the other hand, each point not in a longest path of the reduced digraph, but which influences a point in a longest path, is given level assignment $\#(p-r+1)$, where p, as above, is the length of a longest path in the digraph and r is the length of a maximal path in the digraph originating with the point in question. Thus, $\{k\}$ of level assignment #3 in Figure 4b, which is in a longest path, is influenced by $\{j\}$, which is the originator of a maximal path of length 1; since a longest path in the digraph is of length 2, the level assignment of $\{j\}$ is $\#(2-1+1)$, or #2.

For more complicated digraphs, similar procedures can be followed for ordering more "remotely" connected points at unique hierarchical levels. These ordering procedures, which have been incorporated into a computer program called DECOMP,[18] allow us to define an index of power concentration between any two hierarchical levels, m and n $(m<n)$, of a political system:

$$PC(m,n) = 1 - \frac{N_{MC(m)}}{N_{T(m,n)} - N_{U(m,n)}} \quad \text{if } N_{MC(m)} > 0$$

$$PC(m,n) = 0 \quad \text{if } N_{MC(m)} = 0$$

where $0 \leq PC(m,n) < 1$ and

$N_{C(m)}$ = the number of decision-makers in minority control sets at level m,

$N_{T(m,n)}$ the total number of decision-makers in the political system at levels m through n,

$N_{U(m,n)}$ = the number of decision-makers (not in minority control sets at level m) at levels m through n uninfluenced by any minority control sets at level m.

$N_{U(m,n)}$ will not be equal to zero whenever there is a mutual influence set at level m, or a mutual influence or minority control set at levels $(m+1)$ through n which is only a "transmitter"—that is, which exerts influence but is not influenced from above.[19] Only in the mutual adjustment system (Figure 4b), where $N_{U(1,2)} = N_{U(1,3)} = 1$ because of $\{j\}$, is this term not equal to zero.

---

[18] Steven J. Brams, "DECOMP: A Computer Program for the Condensation of a Directed Graph and the Hierarchical Ordering of Its Strong Components," *Behavioral Science*, forthcoming. A write-up and source deck of this program are available from the Syracuse University Computing Center, Syracuse, N. Y.

[19] In digraph theory, the set of points with outgoing but no incoming directed lines at all levels (but the lowest) of the reduced digraph—the

It is apparent that a single index like PC which summarizes a complex system from the top to the bottom levels may cover up where and to what extent power is concentrated in the system. Therefore, there is an obvious advantage in a "movable" index which allows one to describe the concentration of power between *any* two levels of a political system.

In Table 1 the values of this index for all one-step levels, and for the highest and lowest levels (i.e., the entire system), are given for the hierarchical, mutual adjustment, and mixed systems. When there are no minority control sets exerting influence from a higher to a lower level, the index assumes the arbitrary value 0, which is indicative of the "many" influencing the "few" and thus the low concentration of power between two levels.

The higher the value of PC(m,n), the more concentrated power is between levels m and n. In the hierarchical system, for example, power is more concentrated between levels #2 and #3 (PC$(2,3) = .80$) than between levels #1 and #2 (PC$(1,2) = .75$); for the system as a whole PC$(1,3) = .94$, since $\{T\}$ at level #3 is the only decision-maker counted in the $N_{MC(m)}$ term of the index.

In the mixed system PC$(1,2) = .40$, suggesting that, contrary to our definition of minority control sets, the "many" may exert influence on the "few" and drop the value of the index below .50. Examination of Figure 4c explains this phenomenon: minority control indeed exists, but it exists because of influence directly exerted by $\{a,m\}$ and $\{g\}$ at level #3 as well as level #2. When we look at the concentration of power between levels #1 and #3 (PC$(1,3) = .63$), the index assumes a value $>.50$.

In general, PC$(m,n) \leq .50$ (but not equal to the arbitrary value 0) if and only if the minority control sets at level m, considered together, have more constituent members than the sets at lower levels, down to n, which they influence. This circumstance cannot occur in a system unless multiple influence from two or more sources, at or above level n, impinges on at least one mutual influence or minority control set, perhaps below level n, in the system.

TABLE 1. VALUES OF PC(m,n) FOR THREE DECISION-MAKING SYSTEMS

PC(m,n)	Hierarchical System	Mutual Adjustment System	Mixed System
One-Step Levels			
PC(1,2)	.75	.78	.40
PC(2,3)	.80	0	.60
PC(3,4)	—	—	0
Entire System			
PC(1,3)	.94	.83	—
PC(1,4)	—	—	.67

Because the mixed system contains an influence relationship that traverses more than one level ($\{g\} \rightarrow \{b,h\}$ goes from level #1 to level #3 in Figure 4c), its reduced digraph is not "gradable." In a gradable reduced digraph all the directed lines fall between adjacent levels, so the length of every path connecting two points in such a digraph is equal in all cases to the absolute difference in the levels of the points. As a consequence, influence exerted by mutual influence or minority control sets at one level in both the hierarchical and mutual adjustment systems, each of which is respresentable by a gradable reduced digraph, will reach all mutual influence and minority control sets (connected by a path) at any given lower level in the same amount of time.[20] It is also worth noting that, in every system representable by a nongradable reduced digraph, there will be influence from two or more sources at different levels impinging on at least one mutual influence or minority control set, suggesting the possibility of conflicting orders from different levels that create cross-pressures on the actors in such systems.

So far we have shown how actors in a political system can be grouped into mutual influence and minority control sets and assigned unique hierarchical levels according to the structure of their pairwise influence relations. Having formulated an index to measure the concentration of power between any two levels of a political system, we shall now discuss what this index does *not* measure and some possible variations that might be made in it to suit the particular needs of a study. For convenience we shall assume in the next section that levels m and n have been chosen and shall refer only to the PC index instead of the PC (m,n) index.

---

originators of influence in the system—is the unique point basis of the reduced digraph. In the original digraph (containing cycles), a point basis is not unique and will consist of one member from each of the originator mutual influence and/or minority control sets. See Harary, Norman, and Cartwright, *op. cit.*, pp. 85–89.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 276.



FIG. 5



FIG. 6

V. WHAT THE INDEX DOES NOT MEASURE

One kind of decision-maker occupies a special position in a power structure. This is the *linkage* decision-maker, of which we may distinguish two types. One type is the *upward* linkage decision-maker, as represented by decision-maker *b* in Figure 5, who links decision-makers from higher levels to the members of his mutual influence set. The other type is the *downward* linkage decision-maker, as represented by decision-maker *c* in Figure 5, who links decision-makers at lower levels to the members of his mutual influence set. In both cases the influence of these linkage decision-makers "overlaps" their mutual influence sets and joins decision-makers at different levels in the system.[21] As we shall see below, the type of linkage of a linkage decision-maker may be different with respect to the different decision-makers that he joins above and below him.

When a linkage decision-maker is both upward- and downward-linked, as is decision-maker *c* in Figure 6, the flow of influence in the system from higher to lower levels will be most direct. However, this fact will not be reflected in the value of the PC index, which is the same (.75) between the top and bottom levels for both of the systems in Figures 5 and 6, because the index treats mutual influence sets as indecomposable units of analysis and gives no special recognition to the types of linkage decision-makers within these units.

While information on linkage decision-makers, or the "tightness" of influence relations within mutual influence sets, is not taken into account in the formulation of the PC index, it is certainly recoverable at a later stage in the analysis. Having observed from Figure 4c, for instance, that the mixed system can be represented by a nongradable reduced digraph of four levels, with different PC values for each pair of levels, we can then go back to Figure 3*c* for more detailed information and ascertain that: (1) with respect to minority control set $\{L,k\}$ at level #2, decision-maker *b* in mutual influence set $\{b,h\}$ is both an upward and downward linkage decision-maker; (2) with respect to minority control sets $\{a,m\}$ and $\{g\}$ at level #1, however, decision-maker *b* is only a downward linkage decision-maker (decision-maker *h* in $\{b,h\}$ is the upward linkage decision-maker); (3) thus, we may conclude that the flow of influence to mutual influence set $\{c\}$ at the bottom level takes a more direct route from $\{L,k\}$ through $\{b,h\}$ than from $\{a,m\}$ or $\{g\}$ through $\{b,h\}$.

One form of indirect influence which we have not allowed for in our definition of a minority control set is that occurring when a mutual influence set directly *and* indirectly, but not directly alone, influences one or more other mutual influence sets containing a total of more constituent decision-makers. If we restrict minority control only to instances where the "few" directly exert influence on the "many," then we can reserve the term *minority influence* (and minority influence sets) for those other cases where the "few," both directly and indirectly, exert influence on the "many." If $\{c\}$ influenced $\{j\}$, for example, in Diagram 3b, it would be considered a minority influence set because $\{j\}$ influences $\{k\}$—and thus $\{c\}$ directly or indirectly would influence two decision-makers. Minority influence is a remote form of minority control.

Obviously, the appropriateness of either the inclusion or exclusion of indirect influence in the PC index will depend on whether or not direct and indirect forms of influence can be considered equivalent to each other. This judgment in turn will depend on the nature of the political system under investigation—in particular, the speed with which influence flows from one actor to another—and in what time perspective (short-run, long-run) one seeks to describe behavior within the system. The distribution of influence among the members of a system in the short run may look quite different than in the long run, after indirect influence has had time to "spread."[22]

---

[21] Such "linking pins," when operating at different hierarchical levels, have been found to perform a valuable integrative function in an organization. See Rensis Likert, *New Patterns of Management* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), ch. 8. In digraph theory, linkage decision-makers *b* and *c* in Figure 5 are cut points whose removal would reduce the strength of connectedness of the digraph. See Harary, Norman, and Cartwright, *op. cit.*, ch. 8. For a method to identify "liaison persons" in symmetric graphs, see Ian C. Ross and Frank Harary, "Identification of the Liaison Persons of an Organization Using the Structure Matrix," *Management Science*, 1 (April–July 1955), 251–258.

Given the availability of additional information, the PC index could be modified in another way. If numerical weights could be assigned to decision-makers, minority control (and minority influence) sets could be defined on the basis of the combined weights of the decision-makers in one mutual influence set being less than the combined weights (rather than the combined numbers) of those in other sets which they influence.

It seems evident that what the best index is for any particular study will depend on the nature and purposes of the study. The point I wish to emphasize is that all variations in the power concentration index ultimately depend on variations in the definition of mutual influence sets, minority control (and minority influence) sets, and hierarchical levels of control, the building-block concepts in this analysis.[23] I have attempted to show how these concepts can help us to simplify visually and summarize quantitatively complex power configurations in a political system.

VI. AN ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION TO EMPIRICAL DATA

Unfortunately, few attempts have been made to represent power relations in a political system schematically. The paucity of work in this area undoubtedly stems in part from the lack of analytic tools that enable one to simplify, and extract meaning from, complex power structures. No less an obstacle, however, has been the obdurate problem of identifying a relational concept of power that can be defined operationally and used to measure the exercise of power between actors in a political system.

As a very rudimentary approach to this problem, we shall consider two actors to be in a power relationship when they appear to be responsive to each other's behavior. When one actor responds more frequently than the other, we shall assume that the actor responding less frequently exercises asymmetrical influence over the actor responding more frequently; when the actors respond to each other with equal frequency, we shall assume that they are involved in a symmetrical influence relationship.[24] As Thibaut and Kelley explain, the possession of superior (or asymmetrical) power tends to relieve an actor in a dyadic relationship of the necessity of paying close at-

---

[22] See John R. P. French, Jr., "A Formal Theory of Social Power," in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (eds.), *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (2nd ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 727–744; and Frank Harary, "A Criterion for Unanimity in French's Theory of Social Power," in Dorwin Cartwright (ed.), *Studies in Social Power* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Research Center for Group Dynamics, University of Michigan, 1959), pp. 168–182.

[23] Another elementary concept, influence relationship sets, might be usefully employed to build greater precision into the power concentration index. These sets would consist of all asymmetrical influence *relationships* occurring between each minority control set and the set or sets which it influences. For example, the values of the PC index for the three-actor systems pictured below are the same (.67), but the influence relationship set for the system on the left has one member (one directed line from the minority control set to the mutual influence set) while the influence relationships set for the system on the right has two members (two directed lines from the minority control set to the mutual influence set). Because minority control set $\{a\}$ can exert direct influence on actor c in the right-hand system, a reasonable argument could be made to weight the influence of $\{a\}$, and the concentration of power in the system, by the number of members of the influence relationship sets. The more influence relationships which these sets contain, the more direct will be minority control—and, in one sense, the more concentrated power will be in the system.





[24] For experimental evidence on this point, see Jacob I. Hurwitz, Alvin Zander, and Bernard Hymovitch, "Some Effects of Power on the Relations Among Group Members," in Cartwright and Zander, *op. cit.*, pp. 800–809; Arthur R. Cohen, "Upward Communication in Experimentally Created Hierarchies," *Human Relations*, 11 (Feb. 1958), 41–53; and David L. Watson, "Effects of Certain Social Power Structures on Communication in Task-Oriented Groups," *Sociometry*, 28 (Sept. 1965), 322–336.

tention to his partner's actions.[25] In this sense, power is "the ability to afford not to learn."[26]

In order to apply these simplifying assumptions to the identification of symmetrical and asymmetrical forms of power in dyadic relationships, it is first necessary to try to infer the "responses" of actors to each other's behavior. For this purpose, we shall use data collected by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski on the number and location of all Politburo-level bilateral and multilateral meetings of delegations from eight Communist countries in the two periods November 1956-November 1957 (the "stabilization" period) and 1958–1959.[27] Two countries will be considered to be in an influence relationship if their meetings with each other exceed a specified number. If an equal number occurs in each country, their influence relationship will be considered symmetrical; otherwise, the country *receiving* the most visits (responses) will be considered the country exercising asymmetrical influence over the other.

Influence is thus conceived not as a substance or possession (e.g., GNP) but as a relational property that appears in the transactions of nations.[28] In particular, we have conceptualized it as a property associated with the recurring movements of government officials. From the symmetrical or asymmetrical pattern of such movements, we seek to infer the responses of these officials and their governments to each other's actions.[29]

In the November 1956–November 1957 period, the bilateral and multilateral meetings represented occasions for the eight countries to meet with each other 60 times in pairs.[30] Since there are 28 possible combinations in which eight countries can meet in pairs, one would expect that the average pair of countries would meet $60/28=2.14$ times in this period. If we assume that two countries are in an influence relationship if their Politburo-level delegations met a greater-than-expected number of times, then any pair of countries that met three or more times (i.e., at least 40 percent above the expected number of meetings in this case) would qualify as being in an influence relationship.

In the 1958–1959 period, there were 109 occasions for the 28 pairs of countries to meet with each other in bilateral or multilateral meetings, or an expected number of 3.90 meetings per pair of countries. Instead of assuming that two countries were in an influence relationship if they met four or more times during this period (i.e., at least 3 percent above the expected number of meetings), we shall assume five meetings as the minimum number necessary for an influence relationship to exist (i.e., at least 28 percent above the expected number) in order to make the cutoff point for this period more comparable with the cutoff point for the earlier period.[31]

Based on the above criteria, the symmetrical influence relations among the eight Communist countries for the two periods are shown in

---

[25] John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 125.

[26] Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 111.

[27] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "The Organization of the Communist Camp," in his *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (rev. ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 445–479.

[28] For an actor-oriented measure of influence in dominance situations (system representable by a complete asymmetric digraph where each actor either dominates or is dominated by—but not both—every other actor), see John G. Kemeny, J. Laurie Snell, and Gerald Thompson, *Introduction to Finite Mathematics* (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 390–391.

[29] For an extended treatment of this idea, see Charles A. McClelland, *Theory and the International System* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966), Ch. 3. In a recent paper, McClelland has used digraph theory to study international crises. See his "The Beginning, Duration, and Abatement of International Crises: Comparisons in Two Conflict Areas," in Charles F. Hermann (ed.) *International Crises*, forthcoming.

[30] A bilateral meeting represents an occasion for the meeting of one pair of countries whereas a multilateral meeting represents an occasion for several pairs of countries to meet with each other. Brzezinski did not distinguish between the meetings of pairs of delegations in bilateral and multilateral meetings.

[31] If we assumed six meetings per pair as the cutoff point in the second period (i.e., 54 percent above the expected number), then only 5 of the 28 pairs of countries would be in influence relationships and at least two of the eight countries would therefore not be in influence relationships with any others. At the five-meeting-per-pair cutoff point, on the other hand, 9 of the 28 pairs of countries are in influence relationships, and each of the eight countries is in an influence relationship with at least one other. In the first period, one country (Rumania) is not in an influence rela-



Nov. 1956–Nov. 1957

Fig. 7a



1958–1959

Fig. 7b

Figures 7a and 7b.[32] The grouping of these countries into mutual influence and minority control sets reveals that there are three hierarchical levels of influence in the earlier period (longest path: $\{\text{USR,GME}\}\rightarrow\{\text{CZE}\}\rightarrow\{\text{CHN}\}$), but only two in the later period, so PC(m,n) for the entire system in the earlier period is PC(1,3), in the later period, PC(1,2).

The value of PC(1,3) in the earlier period is .71 (with Rumania not in an influence relationship, the system comprises seven countries), and the value of PC(1,2) in the later period (with the system comprising all eight countries) is .63, suggesting that power became less concentrated in the Communist political system in the late 1950's. This finding seems to be in agreement with the observations of many experts that the bloc had begun to assume a more polycentric character at this time.[33]

As host to frequent delegations from abroad the Soviet Union stands as the dominant influence on other bloc members in both periods. Its association with neo-Stalinist East Germany in the early period, and more revisionist Hungary and Poland in the later period, are particularly worthy of note.[34] Rumania's disattachment from the bloc in the early period—perhaps indicative of its neglect by the rest of the bloc—might in part explain recent signs it has given of disaffection with Soviet policies and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

VII. SOME BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS

Needless to say, the diagrams of influence relations of the eight Communist countries are vastly oversimplified representations of very complex phenomena and processes. Although my measure of influence is based upon the movement of high-level officials in policy-making positions—and thus, presumably, indicative of more than just a lack of indifference between two countries—it ignores the substance of their meetings, the power resources available to the participants, their goals, motives, and opportunity costs, the scope of issues over which influence was exercised, the forms which it took, and the effects of the exercise of influence on the subsequent behavior of the officials and the countries they represented.

Unfortunately, these are matters on which reliable information is generally lacking, even if means could be devised for distilling it and combining it in a way which would make meaningful comparisons possible. For now we must settle for more available and manageable types of data, but there is no impenetrable upper limit on the types of manipulations that we can perform on these data to elicit *patterns* of influence relations among actors in political systems—a heretofore neglected area of politi-

---

tionship with any other, but the three-meetings-per-pair cutoff point for this period cannot be lowered without violating the criterion that the cutoff point be greater than the expected number of visits per pair for the system.

[32] The eight countries, and their code abbreviations, are: Bulgaria—BUL; China—CHN; Czechoslovakia—CZE; East Germany—GME; Hungary—HUN; Poland—POL; Rumania—RUM; and Soviet Union—USR.

[33] See, for example, Robert H. McNeal (ed.), *International Relations Among Communists* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 76–78.

[34] For a discussion of these points, see Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 482–483.

cal inquiry.[35] Indeed, these manipulations as much as the data themselves will determine how rapidly our knowledge advances.

Why has the search for patterns been neglected? At least in part because

> . . . statistical techniques are not appropriate to realms of organized complexity where some statements can be made only of the two or more things considered in their interrelationship, where the pertinent fact is not the presence or absence of something in such and such quantity but rather the nature of the arrangement of the observable entities.[36]

Toward dealing with the arrangement of such entities, I have defined a political system as something set-theoretic in nature consisting of a set of actors and certain kinds of relations between pairs of actors. Then, by relating the actors and their relations to the points and directed lines of a digraph, which were primitive (undefined) terms in the analysis, I was able to utilize the findings of digraph theory to highlight some structural properties of the systems under consideration.

In this way, modern mathematics provides a powerful means to simplify and bring order out of complex systems of actors and their relations where either the empirical structure of a system cannot adequately be interpreted numerically or where the assumptions and concepts of a non-numerical model better describe relevant aspects of the structure. There is necessarily arbitrariness in the choice of a particular model—numerical or non-numerical—and the concomitant simplifications it imposes on the reality one is trying to describe, but a fruitful model can rearrange and discipline the way in which personal bias is introduced so as to evoke new and interesting patterns that intuitive methods cannot reveal.[37]

While different systemic models may produce different patterns that "fit the data," *explanation* of the data requires that a model's mathematical assumptions (e.g., a digraph is an irreflexive relation), primitives (e.g., point), and derived concepts (e.g., strong component of a digraph) underlying the way in which the parts of a system are pieced together be explicitly related to behavioral assumptions (e.g., no actor can influence himself), primitives (e.g., actor), and derived concepts (e.g., mutual influence set) in the model. Having established such a correspondence, the mathematical theory can then be used to draw out nonobvious theoretical implications linking the mathematical primitives and derived concepts (e.g., every point is contained in exactly one strong component), which may then be replaced by their behavioral counterparts (e.g., every actor is a member of exactly one mutual influence set).

At a mathematical level, we end up with not only a set of theorems but an understanding of how they were arrived at, step by deducible step; at a behavioral level, we end up with a set of hypotheses, some of which (those whose constituent terms can be interpreted empirically) are capable of test by reference to observable phenomena. Thus, the statement "every actor is a member of exactly one mutual influence set" is a logically necessary consequence of the assumptions of the digraph model; its formal correctness has nothing to do with how we choose to interpret its behavioral terms empirically.[38] As applied to an empirical situation, however, it is a hypothesis whose corroboration by empirical data would require operationally defining its terms independently of each other and testing the truth of the empirical relationship. For example, we might define an actor to be a member of a legislative body and a mutual influence set to be a party caucusing group in the legislature; in testing the hypothesis, we would not only be confirming or disconfirming *its* empirical validity but mediately strengthening or weakening the primitive hypotheses—of which there may be more than one set—from which it was derived in the model (e.g., all influence relationships are either symmetrical or asymmetrical), which may not be directly testable because their constituent terms (i.e., symmetrical and asymmetrical influence relationships) do not refer to observable phenomena.[39]

---

[35] Cf. Riker's argument for *n*-adic, rather than dyadic, definitions of power. William H. Riker, "Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power," this REVIEW, 58 (June, 1964), 341–349.

[36] Clyde Kluckhohn, "Cultural Anthropology," in Lynn White, Jr. (ed.), *Frontiers of Knowledge in the Study of Man* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 39.

[37] See Christopher Alexander, *Notes on the Synthesis of Form* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 194, Footnote 12. It should be noted that the non-numerical digraph model was used to formulate the numerical PC(m,n) index.

[38] See Rudolph Carnap, "Elementary and Abstract Terms," in Arthur Danto and Sidney Morgenbesser (eds.), *Philosophy of Science* (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1960), p. 155. The above analytic (nonfactual) statement illustrates the great advantage of translating an already developed mathematical theory into a mathematical model of a political system: the model inherits from the theory a stock of proven theorems with a logically unassailable theoretical structure.

Finally, some concepts of the model, when combined with our knowledge of the empirical world, may suggest how characteristics of a system (e.g., "gradability" of its reduced digraph) may be related to characteristics of its members (e.g., extent of cross-pressures on them) and thus lead to new insights into the possible effect of a system on the behavior of its members and vice versa. Other insights might be generated "retroductively" from the data when diverse phenomena are observed (e.g., Rumania's early neglect by Communist bloc members and its independence today) which may be made explicable by supposing a hypothesis to obtain (e.g., neglect of a member of a system will loosen his attachment to the norms of the system).[40] In the conclusion of this article I shall suggest some individual and systemic characteristics associated with the degree of power concentration in a system.

The approach outlined above, heterodox by traditional standards, seems more relevant to the construction of fruitful models and testable theories than simply positing physical analogues of political systems (e.g., an airport traffic control center), whose structural correspondence to real political systems is impossible to validate. Such an approach also seems useful in the face of the welter of uncoordinated findings that new methods of quantitative analysis, particularly with the aid of the computer, have made possible. To give theoretical coherence to our knowledge of the political world, it is essential that we begin to investigate *structural* properties associated with complex and observable patterns of relations instead of focusing attention exclusively on the quantifiable properties of the constituent units of systems.[41] In their allusions to the "exact sciences," social and behavioral scientists generally have not recognized that some of the greatest advances in modern physics, particularly in mathematical theories of symmetry and invariance, have been characterized by a concern with relational patterns and spatial order of geometrical configurations of elementary particles—what might be called the architecture of matter—rather than with properties of the featureless constituent units or the forces that produced them.[42] Indeed, Marshall McLuhan asserts that "it has been the consensus of modern science and philosophy that we have now shifted from 'cause' to 'configuration' in all fields of study and analysis."[43]

My operationalization of the direction of influence flows in terms of the symmetrical and asymmetrical movement of government officials, though supported by experimental studies, should be recognized as a high-order abstraction of the generally unobservable succession of demands and responses of governments in influence relationships to which we are not privy. Different measures of and assumptions about influence may produce different findings, but these will be a matter of concern only if one insists that power is a unidimensional concept whose essence can be revealed by some single best method of analysis.[44] Hopefully, my illustrative application of the power concentration index to empirical data will stimulate the search for reliable and valid indicators of relational power as well as the application of the index—or the kinds of methods which underlie its formulation—to more complex systems which reveal more fully its utility as a comparative measure.[45] In different behavioral contexts, particularly sociometry, the index would seem useful as a measure of the concentration of communications, friendship choices, and other interaction phenomena and processes.[46]

---

[39] Carl G. Hempel, "Operationism, Observation, and Theoretical Terms," *ibid.*, pp. 117–120.

[40] Retroduction, which involves reasoning back from diverse phenomena to a pattern within which they appear intelligible, should be distinguished from induction, which involves the discovery of regularities (empirical correlations) in repetitive observations of details in phenomena. See Norwood R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 85ff. I am indebted to Wayne A. Kimmel for this reference.

[41] This is not to say that study of the isolated parts of systems is not useful but rather that we must also direct our attention to ways of putting the parts together into a palpable whole. This point is developed more fully in my "Transaction Flows in the International System," this REVIEW, 60 (Dec. 1966), 880–881. For a discussion of these contemporary approaches in biology, see C. H. Waddington, *The Nature of Life* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961), esp. pp. 21–24.

[42] Jacob Bronowski, "The Discovery of Form," in Kepes, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 56, 59–60.

[43] Marshall McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 252.

[44] On this point, see James D. Barber, *Power in Committees: An Experiment in the Government Process* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), p. 129.

The digraph model on which the index is based might also be used to construct a logical hierarchy of if-then propositions. Such a hierarchical ordering of causal relations could be obtained by letting the points of a digraph symbolize a set of characteristics $\{c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n\}$ (e.g., bicameral legislature), a single directed line from characteristic c_i to c_j symbolize the implication relation for conditional statements (if c_i then c_j) that are true (for a particular universe), and two directed lines going in opposite directions between characteristics c_i and c_j symbolize the equivalence relation for biconditional statements (c_i if and only if c_j) that are true. Since the characteristics in every "mutual influence set" form an equivalence class, the presence of only one in a set could be used to establish the presence of all in the set; and the presence of characteristics forming a point basis (see footnote 19) could be used to establish the presence of all characteristics in the heirarchy.

VIII. CONCLUSION

I shall conclude by suggesting some possible correlates and consequences of the concentration (or dispersion) of power in political systems. First and most obviously, the concentration of power might be correlated with itself—that is to say, its concentration in one issue-area might tend to be associated with its concentration in other issue-areas, as Robert A. Dahl found in New Haven.[47] On the other hand, the dispersion of powerful forces on one decision might be associated with their dispersion, through different alignment, on others, as apparently was the case in Chicago in the late 1950's.[48] Further, the concentration of power in one functional area may breed its concentration in others, as the rapid centralization of supranational authority in Western Europe a decade ago demonstrated.[49]

Second, the high concentration of power in a decision-making system may increase its vulnerability, especially if the structure of the system is a tree in which the disruption of one channel of influence would affect all decision-makers below the decision-maker directly serviced by this channel. In such a system there would be few opportunities for coalitions with overlapping members to form, which would increase the probability of disruptive conflict in the system and decrease its chances of long-run survival and growth. Growth, Deutsch has argued,[50] is fostered by an increase in the levels of autonomy of a system, which might in graph-theoretic terms be reflected in the development of systems whose power structures are nongradable graphs with centers (or subsystems) of influence connected by linkages spanning several different hierarchical levels.[51]

Finally, at least in small groups, the distribution of power is related to the communications network through which power is exerted. The greater a person's "relative centrality" in a communications network, for example, the higher his morale and the more likely he is to emerge as leader of his group.[52] Analogously in political systems, high concentration of power is probably correlated with the emergence of single rather than collective leaders within elite structures. Furthermore, satisfaction probably accrues to people in these positions, and those who find such positions attractive at the recruitment stage probably possess a distinctive set of psychological predispositions.

---

[45] For an analysis of changes in the structure of influence relationships over time based on visits between heads-of-state and other high-level officials for all nations in the world in 1964–65, see Steven J. Brams, "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (rev. ed.; New York: Free Press, forthcoming 1969). In *ibid.*, it is suggested that the kind of influence tapped by data on international visits tends to reflect the visited nation's control over broad policy areas, but not specific actions related to the vital national interests, of the visiting nation.

[46] One concept making use of interaction data that has been of particular interest in the structural analysis of organizations is status. See Leo Katz, "A New Status Index Derived from Sociometric Analysis," in J. L. Moreno (ed.), *The Sociometry Reader* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 266–271; and Frank Harary, "Status and Contra-status," *Sociometry*, 22 (March 1959), 23–43.

[47] Dahl, *op. cit.*

[48] Banfield, *op. cit.*

[49] Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economical Forces*, 1950–1957. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1958).

[50] Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

[51] One kind of algebraic ordering which has been proposed as a model for the structure of cities and organizations is the semilattice. See Christopher Alexander, "A City is Not a Tree," *Architectural Forum*, 122 (2 parts; April, May 1965), pp. 58–62, 58–61; and Morris R. Friedell, "Organizations as Semilattices," *American Sociological Review*, 32 (Feb. 1967), 46–54.

[52] Alex Bavelas, "Communication Patterns in Task-oriented Groups," in Cartwright and Zan-

Considerably more research is needed, however, to test and confirm how and under what circumstances the concentration of power affects political behavior. Being better able to measure and compare how and to what extent power is relationally distributed among the members of political systems should better enable us to understand and predict its effects.

From a broader perspective, I believe the usefulness of the kind of configurative analysis outlined here—or synthesis, from the viewpoint of combining constituent units—is not limited to the study of power. Other manifold phenomena and processes are amenable to systemic types of analysis, and other models or indices, such as the influence concentration index suggested by Bruce M. Russett in this issue of the REVIEW, will illuminate this kind of pursuit.[53] By taking the trouble to explain the substantive meaning and behavioral significance of the abstract assumptions and concepts of a mathematical theory, we can translate the theory into a model, and the model with operational concepts and data into a testable empirical theory, and thus raise the concept of a political system from the level of vocabulary to the level of analysis. Otherwise, the way in which we try to fit the erratic properties of the parts of a system into a less erratic and more coherent whole will remain in the hocus-pocus world of magic, leaving us with either no visible trace of how a result was obtained or no clue as to its theoretical significance.

---

der, *op. cit.*, pp. 669–682. At a more theoretical level, see Terence K. Hopkins, *The Exercise of Influence in Small Groups* (Totowa, N. J.: Bedminister Press, 1964).

[53] For various measures of the "concentration of authority" based on asymmetric dominance relationships between all pairs of actors in a system, see Otomar J. Bartos, *Simple Models of Group Behavior* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 56–61. These measures, like Russett's, are algebraic in nature and do not presuppose a decomposition that depicts the geometric order in a system.

PROBABILISM AND THE NUMBER OF UNITS AFFECTED: MEASURING INFLUENCE CONCENTRATION[1]

BRUCE M. RUSSETT
Yale University

In suggesting a basis for operational indices of the concentration of power Steven Brams' creative article "Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems" (see pp. 461–475) has performed an important service to the discipline in opening up a neglected area. It is very surprising that despite all the past efforts to devise summary measures of power bases (e.g., income or military strength) so little effort has gone into summary indices for rigorously gauging their dispersion or the absence of dispersion. Having acknowledged Brams' piece as an extremely valuable stimulus for further thought, I would like now to exercise a scientific prerogative to propose a variation in the approach that should, for some theoretical purposes, prove even more useful. As Brams notes appropriately, it is indeed true that the best index "for any particular study will depend on the nature and purposes of the study."

All the versions of Brams' PC index are directed toward measuring the *collective* exercise of influence between different levels of decision-makers. This approach reflects an essentially *deterministic* point of view: the influence from any level on a mutual influence set or sets is determined by the exercise of influence on only one of its members. For example, if *a* has power over *b*, and *b* is in a mutual influence set with *c*, then *c*'s actions vis-à-vis *b* are completely determined by *a*. As far as the PC index is concerned, this is no different from the case of *a*'s directly influencing *b* and directly influencing *c* when *b* and *c* are not in an influence relationship. But if one takes a *probabilistic* viewpoint of indeterminacy, of *a*'s predominance but less than complete control over *b* and *c* when they are in a mutual influence relationship, the relations among units at a subordinate level become interesting. Then the PC index will sometimes prove unsatisfactory because it does not measure the *individual* exercise of influence between each decision-maker and all others at a particular level. The problem can be illustrated with Figures 1a and 1b.[2]

By any of the versions of the PC index both graphs would produce the same measure, $1-\frac{3}{7}=.57$. There are two levels, and a single minority control set of three decision-makers in each. The distinction that in Figure 1a those at the lower level are isolated from one another, whereas in Figure 1b they exert a good deal of influence on one another, is not recognized. Yet intuitively it would seem that power is more heavily concentrated in the first system than in the second. The first illustrates a successful divide-and-rule policy, while the second suggests both a diffusion of total influence and perhaps some possibilities for a future change in the system if the lower group can realize the potential of its greater size and the influence its members exert on one another.

To help avoid such results I propose an alternative measure, based *not* on the size of various *sets* but on the size of the domain, the *number of other decision-makers influenced by a given decision-maker*. This shift to the number of decision-makers influenced, furthermore, makes it possible to avoid the concept of minority control sets, a concept which leads to certain additional difficulties with the PC index. The proposed alternative still makes use of the system of directed graphs employed by the previous article, but does not incorporate the set-theoretic aspects. In line with this probabilistic emphasis on influence but incomplete control of one unit by another, we may identify this index by the letters IC (Influence Concentration) and define it as:

$$\mathrm{IC} = 1 - \frac{D_a + D_b + \cdots + D_n}{N(N-1)}$$

where N is the number of decision-makers in the system, and D_a is the number of decision-makers, *other than a itself*, who are influenced,

---

[1] I am grateful to the National Science Foundation and the Yale Political Data Program for general support, to Charles L. Taylor and Michael J. Taylor for our conversations on these points, and also to Steven J. Brams for a most productive further exchange.

[2] The expression $a \rightarrow b$ means that *a* often influences *b*'s actions, but with no implication that *b* always responds; $a \leftrightarrow b$ would indicate mutual influence. The empirical meaning of "often" would of course have to be specified in the situation.



FIG. 1a



FIG. 1b

directly or indirectly, by *a*, etc. For Figure 1a that would be

$$\mathrm{IC} = 1 - \frac{6+6+6+0+0+0+0}{7(6)} = .57$$

but for Figure 1b the figure is much lower, as seems intuitively reasonable:

$$\mathrm{IC} = 1 - \frac{6+6+6+3+3+3+3}{7(6)} = .29$$

Using the expression $N\ (N-1)$ in the denominator enables us to produce an index that can vary from zero to nearly unity. Like PC normally, it will always fall short of unity. The maximum concentration of power would of course be a situation where a single decision-maker *directly* influenced all the others but was not influenced by them in return. Expressed generally, the maximum possible value both for IC and for PC is $1-(1/N)$. This limits the utility of both indices for comparing systems comprising unequal numbers of decision-makers, since the maximum value approaches nearer to unity, without ever reaching it, as the number of decision-makers increases. But again, IC discriminates between systems where the subordinate units are isolated and where they form one or more mutual influence sets among themselves.

There are, however, two kinds of anomalies which form exceptions to the above statement about the maximum value of PC, and where PC may reach a value of 1.0. First, PC will equal unity whenever the controlling set is not in a minority but is *as large as or larger than the total number of units in the controlled set or sets* (e.g., if *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* were in a mutual influence relationship, and influenced *e*, *f*, and *g* acyclically). Though perfect mutual influence may seldom be observed in empirical political systems, this latter situation may not be so rare as to be absent from "most political systems of interest."[3] Any measure employing the concept of minority control set is unable to acknowledge this situation at all, let alone distinguish conditions where the controlled minority is isolated from where it forms its own mutual influence set. Both of the latter illustrate variants of a "permanent" winning coalition, and either may for instance approximately represent relations between the white majority and Negroes in a few Southern states. Second, in an acyclic chain (or path) where *a* influences *b* and *b* influences *c*, PC (excluding the variant which allows for *minority control sets*) is at 1.0 since there are no minority influence sets. This anomaly is less peculiar than those above, but surely the concentration here is no greater than in the system where one unit *directly* controls each of the others and which has the lower index of $1-(1/N)$. Because $\mathrm{PC}=1.0$ can be reached by so many different systems it is impossible to evaluate such an empirical value without other information on the system in question. Indeed, Brams does suggest other information, such as the identification of "linkage" decision-makers, but one must return to the diagrams to obtain it.

While both IC and PC in its non-anomalous forms must fall short of unity, at the lower end PC is often restricted above zero. For IC, however, zero is the true value for "pure democracy," i.e., where everyone has direct or indirect influence on everyone else. And for the situation of four units in a mutual influence set controlling three isolates,

$$\mathrm{IC} = 1 - \frac{6+6+6+6+0+0+0}{7(6)} = .43.$$

Compared with this, the minimum value of PC in all gradable graphs is

$$\mathrm{PC} = 1 - \frac{\frac{N-1}{2}}{N} = 1 - \frac{N-1}{2N}$$

except, as Brams notes, where several minority control sets impinge on one mutual influence or minority control set, and the membership of the

---

[3] "Measuring the Concentration," footnote 13.



FIG. 2a



FIG. 2b

minority control sets is larger than that of the set they influence. Aside from this exception, the minimum true value of PC, as well as its maximum value, varies with the total number of decision-makers, approaching nearer to .50 as N increases.

Note that the rank-order of relative concentration shown by IC for each of the three situations illustrated in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c of the preceding paper is nevertheless the same as produced by PC; i.e., we obtain an IC of .89 for the hierarchical system, .66 for the mutual adjustment, and .53 for the mixed (compared with .94, .83, and .67 respectively for PC). This confirms Brams' assertion that intuitive descriptions which identified Lindblom's "mixed" system as more concentrated than the mutual adjustment one were unsatisfactory. In any



FIG. 3a



FIG. 3b



FIG. 3c

case, the choice of index depends upon one's theoretical purposes, and neither is manifestly superior for all situations.

There are some interesting similarities between IC and indices of inequality based on the Lorenz curve. The latter, a standard measure of inequality or concentration, is useful wherever we can identify an individual unit as possessing a given proportion of the total value (power, wealth, representation, etc.) in the system.[4] While the Lorenz curve and its derivatives are not strictly applicable here, we can proceed on much the same principle. We can, for instance, order the decision-makers, putting those who influence (directly or indirectly) the smallest number of other decision-makers on the left and those who influence (directly or indirectly) the most on the right. Then, plotting the number of other decision-makers influenced by each on the vertical axis, we obtain graphs like those in Figures 2a and 2b for the hierarchical and mutual adjustment systems respectively. The area of the box above and to the left of the jagged line (which we may call the "concentration line") represents the difference between the actual concentration of power and a hypothetical perfect equality. If every unit influenced every unit the line would connect points running up the left-hand edge of the box and across the top. Because of the restriction on the upper limit, however, the line representing complete concentration would never be quite a perfect reverse *L* along the bottom and up the right side. (It must register the $N-1$ decision-maker as influencing 0 other decision-makers, and then angle up to the top right corner for the *N*th decision-maker who influences all others.)

Some other useful aspects may be noted. Taking a deterministic point of view that an asymmetrical power relationship is complete, in a path PC is at the anomalous value of 1.0 (see above). But if *b*'s actions are influenced but not determined by *a*, then *b* may be considered also to have independent influence over its subordinates in the chain. Under these circumstances *a* has some direct or indirect power over $N-1$ units, *b* over $N-2$, *c* over $N-3$, etc. The IC index is then exactly .50, compounded of

$$1 - \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{N} (k-1)}{N(N-1)}.$$

In a graphical presentation this gives a diagonal line bisecting the square from the lower left corner to the upper right.

Note, however, that the same index may sometimes be obtained from different patterns of influence. Suppose, for example, that we had three systems as illustrated in Figure 3. Each has precisely the same IC index, .25, yet it seems intuitively that influence is not equally concentrated in each. Most observers would regard the system of Figure 3a as in some way more "egalitarian" than either of the others, and the political implications are surely different.[5]

The first two systems can nevertheless, despite identical IC indices, be distinguished by differences in the graphical illustration of their concentration lines, as in Figure 4.

Here the system where only a minority has no influence over others is marked by an initial steep slope rapidly levelling off, whereas the system in which a minority has acyclic influence over the majority is illustrated by a steep slope in the upper right-hand corner. Thus, like the Lorenz curve or every other measure of concentration ever devised, IC cannot be used slavishly or without reference to the details of the distribution. It will often be helpful to plot graphs like those illustrated in Figures 2 and 4, and perhaps to use special-purpose indices to

---

[4] See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, "Measures for Comparing Inequality," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

[5] This is a case where Brams' PC index would differentiate the two, but by showing PC for 3b to be .75 and PC for 3a at the arbitrary value of zero (no minority control sets). Zero is of course an unsatisfactory value since there is in fact some concentration.



FIG. 4a



FIG. 4b

gauge the slope along different segments of the concentration line. For instance, a figure for the average slope of the second half of the line would effectively distinguish systems 4a and 4b, and, on the analogy of the Lorenz curve, the steeper slope would in a sense indicate greater concentration.[6]

Finally, it must be noted that neither IC nor PC takes full account of indirection and the diminution of influence implied by mediation through several actors. That is, recalling our original comment about probabilities, *b*'s control over *d* in Figure 3c is undoubtedly greater than in Figure 3b. In 3c, *b* is also linked directly to *d* without having its influence weakened by being dependent solely on intermediary *c*, with its consequent weakening of influence by the uncontrolled element in *b*'s relationship with *c*. Nor does the graphic type of presentation in Figure 4 distinguish between them, since the concentration line would be just the same as that given for 3b.

It may be said that both IC and PC are directed toward measuring the power dispersion of the *system* rather than toward an adequate measure of the power of an individual *unit*; even so, further refinements ought to incorporate a weighting scheme whereby indirect influence is counted for less than is a direct link. Ideally each relationship would be weighted by the probability of success of an influence attempt. Hence the power of *b* in $b \rightarrow c$ would be the probability that in the event of an influence attempt *c* would obey *b*'s wishes, minus the probability *c* would follow the same course of action even in the absence of any influence attempt $(P_{b/c} = P_{c,b} - P_{c,\bar{b}})$.

And the index of *b*'s power over *d* in

$$\begin{tikzcd} & b \arrow[dl] & \\ c \arrow[rr] & & d \arrow[ul] \end{tikzcd}$$

would be *b*'s indirect influence $(P_{b/c} \times P_{c/d})$ minus *d*'s influence over *b* $(P_{d/b})$. In

$$\begin{tikzcd} & b \arrow[dl] \arrow[dr, leftrightarrow] & \\ c \arrow[rr] & & d \end{tikzcd},$$

however, the index would be the sum of *b*'s direct power $(P_{d/b})$ and the probability of indirect influence if direct influence failed $(1 - P_{b/d})(P_{b/c} \times P_{c/d})$, minus $P_{d/b}$. The index would vary between $+1.0$ and -1.0 depending on whether *b* had net influence over *d*, or vice versa. *B*'s total power in the *system* would thus equal the sum of its power index over each member. Furthermore, various measures of power *concentration* in the system could be compiled from the relationship of the individual power indices. A very simple measure, for example, would be the total power index of the most powerful member divided by $N-1$; a more complex measure could use the variance of the distribution.

It is of course extremely difficult to measure empirically the component probabilities for the exercise discussed in the last paragraph. Their mere introduction raises a variety of familiar problems in the theory of power.[7]

---

[6] Formally, of course, the slope measures the *rate of change* in concentration, but similar measures with the Lorenz curve (e.g., the Schutz coefficient) are often used to suggest an aspect of concentration or inequality. See Alker and Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 364. See also Leo Goodman, "On Urbanization Indices," *Social Forces*, 31 (May, 1953), 360–362. Brams' incorporation of hierarchical levels of control into his PC index is of course another way of dealing with this problem, but it requires several distinct indices (one for each two levels) for each system, thus complicating the comparison of two different systems.

[7] See, *inter alia*, Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, 2 (July 1957), 201–215; John C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games," *Behavioral Science*, 7 (January 1962), 67–80; Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," this REVIEW, 56 (December 1962), 947–952; and William Riker, "Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power," this REVIEW, 58 (June 1964), 341–349.

THE MINORITY PARTY AND POLICY-MAKING IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

CHARLES O. JONES
University of Arizona

Considerable attention has recently been focused on political oppositions in democracies. A recent book examines oppositions in various western countries[1] and a journal called *Government and Opposition* was founded in 1965.[2] The significance of the role of an opposition in democracies does not have to be stressed. It is generally accepted.

What of the role of the opposition in the United States? Robert A. Dahl notes that one must use the plural when speaking of opposition in this country since, "a distinctive, persistent, unified structural opposition scarcely exists in the United States . . . it is nearly always impossible to refer precisely to "the" opposition, for the coalition that opposes the government on one matter may fall apart, or even govern, on another."[3]

While it is true that "the" opposition is not institutionalized as a definite cohesive, persistent, distinctive group in American politics, it is also true that there has usually been an identifiable minority party in Congress. Though it does not always oppose the majority, and cannot be expected to be synonymous with "the" opposition very often, it does persist. Despite handsome invitations to disband—in the form of successive defeats at the polls—a sizeable number of congressmen, senators, and congressional candidates continue to call themselves Republicans and to organize as such in Congress.

This study focuses on the range of strategies, including various forms of opposition, available to the minority party in congressional policy-making. Specific attention will be paid to the Republican party as a minority party in the House of Representatives for two reasons: 1) to limit the scope of the article and 2) because the Republican party is the contemporary minority party. The major questions to receive attention are: What are the principal policy-making strategies of the minority party? What political conditions determine the range of strategies available to it in any one Congress? The major thesis is that there are various types of minority parties when classified by the range of strategies available to them for participating in policy-making. Some minority parties are extremely weak and ineffectual, others have significant sources of power available to them. The role of the minority party in Congress is not a single, consistent role over time. It varies considerably depending on a number of external and internal conditions.

I. POLITICAL SETTING FOR THE MINORITY PARTY IN CONGRESS

There are certain relatively stable factors in the American political setting which are of importance in determining the role of the minority party. Notable among these are, of course, federalism, representation, and the separation of powers—all three of which tend to decentralize the political party structure. While distributing power between a central unit and sub-units, federalism also distributes elective offices throughout the land. Parties exist to fill these offices and therefore organize where elections take place. The representation system is based on the land mass of states for the Senate, population for the House, and a combination of the two for the Electoral College. Separation of powers in and of itself allows for only a minimum of coordination at the national level for the majority party and almost none at all for the minority party. Thus, decentralization and lack of cohesion may be taken as "givens" when analyzing American political parties.

The role of the minority party is also determined by the role of Congress in national policy-making. In general, Congress has the primary function of legitimating one course of action, designed to solve a public problem,

---

* This is a much-revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York City, September 6–10, 1966. Financial support for this study was provided by the Carnegie Corporation in a grant to the American Political Science Association's Study of Congress, Professor Ralph K. Huitt, Director, and the Institute of Government Research, University of Arizona. I wish to acknowledge the comments and criticisms of Samuel C. Patterson, Randall B. Ripley, John Manley, Conrad Joyner, Jorgen Rasmussen, and Phillip Chapman.

[1] Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966).

[2] The first issue of *Government and Opposition* was published in November, 1965.

[3] In Dahl, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

over another. The legitimation process is ultimately one of some type of majority rule and therefore policy to be legitimate must be traced to a numerical majority. Thus, if a course of action is to be legitimated in Congress, it is necessary for political leaders to consider the majority-building prerequisite. The output of the legitimation process may be called policy and normally it is the result of compromise. Note that reference is made to a legitimation "process." There is considerably more involved in this process than voting on legislation. The final vote is merely the manifestation of success, or lack of it, in building a majority. By legitimation process is meant all those activities to collect a majority which go on in Congress (and specifically in the House for this study).

This process of legitimation is not simply one of ratification of what the executive proposes. The executive is, indeed, a major source of proposed courses of action but there are many other sources too—interest groups, constituents, state and local public officials, members themselves. The process of building a majority involves considerable bargaining. The results of this process may bear only slight resemblance to any one of the courses of action originally proposed—whether from the executive or elsewhere.

There are a number of strategies which may be employed by the minority party in the majority coalition-building process in Congress—depending on the political conditions at the time. A minority party which is severely restricted by political conditions may only be able to *support* the majority party or offer *inconsequential opposition* to the majority-building efforts of the party in power. A minority party which has a President in the White House will have the opportunity of *participating* in majority coalition-building efforts. A minority party which is favored by political conditions may have a range of strategies available—e.g., *consequential partisan opposition*, employed to defeat majority party efforts; *consequential constructive opposition*, where the minority party counters with its own proposals; *innovation*, where the minority party initiates its own proposals and attempts to build a majority in favor; *cooperation*, where the minority works with the majority on a particular problem; *support*, as mentioned above; or *withdrawal*, where the minority party is divided on an issue and can find no basis for agreement.

What are the political conditions which may determine the range of strategies for the minority party? Conditions both inside and outside Congress may be significant. I have identified four "external conditions" and four "internal conditions" which seem to have important effects.

The general temper of the times is the first external condition to consider. Is there a domestic or international crisis which dominates policy-making? Or is there relative calm? To what extent has there been expressed a national mood for action in Congress and the executive? Since there are no simple, scientific measures of this condition, I will have to rely on fairly crude estimates of the temper of the times. The second external condition is the relative political strength of the minority party outside Congress (see Table 1). Is the party strong or weak nationally among the voters? in the states? in the White House? The third external condition is national party unity. Obviously a disunified party will be preoccupied with party matters to the exclusion normally of an active role in congressional policy-making as a party.

A fourth external condition is presidential power. A President with a variety of sources of power would normally limit the range of strategies of the minority party whereas a President with only limited sources of power would normally allow more flexibility.[4]

The first of the internal conditions is procedure in the House. Generally speaking procedure is relatively stable but minor changes occur frequently and major changes have occurred in the House in 1910–1911, 1946–1947, and 1961–1965. Such changes may have an important effect on the minority party. A second internal condition is the size of the margin enjoyed by the majority party over the minority party. A third condition is that of majority leadership and organization, and a fourth is minority party leadership and organization. Of particular interest is the ability, style, and sources of strength of both sets of leaders and the nature of the organization relied on.

II. THE MINORITY PARTY IN FOUR CONGRESSES

I have selected four congresses to illustrate the various political conditions which can set the range of strategies for the minority party. These four—the 63rd (1913–1914), 73rd (1933–1934), 85th (1957–1958), and 87th (1961–1962)—represent widely differing situations for the Republicans as a minority party

---

[4] I rely to a great extent on Richard E. Neustadt's analysis of presidential power contained in *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley, 1960).

TABLE 1. VARIOUS COMBINATIONS FOR THE TWO PARTIES SHARING DOMINANCE OF THE HOUSE, SENATE, PRESIDENCY, AND NATIONAL VOTER PREFERENCE, 1900—PRESENT

Combination	Democrats Control	Republicans Control	Occurring In
1	NPI, PR, HO, SE	—	1933–47, 1949–53, 1961–67 (24 yrs)
2	NPI, PR, SE	HO	
3	NPI, PR, HO	SE	
4	NPI, PR	HO, SE	1947–49 (2 yrs)
5	NPI	PR, SE, HO	1953–55 (2 yrs)
6	NPI, SE, HO	PR	1955–61 (6 yrs)
7	NPI, HO	PR, SE	
8	NPI, SE	PR, HO	
9	PR, HO	NPI, SE	
10	PR, SE	NPI, HO	
11	PR	NPI, HO, SE	1919–21 (2 yrs)
12	PR, SE, HO	NPI	1913–19 (6 yrs)
13	SE, HO	NPI, PR	
14	SE	NPI, PR, HO	
15	HO	NPI, PR, SE	1911–13, 1931–33 (4 yrs)
16	—	NPI, PR, SE, HO	1909–11, 1921–31 (20 yrs)

Key: NPI—National Party Identification of Voters (Survey Research Center Concept)
PR —Presidency
HO —House of Representatives
SE —Senate

in Congress. The first two (63rd and 73rd) illustrate the minority party in its most restricted role, the third (85th) illustrates one of those ambiguous policy-making situations where the minority party has a President in the White House, and the fourth (87th) is an example of greater flexibility for the minority party.

Restricted Minorities—63rd and 73rd Congresses. As noted in Table 2, the differing political conditions in 1913 and 1933 placed serious limitations on the alternative strategies which could be practically employed by the minority party. Of major importance in 1913 was the disunity of the Republican Party. Though the Republican Party was presumably the majority party in terms of voter preference in the nation,[5] the Democrats won control of both houses of Congress and the White House (combination 12, Table 1). The result was that Woodrow Wilson had sources of power not ordinarily available to a minority party President. He could capitalize on the disunity of Republicans and the fact that, though there was not a specific domestic or international crisis which dominated politics, there was a mood of dissatisfaction.[6] Arthur S. Link described it as follows:

> The election of 1912 marked the culmination of more than twenty years of popular revolt against a state of affairs that seemed to guarantee perpetual political and economic control to the privileged few in city, state, and nation. The uprising that came so spectacularly to a head in the first years of the twentieth century—the progressive movement—was the natural consummation of historical processes long in the making.[7]

Such sources of strength are formidable but they could be reduced somewhat by internal political conditions favorable to the minority party. This was not the case in 1913, however. As noted in Table 2, the internal conditions also favored Wilson and the Democrats. There had been major procedural changes in the House of Representatives in the two preceding congresses which could also be traced to the

---

[5] Of course, there were no voting behavior surveys for this period. Based on election returns, I am assuming that the Republican Party was the majority party in terms of voter party identification.

[6] Woodrow Wilson was not the kind of man to ignore the opportunity. He had expressed himself on the need for a stronger executive in his book, *Congressional Government* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956, first published in 1885). To him, the president had merely been a branch of the legislature (see p. 173).

[7] Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era* (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 1.

TABLE 2. POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND RANGE OF MINORITY PARTY STRATEGIES IN FOUR SELECTED CONGRESSES

	External Conditions				Internal Conditions				
Congress	Temper	Maj-Min Combination[a]	Min. Party Unity	President	Procedure	Margin	Majority Party Leadership	Minority Party Leadership	Type of Minority Party by Range of Strategies
63rd (1913–1914)	No Dominant Crisis Mood for Action	12 (Ambiguous)	Weak	Strong (Wilson)	Major Changes	Large	Strong	Weak	*Restricted*
73rd (1933–1934)	Dominant Crisis Mood for Action	1 (Unambiguous)	Moderate	Strong (Roosevelt)	No changes	Large	Weak	Weak	*Restricted*
85th (1957–1958)	No Dominant Crisis Mood Unclear	6 (Ambiguous)	Moderately Strong	Weak (Eisenhower)	No Changes	Small	Strong	Weak	*Participating*
87th (1961–1962)	No Dominant Crisis Mood Unclear	1 (Unambiguous)	Strong	Moderate Strength (Kennedy)	Minor Changes	Medium	Weak	Strong	*Flexible*

[a] See Table 1 for explanation of combinations.

divisions in the Republican party. As will be noted below, the reduction of the power of the Speaker had the effect of forcing the Democratic party leadership to develop new techniques for building majorities. They proved themselves adept at doing so—without having to rely on minority party support. Further the Democrats were blessed with a wide margin in the House in 1913—290 to 127. To that date, no party had ever had such a comfortable House margin.

Majority party leadership and organization in the House in the 63rd Congress were both strong and effective. With the diminution of the Speaker's power, and the rejection of collegialism and personalism as leadership styles,[8] it was natural that the House would have to go through a period of democratization. Certainly Speaker Champ Clark could not expect to wield power equal to that of his immediate predecessor, Joseph G. Cannon. At the same time, there were 290 Democrats in the House—a great many of them freshmen—who had to be led, and there was a President in the White House who wanted action. The pattern of leadership and organization that the Democrats developed in the House as a response to this situation is one of the most fascinating in the history of the modern Congress.

Speaker Clark was almost perfectly suited to the conditions of the moment. An affable, personable, and beloved member, Clark is quoted as saying in the 61st Congress, "Although I am going to be Speaker next time, I am going to sacrifice the Speaker's power to change the rules."[9] He referred to himself as "Dean of the Faculty." Randall B. Ripley classifies him as a "figurehead" Speaker.[10] Clark's majority leader, however, was Oscar W. Underwood—the brilliant Congressman, later Senator, from Alabama. Underwood also served as Chairman of the powerful Committee on Ways and Means and therefore of the Democratic Committee on Committees. He became the principal Democratic leader in the House.

Underwood capitalized on the inevitable period of democratization following Cannon's demise by relying on the caucus as a policy-setting group. Though the evidence on Underwood's techniques is still scanty, it is possible to describe the procedure which developed. Following the introduction of major bills, and their assignment to committees, the Democratic caucus would meet to debate the legislation—sometimes for two weeks. A vote would be taken, making the bill a party measure. Unless they recused themselves, Democrats were bound to vote for the bill and to vote against all amendments except those supported by the party leaders. The bill would then be brought before the appropriate committee, hearings held if the Democratic leadership so desired, and sent to the House floor for debate.[11] The Republicans played a very minor role in these proceedings, and they often expressed their frustrations. For example, Sereno E. Payne (New York), ranking Republican on the Committee on Ways and Means and former majority leader under Speaker Cannon, made the following statement in the minority report on the Underwood Tariff: "In this statement we shall not attempt to analyze this bill or to criticize it in detail. *Our acquaintance with it is too brief to permit this.*"[12] The minority report on the Federal Reserve Act expressed the same frustrations.

> The undersigned regret that when the Committee on Banking and Currency met finally to consider H. R. 7837 they found the majority members of the committee so *bound by their caucus action that they could not consider amendments* to the bill which, if adopted, would have eliminated its unsound and questionable provisions.
>
> Such changes . . . are fundamental and vital. The majority members of the committee refused to favorably consider them on the ground that they involved matters of Democratic party policy settled *by the caucus*.[13]

---

[8] These are terms used by Randall B. Ripley in *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967).

[9] Quoted in Chang-wei Chiu, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 1896* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), p. 303.

[10] Ripley, *op. cit.*, Ch. 2. The other categories of leadership style relied on by Ripley are "collegial" and "personal."

[11] Various sources may be relied on for a more complete description of this procedure. See Chiu *op. cit.*; George R. Brown, *The Leadership of Congress* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1922); Paul D. Hasbrouck, *Party Government in the House of Representatives* (New York: Macmillan, 1927); Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); Wilder H. Haines, "The Congressional Caucus of Today." this REVIEW, 9 (November, 1915), 696–706.

[12] U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, House Report No. 5, 63rd Cong., 1st sess., 1913, p. lv (emphasis added).

[13] U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, House Report No. 69, 63rd

Even with all of these disadvantages, it is conceivable that the minority party's options could be increased simply due to the strength, imagination, and style of its leaders. Unfortunately for the House Republicans in 1913, they could not expect to rely on this source of power either. They were led principally by old-guard leaders—all of whom had supported Cannon in 1910 during the speakership fight. The minority leader was James R. Mann of Illinois—an interesting, rather enigmatic figure in House politics. He was closely identified with Cannon and won the minority floor leadership post in 1911 because the old-line Republicans still maintained a majority in the House Republican Party. Mann was apparently precise, humorless, and brilliant in his own way—a sort of "thinking man's H. R. Gross." He seemed to be a transitional figure for the House Republicans—not very well liked among his colleagues and charged with the responsibility of holding the party together until they recaptured control of Congress. It is noteworthy that when the party did gain a majority in the House in 1919 Mann was defeated for the Speakership by Frederick H. Gillett of Massachusetts.

This combination of external and internal political conditions effectively neutralized the House Republican Party. Republicans were limited to *inconsequential opposition*. That is, they opposed the principal aspects of Wilson's program but could do little more than try to have amendments accepted, attempt to have the legislation recommitted, and then oppose final passage. Only if the Democrats were seriously split on some issue could the Republicans expect to play a significant role. These instances were extremely rare.[14]

House Republicans were equally impotent during the 73rd Congress but for different reasons (see Table 2). The economic collapse of the nation was the dominant condition and it worked to the advantage of the Democrats. In 1928, the Republican Party had firm control of Congress, the White House, and the nation. In 1932, the Democratic Party was unquestionably the majority party (combination 1 in Table 1). The 1932 presidential election is classified as a "realigning election" by the Survey Research Center,[15] since major shifts were occurring in voter preference between the two parties. Indeed, even some congressional Republicans failed to support Hoover in 1932. The resulting effect of these external conditions was to provide President Roosevelt with a virtual "blank check" by the public in the 1932 election. He had more impressive sources of power than almost any President in history.

What of the internal political conditions? Did they act to blunt the thrust of presidential leadership sustained by crisis? Several did in later Roosevelt congresses, but in the 73rd Congress there were few roadblocks. There were no major rules changes, but the existing rules were made to serve the President. Major legislation was sometimes processed in a matter of days. The Democratic margin over Republicans was 198 seats—313 to 117. This was the largest margin for either party in history, though new records would be set in the 74th (219 seats) and the 75th (244 seats) Congresses.

For the most part, of course, majority party leadership in the 73rd Congress was in the White House. It was probably fortunate for the Democrats that there was strong presidential leadership, the margins were large, and the mood was for action. Neither the Speaker, Henry T. Rainey of Illinois, nor the Majority Leader, Joseph W. Byrns of Tennessee, were strong leaders. Randall B. Ripley classifies Rainey as a figurehead who was conservative in his use of power.[16] He classifies Byrns in the same way when Byrns became Speaker in the 74th Congress. The Democratic Whip for the

---

Cong., 1st sess., 1913, p. 133 (emphasis added). It is not suggested that all legislation passed without incident in the House. For example, the Tariff bill and Federal Reserve bill both were controversial within the Democratic Party. Once the principal issues were resolved in the party, and between Democratic congressional leaders and President Wilson, however, major bills passed the House by large margins.

[14] One such instance was the legislation to repeal the exemption to American coastwide shipping under the Panama Canal Act of 1912. Speaker Clark and Majority Leader Underwood opposed President Wilson on repeal but, with some Republican support, Wilson was able to build a majority without their endorsement. See Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom;* and James M. Leake, "Four Years of Congress," this Review, 11 (May 1917), 252–283.

[15] Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), Ch. 19; and Philip Converse, *et al.*, "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election," this Review, 55 (June, 1961), 269–280. See also, V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (February, 1955), 3–18.

[16] Ripley, *op. cit.*, Ch. 2.

73rd Congress was Arthur H. Greenwood of Indiana.[17]

If Democratic party leadership in the House was weak, Republican party leadership was weaker. Gone was the strength of Nicholas Longworth of Ohio and John Q. Tilson of Connecticut, who led the House during the Coolidge and Hoover Administrations. The minority floor leader in the 73rd Congress was Bertrand H. Snell. Snell, a staunchly conservative businessman from upstate New York, was never very effective as leader in his eight years as minority leader (though it must be said that he led under extremely difficult circumstances). The Whip was Harry L. Englebright of California.

Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that the minority party in the 73rd Congress varied between the weak strategies of *support* of the majority coalition-building efforts of the President and *inconsequential opposition.* The emergency was there, the President had won an overwhelming mandate to proceed with whatever proposals he thought necessary, and the Republican party had little if any claim to public support. House Republicans could only add a voice to the consensus which served to legitimize unprecedented legislative actions.

The classic instance of Republican support came very early in the first session. The Emergency Banking bill was introduced, debated, and passed in both houses on March 9, the opening day of the 73rd Congress. Majority Leader Byrns asked for and got a unanimous consent agreement to limit debate to 40 minutes *even though members had not seen the bill.* Minority Leader Snell expressed the hope that Republicans would not object to this procedure.

> The house is burning down, and the President of the United States says this is the way to put out the fire. And to me at this time there is only one answer to this question, and that is to give the President what he demands and says is necessary to meet the situation.[18]

The bill passed by a voice vote.

No other legislation in the first session would go through the House with such ease. But the process by no means returned to normal. House Democrats pushed through legislation at a record pace by relying on closed rules which restricted amendments. A total of ten closed rules were employed during the first session, compared to an average of two such rules a session for other Roosevelt Congresses. As Lewis J. Lapham, in his detailed study of the House Committee on Rules, has noted: "Hardly a single important bill having to do with the economic recovery program of the president was considered by the House except under the restrictions imposed by a so-called gag rule."[19] Despite these tactics—so dreaded and heavily criticized by the minority—sizeable numbers of Republicans supported the legislation.

During the second session of the 73rd Congress, House Republicans were considerably less supportive of Roosevelt's efforts. They assumed the slightly more aggressive strategy of *inconsequential opposition.* For example, with the reciprocal trade bill, they issued a minority report which listed 24 separate reasons why Republicans could not support the bill. House Republicans rarely issued minority reports in the first session. When the bill reached the floor Allen T. Treadway (Massachusetts), ranking Republican on the Committee on Ways and Means, served mild notice that Republicans would offer less support in the future.

> . . . in making critical remarks I wish to say that they are in no way reflections on the personality of the President of the United States. I hold the President in the very highest esteem. I have voted with him as far as I could, consistently with my conscience, in his program of recovery; but I claim that when our stern convictions differ from those of the President of the United States, there is but one course for us to pursue. . . .[20]

Treadway's remarks were very circumspect, however, and, it might be added, of no great concern to the President. Roosevelt had a sizeable and dependable majority without Republican support.

The 63rd and 73rd Congresses represent very unusual minority party situations. In both instances, political conditions were such that the minority party could rely on only a very narrow range of strategies in congressional policy-making. House Republicans in both congresses had an immediate, internal party problem—that of survival as a political party.

---

[17] The caucus apparently proved useful in canvassing opinion and organizing the great numbers of new Democrats. See E. Pendleton Herring, "First Session of the 73rd Congress," this REVIEW, 28 (February, 1934), 65–83. The Democratic caucus minutes for this period are available in the Library of Congress.

[18] *Congressional Record,* 73rd Cong., 1st sess., March 9, 1933, p. 76.

[19] Lewis J. Lapham, *Party Leadership and the House Committee on Rules* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1954), p. 52.

[20] *Congressional Record,* 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 23, 1934, p. 5262.

Yet there are important differences between these two situations for the minority party. As noted in Table 2, the Republicans in 1913 had one potential source of power which was not available in 1933—they were presumably still the majority party nationally. In 1913, the salient condition determining the restriction on the minority party was disunity. Therefore, it was within the power of the minority party to make the adjustments necessary to correct this condition. If successful, the restrictions on the minority party in Congress could well be temporary. If unsuccessful, the party could well disappear as a major party. Thus, there were important stakes in seeking a rapprochement. Given the characteristics of the American party system this reunion might best be accomplished by less aggressive behavior on both sides. That is, the party might accomplish a partial healing by just "holding on"—insuring that the divisiveness not go further and that those disagreements which did exist not be advertised so broadly. For the most part, this is precisely what happened.

In 1933, however, the Republicans did not have it within their power to produce remedies. Events were out of control, as far as the minority party was concerned. The party had to stand aside and hope that, by some miracle, the situation would change. It did not. Of the two situations, that during the 73rd Congress is clearly the most undesirable from the point of view of the minority party since it signals a long period when the minority party can expect to play only the most limited role in policy-making.

A Participating Minority—85th Congress. As is noted in Table 1, the American electoral system makes possible very ambiguous political situations. One such is illustrated by the 85th Congress. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was reelected by a very large margin in 1956 but the Republican Party was unable to capture control of either house of Congress. Thus, the minority party in Congress was faced with conflicting demands and expectations—enacting the President's program while opposing congressional Democratic leadership.

Since the margins in both the House and Senate were narrow (33 seats in the House, 2 in the Senate), there were three conditions—one external, two internal—which could have resulted in a strong role for the minority party in Congress (see Table 2 for a summary of conditions). The first of these, the external condition, would be a President with a number of sources of power other than a majority in Congress. President Eisenhower did have one such source of power—his phenomenal popularity among the public. There were several factors which prevented Eisenhower from turning this advantage into success in policy-making, however. First, there was no all-engaging crisis or general mood for action which would rally all legislators to support the President. Second, it was unlikely that a man of Eisenhower's background would have the necessary skills for majority coalition-building in these circumstances (an asset for him at the polls but not in negotiating for majorities in Congress).[21] Third, it seems that the President did not see the need for legislation in many areas and therefore did not press hard for its enactment. Thus, for the very reasons that he did have personal popularity, it was unlikely that he would try to capitalize on this advantage.

The internal conditions which might have strengthened the minority party would be weak majority party leadership combined with strong minority party leadership. If House Democratic leaders had been inept—unable to control their majority—and House Republican leaders had been exceptional negotiators, it is conceivable that the minority party would have been highly successful in building majorities for a Republican program. Unfortunately for the minority, the reverse was the case during the 85th Congress.

In the House, the Democrats were able to rely on Sam Rayburn as Speaker and John W. McCormack as Majority Leader. Rayburn was serving his 22nd term as a member of the House and his seventh full term as Speaker. Though Rayburn apparently lost some of his characteristic alertness in later Congresses, he led his party with strength in the 85th Congress. Rayburn approached the perfect model of the effective Speaker of the House of Representatives. He knew the rules and how to use them, he maintained contact with all of the various wings of the House Democratic party, and he was very protective of his procedural majority—sensing when he may have gone too far with any member. He also retained a fine sense of compromise, and relied on techniques of leadership which emphasized party unity.

McCormack was serving his 15th full term in the House and his ninth term as the second-ranking leader in his party—seven as Majority Leader, two as Minority Whip. Though generally considered to be more partisan than Rayburn, McCormack had proved himself to be a very durable, and generally well-liked, leader.

---

[21] See Neustadt, *op. cit.*, pp. 163–164.

Rayburn and McCormack did not rely on either the caucus or a steering committee. They maintained a relatively efficient whip system as a formal system of communication (led by Carl Albert, Oklahoma, in the 85th Congress) but both relied more heavily on informal methods of contact than on the formal whip system. Both leaders avoided calling caucuses to set party policy, fearing the effects of such meetings on party unity.

House Republicans were not so fortunate in getting strong leadership. They were led by Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts. Martin certainly was experienced in leading House Republicans—he had done so since the 76th Congress. As contrasted with his longtime friend, Sam Rayburn, however, Martin was losing control over his party. He had lost contact with many of the younger members and his health was failing. Evidence for this appeared in convincing form in the 86th Congress when Martin was defeated for the minority leadership post by Charles A. Halleck of Indiana.

Like Rayburn, Martin relied on "personalism" as a leadership technique. But he was never as successful as Rayburn. It seemed as though conditions in the Republican Party (e.g., less sectional diversity) favored greater use of party caucus and committee action than for the Democrats. Republicans were generally more unified and could gain publicity from such meetings. Martin, however, continued to rely on a coterie of advisers. Halleck was one of these in earlier times but Martin had grown to distrust him. Leslie C. Arends, Illinois, served as his Whip and while performing adequately, Arends took a narrow view of his function as Whip.

Thus, House Republicans had rather uninspired leadership in the 85th Congress. Martin's greatest source of strength was his friendship with Rayburn. But many young members considered this friendship more harmful to the party than helpful. They wanted to establish a more positive image for the party and were frustrated with the leadership of Martin, Arends, and ranking committee members like Clarence Brown (Ohio). These dissatisfied members were to make many changes in the House Republican Party in ensuing years.[22]

The range of strategies for the House Republican Party in the 85th Congress was almost as restricted as that during the 63rd and 73rd Congresses. House Republicans *participated* in majority coalition-building. The President would be expected to count his own party first in building majorities and rely on House Republican leaders to assist him in getting the necessary Democratic votes to enact his policies. Given the weakness both of the President and the House Republican leaders, however, it is reasonable to distinguish between *weak* and *strong* participation. The former, of course, characterized the House Republican Party in the 85th Congress.

The range of strategies for the minority party could be expected to be somewhat broader if a particular proposal became more identified with the House Democrats. Thus, if the Democrats were successful in altering the president's legislation to a considerable extent, then House Republicans would be free to adopt a number of strategies—oppose the legislation, substitute their own proposal, support the Democratic version, etc. Further, if the President compromised with the Democrats without House Republican concurrence, or despite their objections, the range of strategies would be increased. It is obvious that majority coalition building under these conditions requires considerable finesse—particularly if the issue is significant and controversial. The policy-making result in the 85th Congress was often confusion, ambiguity, and stalemate.

There were instances during the 85th Congress when the two parties worked together to pass legislation—with the Republicans forming the principal basis of support. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was characterized by bipartisanship at every stage of the process. On the other hand, there were cases when a presidential proposal divided House Republicans. Efforts to unify Republicans risked the loss of needed Democratic support. Efforts to gain Democratic support further divided Republicans. The President had a mixed record on such issues. On reciprocal trade and national defense education, he and his party leaders were able to build a coalition sufficiently large for passage. On federal aid to education, he was not only unsuccessful in doing so, but apparently had some doubts about the bill himself.[23] And who can know how many proposals were never even made due to the ambiguity of the congressional situation? The president himself was discouraged following the first session: "I am tremendously disappointed that so many of these bills have not been acted on, and in some cases, not even have held hearings."[24] The editors of the *Congressional Quarterly* summarized the second session: "Adjournment of the 85th Congress . . . brought to a close a second session as remarkable for what it didn't do as for what it did do."[25]

---

[22] For a discussion of the frustrations of House Republicans under Martin's leadership, see Charles O. Jones, *Party and Policy-Making; The House Republican Policy Committee* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), Ch. 2.

[23] See Neustadt, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

Quite clearly, the external and internal conditions which existed in the 85th Congress resulted in a most confusing policy-making situation. For the most part the House Republican party was limited to a participating strategy in majority coalition-building. Thus, as with the 63rd and 73rd Congresses, the minority party had a restricted range of strategies available. As distinct from those two Congresses, however, the minority party was considerably more involved in congressional policy-making during the 85th Congress.

A Flexible Minority—87th Congress. The combination of conditions which characterized the 87th Congress provided a greater range of strategies for the minority party than the other three congresses examined here. President Kennedy's view of the presidency was in the tradition of Wilson and Roosevelt, but he did not have their sources of strength. There was no all-pervasive crisis to dominate national politics in 1960, Kennedy's margin over Nixon was extremely narrow, congressional Republicans had increased their numbers in both houses over 1958, Republicans were generally unified, and Democrats were plagued with a measure of disunity (see Table 2 for summary of all conditions). Kennedy's greatest sources of power seemed to be his energy in producing new ideas, and renovating old ideas, for solving public problems, and the fact that so little had been accomplished in the 86th Congress. In Neustadt's terms, he was able most to rely on "the expectations of those other men regarding his ability and will to use the various advantages that they think he has."[26] President Kennedy took a very broad view of the presidency:

> Whatever the political affiliation of our next President, whatever his views may be on all the issues and problems that rush in upon us, he must above all be the Chief Executive in every sense of the word. *He must be prepared to exercise the fullest powers of his office—all that are specified and some that are not.*[27]

With the exception of a procedural change in the House, internal conditions also tended to favor the minority party. As noted above, for the first time since 1952, Republicans increased their numbers in the House of Representatives. The Democrats still had a commanding majority—263 to 174—but with probable Democratic disunity on some measures, the Republicans could expect some success in building negative majorities so as to defeat the President's proposals. The President was successful in effecting a procedural change of some significance. The House Committee on Rules had become an anti-administration device and could be expected to cause considerable procedural difficulty for the President's program. In a major power struggle between Chairman Howard W. Smith and Speaker Rayburn, Rayburn won (with the critical support of 22 Republicans) and the Committee on Rules was enlarged by three members. Though enlargement did not result in the Committee's loss of power and independence, it did represent a major defeat for those who had relied on it to curb the majority and merely opened the door to other, more drastic reforms.[28]

The House party leadership situation in the 87th Congress was almost the reverse of that during the 85th Congress. The Republicans were much stronger, the Democrats much weaker. Rayburn, McCormack and Albert continued to lead the Democrats but the long-time Speaker was apparently losing his touch. As one senior Democrat put it:

> Rayburn died at a propitious time. During the last three to five years, things were getting out

---

[24] Quoted in *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 13, 1957, p. 87.

[25] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 14, 1958, p. 57.

[26] Neustadt, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

[27] Quoted in the *New York Times*, January 15, 1960, p. 16 (emphasis added).

[28] There are a number of excellent studies of this struggle. See Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1963), Chs. VI and VII; William R. MacKaye, *A New Coalition Takes Control: The House Rules Committee Fight of 1961* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963); Neil MacNeil, *Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives* (New York: McKay, 1963); James A. Robinson, *The House Rules Committee* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). See also my "Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith—An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives," *Journal of Politics*, 30 (August, 1968). It should be noted that further changes were made in 1965 to reduce the power of the Committee.

from under his control. And during the last two years people really had no idea, but it was distressing to sit there with his group of about 15, and see him trying to grapple with bills like the foreign aid bill when he had lost his touch.[29]

McCormack was elected Speaker after Rayburn died in November, 1961.

The Republicans changed leadership in 1959. Joe Martin was in poor health and had grown away from many of the party's younger members. The 1958 election, in which House Republicans lost 47 seats, served as a catalyst for change. The new minority leader, Charles A. Halleck of Indiana, was less a friend of Rayburn and was considered more partisan than Martin had been. Though he was not the first choice of many House Republicans who had pressured for a change in leadership, they generally considered him superior to Martin.[30] As it turned out, he was to serve as interim leader only—until the insurgents could muster enough support to get a more preferred candidate elected.[31] At the time that Halleck was elected, House Republicans also reorganized their party. The most significant change was to separate the floor leadership and Policy Committee chairmanship posts. This change was made at the insistence of the insurgents. Though the reorganized Policy Committee by no means satisfied those House Republicans who desired more vigorous and imaginative policy leadership, it did give them somewhat more access to leadership decision-making and served to unify the party.

The first point to establish in analyzing policy-making in the 87th Congress is that a minority party with several sources of power is "consequential" in policy-making. Thus, what the House Republicans did during the 87th Congress, the strategy they adopted on a particular piece of legislation, was often important to the outcome. Further, the very fact that they could mount consequential opposition became important in majority coalition building. Put another way, to the extent that the minority party has flexibility in choosing strategies, the majority party's role in policy-making is limited.

In the 87th Congress, House Republicans had a number of options at different stages of the legislative process. They could simply oppose that which was offered by the majority party (partisan opposition), they could counter with their own proposals (constructive opposition), they could support proposals (support), they could cooperate in developing policy (cooperation), they could initiate proposals of their own (innovation),[32] or they could simply not take a party position (withdrawal). As would be expected, a consequential minority potentially can be involved in policy-making during all stages of the legislative process—and various options may be available at each stage. It must be recognized, however, that there are separate minority party leaders—usually the ranking minority members of the committee or subcommittee—during the early stages of legislation. They may or may not consult the House minority leadership in developing strategies. Thus, it is conceivable that the minority party, through its various leaders, may actually employ different strategies at different stages.[33] By their very nature, one would expect that the cooperative and innovative strategies would be employed during the early stages of the legislative process (notably subcommittee and early committee action); partisan and constructive opposition, withdrawal, and support, during the later stages (final committee action and floor action).

It is not possible in this article to provide illustrations of all of the various combinations mentioned above. Only a few examples of the range of possibilities can be offered. There were many bills in the 87th Congress which illustrated *partisan opposition* by the minority party. In some cases, unified partisan opposition found enough support among Democrats to defeat the legislation. Thus, the federal aid to education bill in 1961, the attempt to establish a Department of Housing and Urban Affairs in 1962, and the first farm bill in 1962, all were defeated by the combination of a cohesive minority and defecting Democrats.

---

[29] Personal interview with a senior House Democrat, June, 1963.

[30] For details, see Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–42.

[31] See Robert L. Peabody, *The Ford-Halleck Minority Leadership Contest, 1965* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

[32] Theodore Lowi argues that innovation is a principal function of the minority party in Congress. See "Toward Functionalism in Political Science: The Case of Innovation in Party Systems," this REVIEW, 57 (September, 1963), 570–583.

[33] This is always true of the minority party; but in more restricted situations, the party's options are limited throughout the legislative process. It also should be pointed out that there is considerable legislative and representative behavior by minority party congressmen which is simply not attributable to party membership.

The total House Republican vote on these three bills was 20 in favor and 480 against (an overall index of cohesion of 92).[34]

In other cases, House Republicans offered *constructive opposition* on the House floor following unsuccessful efforts in committee to have their proposals adopted.[35] That is, efforts were made on the floor to amend the legislation and/or recommit it with instructions to accept Republican changes. One such effort—on the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961—was inconsequential. Many House Republicans defected to vote against recommital and for the bill. Other efforts came close to victory. The recommital motion on the Omnibus Housing Act was defeated 215 to 197 and on the Tax Reform Act the recommital motion was defeated 225 to 190. House Republicans were actually successful in substituting their pared-down version of a minimum wage bill on the House floor in 1961—an important defeat for the Kennedy Administration. The President recovered, however, by a victory in the Senate for his bill. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate bill and their report was approved by the House only because 33 Republicans supported the President.

There were many other patterns of strategy during the 87th Congress. On the important Trade Expansion Act of 1962, there was considerable Republican *cooperation* and *support* during the formative stages of the legislation in the Committee on Ways and Means. The legislation split the House Republican Party, however, and many conservative Republicans opposed the bill. Due to this division, no Republican position was adopted. The minority party "withdrew" on this legislation. The House Republican Policy Committee took no position—allowing members to vote as they wished. The results showed 80 House Republicans in favor, 90 opposed.[36]

The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 is an example of *cooperation* in the formative stages followed by *support* on the House floor. The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 is an example of *innovation* followed by *support* on the House floor. The Subcommittee on Special Projects of the House Republican Policy Committee had conducted a general study of employment in the United States. One section of the study dealt with manpower retraining. Many of the recommendations contained in this study eventually found their way into the Manpower Development and Training Act.[37]

There are many other examples which could be given—in this Congress and in the first session of the 88th Congress (where, prior to the assassination, the minority party also had a rather wide range of strategies).[38] The point has been established, however. Conditions were such that the minority party had a range of strategies available in the process of majority coalition building in the House.

III. SUMMARY AND QUESTIONS

The principal thesis of this article has been that the minority party's role in the process of majority coalition-building in the House of Representatives is by no means a consistent role over time. External conditions (temper of the times, minority party strength, minority party unity, and presidential power) and internal conditions (procedure, the margin, majority party leadership and organization, and minority party leadership and organization) determine the range of strategies available to the minority in congressional policy-making. As illustrated by four congresses, the range of strategies varies from the limited number available in the most restrictive minority party situations to the large number available in the flexible minority party situations. A number of these strategies are identified and discussed.

There are several important questions raised by this research which require separate analysis. For example, what are the functional consequences for policy formulation and policy administration of these various types of minority parties? It can be hypothesized that if the minority party has available a wide range of strategies, then both policy formulators and policy administrators will take into account minority party interests and views when performing their respective tasks. A consequential minority party may have a definite effect on the policy-making process. If an issue divides the majority, policy formulators may have to court minority party votes; the minority may be developing alternative proposals which become attractive to those affected by a policy problem and thus these proposals may be taken over by the majority party; minority victories in defeating the President may force executive policy formulators to rethink a proposal; minority party research into administration of policy may result in new legislation; and the general expectation that the minority party will oppose with strength and has certain rights, which are protected, to criticize presidential proposals, may induce caution, precision, and careful consideration in policy formulation and administration.

---

[34] Relying on Stuart Rice's index of cohesion: *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1928).

[35] It should be noted that "constructive" means that the Republicans were offering an alternative. That alternative may well have been "destructive" from the point of view of the President.

[36] For details on the Republican dilemma on this legislation, see Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 126–134.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 65–66.

[38] For evidence on the 89th Congress, see Robert L. Peabody, "House Republican Leadership: Change and Consolidation in a Minority Party," unpublished paper delivered at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York City, September 6–10.

A second major question relates to minority party goal achievement. Do individual strategies in congressional policy-making contribute to the realization of the principal minority party goal of majority party status? If the minority party has a wide range of strategies available, does that result in victory at the polls? On the surface, it appears that the data confirm what every student of Congress knows—electoral success is related to a wide variety of factors, of which the range of policy-making strategies available is relatively minor.[39] In this century the Republicans as a flexible minority have scored impressive gains in the next election (1942, 1946, 1952), scored only slight gains (1962), and lost ground (1944). The greatest victories for Republicans in this century, in terms of net gain of seats, have followed congresses in which the minority party was severely restricted (1914, 1938, and, to a lesser extent, 1966). Republicans as a participating minority in the House have never gained in the next election (1912, 1956, 1958).

If electoral success does not follow from a more active role for the minority party in majority coalition building, a rather anomalous situation results. Minority party leaders are generally expected to rely on strategies which presumably will be rational in terms of the overall party goal of majority party status. Yet the impact of their actions on whether the minority party in fact becomes the majority party may be of very little consequence.

A third major question asks: What of the other combinations of variables not discussed here? Are there other types of minority parties when classified by the strategies available? A cursory examination of the congresses in this century suggests that the categories identified here are generally serviceable. But, as was indicated in the discussion of the differences between the 63rd and 73rd Congresses, a great many refinements can and should be made. Thus, for example, some restricted minorities have little immediate prospect of a greater range of strategies. Clearly, there are degrees of restrictedness and flexibility. Further, it is perfectly conceivable that a participating minority may have a strong, rather than a weak, President in the White House. And what of those rare instances when both parties are in the minority in Congress—one in each house? The two congresses of this type in this century, the 62nd and 72nd, represented highly abnormal policy-making situations wherein the majority party nationally was in the process of being deposed.

This research suggests many other questions as well. Are there differences between the minority parties of the House and Senate in any one Congress? Preliminary analysis indicates that there are. Does the analysis provided here apply to the Democratic party as a minority party? Does it apply to a large number of congresses? What happens to a minority party which fails over a long period of time to achieve majority party status? To what extent are goals of individual members functional or dysfunctional for achieving the party's goal? To what extent is "party" important at all in the formative stages of legislation? These and other important questions must be answered if we are to understand the role of political parties in Congress.

---

[39] For a general discussion of the opposition party in governmental decision-making, see Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), especially Chapter 4.

THE HOUSE AND THE FEDERAL ROLE: A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF ROLL-CALL VOTING*

MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO
University of Hawaii

Much of the business of the U.S. Congress in the post war period has involved issues concerning the size and scope of activities of the federal government. The legislation in this area can be traced, for the most part, to measures which originated during the period of the New Deal in response to the Great Depression and to measures enacted during World War II to meet the short-run exigencies attendant to rapid economic and social mobilization. From the point of view of the expansion of the federal role, the Eisenhower years are of some moment. While they marked a lull in the expansionist trend witnessed under the Democratic presidencies of Roosevelt and Truman, their significance lies in the fact that despite the change in adminsitrations, there was no reversal of the policies begun during the Roosevelt years. While most of the Republican legislators were on record in opposition to the expansion of the federal role, the failure of the Republican Party to introduce and enact legislation to reverse the trend of federal expansion resulted in a new plateau of federal activity from which the congressional dialogue was to proceed during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

While the 87th Congress, meeting during Kennedy's first two years in the White House, did not enact the quantity of legislation expanding the federal role that Kennedy had called for in his inaugural, In the 88th Congress both parties supported a larger federal role to a greater extent than they had previously. In fact the first sessions of the 88th Congress as it bears on the federal role has been summed up as follows: "At no time did the majority of both parties reject a larger federal role." (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 1963, p. 724) With two exceptions, the statement holds true for the second session in 1964.

The research reported in this article is based upon a computer simulation study of roll-call voting on twenty-one bills in the 88th session of the U.S. House of Representatives dealing with the expansion of the Federal role. Its purpose is twofold: first, to elucidate and explicate the determinants of the success of legislation resulting in the expansion of the federal role; and second, to develop and test a model that represents a theoretical overview of the roll-call voting process in the House.

I. THE MODEL

This simulation model of roll-call voting in the U.S. House of Representatives focuses on two basic processes. The first is a cognitive process involving the predisposition toward voting on a bill that a representative develops when he assesses his past voting behavior on that type of bill, the individuals and groups in the House with positive and negative positions on the bill, and the substance of the bill in terms of its benefits and disadvantages for his constituency and region of the country. The second is a communication process in which representatives who do not develop strong predispositions on a bill in the first phase of the model confront the President and their colleagues and receive influence.

The Predisposition Phase. The predisposition phase of the model is depicted in the flow chart of Figure 1. In this phase a predisposition score is calculated for each representative, one at a time, as the attributes of the bill in question are compared with those of the representatives.[1]

The first determination made when a bill is

---

* The author is indebted to Dr. Cleo Cherryholmes of the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University who shared in the design of the simulation model and rendered valuable advice and assistance in its application reported here. The author wishes, in addition, to thank Dr. Harold Guetzkow and Dr. Kenneth Janda of the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University who aided immeasureably in the conception and execution of the research upon which this article is based.

[1] The attributes of the bills were determined from their descriptions in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for 1963 and 1964. The bills chosen for the simulation study are essentially the same as those identified by the Congressional Quarterly Service as pertaining to the federal-role issue area. A few recommital motions on these bills have been added to provide a larger number of bills for purposes of analysis in general and to allow, in particular, for comparisons between bills introduced by the Democratic Administration and those introduced by Republicans (the latter having been reflected, for the most part, in recommital motions).


A bill enters
Does the bill's confrontation with memory evoke a predisposition?
Does the party sponsorship evoke a predisposition?
Does a state delegation evoke a predisposition?
Does a committee membership evoke a predisposition?
Did the representative sign a minority report?
Did the representative sponsor the bill?
Do constituency effects evoke a predisposition?
Do regional effects evoke a predisposition?
yes
no
Calculate the predisposition.
Sum up the predisposition thus far.

FIG. 1. The predisposition phase of the model.

entered into the model and confronts the first representative is whether or not the representative's past voting on that type of bill suggests a bias or predisposition for or against the bill. This aspect of the model is based upon the notion that representatives have ideological postures that provide cues for their roll-call voting behavior.[2] The use of past votes on federal role bills to determine a representative's ideological position with respect to present federal role bills is based upon the discovery of what constitutes, in effect, a federal role dimension in a in a number of roll-call analyses of legislative voting.[3] Thus weights of two or one are added to or subtracted from the predisposition scores of each representative if he has voted consistently for or against bills dealing with the expansion of the federal role.[4]

---

[2] For a number of different perspectives on the effects of personal ideology on legislative roll-call voting, see D. R. Brimhall and A. S. Otis, "Con-

The remaining variables in the predisposition phase of the model relate, first of all, to the individuals and groups that support or oppose the bill in question, the parties, state delegations, individual sponsors, committees that have reported the bill out and the elected leadership,[5] and secondly to the substance of

---

sistency of Voting in Our Congresses," *Journal of Applied Psychology,* 32 (1948), 1–14; Charles Farris "A Method for Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress," *Journal of Politics,* 20 (1958), 308–338; Duncan MacRae *Dimensions of Congressional Voting: A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-First Congress* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958); and Lewis A. Froman, Jr. *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963).

[3] From the standpoint of face validity, the case for the unidimensionality of congressional attitudes on the federal role is a good one. In recent years it has been one of the few issue areas that has consistently distinguished the platforms of the two parties. This consistency has been reflected by the increasing tendency for both casual observers and systematic investigators of politics to employ this issue dimension as a liberal-conservative index. In one case, the use of representatives' past votes on the federal role as a liberal-conservative index has provided an instance of empirical validation of the issue area's unidimensionality (Froman, *op cit.*). It was found that congressmen from constituencies associated with conservative voting are low on the index (at the conservative end), while those from constituencies associated with liberal voting are high on the index (at the liberal end). This type of validation is not completely satisfying in as much as Froman's criteria for liberal and conservative voting with which the constituencies were purported to be associated are not entirely independent of the factors or bills that make up the liberal-conservative index employed. A better case for the unidimensionality of representatives' attitudes (inferred from voting behavior) towards the federal role is based upon inferences from the results of Guttman scaling techniques applied to congressional roll-call votes. This scaling technique, based upon rank-ordering procedures, was designed to tap the unidimensionality of attitude clusters. See Louis Guttman "The Basis for Scalogram Analysis," In S. A. Stouffer (ed.), *Measurement and Prediction* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1950). MacRae, in his Guttman scale analysis of roll-call votes in the 81st Congress, found what he termed "Fair Deal" and "Welfare State" scales for Democrats and Republicans respectively (*op. cit.*). Within both of these scales were most of the roll-call votes concerned with the federal role. Anderson obtained similar scales in his analyses of four succeeding congresses. See Lee Anderson "Variability in the Unidimensionality of Legislative Voting," *Journal of Politics,* 26 (1964), 568–585. Finally, a Guttman scaling analysis was conducted on the 21 bills included in my simulation study. When two bills were eliminated from this analysis, a reproducibility coefficient of .90 was obtained. The two bills that did not scale were not coded for a memory effect in the simulation.

[4] After some testing of the model, predisposition weights of plus or minus two were assigned to representatives who had voted for the expansion of the federal role either eighty-five percent of the time or more or fifteen percent of the time or less. Predisposition scores of plus or minus one were assigned for percentages between sixty-five and eighty-five percent and between fifteen and thirty-five percent. Predisposition scores based upon past voting were calculated only for those representatives who had voted on at least ten bills in this issue area. In general, our measure of past voting behavior on the federal role issue dimension was based on the previous two House sessions. All other weights for variables in the predisposition phase of the model are plus or minus one. It can be observed, then, that the predisposition phase of the model provides a theoretical framework for combining propositions about legislative voting behavior that have emerged from more inductive legislative studies. This theoretical framework is based upon the assumptions that predispositions are additive and that all the predisposing variables have approximately equal weight. It is important to note that this last assumption relates to initial predispositions and not to voting behavior. As will be noted below, these variables appear in the communication phase of the model where their effects are not equal.

[5] Two of these types of predisposition calculations require some clarification. On the basis of our knowledge of the pervasiveness of party conflict in legislatures I have constructed the model such that a coding of a bill for party sponsorship which predisposes all the members on one party

the bill. Thus each bill is coded in terms of the region or regions of the country and types of constituencies it might aid or hinder.[6]

The representative in this conceptualization is thought of as developing a predisposition on the basis of his ideological posture, and the audiences he may be expected to perceive as relevant to a bill. This predisposition phase, however, represents only part of this theoretical conception of the roll-call voting process in the House. After predispositions have been calculated for all the representatives for a given bill, the communication phase of the model is activated.

The Predisposition-Communication Linkage. Not all the representatives are influenced in the communication phase of the model on each bill, but all representatives are potential influences in the communication process. Each representative's potential influence over his colleagues on a given bill is a function of the predisposition that he develops during his confrontation with it in the predisposition phase of the model. Only those representatives whose predispositions fall within the range between plus two and minus two enter the communication process to be influenced. The final votes of all others are determined in the predisposition phase of the model.

The decisions on who enters the communication phase of the model are based upon propositions from both social-psychological findings of influence and conformity in groups in general and findings related specifically to the influence on representatives' voting behavior. From the former we get the proposition that individuals with more extreme attitude positions are less susceptible to influence than individuals with less extreme attitude positions, and from the latter the proposition that a legislator with two or more pressures such as party and constituency influencing his vote in the same direction is unlikely to be susceptible to further influence concerning his vote.[7]

The decisions involved when a representative approaches the communication phase of the model are depicted in the flow chart in Figure 2. It can be noted that we have employed the simplyfying assumption that the communication process for all legislators is based upon the predispositions derived before the process is begun. No cycling of the process is carried out to take account of the possibility of a diffusion of influence in which predispositions generated as a result of communications among representatives become the basis for further influence in later communicative interactions.

The Communication Phase. Bauer, Dexter, and Pool have asserted that "the U.S. House of Representatives is above all a communication node which serves to unify a large and heterogeneous land by bringing into confrontation a group of men representing its various parts."[8] It has been observed, on the other hand, that the patterns of interaction in legislative bodies tend to reinforce rather than moderate basic cleavages.[9] In constructing this communica-

---

to vote for the bill (adding one to all their predisposition scores) has the effect of predisposing all the members of the other party in the opposite direction (subtracting one from all their predisposition scores). In the case of a bill coded from committees, all members of a committee through which the bill has passed are predisposed for the bill except those representatives who signed the minority report. These are predisposed against the bill.

[6] It should be noted that when bills are coded such that some representatives acquire a predisposition as a result of an attribute of their constituency, it is then determined whether or not their constituency is competitive. If the representative comes from a competitive constituency, he acquires an additional unit of predisposition in the same direction. Competitive constituencies were designated as those that had not returned a representative from the same party in the last four consecutive congressional elections. The constituency attributes included in this study were percent urban, percent rural farm, percent rural non-farm, percent negro, percent foreign stock, percent owner occupied dwellings, percent white collar, and degree of competitiveness. With the excpetion of the competitiveness variable, the raw data on these variables was obtained from the *Congressional District Data Book, Districts of the 88th Congress*, 1963.

[7] For evidence with respect to the attitude extremity proposition see Carl Hovland, O. J. Harvey, and Muzafer Sherif, "Assimilative and Contrast Effects in Reactions to Communication and Attitude Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 55 (1957), 244–252. The proposition on immunity to influence of representatives with two influences predisposing them in the same direction is suggested by Julius Turner *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951) p. 125.

[8] Raymond Bauer, Lewis Dexter, and Ithiel de Sola Pool *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964).

[9] John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and Leroy Ferguson, *The Legislative Sys-*


Examine the predisposition generated for the representative in the predisposition stage of the model.
Check the predisposition of the next representative.
Is the representative's predisposition +2 or greater?
yes
Vote for the bill.
no
Is the representative's predisposition −2 or less?
yes
Vote against the bill.
no
Enter the communication process.

FIG. 2. The communication entry criteria.

tion process I have attempted, based upon investigations of interactions in legislative bodies, to simulate the types of confrontations that a legislator is likely to engage in when, because of either a lack of significant cues or a conflict among them, he has not evinced a strong predisposition to vote for or against a given bill.

The method employed to simulate these confrontations is an adaptation of the method of "pseudo partners" used by Abelson and Bernstein in their fluoridation referendum simulation.[10] With this technique they matched conversation partners on the basis of potentiality for conversation, which was calculated as a function of social network information, a meshing of demographic characteristics and shared habitual loci of discussions about community issues. They based their conversation rates upon the levels of interest in the issue under discussion. I have adapted this procedure to the social network in the House by basing my conversation partner matching decisions on knowledge of the structure and processes of legislative systems in general and the House in particular.

The variables chosen to represent the structure of the communication network in the House are based upon observations of the frequency of interactions between representatives with attributes of their conversation partners, and the general observations that representa-

---

tem: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1962).

[10] Robert Abelson and A. Bernstein, "A Computer Simulation Model of Community Referendum Controversies," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (1963), 93–122.


A representative enters the communication process.
Is the bill part of the President's program?
no
yes
Add .01 to the conversation probability.
no
Is the representative a member of the President's party?
yes
Add .04 to the conversation probability.
Is the representative from the President's state?
yes
Add .2 to the conversation probability.
no
Is the representative from the President's region?
yes
Add .05 to the conversation probability.
no
Call a random number to compare with the probability.
Is the random number less than or equal to the probability?
yes
Add the President's predisposition to the representative's influence total.
no
Continue the communication process.

FIG. 3. Communication with the President.

tives seek information from certain types of colleagues and that some representatives, particularly those in positions of leadership, seek to give information or exert influence on certain types of bills. For the purposes of communication, then, each representative is described in terms of his party, state, region, constituency characteristics, leadership positions, committee membership, rank on each committee, and seniority.

The first determination made when a representative enters the communication process is whether or not he has a conversation with the President. Such a conversation symbolizes, for the sake of simplicity, a conversation with either the President or one of his legislative liaisons. The inclusion of the President in the communication process is predicated on the observation that presidential-legislative relations of this type have been institutionalized in the post war period.[11] As is indicated in the flow chart of Figure 3, I have confined the President's communications with representatives to cases in which legislation that is a part of his program is concerned.

The probabilities of conversation generated when the President confronts a representative are depicted in Figure 3. To arrive at these probabilities we begin by setting a limit on the average number of representatives that the President might be expected to confront on bills that are a part of his program. Here we assume that his number of contacts would approximate those of the formal leaders of the majority party in the House (the Speaker, Majority Leader, and Whip). After setting such a limit (approximately 45 contacts) we can then apportion this contacts among the types of legislators he confronts in such a manner that his total number of contacts on a given bill will approximate our limit. For these approximations we assume that his frequencies of interaction with the various types of representatives is similar to those of a representative. He is thus given more contacts with the members of his party, representatives from his home state, and representatives from his region of the country.

When the probability of conversation between the representative and the President is calculated, a random number is called, if the random number is less than or equal to that probability, it is assumed that a conversation took place and the President's predisposition on the bill (plus two if he favors the bill and minus two if he opposes it) is added to the influence total for that representative.

The representative then enters that part of the communication process within which a determination is made as to the members of the House with whom he will converse. In this part of the communication process he confronts all 434 of his colleagues. For each confrontation a probability of conversation is calculated, based on a matching of attributes of the representative and his potential influencers. As in the case of confrontations with the President, a random number is called after each of these confrontations, compared with the probability of conversation generated, and, when it is less than or equal to that probability, results in the addition of the predisposition that the conversation partner developed in the predisposition phase of the model to the representative's influence total.

The formal leadership of the House is prominent in the communication process because, as Truman has observed, "The House has four and one half times as many members as the Senate. From this schoolboy fact comes the tendency for the formal leadership in the House to correspond closely to the actual. . . ."[12] Thus in the first part of the matching process (shown in the flow chart in Figure 4) it is determined whether the representative entering the communication process is an elected leader. If he is, it is then determined whether or not his potential conversation partner is an elected leader. The flow chart in Figure 4 indicates the probabilities of conversation generated when the various types of leadership confrontations take place. These probabilities are derived from the general observation that the leadership in the House interacts frequently, and from the findings of investigations of state legislative bodies which indicate that the presiding officer (speaker) and majority leader have a close relationship and that the interactions between these and the minority leaders are somewhat less frequent.[13] They are based, in addition, on the finding that frequent interactions occur between the whips and whip organizations, and between these and the other elected leaders.[14]

The probabilities of conversation among the legislative leaders are based, in part, on the average total number of communications in which a non-leader becomes involved in legislative bodies. To distinguish formal elected leaders, I made use of the finding that the leaders become involved in twice as many communicative interactions on the whole as do the rank and file members of legislative bodies.[15] The probabilities appearing in Figure 4 are thus based upon an extrapolation from the total number of communications in which leaders become involved. The relative apportioning of probabilities for inter-party as opposed to intra-party confrontations is explicated in our discussion of non-leadership interactions below.

The flow chart in Figure 5 depicts the beginning of that part of the communication phase of the model in which a representative who holds no positions of elected leadership becomes involved after having confronted the President.

---

[11] See for example Richard Neustadt "Presidency and Legislation," this REVIEW, 49 (1955), 980–1021.

[12] David Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: Wiley, 1959).

[13] Wahlke *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

[14] Randall Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," this REVIEW, 58 (1964), 561–576.

[15] Wahlke *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 226.


Is the representative an elected leader?
yes
Is it a speaker-majority leader confrontation?
yes
Conversation probability equals .9.
no
Is it a majority leader-minority leader confrontation?
yes
Conversation probability equals .3.
no
Is it a majority leader-majority whip confrontation?
yes
Conversation probability equals .8.
no
Is it a speaker-minority leader confrontation?
yes
Conversation probability equals .3.
no
Is it a speaker-majority whip confrontation?
yes
Conversation probability equals .7.
no
Is it a majority leader-regional whip confrontation?
yes
Conversation probability equals .3.
no
Is it a speaker-regional whip confrontation?
yes
Conversation probability equals .3.
no
Is it a regional whip-regional whip confrontation (same party)?
yes
Conversation probability equals .6.
no

FIG. 4. Leadership interactions.

The first determination made in this section is whether the potential conversation partner is a regional whip assigned to the region of the representative. The high probability of conversation generated when the representative confronts his regional whip is based upon the finding that such a conversation actually does take place on most bills.[16]

The next set of determinations depicted in Figure 5 constitutes the matching of attributes

---

[16] Ripley, *op. cit.*


Is it a minority leader-minority whip confrontation?
yes
Conversation probability equals .7.
no
Is it a minority leader-regional whip confrontation?
yes
Conversation probability equals .2.
no
Is it a majority whip-regional whip confrontation?
yes
Conversation probability equals .6.
no
Is it a minority whip-regional whip confrontation?
yes
Conversation probability equals .4.
no
Is it a speaker-minority whip confrontation?
yes
Conversation probability equals .2.
Call a random number to compare with the probability.
Is the random number less than or equal to the probability?
yes
Add the conversation partner's predisposition to the representative's influence total.
no
Continue the communication process.

FIG. 4. (cont.) Leadership interactions.

between the representative and his potential conversation partner. As in the case of the other types of confrontations discussed thus far, the probabilities of conversation generated are based on the limit set for the average total number of communications in which a representative tends to become involved. That average falls between twenty-five and thirty and is derived from investigations of communicative interactions in legislative bodies. It has been found that in general legislators in state legislative bodies exert personal influence over approximately a dozen colleagues. We have added another half dozen to take account of the larger size of the House which increases the possibility of a wider acquaintanceship,


Is the conversation partner his regional whip?
yes
Conversation probability equals .9.
no
Add .01 to conversation probability.
no
Is the conversation partner a member of his party?
yes
Add .04 to conversation probability.
Is the conversation partner from his state?
yes
Add .3 to conversation probability.
no
Is the conversation partner from his region?
yes
Add .05 to conversation probability.
no
Is the conversation partner from a similar constituency.
yes
Add .01 to conversation probability.
no
Is the conversation partner a member of any of his committees?
yes
Add .05 to conversation probability for each.
no
Is the conversation partner in the same seniority grouping?
yes
Add .02 to conversation probability.
no
Continue the communication process.

FIG. 5. Rank and file interactions.

and the remainder has been added to represent the communications that a representative has with both elected and seniority leaders in the process of carrying out the task of legislating.[17]

The apportioning of the probabilities for confrontations between representatives involves a matching procedure. This procedure begins with a determination of whether the representative and his potential conversation partner are members of the same party. The relative size of the probabilities for inter- and intra-party interactions is based on the finding that a representative tends to have four times as many communicative interactions with members of his own party than with members of the opposition.[18]

The matching procedure then continues with a determination of whether the representative and his potential conversation partner are from the same state delegation. The additional probability of conversation added for intrastate confrontations is based upon the observation that state delegations in Congress are somewhat cohesive in their voting behavior and upon congressmen's reports that their state delegations are important sources of their communications about legislation.[19] The size of the probability relates, again, to the limit set for the total number of communications a legislator can be expected to have and is weighted on the basis of inferences drawn from the above sources as to the importance of the state delegation as opposed to other factors in the communication process.

---

[17] See Wahlke *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 222 for data on the dozen basic interactions. The additional interactions are based upon the findings of Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 145–275.

[18] See Garland Routt "Interpersonal Relationships and the Legislative Process," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 19 (1938), 129–136, and Wahlke *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

The next determination in the matching procedure is whether the representative and his potential conversation partner come from the same region of the country. The probability of conversation added for intra-regional confrontations is based upon both observations of interactions in legislative bodies and reports of conversation frequencies by members of the house.[20] The probability is based, in addition, on the limit set for total communications as in the case of the other probability increments.

The next matching determination depicted in the flow chart of Figure 5 is whether the representative and his potential conversation partner represent similar constituencies in terms of their urban-rural attributes. The probability of conversation added for a confrontation between representatives with like constituencies is based upon the finding that those with similar constituencies engage in a greater-than-average number of communications in a state legislature, and upon the finding that there is a slight tendency for those with similar constituencies to demonstrate cohesion on roll-call votes in the House.[21]

The next matching determination for confrontations among representatives relates to committee membership. The probability of conversation added when the confrontation is between representatives who share a committee assignment is based, first of all, on the common sense supposition that those who share committee assignments will have some communications in the course of carrying out those assignments, and secondly on the finding that those sharing committee assignments in the House demonstrate a slightly greater than average cohesiveness on roll-call votes.[22]

The last matching determination in this phase of the communication process relates to the effect of shared seniority status on communicative interactions of representatives. The probability of conversation added for shared seniority status is based upon the finding that interaction in legislatures occurs disproportionately within seniority groupings.[23]

In addition to the criteria for the matching decisions enunciated above, the probabilities of conversation for these and other types of confrontations are based upon the finding that representatives in the majority party are more cohesive on roll-call votes than those in the minority party and on the finding that more interactions take place between members of the majority party.[24] The use of this criterion can be noted in the apportioning of probabilities of conversation for interactions between leaders and rank and file representatives to be described below.

The flow chart in Figure 6 depicts the determinants of communication that are included to account for interactions between rank-and-file representatives and the seniority leaders and technical experts in the House, the chairmen and members of the committees through which the bill that is the subject of communications passes. The probabilities of conversation added for these confrontations are apportioned on the basis of a matching of party between the representative and his potential conversation partner, the assumption being that the representative seeking technical

---

[19] See Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 253; Donald Matthews *U. S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960); John Kessel, "The Washington Congressional Delegation," *Mid-West Journal of Political Science*, 8 (1964), 1–21; Lewis Froman, Jr. and Randall Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), 52–63; and Marc Ross," Some Correlates of Voting Support for the Leadership in the House of Representatives" (Mimeo, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 1965).

[20] Routt, *op. cit.*, p. 135; Samuel Patterson, "Patterns of Interpersonal Relations in a State Legislative Group: The Wisconsin Assembly," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 23 (1959), 101–109; Ross, *op. cit.*

[21] Allan Fiellin "The Functions of Informal Groups: A State Delegation," in R. L. Peabody and N. W. Polsby (eds.), *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 66; and Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

[22] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

[23] See Wahlke *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 224; and Routt, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

[24] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 286; Routt, *op. cit.*, p. 135.


Is the conversation partner a member of a committee through which the bill has passed?
no
yes
Is the conversation partner a committee chairman?
yes
Add .02 to conversation probability.
Add .01 to conversation probability
no
Is the conversation partner a high-ranking committee member (including a chairman)?
yes
Add .03 to conversation probability.
Continue the communication process.

FIG. 6. Interactions with the seniority leaders.

advice on bills will display biases similar to those displayed in his choices of other conversation partners. In addition, in keeping with the finding that the seniority leaders (committee chairmen) are expecially cohesive with their party on bills that have gone through their committees, the chairmen are weighted more heavily in the communication process.[25] The higher ranking members of the committees relevant to the bill in question are given more weight in the communication process also, based upon the finding that technical experts receive more communications than rank and file legislators.[26]

The final determinations in the communication phase of the model relate to the probabilities of conversation added when a representative confronts an elected leader. The flow chart in Figure 7 depicts the matching procedure involved. The probabilities of conversation added are based, in part, on the finding discussed above that leaders are involved in twice as many communications as non-leaders and, again, on the limit set for total communications for each representative. The apportioning of probabilities for the various types of leaders is based on the reports of communicative interactions by congressional representatives.[27] As in the case of the seniority leaders, representative-leadership interactions are incremented only for intra-party confrontations.

An overview of the communication phase of the model is depicted in the flow chart of Figure 8. It can be noted that when the random number falls within the probability of conversation calculated for a given confrontation, the predisposition of the conversation partner is added to the influenced representative's influence total. When a representative has confronted all 434 of his colleagues, his new predisposition is calculated on the basis of the influence he has received in the communications in which he has become involved. This calculation is carried out by dividing the sum of the predispositions with which the representative is confronted by the number of conversations in which he has been involved to obtain the average predisposition or attitude toward the bill with which he has been confronted. The representative's new predisposition then becomes one that is halfway between his old one and the

---

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 240.

[26] Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

[27] Ross, *op. cit.*


Is the confrontation with a member of the representative's party?
yes
no
Is the conversation partner the majority leader?
yes
Add .04 to conversation probability.
no
Is the conversation partner the speaker?
yes
And .03 to conversation probability.
no
Is the conversation partner the majority whip?
yes
Add .02 to conversation probability.
no
Is the conversation partner the majority assistant whip?
yes
Add .01 to conversation probability.
no
Is the conversation partner the minority leader?
yes
Add .03 to conversation probability.
no
Is the conversation partner the minority whip?
yes
And .015 to conversation probability.
no
Is the conversation partner the minority assistant whip?
yes
Add .007 to conversation probability.
no
Call a random number to compare with the probability.
Is the random number less than or equal to the probability?
yes
Add the conversation partner's predisposition to the representative's influence total.
no
Begin the next representative's communication process.

Fig. 7. Representative-leadership interactions.


Check the original predisposition of the representative.
Is that predisposition greater than or equal to +2 or less than or equal to −2?
no
yes
Confront the President and 434 colleagues in the communication process.
Calculate the sum of the predispositions of those with whom conversations have been held.
Divide that sum by the number of conversations held and calculate a new predisposition (half the distance between the old predisposition and the average predisposition confronted).
Vote on the bill (yes for a positive predisposition and no for a negative predisposition).
Check the next representative.

FIG. 8. An overview of the communication phase.

average one that he has confronted. This influence calculation is based upon research findings of attitude change and conformity in situations of communicated influence in small groups.[28]

The outputs of the communication process are thus the new predispositions of those

---

[28] See S. C. Goldberg, "Three Situational Determinants of Conformity to Social Norms," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 59 (1954), 325–329; C. I. Hovland and H. A. Pritzker, "Extent of Opinion Change as a Function of Amount of Change Advocated," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 54 (1957), 257–261; C. I. Hovland, O. J. Harvey, and M. Sherif, *op. cit.;* S. Fisher and A. Lubin, "Distance as a Determinant of Influence in a Two-Person Serial Interaction Situation," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 56 (1958), 230–238; P. G. Zimbardo, "Involvement, Communication Discrepancy, and Conformity," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 60 (1960), 86–94.

TABLE 1. ACTUAL AND SIMULATED VOTING OUTCOMES

Bill	Simulated Voting	% Correct	Actual Voting
HR 12 (recommittal)	171–239	84	171–239
HR 12	280–128	77	288–122
HR 4955 (recommittal)	153–244	92	181–217
HR 4955	382–13	92	378–27
HR 6143	294–104	70	287–113
S 1576	353–3	94	335–18
HR 6196 (recommittal)	167–237	81	179–224
HR 6196	232–168	78	216–182
HR 6518	262–119	82	273–109
HR 4955 (recommittal)	159–214	90	180–193
S 2265 (recommittal)	153–209	86	174–188
S 2265	241–121	76	254–107
HR 7152	323–100	84	290–130
HR 8316	362–0	87	317–43
HR 10222	245–173	90	229–189
HR 6196	238–175	89	211–203
HR 3881	230–172	82	212–189
HR 11377	247–172	85	226–185
HR 12175	371–3	82	308–68
HR 11926	221–170	78	218–175
S 3060 (recommittal)	148–197	76	107–237

representatives who receive influence in that phase of the model. It is these new predispositions that determine their votes on the bill in question.

II. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MODEL

Because this simulation model aggregates the voting choices of each individual representative to obtain roll-call results, the basic evaluation of its performance has been carried out at both the macro and micro levels. The former involves the extent to which the voting outcomes in the simulation approximate the actual voting outcomes in the Eighty-Eighth Congress, and the latter considers the extent to which each individual representative's voting behavior in the Congress is approximated by his voting behavior in the simulation.

Considering, first of all, the macro level or voting outcomes as a whole we present the simulated and actual voting outcomes in Table 1. It can be noted that, in the simulation, the splits in the votes tend to be larger than were the splits in the actual votes. The average split in the simulated votes is 141 while the actual average split was 109. This difference is explicable in terms of the types of representatives for which the model's performance is below its overall average for individual voting performances. The sources of error will receive more attention in our discussion of the micro level performance of the model. Despite this tendency for the simulation to over-emphasize the splits in the votes, it can be noted that the correct outcomes are obtained by the simulation for all the bills. Using the splits in the simulated and actual votes as raw scores, moreover, we obtain a product-moment coefficient of correlation between the simulated and actual voting outcomes of .97.[29] While this suggests a very positive evaluation of the simulation model, the assessment of its performance must be made in the context of a consideration of what kinds of performances are obtained with variations or alternative formulations of the model.

Before turning to this type of assessment, however, the micro level performance of the original model remains to be considered. The percentages of individuals voting the same way in the simulation as they actually voted are presented for each bill in Table 1. The average percentage of individuals correctly simulated across the twenty-one bills is 84. Breaking that figure down for the three different categories of party sponsorship we find that for the four bipartisan bills the average percentage of individual representatives correctly simulated is 89. The percentages obtained for the eleven Democratic Administration bills and the six Republican sponsored recommittal motions are 82 and 85 respectively. The assessment of these differences and all others reported must be made in the context of the amount of variation in results that can be obtained because of the stochastic variation of the communication phase of the model.[30]

---

[29] If the sum of the yes and no votes are used as raw scores instead of the splits between the yes's and no's on each vote, correlation coefficients become .95 and .96 respectively. It should be noted, however, that because the product-moment correlation coefficient adjusts for the situation in which the range of the values for one variable is higher than that for the other, the coefficient we have obtained slightly overstates the degree of fit between the simulated and actual roll-call voting outcomes.

[30] To determine this variation two bills were run ten times each, one being a bill with a large number of representatives entering the communication phase and the other with relatively

These percentages obtained for the three party-sponsorship categories are explicable in terms of the types of individuals for which the simulation performs best. The most significant difference is between Democrats and Republicans. Averaging the percentages across all the bills yields scores of 86 and 79 correctly simulated Democratic and Republican representatives respectively. All of this difference is accounted for by the Democratic Administration-sponsored bills, for representatives in both parties voted correctly in the simulation: an average of 83 percent on the Republican-sponsored recommittal motions and an average 85 percent on the four bills with bipartisan support. The simulation thus tends to over-emphasize the cohesiveness of the Republicans on Democratic-sponsored bills despite the attempt to build greater cohesiveness for Democrats than Republicans into the communication phase of the simulation model described above.[31] It may be that it is this poorer micro level performance of the simulation for Republican repsentatives that accounts for part of the lower percentage of correctly simulated representatives on Democratic-sponsored bills.

Turning to the regional breakdown of the extent to which individual representatives are correctly simulated, we find that the poorest performance for regions obtained is for the southern representatives, with an average percentage correct across the twenty-one bills of 78. The next lowest percentage correct is for the eastern representatives at 83. The midwestern, mountain and far western representatives are simulated correctly with percentages of 88, 86, and 86 respectively.

It would appear that the simulation model confronts the same difficulty as the Democratic Whip organization, predicting the voting behavior of the Southern Delegation.[32] Because of the difficulty of discerning those bills on which the conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats takes shape, we must code the southerners as regular Democrats and thus predispose them in the same manner as the other Democratic representatives, with respect to party affiliation. By do doing, we miss a sizable percentage of them on occasions when they side with Republicans against "liberal legislation" such as bills proposing the expansion of the federal role. It should be noted in addition that it is undoubtedly the incorrect simulating of the voting of some southern representatives that accounts, in part, for the greater average split in the simulated votes as opposed to the actual votes, for the switching over of southerners has the effect of moderating the heavily party-oriented cleavages that account for the larger splits in the simulation.

The slightly lower average percentage correctly obtained for eastern representatives is probably explicable in terms of the traditional liberalism of eastern representatives. Several eastern Republican representatives usually side with Democrats on liberal legislation, and in general, eastern representatives from both parties tend to have more liberal voting records than their colleagues from other parts of the country. Our simulated voting results on the communications regulation bill, HR 8316, illustrate this phenomenon quite clearly. Coding the bill as a bipartisan measure resulted in an average percentage of representatives correctly simulated of 87. Because this bill results in the diminution of the federal role, however, a number of liberal easterners who had voted against the bill ended up for it in the simulation as a result of the bipartisan effect. Thus a below-average percentage of eastern representatives of 84 was obtained. Again, this slightly lower performance for eastern representatives would have the effect of over-emphasizing the voting splits as is the case with the performance on southern representatives.

Looking at the performance of the simulation model for the different representatives in terms of the types of constituencies they represent reveals a range of correctly simulated individual representatives from 86 per cent for representatives with predominantly urban constituencies to 81 per cent for representatives with predominantly rural non-farm constituencies. The representatives with predominantly rural farm constituencies were correctly simulated on an average of 82. These differences are probably a result of the distribution of Republicans and southern Democrats in terms of constituency types. A disproportionate share of non-southern Democrats represent constituencies with a high proportion of urban residence while Republicans and southern Democrats disproportionately represent rural farm and non-farm constituencies.

One interesting constituency-type variation in per cent correctly simulated is for competi-

---

few. In each case, the amount of variation in the percentage of representatives correctly simulated did not exceed one percent. Thus any difference in percentages that is two percent or greater can be treated as an actual difference.

[31] In keeping with previous findings cited in a number of the works noted above, the structure of the communication process provides for more communicative interactions within the majority party.

[32] See Froman and Ripley, *op. cit.*

tive versus non-competitive districts. Representatives from the former were simulated correctly on an average of 83 per cent.[33] While this can be interpreted as evidence of the relatively stronger hold that the parties (the strongest determinant in our model) have over representatives who are less firmly established, the fact that competitive districts are not equally allocated on a regional or party basis confounds the clear interpretation of this result.

Moving to the consideration of a representative categorization that is closely related to the competitiveness of constituencies we can look at the extent to which the voting behavior of representatives with different seniority positions are correctly simulated. The findings from legislative research suggest that representatives with high seniority rankings are less likely to be loyal to their party and are thus far less predictable in terms of their roll-call voting.[34] The results of the simulation tend to support this proposition: it yields an average per cent correct figure of 87 for the low-seniority members of the House while the average per cent correct figure obtained for representatives with high seniority standing is 82. Again, this finding must be assessed in the context of possible confounding factors, not the least of which is the fact that southern representatives possess a disproportionate share of the high-seniority positions in the House.[35]

We have seen thus far that the model as originally constituted simulates the voting on federal role issues in the 88th Congress with results that match the outcomes of the actual voting quite closely at both the macro and micro levels. We have, in addition, gained some insights into the extent to which the voting behaviors of different types of representatives are explicable in terms of our theoretical formulation of the voting process. In the final section I turn to a consideration of the validity of my theoretical formulation by examining the extent to which alternative formulations of the simulation model can replicate the results obtained with the original formulation.

III. THE VALIDITY OF THE SIMULATION MODEL: ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS

Pool, Abelson, and Popkin have addressed themselves to the problems of evaluating a complex simulation model:

> A complex model can predict real-world outcomes and yet be wrong in many details. It may predict accurately because the main effects are correctly represented and yet the model may contain many irrelevances. So one must always question the details of a complex model, even if it passes the test of good prediction.[36]

Simulation is a modeling strategy that is perhaps ideally suited for the questioning of the details of a model. Assumptions can be changed, and in a matter of minutes the data can be processed on the reformulated model. In this section we turn to a consideration of the details of our simulation model of roll-call voting in the U. S. House of Representatives in order both to examine the validity of the model as it was originally formulated and to test the sensitivity of the determinants or effects pogrammed into the model to represent those processes and propositions that we had deemed to be significant factors in the roll-call behavior of the members of the House.

The Party Effect. There is little doubt that on the American legislative scene, party is the most significant factor in roll-call voting cleavages. Recent quantitive analyses of roll-call voting in the Congress have explored this phenomenon systematically.[37] Because party is a prominent determinant in our simulation model, appearing as both a predisposing factor and a communications parameter, a systematic assessment of the performance of the model requires the consideration of the extent to which the party effect contributes to that performance.

We thus examine, first of all, the performance of a simulation model in which party is the only effect. Maintaining the same coding rules for party sponsorship and omitting all other determinants we obtain the voting results shown in Table 2. The actual results and the results obtained with the original model are also shown for purposes of comparison. Again using the voting splits as raw scores, we obtain a product-

---

[33] These percentages are computed for only those twelve bills on which constituency effects are coded.

[34] See Oliver Garceau and Corrine Silverman, "A Pressure Group and the Pressured: A Case Report," this REVIEW, 48 (1954), 672–691; Truman, *op. cit.;* Froman, *op. cit.*

[35] If this inquiry were directed toward a rigorous examination of such effects as seniority, we could control for confounding effects and operate the model with these controls to obtain these more specific insights into the effects of individual mechanisms.

[36] Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert Abelson, and Samuel Popkin, *Candidates, Strategies, and Issues: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential Elections* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), p. 64.

[37] See Turner, *op. cit.;* MacRae, *op. cit.*; Truman, *op. cit.;* and Froman, *op. cit.*

TABLE 2. THE RESULTS OF THE "JUST PARTY" MODEL

Bill	Original Model	% Correct	Party Model	% Correct	Actual Voting
HR 12 (recommittal)	171–339	84	171–239	84	171–239
HR 2	280–128	77	240–170	77	288–122
HR 4955 (recommittal)	153–244	92	163–235	93	181–217
HR 4955	382–13	92	399–0	95	378–27
HR 6143	294–104	70	237–163	60	287–113
S 1576	353–3	94	357–0	95	335–18
HR 6196 (recommittal)	167–237	81	169–235	81	179–224
HR 6196	232–168	78	232–168	78	216–182
HR 6518	262–119	82	220–163	78	273–109
HR 4955 (recommittal)	159–214	90	160–213	90	180–193
S 2265 (recommittal)	153–209	86	153–209	86	174–188
S 2265	241–121	76	210–152	74	254–107
HR 7152	323–100	84	423–0	69	290–130
HR 8316	362–0	87	362–0	87	317–43
HR 10222	245–173	90	242–176	90	229–189
HR 6196	238–175	89	237–177	89	211–203
HR 3881	230–172	82	235–167	75	212–189
HR 11377	247–172	85	245–167	84	226–185
HR 12175	371–3	82	374–0	81	308–68
HR 11926	221–170	78	0–0	00	218–175
S 3060 (recommittal)	148–197	76	148–197	76	107–237

moment coefficient of correlation between the actual voting splits and the "just party" simulated voting splits of .80 as compared with the .97 coefficient obtained with the original model. The micro level performance or average percentage of representatives correctly simulated by the "just party" model is 78 as compared with the 84 per cent obtained with the original model. It is thus clear, on the one hand, that party plays an important role in the performance of the simulation model, but on the other, it is also clear that the remaining effects built into our model are not irrelevant, for the results obtained with only the party effect are not as good as those obtained with the original model at either level.

Another way to assess both the model as a whole and the effect of the party variable is to run the model in its original form without including the party effect. When this is done the performance criteria are markedly similar to those obtained when just party is used to simulate the voting. The voting results obtained with this variation of the model are presented in Table 3 along with the results obtained with the "just party" model and the actual votes for purposes of comparison. The product-moment coefficient of correlation between the actual voting splits and those obtained with party removed from the model is .68, somewhat lower than that obtained with just party as the model. But the average percentage of representatives correctly simulated is 78, the same figure obtained for the "just party" simulation.

Two types of interpretations suggest themselves from the sensitivity testing of the model with the party effect the subject of our manipulations. The relatively similar performance of the model with just party and without party suggests that the original model is somewhat overdetermined in terms of party. The absence of party in the second reformulation of the model is partly compensated because of the extent to which the communications process is structured by a party effect, but the communications is also structured by the preceding predisposition phase of the model. This suggests that there may be a party surrogate in this prior phase that accounts for the similar performances. We examine this possibility below.

The other type of interpretation afforded by manipulation of the party effect relates to the types of issues processed in the model. Included in Table 3 along with the juxtaposed voting results of the "just party" and "without party" simulations are the percentages of representatives correctly simulated on each bill. If we examine the three different categories of party sponsorship, bipartisan, Democratic, and Republican, separately, we can determine the extent to which the party effect is significant in each. These are broken down into the party sponsorship categories in Table 4.

TABLE 3. THE RESULTS OF THE "JUST PARTY" AND "WITHOUT PARTY" MODELS

Bill	"Just Party" Model	% Correct	Actual Voting	"Without Party" Model	% Correct
HR 12 (recommittal)	171–239	84	171–239	158–250	84
HR 12	240–170	77	288–122	353–55	78
HR 4955 (recommittal)	163–235	93	181–217	120–175	83
HR 4955	399–0	95	378–27	285–113	70
HR 6143	237–163	60	287–113	301–96	82
S 1576	357–0	95	335–18	272–83	75
HR 6196 (recommittal)	169–235	81	179–224	127–272	75
HR 6196	232–168	78	216–182	257–137	76
HR 6518	220–163	78	273–109	315–66	80
HR 4955 (recommittal)	160–213	90	180–193	121–243	84
S 2265 (recommittal)	153–209	86	174–188	171–188	88
S 2265	210–152	74	254–107	288–72	75
HR 7152	423–0	69	290–130	165–243	64
HR 8316	362–0	87	317–43	265–97	75
HR 10222	242–176	90	229–189	265–149	87
HR 6196	237–177	89	211–203	247–164	86
HR 3881	235–167	75	212–189	209–190	85
HR 11377	245–167	84	226–185	255–156	86
HR 12175	374–0	81	308–68	297–75	79
HR 11926	0–0	00	218–175	224–170	79
S 3060 (recommittal)	148–197	76	107–237	130–213	79

Considering, first of all, the bills coded as bipartisan we obtain an average percentage of correctly simulated representatives of 90 with the "just party" model, slightly better than the 89 per cent obtained over the same bills with the original model. The percentage obtained with the "without party" model is only 75, considerably lower. Similarly, we obtain an average percentage of correctly simulated representatives on the Republican-sponsored recommittal motions of 85 with the "just party" model, the same figure obtained with the original model. The percentage obtained with the "without party" model is 71, again considerably lower.

When we examine the eleven remaining Democratic Administration bills, however, we find that the percentage of correctly simulated representatives is only 70 for the "just party" model as compared with the 82 per cent figure obtained with the original model. The "without party" model, on the other hand, correctly simulates an average of 79 per cent of the representatives on these bills. This reversal in performances between the "party only" and "without party" models suggests some validity for our presupposition about treating recommittal motions as incidents of party conflict rather than mediating the party effect with substantive coding for region and constituency variables as in the case of the Democratic Administration bills. At a general level, this result tends to validate the inclusion of constituency and regional effects in the model, for these enhance its performance. To assess the inclusions of regional and constituency effects more critically, however, we must directly manipulate them with further sensitivity testing of the model.

The Constituency Effect. Investigations of the relationship between the demographic and political characteristics of constituencies and the roll-call behavior of their representatives have been extensive. The findings from these studies all point in the direction of such a

TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF THE ORIGINAL "JUST PARTY," AND "WITHOUT PARTY" MODELS ON THREE PARTY SPONSORSHIP CATEGORIES

	Original Model % Correct	"Just Party" Model % Correct	"Without Party" Model % Correct
Bipartisan Bills	89	90	75
Republican Sponsorship	85	85	71
Democratic Sponsorship	82	70	79

TABLE 5. THE RESULTS OF "WITHOUT CONSTITUENCY" MODEL

Bill	Original Model	% Correct	Without Constituency	% Correct	Actual Voting
HR 12 (recommittal)	171–239	84	170–239	84	171–239
HR 12	280–128	77	242–168	77	288–122
HR 4955 (recommittal)	153–244	92	149–249	91	181–217
HR 4955	382–13	92	380–17	91	378–27
HR 6143	294–104	70	169–230	66	287–113
S 1576	353–3	94	352–4	94	335–18
HR 6196 (recommittal)	167–237	81	168–236	81	179–224
HR 6196	232–168	78	233–166	78	216–182
HR 6518	262–119	82	224–159	79	273–109
HR 4955 (recommittal)	159–214	90	158–215	90	180–193
S 2265 (recommittal)	153–209	86	150–212	86	174–188
S 2265	241–121	76	213–149	74	254–107
HR 7152	323–100	84	297–126	88	290–130
HR 8316	362–0	87	362–0	87	317–43
HR 10222	245–173	90	243–175	90	229–189
HR 6196	238–175	89	238–176	88	211–203
HR 11377	230–172	82	236–166	76	212–189
HR 12175	247–172	85	245–167	84	226–185
HR 12175	371–3	82	351–20	83	308–68
HR 11926	221–170	78	317–0	42	218–175
S 3060 (recommittal)	148–197	76	147–198	76	107–237

relationship.[38] While these investigations have not systematically explored the constituency effect from issue to issue in terms of the extent to which different types of issues result in different degrees of constituency loyalty on the part of representatives, Miller and Stokes' recent investigation explored the effect in this manner.[39] They found, among other things, that representatives tend to heed the desires they perceive their constituents to have as well as the ones they actually do have, particularly on domestic welfare legislation. The close similarity between the welfare legislation included in the Stokes and Miller study and our bills dealing with the federal role is the basis upon which the decision to code constituency effects was made.

In order to examine the validity of constituency coding in general and the specific coding decisions made in particular, I have run the model on the twenty-one bills without the constituency coding that had been included in the original run. The voting results obtained with this alternative formulation of the model are presented in Table 5 along with the actual voting results and the voting results obtained with the original model for purposes of comparison. The coefficient of correlation between the actual splits and those resulting from the "without constituency" simulation is .80 as compared with the .97 coefficient obtained between the original model and the actual votes.[40] It would appear that the constituency effect is not an irrelevant part of the simulation model.

To examine the extent to which the specific constituency coding decisions were well advised, we consider the micro level performance of the model without the constituency coding. The average percentage of representatives correctly simulated on the twelve bills for which constituency was coded is 78 for the run with the "without constituency" model. This

---

[38] Turner, *op. cit.*; Duncan MacRae "The Relation Between Roll-Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," this REVIEW, 46 (1952), 1046–1055; MacRae, *op. cit.*, 1958; J. Roland Pennock "Party and Constituency in Postwar Agricultural Price Support Legislation," *Journal of Politics*, 18 (1956), 167–210; Froman, *op. cit.*

[39] Warren Miller and Donald Stokes "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), 45–56.

[40] When we compute the correlation between the actual splits and the "without constituency" splits across only the twelve bills on which constituency was originally coded we obtain a coefficient of .78 as compared with a .95 obtained with the original model for the same bills.

TABLE 6. THE RESULTS OF THE "WITHOUT REGION" MODEL

Bill	Original Model	% Correct	Without Region	% Correct	Actual Voting
HR 12 (recommittal)	171–239	84	171–139	84	171–239
HR 12	280–128	77	287–123	75	288–122
HR 4955 (recommittal)	153–244	92	165–233	92	181–217
HR 4955	382–13	92	385–13	92	378–27
HR 6143	294–104	80	338–61	70	287–113
S 1576	353–3	94	354–3	94	335–18
HR 6196 (recommittal)	167–237	81	168–236	81	179–224
HR 6196	232–168	78	232–167	78	216–182
HR 6518	262–119	82	252–129	81	273–109
HR 4955 (recommittal)	159–214	90	159–213	90	180–193
S 2265 (recommittal)	153–209	86	154–208	86	174–188
S 2265	241–121	76	239–121	77	254–107
HR 7152	323–100	84	423–0	70	290–130
HR 8316	362–0	87	265–97	75	317–43
HR 10222	245–173	90	244–174	90	229–189
HR 6196	238–175	89	238–176	89	211–203
HR 3881	230–172	82	244–158	78	212–189
HR 11377	247–172	85	246–166	85	226–185
HR 12175	371–3	82	371–3	82	308–68
HR 11926	221–170	78	225–169	78	218–175
S 3060 (recommittal)	148–197	76	147–198	76	107–237

compares with an average of 85 per cent obtained for those twelve bills with the original model. While this is not conclusive evidence of the validity of the specific coding decisions made for the constituency effects, it argues strongly for that validity. It tends to validate the model as a whole and to support previous findings on the effect of constituency factors on legislative roll-call voting behavior.

The Region Effect. Sectionalism or regional cleavages in congressional voting behavior have been found in many investigations.[41] In our simulation of bills dealing with the federal role, only four were coded as having regional effects. All of these were coded to suggest a negative predisposition on the part of southern representatives.

To test the extent to which my regional coding aided in the performance of the simulation model we processed the twenty-one bills without the regional coding. The voting results obtained with this "without region" model are presented in Table 6 along with the actual results and those obtained with the original model for purposes of comparison. The product-moment coefficient of correlation between the splits on the actual bills and those resulted from the "without region" simulation is .89 as compared with the .97 coefficient obtained between the actual voting splits and those resulting from the original simulation model.[42] The regional coding thus substantially improves the performance of the simulation model even though only four bills are coded as subject to a regional effect.

To test the extent to which my specific regional coding was well informed, we examine the micro level performance of the "without region" model. The average percentage of representatives correctly simulated with this variation of our original model is 77 as compared with an average of 83 correctly simulated with the original model for the four bills on which region effects were coded. We thus have partial validation of the regional coding decisions. It would appear that the substantive provisions of the simulation model (including both constituency and regional effects) is an important part of the legislative process involved

---

[41] See for example H. G. Roach "Sectionalism in Congress (1870–1890)," this REVIEW, 19 (1925), 500–526; G. Grassmuck, *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1951); V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).

[42] When we compute the correlation between the actual splits and the "without region" splits for only the four bills on which region was originally coded we obtain a coefficient of .62 as compared with a .99 obtained with the original model for the same bills.

TABLE 7. THE RESULTS OF THE "WITHOUT MEMORY" MODEL

Bill	Original Model	% Correct	Without Memory	% Correct	Actual Voting
HR 12 (recommittal)	171–239	84	171–239	84	171–239
HR 12	280–128	77	336–72	71	288–122
HR 4955 (recommittal)	153–244	92	153–249	93	181–217
HR 4955	382–13	92	399–0	95	378–27
HR 6143	294–104	70	314–80	73	287–113
S 1576	353–3	94	357–0	95	335–18
HR 6196 (recommittal)	167–237	81	169–235	81	179–224
HR 6196	232–168	78	232–168	78	216–182
HR 6518	262–119	82	280–102	81	273–109
HR 4955 (recommittal)	159–214	90	160–213	90	180–193
S 2265 (recommittal)	153–209	86	166–196	83	174–188
S 2265	241–121	76	271–89	71	254–107
HR 7152	323–100	84	322–100	84	290–130
HR 8316	362–0	87	362–0	87	317–43
HR 10222	245–173	90	246–171	90	229–189
HR 6196	238–175	89	237–177	89	211–203
HR 3881	230–172	82	172–229	78	212–189
HR 11377	247–172	85	245–167	84	226–185
HR 12175	371–3	82	374–0	81	308–68
HR 11926	221–170	78	226–168	78	218–175
S 3060 (recommittal)	148–197	76	148–197	76	107–237

in roll-call voting. The inclusion of these effects has aided the overall performance of the model at the macro level and provided better individual performance of the model on the bills for which coding makes the substantive provisions relevant.

The Memory Effect. On all but two of the bills, memory is coded in terms of whether the bill proposes an expansion or diminution of the federal role. Each representative thus has his predisposition affected if his past votes on the federal role issue dimension suggest a positive or negative attitude toward the expansion of the federal role. To examine the extent to which memory is an important effect in our model I have run the bills through the model without including the memory effect. The results of the "without memory" simulation are presented in Table 7 along with the actual and original simulation results for purposes of comparison.

Looking at the macro level performance of the "without memory" model, we obtain a product-moment coefficient of correlation of .97, the same coefficient obtained with the original model. The lack of contribution of memory can be further highlighted by viewing the results obtained when just memory is used to simulate the votes. The product-moment coefficient of correlation obtained between the actual voting splits and those resulting from the "just memory" simulation is only .21.

These findings suggest that the memory effect does not aid in the macro level performance of the simulation model. The presence of the memory effect may, however, account for the findings obtained when the party effect was manipulated. When we correlate the splits resulting from the "just party" simulation with those resulting from the "just memory" simulation we obtain a coefficient of .62. This suggests that memory tends to coincide to some extent with party membership and is thus somewhat of a party surrogate which may explain part of the similarity of the results obtained with the "just party" and "without party" simulations.

Despite the small role that memory has been shown to have in the macro level performance of the simulation model, the micro level performance of the "without memory" simulation model indicates that the memory effect is not entirely superfluous. The average percentage of representatives correctly simulated by the "without memory" model is 82 as compared with the 84 per cent figure obtained when memory is included. The memory effect is thus a slight aid in the micro level performance of the model.

Of some interest is the performance of the memory effect on the different types of bills. Comparing the average percentage of correctly simulated representatives obtained with the "without memory" model and the original

TABLE 8. THE RESULTS OF THE "WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS" MODEL

Bill	Original Model	% Correct	Without Communication	% Correct	Actual Voting
HR 12 (recommittal)	171–239	84	173–222	84	171–239
HR 12	280–128	77	254–119	72	288–122
HR 4955 (recommittal)	153–244	92	155–233	90	181–217
HR 4955	382–13	92	303–34	74	378–27
HR 6143	294–104	70	188–133	62	287–113
S 1576	353–3	94	278–13	77	335–18
HR 6196 (recommittal)	167–237	81	170–221	79	179–224
HR 6196	232–168	78	220–168	78	216–182
HR 6518	262–119	82	219–120	76	273–109
HR 4955 (recommittal)	159–214	90	158–200	88	180–193
S 2265 (recommittal)	153–209	86	164–169	84	174–188
S 2265	241–121	76	207–121	72	254–107
HR 7152	323–100	84	298–100	83	290–130
HR 8316	362–0	87	265–96	68	317–43
HR 10222	245–173	90	237–170	89	229–189
HR 6196	238–175	89	226–176	87	211–203
HR 3881	230–172	82	169–177	77	212–189
HR 11377	247–172	85	228–168	85	226–185
HR 12175	371–3	82	285–25	74	308–68
HR 11926	221–170	78	214–167	77	218–175
S 3060 (recommittal)	148–197	76	147–183	76	107–237

model for the four bipartisan bills yields the same figure of 89. Similarly, the "without memory" model results in the same average percentage of representatives correctly simulated across the six Republican sponsored recommittal motions as in the original model, 85. It is on the Democratic Administration bills that memory appears to aid the micro level performance of the model.

While the original model correctly simulated the voting behavior of 82 per cent of the representatives on the Democratic Administration bills, the "without memory" model correctly simulated only 79 per cent of the representatives on these bills. Because it is these bills that deal with the substantive issues involved in legislation, the memory effect probably conveys the impact of ideological postures that have been found to have some effect on legislative roll-call behavior.[43] In the case of recommittal motions and bipartisan bills, the content of the bill that tends to evoke ideological effects is obfuscated by procedural concerns and the bipartisan effect respectively.

The Communication Effect. We turn finally to a consideration of the contribution made by the communications phase of the model. Again this assessment is made by testing the sensitivity of the effect by removing it. The voting results obtained when the model is run without the communications process are presented in Table 8 along with the actual and original simulation model voting results for purposes of comparison. Examining, first of all, the macro level performance of this alternative formulation of the model we obtain a product-moment coefficient of correlation between the actual voting splits and those resulting from the "without communications" simulations of .88 as compared with the .97 coefficient obtained between the actual and original model voting splits.

The micro level performance of the model is also enhanced by the communication process. The average percentage of representatives correctly simulated by the "without communications" simulation model is 78 as compared with the 84 per cent correctly simulated by the original model. We thus have a basis for believing that the communications process is not an irrelevant part of our overall model.

Several important questions can be raised with respect to internal aspects of the communications phase of the model. In constructing the process I found that changes in key mechanisms such as the salience of the party effect resulted in a dimunition of the performance of the model as a whole. Changes in the average number of communications of representatives had similar effects on the performance of the model as a whole. A thorough examination of the sensitivity of all the important effects in the communication process has not been conducted as yet, but the indications derived from the examinations thus far suggest that the communications phase of this model is quite sensitive to changes in parameters and mechanisms.

---

[43] See footnote 2 above.

IV. CONCLUSION

The fact that every alternative formulation of the model undertaken thus far has decreased some aspect of the model's performance lends evidence in support of the contention that the relatively good match obtained between the actual roll-call voting in the House on federal role issues and in our simulation is not a result of a number of errors or ill-advised hypotheses that cancel each other out to make the model right for the wrong reasons. What is especially significant is the fact that the theoretical model based upon propositions from legislative and face-to-face group research can be used to simulate the roll-call voting on an issue area in two sessions of the House with good performances at the macro and micro levels.

The results of the research just reported can be assessed from various perspectives. From the point of view of legislative behavior research, the performance of the model lends support to the propositions from legislative research upon which it is based. In addition, the model represents, in itself, a theoretical formalization of legislative voting behavior. To the extent that it was validated with the sensitivity testing reported in this chapter, that formalization has been shown to perform in a manner that suggests acceptance of the conceptualizations which comprise it.

In terms of the manner in which theories can be evaluated, this theoretical model has performed well on the basis of a prediction criterion. In addition, the ability of the model to simulate legislative voting effectively with few mechanisms grouped into its predisposition and communication phases suggests a positive evaluation in terms of a theoretical organizing criterion discussed in a recent article.[44] To the extent to which the model performs similarly on other types of issues and for other sessions of the House, its organizing power will be further enhanced.[45] The manipulability of the model has been demonstrated, in part, by the sensitivity testing reported in this paper. While it cannot be increased without sacrificing organizing power, its potential has not been exhausted here.

The performance of the model can also be assessed in terms of its successful simulation of a large decision-making body. It can be noted that the evaluation of the performance of processes in large groups depends upon the ability to discern outputs from the group processes in order to compare the functional equivalence of outputs in the simulation and thereby obtain evaluation criteria. The public character of roll-call voting provides an easily obtained quantifiable output and thus renders legislatures susceptible to the simulation mode of investigation. The success of this simulation is encouraging from the point of view of its implications for the application of the simulation technique to the study of social and political processes in large groups as well as its illumination of the determinants of the legislative process involved in the roll-call voting decisions of representatives.

Finally, a number of directions in which investigation of the model might proceed suggest themselves. In terms of the predisposition phase of the model, we could investigate the extent to which the inclusion of personal characteristics of representatives as predisposing effects would affect the simulation of roll-call votes. The communications phase of the model could be reformulated in two ways. First, a number of parameters could be added to affect conversation probabilities, and second, the communication process could be cycled to allow for a diffusion of influence whereby those whose predispositions have been changed as a result of interactions with colleagues could interact with other colleagues as influencers on the basis of their newly acquired predispositions.

What is perhaps most significant from the point of view of future research possibilities with the model is the relative similarity of state legislatures ot the Congress. In order to develop our model to the point where it simulates legislative voting in a broader sense, we hope to employ it in simulations of roll-call voting in state legislatures as well as in several other sessions of the U.S. House of Representatives. In this way we hope to enhance the organizing power of a theoretical formulation, the potential of which we have begun to explore in the research reported here.

---

[44] K. W. Deutsch, J. D. Singer, and K. Smith. "The Organizing Efficiency of Theories," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 9 (1965), 30–33.

[45] For a more extensive treatment of the model which includes an assessment of its performance on foreign affairs legislation, see Cleo H. Cherryholmes and Michael J. Shapiro *Representatives and Roll-Calls: A Computer Simulation of Voting in the Eighty-Eighth Congress* (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), forthcoming.

ORGANIZATION THEORY AND THE EXPLANATION OF IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF CONGRESS*

LEWIS A. FROMAN, JR.
University of California, Irvine

By and large the Congress of the United States has been studied on its own terms, as a somewhat unique political institution. Studies of Congress are usually considered to be important simply because they shed light on an important institution in the American political system. It is true, of course, that Congress *is* an important policy-making body and does deserve study for that reason. But there is no reason why substantive importance cannot be combined with "importance" in another sense. It is also important, for example, to develop theory within any discipline which will help explain the phenomena under study. Trivial substantive problems can be made interesting because of the theory which they suggest. And because a problem may already be substantively important does not mean that it cannot be made even more significant by theoretical development.

As a result of this substantive focus, research on Congress has produced a very rich body of descriptive data on various components of the institution, including its members and leadership, group structure, committees, party systems, organization, and rules and procedures. Studies have also provided generalizations concerning such things as the decentralized decision-making of Congress and the effects of the seniority rule on the distribution of power within the House and Senate. These descriptive data and generalizations may serve as the content to be explained within the context of a theory. As yet there has been very little effort at theory construction concerning Congress. The data are there—their organization and explication remain.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONGRESS

Although it is difficult to abstract *the* most important characteristics of Congress which have emerged from these studies, most close observers would agree that the following thirteen accurately reflect some of the more interesting and useful things which may be said about Congress.[1]

I. Impact on Public Policy
   1. Congress is an important political decision-making body which, unlike legislatures in many other countries, makes a significant, independent contribution to public policy.

II. Organization
   2. Decision-making in Congress is highly decentralized, with power widely dispersed among committees, subcomittees, and the formal and party leadership.
   3. Each body has a well-developed system of formal and impersonal rules and procedures, with the rules of the House of Representatives more formal and impersonal than those of the Senate.

III. Members
   4. Members in each body may make large individual contributions to public policy, although some members are more salient than others.
   5. Members of each house have a high commitment and loyalty to the Congress.

IV. Group Structure
   6. There are many subgroups within each body, with the House having a larger number than the Senate.
   7. There is a highly developed specialization of labor and specificity of roles, and more so in the House than the Senate.
   8. Group cohesion in each body is relatively low.
   9. The existence of an active group structure has important consequences for decision-making and public policy.

---

* I wish to thank James G. March and Deane E. Neubauer for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

[1] Since the literature is so voluminous, and since most of the findings have been replicated and are not controversial, I will not attempt to cite specific references in each instance. For a general bibliograpny see the latest texts on Congress, William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, *The American Legislative Prcoess: Congress and the States* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), and Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, *The Legislative Process in the United States* (New York: Random House, 1966).

V. Leadership
  10. Each house has a relatively elaborate and complex leadership structure.
  11. Authority of leadership is relatively low.
VI. Processes
  12. Internal communication within each body is relatively elaborate and complex.
  13. A prevalent form of decision-making within each body is bargaining.

These thirteen generalizations about Congress are obviously not meant to be exhaustive of those which could be made in each category (as well as in additional categories). They are, however, among the more important propositions which aid in the understanding of the congressional process. As far as I know none are contradicted by any study, and most are supported extensively in the literature. These thirteen propositions, then, will be taken as "given," as true of Congress, and as important enough to be "explained."

II. POSSIBLE EXPLANATORY THEORIES

There are, essentially, two ways in which one may attempt to link up emprircal findings with observations about their significance. One may discuss the *consequences* of the findings, what happens *because* the findings are true; or one may attempt to show *why* the findings are true, what *explains* the findings. The first is called functional analysis, the latter causal analysis.

Occasionally, but unfortunately only occasionally, the rich descriptive data on specific aspects of Congress and the generalizations relating one aspect to another are related further to possible consequences which the data being explored may have on public policy, careers of members, relations with the executive branch, or the American political system in general. Although most researchers on Congress are aware of the importance of demonstrating the effects which the institutional characteristics or processes which they describe have on important outcomes, the difficulty in collecting reliable data on such consequences often prohibits more than speculation.

More rare still are studies which explain *why* the descriptions or patterns which are observed are what they are. With relative infrequency historical references are made as to the genesis of certain features of Congress, but little or no *causal* analysis is attempted. At best one finds ad hoc explanations of special features of Congress, but such explanations are normally intrinsic to the organization itself and therefore difficult to validate in terms of general laws. Comparative data are necessary for this purpose. For example, to explain why power in Congress is decentralized it is not sufficient to point to the existence of the committee system. Multiple units are undoubtedly necessary to a dispersal of power, but not a sufficient condition for it. Are, for example, all organizations with committees decentralized? Undoubtedly not. But raising the general question forces one to think in a context larger than Congress itself, that is, on a comparative basis.

It is commonly accepted in philosophy of science that one achieves explanation of a phenomenon when that phenomenon can be subsumed under a general law. Thus, that Congress has a seniority system might be deduced from the following argument: All organizations with extensive divisions of labor have seniority systems; Congress is an organization with an extensive division of labor; therefore . . . (The soundness of this particular argument is not at issue here, it is the *form* of explanatory propositions with which this paragraph is concerned.)

What is necessary, then, in order to "explain" certain salient features of Congress is to subsume the specific findings under a set of more general hypotheses or laws (whether the former or the latter will affect the *credibility* of the explanation). But to do so requires moving away from the view that Congress is a unique institution and treating it, instead, as an instance of a more general category. What the more general category is will affect the terms of the theory as well as other matters. For example, Congress may be considered as an example of a legislature. If we had a theory of legislatures, then many of the propositions about Congress could be tested within that theory and many of the characteristics of Congress could be explained by the laws or hypotheses of that theory. We do not, however, have such a theory, although the development of one would certainly be useful. We do have the beginnings of general theory in the literature on organizations and it is not unrealistic, in order to use that theory, to label Congress an instance or an example of a formal organization.

If we view Congress as a formal organization, and use the general propositions which have been stated, with more or less validity, about formal organizations, we will be able to avoid strictly ad hoc interpretations of Congressional phenomena and, in their place, substitute a somewhat organized and consistent set of empirical generalizations which have been found to be true of other formal organizations. Such propositions, used in explanation, may be quite powerful and parsimonious and aid immeasurably in our understanding of why Congress is as it is. Dealing with Congress at this theoretical level may also have a number of other payoffs. If we are able to subsume important findings about a political institution under some general laws such an effort would provide significant clues as to what might be involved in attempts to change or reform various features of that organization. When one attempts to make changes in the absence of knowledge about causes, he is often "whistling in the wind," a constant source of irritation by the way to those who, at an intuitive level, are knowledgeable about Congress and who must deal with reform proposals by those who are not.

What follows, then, is an effort to explain the thirteen general characteristics of Congress concerning public policy, organization, members, group structure, leadership and processes, by subsuming these characteristics under general statements which have been drawn from organizations other than Congress. It is in this sense that Congress will be treated as a formal organization, subject to the same "laws" as other organizations, and unique only in the sense that there is only one Congress of the United States although there are many formal organizations.

The major source of these propositions is an article by Stanley Udy, Jr., which is an effort to subsume the extant literature on comparative organizations by the formulation of somewhat abstract generalizations.[2] Udy's definitions will be found in his article, along with the bibliographic references supporting the propositions. In several cases the propositions have been rephrased for clarity, consistency, and relevance. It is to be emphasized, however, that these propositions are designed to encompass organizations in general and that data from legislative bodies had no part in their formulation. The process in which we are engaged in this paper, then, may be described in two ways: (1) an exploration of "goodness of fit" of propositions in one literature to the findings in another literature, and (2) an attempt to organize a number of descriptive statements about Congress around a set of explanatory propositions.

III. EXPLANATION OF MAJOR FINDINGS ON CONGRESS

The propositions about organizations from Udy and March and Simon may be placed in one of two categories, depending upon the reference of the independent variable: (a) propositions in which the environment of the organization is the independent variable, and (b) propositions in which either the organization itself or its membership is the independent variable. We will first consider three propositions which specify the environment or social setting as the independent variable. These three propositions help to explain seven of the descriptive statements about Congress enumerated at the beginning of this paper. The numbers in parentheses following each proposition refer to the descriptive statements (see above) being subsumed. We will then proceed to discuss four propositions in which organizational factors are the independent variables.

Environmental Determinants

1a. *The more highly differentiated the social setting, the more salient the organization itself.*[3] (1)

Since outcomes of legislatures are public policies, this proposition asserts that although any setting undoubtedly affects an organization's output, the more differentiated and less unitary the setting the greater will be the effects of the organization itself in determining the organization's outcomes.

Applying this general proposition to Congress, it has often been suggested that Congress does not simply ratify the requests from its environment (including requests from the executive, interest groups, public opinion, political parties, etc.), but that the organization itself has a major impact on matters of public policy. It is even suggested that the American Congress is probably more powerful vis-à-vis the executive than are most other national legislatures. One explanation of this independence, as this first proposition suggests, is that the United States Congress may be classed with those formal organizations which face a relatively more differentiated environment. The social setting of the British Parliament, for example, is a good deal less highly differentiated given the fact that the diversity of interests which exist are already aggregated in a strong, cohesive, majority party which presents the bulk of requests. In Britain, of course, Parliament is not a highly salient political institution in terms of its independent impact on public policy. This observation may lead to a general hypothesis about legislatures: the independent influence which a legislature exerts will vary inversely with the centralization of other pressures. The French Assembly under the Fourth Republic could have a greater impact on public policy than the French Assembly in the Fifth Republic. In the former centralization of pressure was rather weak; in the latter it is relatively strong.

---

[2] Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "The Comparative Analysis of Organizations," in James G. March (ed.), *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 678–709. Proposition seven comes from James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 130.

[3] This part of proposition one is actually a deduction from two others: The more highly differentiated . . . the social setting, the less salient it will be; The less salient the social setting . . . , the more salient the organization itself; therefore . . . . By "differentiated" is meant dispersed, heterogeneous, plural, non-unitary. By "salient" is meant important as an influence on the output of the organization.

1b. *The more highly differentiated the social setting, the more decentralized the decisional apparatus, the greater the amount of internal communication and group interaction, and the greater the expectation of high commitment of members.*[4] (2, 12, and 5)

Part b of this proposition asserts that not only will a diffuse and non-unitary environment make the organization more important as a determiner of its own decisions, but such an environment will also affect how the body is organized and how its members behave. An organization which faces a more unitary environment will be less likely to have an elaborate decentralized decision-making structure. It will also have less internal communication and less commitment of its members to the organization (which may, incidentally, also help to explain why a more centralized decision-structure is necessary).

The fact that Congress is subjected to a wide breadth and diffuseness of external pressures is documented without contradiction in the literature on Congress as well as in the relevant literatures on interest groups, political parties, public opinion, and public administration. The literature, of course, also supports the findings that Congress is highly decentralized, has a large amount of internal communication and interaction, and a high commitment of members to the organization.[5]

It is also interesting to observe that propositions 1a. and 1b. are probably mutually reinforcing. That is, an organization which has an important independent influence on its own decisions is also an organization where one would expect the commitment of members to be high. Similarly, an organization where commitment of its members is low is much more likely to be hierarchically organized (in order to force compliance) than an organization where commitment is high.

The amount of differentiation in the social setting, then, affects four important variables, some of which also influence (or at least are consistent with) the others.

2. *The . . . greater the amount of pressure exerted on the organization from the social setting, the greater the emphasis on administration.* (10)

In this proposition "administration" may mean at least three things: (1) routine tasks, (2) elaborate rules and procedures, and (3) complexity of leadership structure. Although we are primarily interested in the latter, all three meanings of the term are consistent with congressional findings. Proposition 2, then, asserts that organizations will vary in amount of routine tasks, the elaboration of rules and procedures, and leadership complexity and that one of the factors affecting the extent of "administration" is the amount of pressure exerted on the organization from the environment.

Studies of Congress attest to the large amount of outside pressure which is exerted on its members (from interest groups, constituents, executive agencies, party leaders, etc.) and also to the large amount of time which is spent by Congressmen and Senators on routine tasks (answering the mail, going to meetings, "making a record," etc.), the rather elaborate rules and procedures in both bodies, and the relatively complicated leadership structure.[6] As is suggested by the general proposition, the two sets of factors, amount of pressure and amount of administration, are related in organizations other than Congress as well.

---

[4] These three dependent variables are positively associated with what Udy calls "breadth and diffuseness of external pressure." I take "differentiated social setting" and "breadth and diffuseness of external pressure" to be synonymous.

[5] For discussions and bibliography see Keefe and Ogul, *op. cit.;* and Jewell and Patterson, *op. cit.*

[6] For example, see Robert L. Peabody, "Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives," this REVIEW, 61 (September, 1967), Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Repre-

Another way to state this proposition is in terms of work overload. Congressmen and Senators are literally deluged with requests, information, and "pressure." The three administrative responses of routine, rules, and role structure are efforts to cope with this overload.

3. *The greater the degree of conflict with the social setting, the greater the amount of authority exercised at all levels, and the more cohesive the group structure.* (11, 8)

Authority exercised by leaders in Congress is relatively small. Committee chairmen, the Speaker, the Majority and Minority Leaders, etc., are not able to command support although they do bargain for it. The literature suggests that leaders do have rewards and punishments to dispense, but all agree that the size of these resources is relatively small. Similarly, although the group structure in Congress is important and extensive it is not cohesive.[7]

These features follow from the independent variable in the above proposition, that is, Congress as an organization is not in conflict with the social setting. Rather, one would more accurately describe the relationship as being *in league* with the social setting. This comes about in two ways. First, Congressmen and Senators have constituents to court and care for, and they in fact spend an enormous amount of time doing just that. Estimates of time spent on constituency affairs range as high as ninety percent. Congressmen and Senators may, in fact, be in conflict with certain segments of the population, but not a majority of their own constituents (at least not publicly).

Second, it has been pointed out numerous times that although in some senses the executive branch and Congress are in conflict, in most matters legislators work hand in glove with the administrative departments which they oversee. Of course, the amount of cooperation undoubtedly varies in the House and Senate from committee to committee, but by and large relations with executive agencies are cordial and friendly, not hostile.

Another aspect of these same phenomena of lack of strong authority and low cohesion is the fact that Congress exhibits a good deal of intra-organizational conflict, not only between the parties but within parties as well. It would also be expected that this would be true of other organizations which have non-conflictual environmental relations, a fact which might suggest that relationships between organizational variables in Congress might also be generalizable to other organizations.[8]

These three environmental factors, extent of differentiation, amount of pressure, and degree of conflict help to explain a wide range of congressional phenomena in particular (statements 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, and 12 in the list at the beginning of this paper), and organizational phenomena in general.

Organizational Determinants

In the previous three propositions the environment or social setting has been the major independent variable. In this section we well consider propositions in which the independent variable is intra-organizational.

4. *The more permanent the organization, the lower its turnover rate, and the less mechanized the technology, the higher the salience of its group structure.* (9)

One of the features of Congress which has intrigued several recent writers on Congress is the important role which informal groups and group norms have in affecting the way in which Congressmen do their work.[9] It has long been

---

sentatives," this REVIEW, 58 (September, 1964), 561–576; Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and Randall B. Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats," this REVIEW, 59 (March, 1965), 52–63, and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules, and Procedures* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

[7] Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: Wiley, 1959); Alan Fiellin, "The Functions of Informal Groups: A State Delegation," in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 59–78; and John H. Kessel, "The Washington Congressional Delegation," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 8 (Feb., 1964), 1–21.

[8] See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), which draws explicit parallels between Congressional processes and decision-making in the Pentagon.

[9] See Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," this REVIEW, 56 (June, 1962), 310–324; Donald R. Matthews, *U. S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), especially Chapters 1 through 5; Alan Fiellin, "The Functions of Informal Groups: A State Delegation," in Peabody and Polsby (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 59–78, and John F. Manley, "The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee," this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 927–939.

known, since Woodrow Wilson's *Congressional Government*,[10] that committees and subcommittees play an all but overwhelming role in Congressional deliberations. But not only are these more formal groups now recognized as important cogs in the decision-making apparatus, but informal groups such as state delegations, voluntary clubs such as the Democratic Study Group in the House, informal groups of individuals within committees and subcommittees, and even larger groups such as the "conservative coalition," are being given increasingly more attention. Both the House and the Senate have a large number of informal groups as well as formal ones.

Causal proposition 4 asserts that the permanence of an organization, its relatively low turnover, and an unmechanized technology help to produce in organizations generally a highly salient group structure. Congress is certainly a permanent organization. Less well known, however, is the fact that turnover from Congress to Congress is relatively low, averaging about fifteen percent in the House of Representatives every two years.[11] That is, approximately eighty-five percent of all Congressmen remain in Congress from one election to the next. The turnover in leadership positions, of course, is even smaller. In addition Congress is noted for its resistance to mechanization. Even such simple things as the installation of electric voting devices have failed to attract much enthusiasm among Congressmen and Senators. Most members of Congress pick up their information about what is going on as a result of talking with others. Televising the proceedings in each chamber, with closed-circuit outlets in each office would certainly be an aid to the members in determining when their presence on the floor might be desired. Rather than this, however, reliance is placed on word of mouth, and such low mechanization items as the telephone.

In addition to the high salience of the group structure, or more likely as a consequence of it, a number of informal norms have developed which help to protect the members and preserve stability. In a body in which members will be in contact with one another over long periods of time, and in which the technology of the organization is almost entirely social, it is not surprising to find that informal ways of doing things grow up which help to avoid serious threats to the stability and functioning of the organization. The seniority rule, senatorial courtesy, restrained debate, and even the so-called "Senate type," are undoubtedly a product of this. No issue is worth the destruction of the institution—members will have to deal with other members over a wide range of issues and over long periods of time. Legislators are, in effect, socialized into rules which specify that one must not jeopardize his ability to play future games by seriously discombobulating other members.

5. *The greater the need for technical expertise, the more salient the membership.* (4)

Not only is Congress as an organization highly salient (essentially because of its highly differentiated environment), and groups within Congress important (causal proposition 4), but its members may also become significant figures in the development of public policy. Undoubtedly, as this proposition suggests, part of the reason why this is true is the importance attached to technical knowledge about very complicated matters of public policy. Such expertise may lie in a substantive field like housing or tax matters, or in parliamentary skills. In any event members may become influential by the amount of information about a topic which they have at their command.[12]

This factor of technical expertise also helps to explain why some Congressmen are more important than others and why periods of apprenticeship are developed within the institution. A number of norms of behavior, in fact, revolve around the learning of technical expertise. Freshman members are expected not to participate extensively in debate, to speak only about what they know, and generally to watch and listen rather than participate.[13] One source of power in the House and Senate is information and, like other technical skills, it must be learned. Additional support is given to this hypothesis by the deference which is paid to those who have information and skills. Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, for example, is an enormously respected member of the House, not only because of his formal position but for his technical competence and parliamentary skill as well.

---

[10] (New York, Meridian Books, 1956.) This book was first published in 1885.

[11] See Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," in David B. Truman (ed.), *The Congress and America's Future* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965); Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the House of Representatives," paper delivered at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *The Congressional Process*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 1.

[12] See, for example, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The Power of the Purse* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

[13] See Matthews, *op. cit.*, Chapter 5.

6. *The larger the size of the organization, the greater the number of subgroups in it; hence the greater the overall emphasis on formal and impersonal rules and specificity of roles.* (3, 6, 7)

This proposition helps us in two ways. First, both the House and Senate are relatively large organizations. For example, in 1960 more than ninety-five percent of the 4.7 million business organizations in the United States had less than one hundred employees.[14] Even without counting the large supporting staffs in the House and Senate, each is larger than this figure. We would expect, then, that both houses of Congress would have a relatively large number of subgroups, formal and impersonal rules, and high specificity of roles.

But the fact that membership in the House is over four times that of the Senate would also suggest that the House, as compared with the Senate, would have a larger number of subgroups, a more complex and impersonal set of rules, and greater role specificity. The data indicate that each of these is true. Although the data on social groups is incomplete, in formal group structures the House in the Eighty-ninth Congress (1965–66) had 20 committees and 125 subcommittees, whereas the comparable figures for the Senate were 16 and 99. On the question of role specificity, Representatives are usually members of only one committee whereas Senators normally have three or more committee assignments. In addition fifty-one percent of Senate Democrats have two or more committee or subcommittee chairmanships whereas only twelve percent of House Democrats play such multiple roles.[15] The data on rules and procedures is somewhat more difficult to summarize, but existing evidence supports the contention that House rules are more elaborate, formal, and impersonal than are Senate rules.[16]

7. *The extent of use of analytic processes to resolve conflict is a function of the type of organizational conflict involved. The more organizational conflict represents individual rather than intergroup conflict, the greater the use of analytic procedures. The more organizational conflict represents intergroup differences, the greater the use of bargaining.*[17] (13)

This proposition simply asserts that bargaining as a method of reaching agreement will be prevalent in organizations which have group conflict as opposed to analytic problem-solving devices in individual conflict.[18] The processes of log-rolling, compromise, and side-payments are widely used to reach majority agreement in committees, subcommittees, and on the floor of both the House and Senate.[19] The reasons for intergroup conflict in Congress are, of course, obvious. Disagreements in Congress reflect, generally, the cleavages within society. Such cleavages include ideological differences (e.g., over the role of the federal government), religion, race, region, social class, and many others. Small groups of Congressmen and Senators may think somewhat alike on such matters, but putting together a majority coalition with respect to any single policy which touches on one or more cleavages usually results in extensive bargaining.

These last four intraorganizational propositions, then, account for the remaining six descriptive statements about Congress (3, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 13).

IV. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

We began this paper with thirteen major propositions about Congress. Each was subsumed under a more general empirical proposition about formal organizations derived independently of any data on Congress but which fit other formal organizations. We can now briefly summarize, diagrammatically, the major relationships.

In each of the thirteen explanations there is no recourse to factors peculiar to Congress (and hence no problem in proving the validity of unique explanations). In addition several additional findings about Congress were cast in a more general language to suggest that they too may not be peculiar to only one formal organization.

A number of implications for further research are suggested by this tentative beginning in wedding organization theory to the study of Congress.

1. Propositions in organization theory may be very helpful in causal analysis of political institutions other than those usually included in public administration. The executive branch is by no means the only location of formal or-

---

[14] William R. Dill, "Business Organizations," in James G. March, *op. cit.*, p. 1072.

[15] Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *The Congressional Process*, *op. cit.*

[16] *Ibid.*, *passim.*

[17] This proposition is taken from James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 130.

[18] A similar proposition is found in Udy, *op. cit.*: "The greater the difficulty of group as opposed to individual problems, the greater the pressures toward social interaction" (p. 701).

[19] See Froman, *The Congressional Process*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 2.

FIG. 1. Summary relationships.


Independent Variables
Congressional Dependent Variables
Setting
Organizational
Policy
Organization
Members
Group Structure
Leadership
Process
1. highly differentiated
2. amount of pressure
3. low conflict
4. high permanence low turnover low mechanization
5. high technical expertise
6. size
7. intergroup conflict
1. high salience of Congress
2. high decentralization
5. high commitment
12. high internal communications
10. high complexity of leadership
8. low cohesion
11. low authority
9. high salience of group structure
4. high salience of members
3. high formal and impersonal rules
6. large number of subgroups
7. high specificity of roles
13. bargaining

ganizations which may have common features. In addition, the general propositions used here by no means exhaust the list of possible factors which may be included in the study of comparative organizations.[20]

2. There is, of course, no reason why such comparative study should be restricted to the search for causes only. It may also be true that certain organizational characteristics may produce similar consequences in terms of the organization's output. None of the possibilities which readily suggest themselves concerning *functional* analysis have been included here.

3. As suggested at the beginning of this paper, proposals for change in such highly visible organizations as the United States Congress must take into account the "realities" of the organization. Included in a list of such realities would have to be some notion of *why* the organization operates the way it does now in order to make realistic estimates of the likely acceptance and feasibility of changes. To propose changes without taking into account the causal roots of what is being proposed to be changed is to run the risk of being labeled naive, being ignored, or botching the job. Among other things which the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act purported to do, for example, was to reduce the number of committees in Congress. In fact, counting subcommittees which have vastly increased in number, the number of subgroups in the organization has increased. The analysis in this paper perhaps sheds some light on why this has been the case.

4. The interplay between organization theory and the study of specific formal organizations like Congress need not be all in the direction of organization theory suggesting the more general propositions which will then be applied to a specific governmental institution. In several places in this paper propositions which developed from the study of Congress were thought to have more general application. For example, a greater degree of technical expertise in any organization might produce a more highly extended apprenticeship system, similar to the one developed in Congress. Or organizations which have low conflict relations

---

[20] Udy's article, *op. cit.*, lists many more general propositions, most of which have to do with technological and psychological relationships.

with the environment might be hypothesized to have a higher degree of intra-organizational conflict. Both of these general propositions were suggested as a result of the study of Congress, and the question being asked is whether these propositions might not be true of other organizations.

5. One of the advantages of relying on comparative data as a source of general propositions is that factors which may be peculiar to only a small subset of institutions may turn out, on reflection, to be special cases of more general rules. For example, although a large number of important propositions about Congress were discussed, in no case was it even necessary to refer to the fact that Congressmen are elected rather than recruited in some other way. Certainly the fact that they are elected has something to do with the low degree of conflict with the social setting which, it is suggested, is characteristic of Congress. But organizations may, for many different and specific reasons arrive at the same or similar degree of low conflict. Election is one way, recruitment through professional schools may be another. Regardless of the specific nature of recruitment, however, the result may be the same, that is, low conflict with the social setting.

Given these advantages of comparative organizational study, it is hoped that this paper will encourage further efforts in the same direction.

IF, AS VERBA SAYS, THE STATE FUNCTIONS AS A RELIGION, WHAT ARE WE TO DO THEN TO SAVE OUR SOULS?*

LEWIS LIPSITZ
University of North Carolina

Sidney Verba has argued that the state in modern societies may function as a religion. He is certainly not the only one to adopt such a point of view. But his work is especially notable in that he has strengthened the argument by welding together a theoretical perspective that seems to be derived from structural-functional analysis and a good deal of varied and interesting, though not crystal-clear data. Verba's discussion of the functions of the state is most explicit in his article on the Kennedy assassination—in which he seeks to interpret the many studies of public reaction to the President's death. In this article, appropriately titled "The Kennedy Assassination and the Nature of Political Commitment,"[1] Verba attempts to go to essentials. He speaks of the *deeper* levels of political involvement made evident by the psychological crisis of the assassination. Repeatedly he employs the term "primordial" to describe the character of the underlying political commitment to the nation-state and its symbols in modern societies—the foremost of these symbols in America being the President. But let Verba speak for himself since he is explicit about these matters: first, on the nature of public reactions and the larger meaning of those reactions:

> The Kennedy assassination . . . illustrates the close meshing of the sacred and the secular in the top institutions of a political system. In a society in which the formal ideology is officially secular . . . the close linkage of religious institutions to the events of the crisis weekend is particularly striking . . . a larger proportion of the American population responded to the assassination with prayer or attendance at special church services and religious ceremony and imagery abounded in the events of the weekend.[2]

On the basis of what seems to him the extraordinary depth and the special one of public reaction to the assassination, Verba goes on to offer the following interpretation:

> What this suggests is that complete separation of church and state may be possible only in a formal sense. In a secular society where formal religious commitment is weak, the activities of the state may be the nearest one comes to activities of ultimate importance, activities that fundamentally determine matters of death and life and the quality of life. In short, governmental institutions may have significance of a religious kind. The awe inspired by the ultimate power of the church in more pious times may be akin to the awe inspired in modern secular societies by the ultimate power of the state.[3]

Second, there is Verba's notion of the President's central symbolic role. Drawing on recent studies of political socialization, he argues:

> He [the President] is the symbolic referent for the learning of political commitment; children first become aware of political matters through an awareness of and diffuse attachment to the President. As Durkheim pointed out, complex social collectivities . . . are not easily the direct objects of emotional attachment or commitment. Rather some common symbol . . . is required . . . this central symbolic role in a modern secular society is preempted by the political symbols that stand on the highest level for the society—in the American case by the presidency above all.

Verba goes on to say:

> The presidential role is thus endowed with a religious quality . . . Religion and politics in the United States are closely related to each other, and many of the functions religion and religious symbolism perform elsewhere in holding society together are performed in the United States by the central political symbols. If in the new states a passionate political religion replaces an intense traditional religious commitment, in a modern society such as the United States a somewhat less intense political religion assumes some of the functions of a less intense religious system. . . .[4]

---

* So many people have criticized this article that I can only mention a few who have made life particularly hard: Herbert Reid, Donald Searing, Robert Alford and Kenneth Ring. Without their comradely impatience I would have made even more mistakes.

[1] In Bradley S. Greenberg & Edwin B. Parker (eds.), *The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 348–360.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 352.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 353. Robert Bellah has recently put forward an argument for the existence of what he calls a "civil religion" in the United States.

All of this is profoundly interesting and provocative, but immediately questions come up: for example—what is a "religious quality?", how do we know that politics has moved in to fill the psychological gap left by the loss of religion?; does religion and/or its symbolism really hold society together, and if so, what exactly does that mean? In short, has Verba himself taken a great leap of faith in reaching his conclusions? For the moment, let us swallow our skeptical tendencies and accept at least that there is a grain or more of truth in his linking up the sacred and the political in modern societies. But accepting the potential insightfulness of Verba's analysis, where does it lead us? The political leader as monarch-priest; the citizen as worshiper; the political group as sacred object—these are strange, but nonetheless familiar themes. They are familiar because social scientists often use ideas of the sacred, and religious metaphors, in interpreting politics outside western, industrial societies. They are strange because Verba has taken these ideas, previously manufactured chiefly for export, and put them to work at home. The result, you would think, would be thoroughly disturbing to men who care about the quality of our political life. Yet, remarkably enough, Verba seems entirely at ease, and never appears to raise as much as a normative eyebrow at the possible implications of his own imaginative analysis. But then, what are these implications?

I. POLITICS AS SECULAR RELIGION

> In the representative system, the reason for everything must publicly appear. Every man is a proprietor in government and considers it a necessary part of his business to understand. . . . He examines the cost, and compares it with the advantages and above all, he does not adopt the slavish custom of following what in other governments are called LEADERS.
>
> Thomas Paine

Secularization is a dominant trend of modern times. In fact, it is precisely the questioning of received truths, of once sacred notions, that is identified with the nature of modernity. Science, technology, industralism, the modern nation-state, all are associated with the growth of the secular style and the decline of traditional faiths.

But at the same time we are supposedly becoming secular, life has grown increasingly politicized. The modern era is the time of that "fundamental democratization" of which Mannheim spoke—the involvement of the masses of people in political life. Revolutions, civil wars, international conflicts, general social upheaval, ideological ferocity—these are the characteristic features of our epoch. What Thomas Mann wrote half a century ago seems to sum up the extraordinary quality of modernity: "In our time the destiny of man presents its meaning in political terms."

As students of this upheaval, some social scientists have perceived the continued importance of religious impulses in social life despite their seeming decline. This is not so much the religion of established churches and beliefs in supernatural beings; rather, it is a concept of religion fundamentally involving ideas of the "sacred."[5] It is the "religious" impulse inter-

---

He sees the notion of an "American Israel" playing a "constitutive role" in the thought of early American leaders, and he perceives considerable continuity in the civil religion, employing as a clear contemporary example of its appearance, President Kennedy's inaugural address, Bellah states: ". . . this religion—or perhaps better, this religious dimension—has its own seriousness and integrity and requires the same care in understanding that any other religion does." Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," *Daedalus* (Winter, 1967).

[5] There is a good deal of controvery over the problem of defining religion. Some writers regard the crucial distinction to be that between the "sacred" and the "secular." Roger Caillois, for example, in *Man and the Sacred* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), identifies religion with the realm of the sacred, arguing that in this realm men feel a deep-seated dependence and show a lack of critical inquiry. His argument here follows Durkheim's position that sacredness is a matter of social definition and can be applied to a good many things. Melford Spiro, on the other hand sees religion as inextricably connected with supernatural beings, though he notes that the worship of other "sacreds" may serve many of the same functions as religious beliefs. Melford E. Spiro, "Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation," in Michael Banton (ed), *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion* (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 85–126. Clifford Geertz and Phillip Rieff provide discussions of religion in terms of its psychological functions and this focus provides a bridge between the alternative definitions noted above. Geertz defines religion as a system of symbols that establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic: Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in Banton, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–46. For Rieff, religion performs two functions: the therapeutic control of

preted in this sense that social investigators have though they found in various aspects of modern political life. Interpretations of Communism, both as an ideology, and a set of institutions, often rely heavily on analogies borrowed from religion. Alfred Meyer, for example, develops the analogy very extensively and suggestively between communism and puritanism.[6]

Then too there are the "new states" and the phenomenon Apter has called "political religions" in those changing societies. There is no need here to engage in a discussion of these "political religions." It is enough just to note the consensus that such a phenomenon exists. Political religions attempt to define a new reality, to mobilize people's deepest sentiments, and generally to compensate for the loss of older, now shattered, beliefs. Fascism might perhaps qualify under this heading. Coming closer to home in recent years, various analysts have argued, although some only implicitly, that the religious impulse was still to be found, even in the most apparently modern and developed societies.

In an article analyzing the supposed "functions" of the Coronation of a British Queen, Shils and Young draw on the identity Durkheim suggested between religious and political rededication ceremonies: "What essential difference is there between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principle dates of the life of Christ, or of Jews remembering the exodus from Egypt or the promulgation of the decalogue, and a reunion of citizens commemorating the promulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life?"[7] For Durkheim, as for Shils and Young, the religious impulse, the creation of a realm of the sacred, is a social cement, binding together members of a collectivity.

This argument leads to the conclusion that there are strong similarities between the religious and the political, and for that matter, between traditional and modern social systems. Apter argues, for example, that "politics in its moral sense can be described as approaching religion, just as churches in their organizational sense can be said to approach politics:"[8] Almond has pointed out that traditional patterns of socialization continue in modern political systems, but are supplemented by other, more differentiated socialization mechanisms. Verba, discussing comparative political culture, argues that a "residue of non-rationality" a political commitment that is "implicit" and "primitive," exists in all stable political cultures.[9] Primary among these "implicit" beliefs he places the feeling of national identity.

Perhaps the fundamental social-psychological underpinning to this point of view has been added by Robert Lane, Murray Edelman, David Easton, and Robert Hess. Easton and Hess tell us that "not only do many children associate the sanctity and awe of religion with the political community, but to ages 9 or 10 they sometimes have considerable difficulty in disentangling God and country." Their discussion of the psychological consequences of the flag salute is particularly interesting. They see the ritual as displacing religious affect onto a political object. They conclude: "The fact that as the child grows older he may be able to sort out the religious from the political setting much more clearly and restrict the pledge to a political meaning, need not thereby weaken this bond. The initial and early intermingling of potent religious sentiment with political community has by that time probably created a tie difficult to dissolve."[10] Edelman asserts that politics can never deal strictly with who gets what in the sense of tangible benefits and punishments. Rather he maintains that "symbolic" rewards and punishments also play a

---

everyday life, and relief from that control by covertly providing opportunities for instincts to express themselves. Phillip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic* (New York Harper & Row, 1966). Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger have discussed religious roots in the formation of the self and the construction of symbolic universe. They see religion referring to a realm that transcends everyday life, giving it ultimate meaning. Their analysis of the process of legitimation is particularly suggestive: Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday 1966). Thomas Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion* (N. Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1967).

[6] Alfred G. Meyer, *Communism* (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 4–8. And Meyer says that he is certainly not the first to note the similarities.

[7] Edward Shils and Michael Young, "The Meaning of the Coronation," *Sociological Review*, 1. (December, 1953). The quote is from Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Norman Birnbaum has a thoughtful critique of Shils and Young, "Monarchs and Sociologists," *Sociological Review*, V. 3 (July, 1955) pp. 5–23.

[8] Apter, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

[9] Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Verba (ed.), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton, University Press, 1965).

[10] David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, V. 6 (August, 1962), pp. 238–39.

significant role in political conflict. This would be true in all political systems—and Edelman applies his ideas to the contemporary United States in particular. The "symbolic" side of politics, according to Edelman, involves two things: the creation of a sense of belonging, and attempts to allay the feelings of anxiety widespread in mass publics.[11] Lane, on the basis of intensive interviews with Eastport "common men" looks at the question of religion and politics from the perspective of the urban citizen in an industrial society in mid-twentieth century.[12] He finds that "in many ways belief in a powerful state is a psychological substitute for belief in a powerful God." And this belief, according to Lane, serves an essential psychological function. He says: "A positive faith in one's political system, like a positive faith in religion, reassures a person that he is properly connected to the powers that be. . . He has been 'good' and, like a good child, deserves well of the authorities."[13]

Still, the argument remains vague. What exactly are the consequences of the religious impulse in politics—particularly American politics. First, we are led back immediately in the direction of the President and Verba's analysis of reactions to the assassination. Greenstein has recently summed up behavioral research on the American President in seven points.[14] One—the President is by far the best known political figure in this country, and often the only political figure known. Two—there is great respect for the status of the President, although often combined with cynicism toward politicians. Third and Fourth—the President is the first public official to come to the attention of young children and children see the President as very important and benign. Fifth—in spite of much variation, adults generally have favorable views of the President's performance. Sixth—there is a tendency to rally to the support of the President particularly when he acts at a time of international crisis. And seventh—scattered clinical evidence indicates that for an undetermined portion of the population the President is an unconscious surrogate of childhood authority figures. In addition Greenstein notes that although responses to the Kennedy assassination were profound, they were not uniquely so. From the evidence available he argues that similar reactions occurred at the deaths of other Presidents such as Lincoln, Roosevelt, McKinley, Garfield and even Harding. These reactions often take a somatic form involving headache, tenseness, insomnia and rapid heart beat.

But the religious impulse in politics leads us in another, though related, direction—the direction of American nationalism. Writing in the mid-1950's S. M. Lipset noted that Americans were not a tolerant people and pointed out that "each war and most postwar situations have been characterized by the denial of civil liberties to minorities. . . ."[15] He went on to relate this lack of tolerance, especially in crisis situations, to the quality of national allegiance in this country. ". . . Americanism is a political creed. . . . Our national rituals are largely identified with reiterating the accepted values of a political system, not solely or even primarily of national patriotism. For example, Washington's Birthday, Lincoln's Birthday, and the Fourth of July are ideological celebrations comparable to May Day or Lenin's Birthday in the Communist World," Rather than a notion of simple citizenship, the concept of Americanism, Lipset concluded, had become a "compulsive ideology." If, then, there are specific large-scale evidences for the infusion of religious tendencies into American politics they would probably be most apparent along these two dimensions: Intense and often intolerant patriotism, and implicit reverence for the President, particularly in times of crisis.

II. THOREAU'S POSITION

We have now taken one of the necessary two steps backward to gain perspective on Verba's findings. These findings, as it turns out, are not unique, but dovetail with the interpretations of a good many other social scientists. Of all the writers mentioned, only Lipset and Edelman are at all disturbed at what they see. The others either simply report findings, or, more important for purposes of this paper, they see the religious impulse in politics performing useful and perhaps essential functions. Verba, as well as Shils and Young in their piece on the British coronation, take the position that some kind of religious or quasi-religious political commitment must be widespread if a social system is to be stable. As Verba points out, there is no such deep, consensual commitment to "democratic" ideas and so a latent, but unquestionable basic loyalty to the going political order must be what maintains the "stability" of the system. Of course, this emphasis on stability and on latent emotional ties is nothing new, not only structural-functional theorists, but Marxists as well have acknowledged the potency of the religious impulse in social and political life. What is worth noting, however, is the ease with which these writers assume that such impulses are entirely harmonious with democratic expectations. Speaking of national identity, for example, Verba says: "It is perhaps only when *some* basic beliefs remain implicit and 'primitive' and when the commitment to them is heavily expressive that one can have the underlying stability that allows a more pragmatic approach in relation to other beliefs." Or, to take another example: ". . . stability in 'modernized' systems may depend upon the maintenance of a residue of non-rationality—of traditional, implicit and unquestioned values . . . that keeps certain aspects of the political system out of the realm of rational means-ends calculations." What a happy balance Verba hopes to strike! The emphasis on combining sacred and pragmatic beliefs in politics, and maintaining each in proper amount is reminiscent of Berelson's praise of political apathy, and Almond and Verba's conclusion that it takes some "subject" and "parochial" types in order to achieve the proper mix for the stable, yet not stagnant, civic culture. But can it really be that there are no dangers to democratic politics flowing from those "primitive" beliefs. Clearly, Lipset's discussion of Americanism is not comforting. But Edelman too expounds a darker side in his interpretation: "Alienation, anomie, despair of being able to chart one's own course in a complex, cold and bewildering world have become characteristic of a large part of the population of advanced countries. As the world can be neither understood nor influenced, attachment to reassuring abstract symbols rather than to one's own efforts becomes chronic."

---

[11] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

[12] Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 198–199.

[14] Fred I. Greenstein, "Popular Images of the President," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 122 (November, 1965), 523–529.

[15] S. M. Lipset, "The Sources of the Radical Right—1955," in Daniel Bell (ed.), *The Radical Right*, (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1963), p. 264. See also Robert Dahl's characterization of America as a ". . . somewhat deviant case: most other stable democracies have not imposed as severe a set of legal and social obstacles to political dissent as exist in the United States." R. A. Dahl, "Epilogue," in R. A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), p. 391.

The question of who is right in this matter—Verba or Edelman—is partly empirical but not wholly so. In order to evaluate the consequences of the infusion of the religious into politics, we have also to employ normative tools. This is the second step backward we have to take to gain perspective on Verba's analysis. It is my contention that Thoreau, that solitary but significant figure in the liberal tradition, can help us in this, perhaps more than anyone else.

Thoreau is not an easy man to deal with, especially if you come to him with the problem of social stability foremost in your mind. His most important political writings all involve attacks on the going political order, and attacks of a very radical sort. He tells men to obey their consciences not the law. He refers to higher laws that ought to have precedence over legislation. In the famous essay on civil disobedience written after his refusal to pay certain Massachusetts state taxes as a protest against the Mexican War and the extradition of fugitive slaves, he declared his intention of unilaterally severing his ties to the on-going political system. He wants to opt out—return to his state of nature, to his berry field, leaving the state and its noise far behind. But sadly, Thoreau finds that the state does not merely get in the way of the good, but itself is a vast machine of evil. It is not enough therefore for a man to opt out: nothing less than a decisive alteration of the state is needed. Thoreau actually accepts both of these points of view in different places—they might be represented by the contrast between Thoreau himself at Walden Pond, and Captain John Brown—whom Thoreau championed—taking up arms against the slave system. Thoreau has been attacked for inconsistency and moral confusion because of these varied strands in his writings.

Yet it has been overlooked that Thoreau perceived and was attempting to come to grips with a very complex and modern phenomenon-exactly that phenomenon Verba has described for us: the growth of a religious attitude toward the nation-state; the phenomenon of "primordial" allegiance, of "primitive" and unquestioned beliefs. In the essay on Civil Disobedience, Thoreau, like Verba, sees that in his time the political realm is dealing with ultimate questions, with matters of conscience—matters, as Verba puts it, "of death and life and the quality of life." Of course, Thoreau had in mind those unquestionably ultimate issues of slavery and war. But unlike Verba, Thoreau saw disastrous consequences for liberal democracy in the growth of the sacred form of political allegiance. Actually he saw twin disasters: first, the loss of moral autonomy for the mass of men who abandoned their consciences to state direction: and second, ostracism or worse for the few who would not abandon their convictions and as a result became enemies of the state. Calling attention to this dilemma, Thoreau says: "Can there not be a government in which majorities do not virtually decide right and wrong, but conscience?—in which majorities decide only those questions to which the rule of expediency is applicable? Must the citizen even for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator?"[16] But most men do resign their consciences to the legislators, and Thoreau chooses a military image—not by accident I think—to make this clear: "A common and natural result of an undue respect for law is, that you may see a file of soldiers, colonel, captain, corporal, privates, powder-monkeys, and all, marching in admirable order over hill and dale to the wars, against their wills, against their common sense and consciences, which makes it very steep marching indeed . . . they are all peaceably inclined. Now what are they? Men at all? or small moveable forts. . . ."[17] Those who, as Thoreau puts it, "serve" the state with their consciences also, and not just with their bodies—the heroes, patriots, and reformers—these men often resist state authority. And Thoreau's argument is that the state inevitably treats them as criminals because it has been persuaded of its own sanctity.

In his own time, Thoreau regarded Captain John Brown as one of these conscientious patriots. For Thoreau, Brown's distinguishing characteristic involved his refusal to place his faith in leaders, in intermediaries—it was, in short, his political protestantism. Thoreau's own language in "A Plea for Captain John Brown," makes the religious analogy clear: "The curse is the worship of idols, which at length changes the worshiper into a stone image himself. . . . This man [John Brown] was an exception, for he did not set up even a political graven image between him and his God."[18]

Whatever we want to call him—anarchist, romantic, enemy of the people—Thoreau did perceive that the intertwining of the religious and the political ought to be regarded as a problem. And indeed it must be regarded as a problem from the standpoint of the liberal tradition. Thoreau, as an inheritor of the Lockean view with its emphasis on the strict separation of church and state, could hardly avoid this problem. His originality and importance lies in the fact that he, like Verba, did not think of church and state in formal institutional terms, but in psychological terms—in terms of conflicting impulses within human beings. In this, he carried the Lockean argument for separation one step further. Locke's distinction between church and state is based upon the matters each must deal with. The state is justified as a matter of convenience—its purposes are pragmatic and commonsensical. Men gave their consent to government because it provides certain definable benefits. The relationship between man and the state is a contractual one—with the state providing certain day-to-day services in exchange for the giving up of the right to judge one's own case. The state, as one interpreter of Locke has characterized it, is a limited corporation. The culmination of this rather expedient attitude toward the state shows up in Jefferson's notion that a political revolution per generation would be needed to adapt the governmental framework to the people's needs, and in Tom Paine's proclamation that each generation was a new Adam, for whom inherited political forms were irrelevant.

The church, for Locke, dealt with the sacred, with ultimate questions of individual salvation. It was absolutely essential then that religion not corrupt itself through association with the state, and also that the state not coerce men into accepting a particular religious position. In sacred matters, for Locke, voluntarism was fundamental. Salvation could not be established by government edict.

But if voluntarism is essential in matters of the sacred, and if we discover that the state deals not in matters of convenience, but of conscience, matters of death and life and the quality of life, then the same voluntarism Locke thought essential for church-religion, must be applied to political-religion as well. As I understand it, this is the essence of Thoreau's argument. He sees that the state is not merely a matter of convenience and that allegience to it is psychologically similar to religious allegiance. Law and morality became intertwined and the basis of the Lockean dichotomy between church and state evaporates. Given this reality, Thoreau speaks for the rights of conscience. He argues by analogy with the Lockean position on religion that political salvation should not be coerced and that the right to opt out of the contract should be recognized as it would be in the case of a church. If politics is our religion, each man must nonetheless save his own soul, but this time on the terrain of the authoritative allocation of values.

Thoreau means to make clear that it is blasphemy for liberals to regard the state with reverence, since such attitudes are a retreat from the hard-headedness of liberal thought.

---

[16] "Civil Disobedience," *Thoreau's Writings*, Vol. IV, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1906), p. 358.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 358–359.

[18] "A Plea . . . ", *ibid.*, P. 419.

He is pointing in his own way toward the idea of that escape from freedom Erich Fromm has described this way: "After the great European Revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries failed to transform 'freedom from' into 'freedom to,' nationalism and state worship became the symptoms of a regression to incestuous fixation."[19] He is pointing in his own way to the phenomenon of mass acquiescense that Edelman has connected with symbolic reassurances, particularly strong in the foreign policy area. Finally, Thoreau is pointing to a resolution of the liberal dilemma—the dilemma posed by the nationalization of the sacred. This solution, impassioned and extreme as it may seem in Thoreau, basically calls for enlarged rights for dissenters, and a more critical attitude generally toward the political system. It is perhaps the normative reverse of Verba's idea that some basic beliefs should remain unquestioned if there is to be the stability which allows a pragmatic approach to other beliefs. The Thoreauian tendency would be to argue that modern politics inevitably confronts precisely those issues which touch the core of political religion: the issues of war, dissent, and enlightened popular sovereignty. Though he would admit that liberal thought provides no clear solution, a contemporary Thoreau would suggest that we will find a way out of these problems by revitalizing the meaning of resistence, probably in the direction of civil disobedience and a heightened consciousness of the meaning of consent.

I am not attempting here to make a case for Thoreau's brilliance as a political philosopher, nor to deny that his position has many probably insoluble problems.[20] I am arguing that he graspee a central development of our era and perceived its normative significance.

III. NORMATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF EMPIRICAL SCIENCE

What need have we of the socialization of banks and factories? We socialize men.

Remark attributed to Hitler

We cannot accept Verba's assurance that the sort of religious attachment to political symbols he describes holds no dangers for democratic life. We have many normative specifics to attend to.[21] First, we need to look again at the problem of the democratic personality. If we regard achieving democracy as, in part, a problem of developing the self, then a passive, reverent citizenry is undesirable regardless of how much stability it may generate. We need to think of measuring democracy not by defining it blithely as whatever exists in so-called democracies, but in terms of the creation of citizens—men and women aware of the problems of freedom in their own and other societies; men and women relatively free from irrational obsessions. We need to scrutinize the undemocratic aspects of our societies, at the workplace, also in the home and school, and develop plans for reform, or conservation. We are still awaiting that general democratization of social life which Dewey spoke of, and which depends upon a more equal distribution of economic and cultural resources.

A second concern grows directly out of this perspective on democracy. There is a suggestion in much recent literature that "democracy" is saved only by the "apathy" of large numbers of people who have undemocratic attitudes.[22] To activate these apathetics then appears to risk undermining what democratic processes we have. For example, in relation to the Vietnam War, a national survey early in 1966 showed that individuals with income below $5,000 a year were three times as likely to oppose the right to demonstrate against the war as individuals with incomes of $10,000 a year or more.[23] Would it contribute to democratization to activate those who oppose dissent? Aren't we here dependent on mass acquiescence and elite support for libertarian norms, with a little help from our friends, the upper middle class. Such has been the common argument. But this argument is strangely myopic in several respects. For present purposes, its major failing is a refusal to press the question hard enough.[24] Why should individuals with low incomes or little education oppose dissent when they are not more likely to support the war itself, and perhaps even less likely to support the war?[25] This is not a simple ambiguity, but perhaps here we are encountering precisely that primordial attachment to national symbols that makes for "stability." If less educated people are less likely to favor libertarian norms this may occur because of the kind of early socialization they participate in. We cannot with one hand endorse primordial allegiance to the nation and with the other hand condemn anti-libertarian nationalism. It seems likely that these matters are linked. Here we return to concerns that Marx and Freud dealt with long ago, when they sought the roots of the "religious" in the fundamental structure of human development. Perhaps in discussing political religions we need to rethink Marx's argument: "The abolition of religion as the *illusory* happiness of the people is required for their *real* happiness. The demand to give up illusions about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions."[26] Instead of assuming then the "naturalness" of a religious attachment to politics, we should seek the empirical origins of this process.

---

[19] Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston).

[20] The critique of Thoreau's politics by Heinz Eulau—"Wayside Challenger," *Antioch Review* (Dec., 1949), 509–522, argues that to follow Thoreau's injunctions and make the individual conscience the ultimate political decision-maker would bring on anarchy, and make democracy impossible. Eulau's position, though it has some important sense to it, fails to penetrate to the real problem Thoreau sought to deal with. Eulau's argument is equally absolutist, ignoring the problems that would flow from too great a reverence for existing laws. Generally, Eulau forgets that at any one moment, democratic values, and other important values as well, may conflict with legalities.

[21] There are a great many empirical specifics as well.

[22] As one example, see Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this REVIEW, 58 (June, 1964), 361–382.

[23] Louis Harris survey reported in the Washington *Post*, April 18, 1966. Under $5,000, 60% oppose the right to demonstrate; over $10,000, 19% oppose it.

All of this should make us increasingly aware of the ideological implications of our work. Despite our proclamations of value "neutrality" it is increasingly clear that many of the analytical frameworks and conclusions of behavioral political scientists have normative roots and branches.[27] This is also clearly true in the discussion of political religions. Our increasing sophistication about "methods" of research has not been matched by an equal sophistication about the normative side of that research. But that sort of sophistication is not easy to come by. To begin, we might take greater care in discussing both "democracy" and "stability"—both of which are in deep need of quantification and clearer definition. Failing to deal with these matters, we will find ourselves, as sometimes in the past, offering bland endorsement of the status quo in western societies, while turning away from the deepest normative and empirical questions.

In the end, of course, it may not matter what social scientists think. That is an empirical question. If not, these issues are important only for the profession and for the sake of personal clarity. On the other hand, the social role of social scientists might just be of some consequence and we may, ourselves, help to determine by our action or inaction what our social role will be. In that case, the stakes are considerable and the costs of confusion high.

Finally, we need to pay careful attention to the problem of dissent in modern societies. The civil rights movement made this problem real again, and a good many social scientists have tried to come to grips with questions of civil disobedience. More recently, the issue of conscientious objection to a particular war has also burst upon us. One would think that, given the liberal heritage, given the extraordinary dimensions of war in modern times, given the Nuremberg trial experience—we would have paid more attention to this problem. Unfortunately, the Vietnam war has had to recall us to it. Modern war is, after all, precisely the experience that invalidates the old liberal dichotomy between church and state. Wars deal in ultimate matters, and generate passionate affiliations rare in peacetime. And here Thoreau's plea for the rights of conscience is most immediately relevant. The right conscientiously to object to a particular war follows from the principle of voluntarism in sacred matters. Legal protection for such a right would clarify for each individual the fact that *obedience* as well as opposition was a moral choice. This, in itself, would be a gain in democratic education.

---

[24] There are a good many other serious failings in this point of view. On this matter, see my letter criticizing McClosky's argument in this REVIEW (December, 1966), 1000–1001. A thorough treatment is Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism.* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967).

[25] Sidney Verba, et al., "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam" this REVIEW, (June, 1967) 317–333. A curious Gallup poll of February, 1967, shows that 40% of those with incomes under $3,000 a year favored a bombing halt, while only 14% of those with incomes over $10,000 a year did so.

[26] From "Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right."

[27] There are many recent discussions of this matter: Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics," this REVIEW, 59 (March, 1965), 39–52; Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, *Philosophy, Politics and Society.* Third Series, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), pp. 25–57. Charles C. Moskos, Jr. and Wendell Bell, "Emerging Nations and Ideologies of American Social Scientists," *The American Sociologist,* (May, 1967), 67–72, for three particularly relevant pieces.

IV. CONCLUSION

It may be that men ought not to live, and perhaps cannot live, without a religion or its functional equivalent—some set of beliefs related to "ultimate" matters. And of course it is clear that even the man who attacks dogmatism has his own dogma, which includes, at least, the freedom to criticize. This is not as much of a dilemma as it appears. There are, after all, dogmas and dogmas. It makes sense to distinguish between a group attachment based on enlightenment and personal experience, and an attachment developed largely unconsciously, which resists examination.[28]

Robert Bellah has something of this sort in mind when he argues that America's civil religion has had a "best" and a "worst", a depth and a distortion. He chooses to believe that "it is difficult to use the words of Jefferson and Lincoln to support special interests and undermine personal freedom."[29] And he also chooses to identify the words of Jefferson and Lincoln with America's "civil religion." On the other hand, he calls to mind the use of nationalistic sentiment "as a justification for the shameful treatment of the Indians . . ." and its use "to legitimate several adventures in imperialism. . . ." Right now, he argues, there is "the tendency to assimilate all governments or parties in the world which support our immediate policies or call upon help by invoking the notion of free institutions and democratic values. Those nations that are for the moment 'on our side' became 'the free world.' A respressive and unstable military dictatorship in South Viet-Nam becomes 'the free people of South Viet-Nam and their government.' "[30] Faced with what he considers a degeneration of the civil religion, Bellah counts on the "prophetic voices" to call us back to sanity. He recalls Lincoln's opposition to the Mexican War. He quotes Thoreau: " 'I would remind my countrymen that they are men first, and Americans at a late and convenient hour. . . . ' " For Bellah these words provide the appropriate standard for contemporary thought and action. Yet here, I think, Bellah stretches his conception of civil religion to include even its staunchest opponents. Thoreau is reacting against precisely that reverence for established authority which civil religion creates. To ask for civil religion without reverence is to abandon the core of the concept. Moreover, the implications of civil religion in the United States are far more serious now than a hundred years ago. The United States is not just another country, but a primary world power. The ways in which Americans regard their government may have consequences which touch men everywhere. This is not true of many other societies. What is required, as Bellah states, is the articulation of standards that transcend immediate interests and subject the nation itself to judgment. But to work out and internalize such standards would require a far more critical attitude toward political authority.

(Editor's Note: For comments by Professor Verba, see Communications, pp. 576–577.)

---

[28] On this point, Michael Walzer has put the matter eloquently: "The increasing size of the state, the growing power of administration, the decline of political life: all these turn politics from a concrete activity into what Marx once called the fantasy of everyday life. The state becomes an arena in which men do not act, but watch the actions, and, like other audiences, are acted upon. Patriotic communion is always a fraud when it is nothing more than the communion of an audience with its favorite actors, of passive subjects and heroes of the state. Our emotions are merely tricked by parades and pageants, the rise and fall of political gladiators, the deaths of beloved chiefs, the somber or startling rites of a debased religion. It could be done to anyone, whereas patriotism ought to be the pride of a particular man, the enjoyment of particular activities": "Politics in the Welfare State," *Dissent* (January–February, 1968) p. 36.

[29] Bellah, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[30] *Ibid.*

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE RELATION OF POLITICAL THEORY TO ANTHROPOLOGY*

CARL J. FRIEDRICH, assisted by MORTON HORWITZ
Harvard University

The study of developing areas has, in recent years, caused political science and theory to be increasingly aware of realities of non-Western government and politics. Comparative politics and its theory no longer, therefore, can avoid utilizing the results of the research of anthropologists and ethnologists in a way comparable to the use of historical data if they wish to be comprehensively empirical. Since the political theorist will not, as a rule, be able to become a practising anthropologist, the basic problem of such cooperation turns upon whether the investigating anthropologist asks the crucial, the basic questions in the first place. A broad survey of their reports and writings, such as the Human Relations Area Files afford, shows that this is by no means generally the case. Nor is this easy to achieve, for political scientists and anthropologists differ in their objectives. It has been suggested that the anthropologist is primarily interested in diversity, in how many ways something could be done, whereas for the political scientist and theorist such divergencies are important mainly as they lead to political insight and verifiable generalization.

The utility of the writings of anthropologists for the political scientist is seriously impeded by the over-simplified and misleading understanding of the nature of power and authority held by many of them.[1]

One of the most pervasive difficulties which arises among those who would use the work of anthropologists is the one-dimensional understanding of what the concept "power" entails. Because of the liberal and egalitarian assumptions of many anthropologists, a tendency to ignore the element of power is characteristic of much of the literature. Only where they are confronted by a clearly hierarchical society in which elements of coercive power can hardly be overlooked do they set about to analyze the power relations in primitive cultures. Many primitive societies, however, are not particularly hierarchical so that the dominant sources of power in these societies, deriving either from social coercion or from consent, are more difficult to detect. Often, in the absence of clear and determinate individuals who exercise power in a particular society, students of primitive cultures have come to conclude that in fact there is *no* power in the society.[2]

Leaving aside for the moment the obvious confusion of power and authority which is quite common in anthropological writings, there are other grave difficulties with their work as far as power relations are concerned. One often finds in reading such material that there is undue preoccupation with the formalistic aspects of power, to the exclusion of analyses of many other relevant power situations. There is, in addition, insufficient appreciation of the informal aspects of social coercion which are among the dominant means of social control in primitive societies. The situation which some anthropologists find "perennially astonishing" is undoubtedly the result of a highly complex system of informal social controls, not the least important of which is the "personal influence" of the headmen. E. Adamson Hoebel remarked upon this tendency to ignore social coercion in his critique of Malinowski's studies of the Trobriand Islanders' systems of law. In all of his studies of law, Hoebel noted, "Malinowski exhibited a definite distaste for the forces of social coercion and he exerted himself to the utmost to minimize—even banish—them as operative elements in the regulation of human relations."[3]

---

* What follows is a revision of a working paper prepared for a conference held at Yale University on May 7–8, 1965, which has been reported elsewhere. Its purpose was to consider the problems raised in adapting the Human Relations Area Files to the use of political scientists (and by implications to that of jurists, economists, and other social scientists). There can be little doubt that although "the HRAF constitute a major potential resource for research and teaching in political science," they have not been used to any great extent by political scientists. (The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Mr. Michael Rothschild.)

[1] These writings are digested in the *Human Relations Area Files*, produced at New Haven, in cooperation with Yale and a number of other universities. In the footnotes which follow, there is a certain time lag due to delays in incorporating material in the HRAF. See, for a recent contribution which is informed by a much greater awareness of the problems here discussed, Max Schwartz, *Political Anthropology* (New York 1966), though even here the references are spotty and the views often rather one-sided.

[2] The interesting study by John Middleton and David Tait (eds.), *Tribes Without Rulers* (1958), while more sophisticated, suffers from this difficulty too. Max Schwartz has, in *Political Anthropology*, offered a good review of the literature of political anthropology, including the studies of Goodenough and Leach which focus attention upon conflict and process.

Some anthropologists, however, have given careful attention to the informal processes of social control in primitive cultures. Leighton and Kluckhohn, for example, quite a few years ago described in great detail the social controls which they found among the Navaho on the basis of their "shame culture."[4] And in his study of Yahgan society, Gusinde points out that among the Yahgan "one could speak of public opinion as the guardian of laws and as the avenger of serious transgressions. It acts no less successfully than a police force or a court of justice."[5] Indeed, he gives great weight to this crucial dimension of primitive life.

> The pressure it puts upon a person can be clearly seen from the fear which everyone, not only the average Indian, has for a bad reputation and even more of public ostracism. If he sees himself ensnared by it, he promptly hastens back to the path of virtue and constantly tries with exaggerated zeal to change the bad opinion about him into a good one.[6]

Yet, in spite of his clear insight into informal aspects of social control, Gusinde appears to exhibit another tendency prominent among students of society imbued with liberal and egalitarian ideals. While he is willing to see an amorphous "public" as the guarantor of social order, he is unwilling to see that specific individuals very often do exercise disproportionate amounts of power in a given society. In fact, one often finds among anthropologists that only the most well-structured and formal power relationships are given attention. Thus, Gusinde emphasizes that "there is no authoritative judge over all the people; everyone must seek his own justice." Furthermore, he stresses that "there is no superior authority appointed for either tribal community or for smaller groups." Yet, he mentions, but does not elaborate upon a phenomenon which is often of crucial significance in primitive cultures:

> There are always certain . . . men, who as a result of their advanced age and blameless character, their long experience and mental superiority, have a moral influence of such importance that it amounts to positive control.[7]

Just what the precise nature of this "positive control" is, we are not told. We know that in primitive cultures the power exercised by political leaders will more often than not be consensual power deriving from authority, where the members of the community cooperate with the leadership in securing obedience to the community's values and beliefs. But a preoccupation, on one hand, with the formal and coercive aspects of power or, on the other hand, with the informal sanctions of an amorphous public opinion, has obscured the consensual aspect of power and leadership possessing less formal characteristics.

The failure to appreciate the consensual component of power can be traced to a still more fundamental misunderstanding of political phenomena which constantly reappears in anthropological writings: the confusion of power with authority. Since many of the studies identify authority with power, or see it as some kind of power, usually legitimate power or formal power or rightful power (which again is some sort of legitimate power), an inquiry into the basis of authority often becomes merely an investigation into the basis of power.[8] As we have argued, however, "there are power situations which are differentiated from others by the fact that the wielder of power has the capacity to elaborate what he prefers by reasoning which would make sense to those who follow him, if time and other circumstances permitted. Such reasoning usually involves the values and beliefs, as well as interests, of the group within which the power is exercised. The power-handler shares with his followers all or part of such values and beliefs, and therefore could, and at times will, explain to his following the reasons he acted in a certain way and more especially why he preferred them to act likewise. What we are proposing is that his capacity for reasoned elaboration when it exists should be called political authority." Because "power can be implemented and enlarged by the capacity for reasoned elaboration"[9] and because the particular component of power which is usually affected by political authority is consensual power, there is a clear relationship between the failure of anthropological studies to give appropriate attention to consensual power and their misunderstanding of the nature of authority.

---

[3] E. Adamson Hoebel, *The Law of Primitive Man* (Cambridge, Mass.), 1961, p. 181.

[4] Dorothea Leighton and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Children of the People* (Cambridge, Mass.), 1947, pp. 105–106.

[5] Martin Gusinde, *The Yahgan: the Life and Thought of the Water Nomads of Cape Horn* (trans. Frieda Shutze, for Human Relations Area Files), p. 1025.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 802.

[8] For a more detailed theoretical discussion, see Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York, 1963), pp. 213ff.

If we understand authority as involving the capacity for reasoned elaboration then the anthropologists have all but ignored this significant dimension of political behavior. Even so, although rarely understood, the nature of political authority is often alluded to in anthropological discussions of the leader's role. There are many cases where this capacity is clearly an essential concomitant of such leadership. Thus it has been shown that among the Nambicuara (Brazil) the very existence of the band is dependent upon the chief's ability to inspire confidence in his followers.[10] It is true in other cases as well. Of the Comanche (North America) it has been written: "A peace chief rose to his position of leadership by combining generosity, kindness, evenness of temper, wisdom in council and knowledge of his territory with good sense and *the ability to speak persuasively on matters at issue.* The man whose advice was most persistently followed served as a peace chief for his group. He emerged gradually as a leader, and when his ability to influence his group was surpassed by that of another man, he ceased to be its (chief)."[11] An almost identical situation is described by Honigmann in his study of the Nahane.

> A leader held authority as long as he lived. . . . Leaders who lost competence found themselves ignored, the people adhering to a more intelligent man. The headman's functions transcended mere food getting. His wisdom derived from experience, and *the ability to speak convincingly reinforced his authority in moral matters.*[12]

Needless to say, the source of authority need not be verbal facility, but may well be the power of example. Karsten notes that "the Jibaros have absolute faith in the heritability of prominent qualities, and ascribe extraordinary importance to education and the power of example. The son of a great chief, they say, must necessarily also become an able warrior because he is, as it were, a direct continuation of his father, has received a careful education for the deeds of war, and has always had the good example of his great father before his eyes."[13] In a large number of cases, however, the capacity for verbal elaboration is an essential element in authority. Among the Navaho, Kluckhohn and Leighton observe, "age and experience, ceremonial knowledge and oratorical skill, wealth and any combination of these facts can bring prestige and influence. . . . "[14] And among the Kapauku, as Pospisil has shown, wealth and generosity as well as eloquence and verbal courage are considered basic attributes of authority. Despite his wealth and generosity, a man who is afraid to argue publicly and pass judgments has hardly a chance of becoming a headman."[15]

There are many cases where an important element which enhances authority is some form of secrecy or esoteric ritual. Particularly a characteristic of aristocratic or hierarchical cultures, secrecy extends authority by convincing the common people that, while the capacity for reasoned elaboration is in no way impaired, they are for one reason or another better off not knowing. "Among the Bemba," Richards writes,

> much of the tribal ritual is secret . . and the advisory council is composed of what might be called an aristocratic caste. If the bakabilo meet in sitting on the open ground of the capital . . . they use archaic language on purpose, so that the common people cannot understand . . . the Bemba chiefs were formerly considered very nearly divine, and the belief in their supernatural powers is still strong enough to integrate the

---

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 233, for this and the preceding quotation.

[10] Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Social and Psychological Aspects of Chieftanship in a Primitive Tribe: the Nambicuara of Northeastern Mato Grosso," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Series II, vol. 7 (1945), 16–32.

[11] Ernest Wallace and E. A. Hoebel, *The Comanches* (1952), p. 211.

[12] John J. Honigmann, *The Kaska Indians: An Ethnographic Reconstruction* (New Haven, 1954), p. 84.

[13] Rafael Karsten, "The Head-Hunters of Western Amazonas: The Life and Culture of the Jibaro Indians of Eastern Ecuador and Peru," *Societas Scientiarum Fennica: Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum*, Vol VII, No. 1 (1935), p. 267.

[14] Clyde Kluckhohn and Dorothea Leighton, *The Navaho*, Cambridge, Mass., 1946. p. 71.

[15] Leopold J. Pospisil, "Kapauku Papuan Political Structure," in Verne F. Ray (ed.), *Systems of Political Control and Bureaucracy in Human Societies* (Seattle, 1958), p. 18.

tribe. The sacredness of the royal ceremonial largely depends on its secrecy and the fact that only persons of the right descent can take part in the ritual. The ordinary people do not attend the ceremonies except in the case of some inhabitants of the capital, but they value their secret nature and speak contemptuously of the Bisa and the neighboring tribes with less complex rites."[16]

Similarly, Firth has observed that among the Tikopia, where ritual knowledge is the basis of authority, the chief is reluctant to communicate all he knows to his son.

> A younger man of rank will not normally know as much as his father because in native belief if a chief or elder imparts the last vestiges of his ritual knowledge to his son, then the gods regard that as a sign he is finished with the affairs of this world and will soon make him die. Only when he is very old or ill does he divulge the information.[17]

Another good illustration of this phenomenon can be seen in ancient Thailand, where, as Thompson reported, the secrecy of the law was the basis of its authority. "The concept that law was a secret science known only to judges and not open to discussion by the people still survived in 1850, when a law code in process of compilation was seized by the king and destroyed lest it should become known to the public."[18]

The tendency to confuse power and authority leads to considerable difficulty in making effective use of anthropological studies in political theory. For example, of the Kavirondo Bantu we learn:

> Political authority . . . remained inarticulate. It was not linked upon the clearly defined rights and privileges, such as are usually associated with insitutionalized chieftainship. The leading elders of a clan or sub-clan were *merely* those persons whose *opinion* carried *most weight* when public matters were discussed . . . and who were called to perform sacrifices. They had no rights that were inherent in their office. . . . There is no generally accepted term for a clan or tribal head, but a leading elder is referred to by a variety of terms which can also be used with regard to any respected and honoured person. Finally, there was no formal appointment and installation of the head of a clan or sub-clan.[19]

What makes this report especially interesting is its old-fashioned, or shall we say unsophisticated, use of the term "authority." It seems to stand for "power" as well as "rulership" and "office." Had the author had a different conception, he would have recognized the conduct he observed as indicative of the primordial and characteristic syndrome of authority, and thus would have been able to contrast it with other types of political situations. Moreover, the informal and unstructured attribute of authority in this situation led him to treat lightly one of the most important sources of power in primitive cultures.

Situations such as the one just related have in recent years aroused the interest of anthropologists as they have debated "stateless" societies, "tribes without rulers,"[20] in short, societies or cultures without any centralized pattern of government. Characteristically, these sorts of political systems are operated with the help of authority and the influence which springs from it, in a loose and segmented way.[21] It is wholly inadmissible, in fact, to argue that these societies lack "authority," as we have seen is done in a good deal of the literature. An attempt to restrict the political to that which is coercive (even though recognizing the role of consent in human society) is certainly unacceptable from the viewpoint of political theory. We have heard it argued that "in the modern nation state, the ancient empire, the African kingdom, etc., the limits of the political field are coincident in the end with the limits of authority," meaning by authority the right to rule coercively. Yet, as we have seen, this formulation excludes the significant political dimension of leadership deriving from authority, understood as involving the capacity for reasoned elaboration.

There are, as we have already mentioned, many societies in which the characteristic situation of power based on authority can be surmised to exist, particularly in all those in which the ruler acts as judge; for judicial decisions are typically affected by authority (though by no means always, as so-called cadi-judgments show). Thus we hear about the Zulu (South Africa) that the king demonstrates authoritative qualities in promulgating law and judging cases. As the supreme court of the nation "the king was supposed to maintain the customary law . . . he could not decide against the law, for his favourite. Nevertheless, the king could in deciding the case create a new law for what he and his council considered good reason."[22] Among the Hausa it is pointed out, there is a clear distinction between Law (*shari'a*) and acts of legislation (*doka*, pl. *dokoki*). "The chief had neither the function nor the power of making or altering the *shari'a*, which it was formerly his duty to apply and execute within the scope of powers alloted to him. Since the *shari'a* is regarded in Zaria as a divinely santioned code of law, it may not be altered except under *force majeure* by acts of legislation (*dokoki*), although of course its application provides considerable scope for differences of interpretation. Hence community chiefs lacked the function and power of enacting *dokoki* which modified the *shari'a*."[23] Both of the situations here described are surely reminiscent of the medieval king, or at least of the image of the king as judge, believed in during the European middle-ages. It is found in many other cultural settings, notably among the Tallensi, the Ankole and the Marquesas.[24] And there are many other comparable situations, as, for example, that among the Ganda (East Africa) where the king was reported in an early study as absolute in power and yet as "expected to respect established right, to uphold justice, and to behave with 'kindness' or generosity in rewarding the deserving." In fact, "in relations between the chiefs and people we see again a conflict between a theoretical absolutism and an equally conceived theoretical standard of air dealing. . . . "[25] In a similar manner, Firth went to great lengths to illustrate the fact that among the Tikopia "the power of the chief, absolute though it is in theory, is continually held in check in the interests of his people."[26] Not only do both of these situations illustrate customary restraints upon a formally absolute ruler, they also imply that power is primarily consensual. The required standard of justice by which such a chief is measured seems to be the analogue to that required by the classic Greek, and more especially by the Platonic, conception of monarchy which dominated much later thought; here the link with traditional political theory is evident.

---

[16] Audrey I. Richards, "The Political System of the Bemba Tribe—North-Eastern Rhodesia," in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), *African Political Systems* (London, 1940), p. 111.

[17] Raymond Firth, *Primitive Polynesian Economy* (London, 1939), pp. 103–104.

[18] Virginia Thompson, *Thailand: The New Siam* (New York, 1941), p. 269.

[19] Gunther Wagner, "The Political Organization of the Bantu of Kavirondo," in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, *op. cit.*, pp. 235–236.

[20] Middleton and Tait, *op. cit.*, 1958. Unfortunately, it, too, is entangled in difficulties resulting from the failure to distinguish power and authority. A similar attempt at classifying "stateless societies" is offered by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard in their Introduction to *African Political Systems*, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–16.

[21] M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau: 1800–1950* (1960).

There are numerous cases where the element of authority is the distinguishing feature of the "legal process" in primitive societies. Among the Kikuyu, for example, the capacity of reasoned elaboration is the central characteristic of the judge's authority. "A *muthamaki* or *mugambi* depends for his judicial reputation very largely on his knowledge of the principles on which judgments in previous cases have been based. . . . "[27] A very interesting example of authority as "reasoned elaboration" also occurs in the following case, where it is explained why the crime of murder (*awudie*) came to be punished among the Ashanti by centralized authority. One of the Ashanti legal maxims says: "It is taboo for any person killed to have to inquire after death 'What was it I did?'." Murder without due process of law "struck at the root of all centralized authority," for the authority of the council of Elders in punishing cases of murder was based on its ability satisfactorily to supply to the murderer the answer to the question, "What was it I did?" Only where the murderer could be shown through a trial authorized by custom that he had committed murder was execution lawful. To go outside of the law—to take the law into one's own hands by punishing a murderer—

---

[22] Max Glueckman, "The Kingdom of the Zulu of South Africa," in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, *op cit.*, p. 33.

[23] M. G. Smith, *The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria*, London, 1955, p. 10.

[24] The Tallensi and the Ankole are discussed by Fortes and Orberg, respectively, in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, *op. cit.*, pp. 266 and 121ff. The Marquesas are described in Ralph Linton, "The Material Culture of the Marquesas Islands," *Memoirs Bernice P. Bishop Museum*, vol. 5, p. 268 (1925). Rothschild added the following comment here. Only in the colonial period when Tallensi chiefs were agents of the British Administration can it be said that they had judicial power based on authority. The Tallensi are one of the famous tribes of the anthropological state and their fame rests on Fortes' description of their social structure before the British came to the Gold Coast and before chiefs had pronounced judicial functions.

[25] Lucy P. Mair, *An African People in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1934), pp. 268, 183.

[26] Raymond Firth, *We, the Tikopoa: A Sociological Study of Kinship in Primitive Polynesia* (London, 1936), p. 284.

[27] H. E. Lambert, *Kikuyu Social and Political Institutions* (London 1956), p. 120.

was rightly considered a challenge to all authority.[28]

The absence of a clear understanding of authority as well as a tendency to ignore the consensual element of power in primitive cultures has led to a debate among anthropologists on the nature of "law" as encompassing "all processes of social control, and . . . any of the obligations, customary actions, and conventions inherent in the social system . . . ." Such a characterization is both too all-inclusive and "confusing." The particular author from whom this statement is taken limits his definition "to social control which is maintained by organized legal sanctions and applied by some form of organized political mechanism."[29] Yet, once we understand the consensual component in power and realize that the primitive legal process depends far more on the strength of custom than on coercion, we see that it is precisely within the realm of "customary actions and conventions inherent in the social system" that we are likely to find the legal process at work. Moreover, to limit "law" to "organized legal sanctions" overlooks the importance of the informal and amorphous processes of social coercion prevalent in primitive society. Even so, he points out that among the Nuer "there were recognized standards for the control of human relationships even though these were maintained by sanctions too indeterminate to be called legal."[30] Yet, as we shall see, there are good reasons both for distinguishing between law and custom and for devaluating the importance of sanctions in connection with defining law.

Where law is employed as a term "designating the enforceable rule, enforced by a legitimate ruler possessing authority," it appears that many difficulties in understanding the primitive legal process are avoided. "For evidently such rules will be expressing the values, interests and beliefs of the community, and hence will be rooted in custom and habit exhibited in the behavior of the members of such a community."[31] Three difficulties are eliminated by this formulation. First, it avoids the formalistic insistence upon "centralized" authority or sanctions. The inquiry is shifted to whether, in fact, a rule is enforced by *any* legitimate ruler possessing authority. This formulation also escapes the difficulty inherent in the realist position, which, simply put, asserts that law is a generalization based upon what is the prevalent behavior of various persons, especially of judges. This difficulty results from the fact that if law is prevalent custom, it is not easy to comprehend the imperative "ought" aspect which a command involves, for if people do something anyhow, why tell them that they ought to? Thus, the distinction between law and custom emphasizes the ideal obligatory "ought" element in law which custom often lacks. To underline this point, Hoebel discussed Malinowski's distinction between the customary and legal handling of the incest taboo among the Trobriand Islanders, where mild moral disapproval turned into harsh legal punishment once the incest was called to public notice.[32] On the other hand, a strictly normative interpretation of "law" is likewise misleading. This is so because law can be nullified; if few or none obey it, it ceases to exist. Indeed, as Pospisil points out, the result would be "that so-called dead rules which are not enforced and are often unknown to the public, being contrary to the behavior of the majority of the people, are considered together with the rest of the rules as the law of the country."[33]

By understanding law as an "enforceable rule, enforced by a legitimate ruler possessing authority," we are able to encompass both the empirical and normative aspects of law. The first question one asks is whether, in fact, a rule is enforced. Usually the proper place to look for this phenomenon is among the decisions of the native headmen or councils.[34] Yet, the normative and obligatory aspect of law is derived from the authority of the headmen's or councils' decisions, which relate legal commands to the interests, values and beliefs of the community. It is in terms of the rule-makers' capacity for reasoned elaboration, which relates decisions to a community's interests, values and beliefs, that a law becomes authoritative. Conversely, the obligatory aspect of law declines when it becomes less authoritative.

The concept of authority is crucial to the understanding of primitive law; for it relates to the tricky question of whether there must be sanctions for there to be law. It is surely extreme to say that physical force is the only kind of sanction standing behind law.[35] Indeed, if we accept this formulation "law would not be a universal phenomenon, for cultures exist where physical sanction is practically lacking."[36] Among the Kikuyu, it has been shown, "if a judgment debtor failed to pay and persisted in his recalcitrance he would be ostracized, excommunicated from society. He was 'shut out'. . . . His relatives and neighbors would show their disapproval by declining to talk or eat with him."[37] And among the Kapauku, "being shamed by a public reprimand, which sometimes lasts for several days, is much worse than anything except capital punishment."[38] Among the Yahgan as well, it is reported, "punishment of being ignored and ostracized is more effective than scoldings and whippings."[39] Yet, it appears that if law is to be distinguished from custom, some form of sanctions—however informal and unorganized—must accompany a legal rule, even if these sanctions are rarely invoked to enforce a decision. The Guajiros, for example, emphasize the differences between moral obligations, which derive from custom, and legal obligations, which are backed up by public sanctions.[40] Yet, it is perhaps more important to insist that the authoritative nature of law in most primitive cultures, on most occasions, eliminates the necessity for sanctions. Because law is generally an expression of the interests, values and beliefs of a people, a legal offender often will habitually bow to the weight of the law without ever considering the sanctions which disobedience entails.

---

[28] R. S. Rattray, *Law and the Ashanti Constitution* (London, 1929) pp. 295–296.

[29] P. P. Howell, *A Manual of Nuer Law* (London, 1954), p. 225.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[31] Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 270. See also *The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective*, 2. ed. (1954), *passim*.

[32] Hoebel, *The Law of Primitive Man*, pp. 185ff.

[33] Leopold Pospisil, *Kapauku Papuans and Their Law*, New Haven, 1958, p. 248.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 255.

If a "legal process" is to be identified among primitive peoples, it appears that greater understanding of customary processes of settling disputes is necessary. To some extent, the HRAF material, with its emphasis upon formal "structural" categories, makes this attempt at understanding more difficult, especially where, for example, it stresses "office" rather than "process." It is important to bear in mind, therefore, as the legal realists insist, that one must look to the informal processes of dispute-settling in primitive cultures, for there is a greater tendency to define law too narrowly. Essentially, there are three modes of settling disputes in all societies, not all of which, however, need be part of the legal process. If there are no rules at all, we may speak of expedient settling of disputes, if only broad general rules, of discretionary settling, if detailed rules, of judicial settling.[41]

The case of the leopard-skin chief among the Nuer might well be an example of the expediential mode of settling disputes (though there are also to be found the other two types of dispute-settling). "Only if both sides are willing to submit to arbitration can a dispute be settled. Also, although the chief, after consultation with the leaders, can give a verdict, this verdict is reached after general agreement and in large measure, therefore, arises from an acknowledgement by the defendant's or plaintiff's party that the other party has justice on its side."[42] Most Nuer disputes, in fact, are settled privately and between the parties concerned without the intervention of the leopard-skin chief. Indemnities "will not be paid if there is no pressure on the part of the community in which they live, and there will be pressure in proportion to the extent to which men's mutual animosity disturbs the tranquility of the community, generally speaking, the greater the structural distance between them, the less likelihood of composition."[43] Indeed, this seems to be the characteristic mode of dispute settling among atomistic or uncohesive primitive societies, where neither powerful public opinion nor centralized power exists. Just as with the Nuer, compensation is determined by so-called "arbitors" or "palabras," who are nothing more than "intermediaries named by the family groups affected to settle the affair peacefully."[44] Although there are fairly well-defined ideas of customary liability and compensation, the family of the injured person must seek a settlement which will provide a settlement in accordance with their power. Where the expedient mode of dispute settling predominates, neither equity nor justice are as important as the maintenance of equilibrium within the body politic, and hence this becomes the central object of any settlement of a dispute.

---

[35] Hoebel, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[36] Pospisil, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

[37] Lambert, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

[38] Pospisil, *op. cit.*, pp. 267–268.

[39] Gusinde, *op.cit.*, p. 984.

[40] Vincenzo Petrullo, "Composition of 'Torts' in Guajiro Society," *Publications of The Philadelphia Anthropological Society*, Vol I. (1937), 156–158.

[41] Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 426.

[42] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "The Nuer of the Southern Sudan," in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard *op. cit.*, p. 293.

[43] Howell, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[44] Roberto Pineda Giraldo, *Aspectos de la Magia en la Guajiro* (translated from the Spanish for the Human Relations Area Files by Sydney Muirden), pp. 77.

Discretionary settlement of disputes comes into play whenever no specific rules or principles have been formulated, while at the same time mere whim, that is the failure to recognize broad rules of conduct, cannot be allowed. Among the Azande, for example, "custom determines in most cases what penalty to inflict," but the chief has great discretion in applying the rule. In the case of witchcraft, discretion is particularly pronounced for guilt is determined not on the basis of precedent but by recourse to an oracle. The importance of precedent is here transferred to the correct operation of the oracle so that "true" judgments will be given.[45] Among the Kikuyu, we also find a clear case of discretionary settling of disputes. "Every tribe has a code, but it is a code of general principles, not of detail. Every judgment must conform to it, though the principles are applied with a latitude unknown in European law."[46] Where the discretionary mode predominates, the emphasis in dispute settling appears to be on equity, rather than on strict obedience to rules which are held to embody substantive justice. The attitude appears to be similar to Plato's classic argument against written law on the grounds that laws prevent the realization of justice in particular cases. Plato argued for the discretionary approach to justice as long as the ruler was bound by moral conviction. To be sure, his last word on the subject in the *Laws* marked a change in his position, because by then he despaired of finding rulers who would be certain to be just.[47]

Finally, the mode of judicial settling of disputes is often the most difficult to identify among primitive peoples. Researchers have tended to ignore this phenomenon in primitive cultures, perhaps for the reason that they have been prepared by their own experiences to look for a determinate legal sovereign or for a formal judicial authority that has explicit powers to enforce its decisions. On the other hand, the legal realists have rightly insisted that the proper test is whether a judge's legal decisions are in fact obeyed, even when he lacks the formal characteristics of a judge. There exists a great variety of "courts" which may appear in primitive societies.[48] To illustrate, a typical example of the legal process among a primitive people is given by Koppers in his study of the Bhil. The *panch*, or judicial council consists of an assemblage of "the most established and most influential members of the village." Of them he reports;

> The *panch* treats clan and caste questions above all, property disputes and disagreements of every sort, in which the most numerous are probably those concerned with marriage and women. . . . If one of the two parties is found guilty, then the guilty party must provide the *daru*. However, it happens rarely that the guilt is ascribed exclusively to one party; generally both sides are more or less guilty and a corresponding decision of the *panch* is rather rare.[49]

If one were to search for "organized legal sanctions" he undoubtedly would find none, for all that exists in the way of sanctions is the informal disapproval of public opinion. Here as in other cases, the sanction of public opinion underlines the authoritative nature of the legal process: to disobey the legal authority is to strike at the heart of the communal values and beliefs, which brings public ostracism. Physical force plays little if any role in upholding the legal process.

The same kind of situation occurs among the Baluhya: intra-clan disputes are usually settled privately by negotiation and mediation. When they become serious and the public takes notice, then the elders of the different clans meet together and pronounce judgment. "The only sanction which supported legal decisions given by the leaders of the sub-clan or by the larger *ad hoc* assembly of all clan elders was the solidarity of the members of the respective groups in backing these decisions. Native statements assert that whenever the verdict was supported by all or the great majority of the clan elders, the defendant would not have tried to oppose."[50]

In the above instances it was fairly clear, although implicit, that decisions were determined on the basis of specific and well-defined customary rules. This judicial mode of settling disputes is made even clearer by Pospisil's description of the Kapauku "process of law."

---

[45] C. R. Lague, *Les Azande du Miam-Niam* (trans. from Human Relations Area Files), pp. 20–21. Cf. also Evans-Pritchard, *op. cit.*

[46] Lambert, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[47] Grene, *Man and His Pride: A study of the Political Philosophy of Thucydides and Plato.* See Ch. 12, especially at the end.

[48] Hoebel, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–26.

[49] Wilhelm Koppers, *Die Bhil in Zentralindien*, (translated for the Human Relations Area Files by Theodore J. Ziolkowski), p. 165.

[50] Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 221. Rothschild added the following comment: "It should be noted that the council's decision was accepted only if elders from all sections of the clan or sub-clan accepted it. If there were disagreement which followed lineage lines and neither side gave in the clan would split which was, one gathers from Wagner, not an infrequent occurrence."

> After he secures all the evidence and makes up his mind as to the factual background of the dispute, the authority starts the activity called by the natives *boko duwai*, which means the process of making a decision and inducing the parties to the dispute to follow it. This process could hardly be compared in its form to the adjudicating activity of our judges. The native authority makes a long speech in which he sums up the evidence, appeals to a rule, and then tells the parties what should be done in order to terminate the dispute. If the disputants are not willing to comply, the authority becomes emotional and starts to shout reproaches, and makes long speeches in which evidence, rules, decisions, and threats form inducements. Indeed, the authority may go as far as to start "wanai, the mad dance," or to change his tactics suddenly and weep bitterly about the misconduct of the defendant and the fact that the latter refuses to obey him. Some native authorities are so skilled in the art of persuasion as to produce genuine tears which almost always break the resistance of the unwilling party. A superficial Western observer confronted with such a situation may very likely regard the weeping headman as the culprit on trial. Thus, from the formalistic point of view, there is little resemblance between the Western court sentence and the *boko duwai* activity of the headman. However, the effect of the headman's persuasion is the same as that of a verdict passed in our court. As we have seen, there were only five cases in our material (176 cases) where the parties openly resisted and disobeyed the authority. . . .[51]

This description of the Kapauku "process of law" again raises the question of whether students of primitive cultures are defining "law" with sufficient flexibility to enable them to understand what appear to be legal phenomena. The reason for informality in the primitive legal process need not be the "underdeveloped" nature of their legal institutions. In fact, informality may be the expression of a profound cultural objection to the formalistic adversary nature of advanced legal institutions. Mediation and negotiation become the mechanism by which this idea is approached, although, of course, these processes do not square with the Bodinian-Austinian doctrine of law as the act of a sovereignty. Because of the traditional mode of settling legal disputes, the observer may fail to note the specific and detailed customary rules for settling disputes, because they often, although known, remain unarticulated. This is not to say that the abstract rules which natives may identify are necessarily "good law." Only through empirical study of actual "decisions" can the observer learn the actual rules governing settlement of disputes.

The study of law in primitive cultures is intimately related to the basic political structure of those cultures. One of the most important distinctions in this connection, already mentioned, concerns the question whether a particular society possesses some form of centralized governmental institutions. Where a centralized governmental system exists, one can expect a fairly well defined system of law. In these states, rules and decisions are generally made by headmen or councils possessing powers of enforcement by appropriate sanctions. It should be pointed out in this connection that virtually all of the tribes contained in the studies digested in the HRAF display the attitude towards law characteristic of traditional societies: They conceive of law as "discovered" and not "made." Many, as we have seen, have some conception of a "higher law," which they invariably identify with customary practices.

As the centralized governmental institutions become more powerful, there is some tendency for a society to regard a greater number of misdeeds offenses against the body politic as distinguished from mere private offenses against persons or things. Yet, this is not always so. Among the Zande, for instance, punishment is essential "for the satisfaction of the individual," not of the community. Although there are clear powers of enforcement in the hands of the chief, all crimes except witchcraft appear to be regarded as private matters to be settled by indemnity.[52] Among the Baluhya there is no clear distinction between crimes against society and those which affect individuals, because the extent of social involvement depends on the actual social disruption which a particular offense causes and not on its inclusion in a category of crimes against society. The Baluhya, in addition, limit social punishment to repeated offenders who can not be disciplined privately.[53] On the other hand, the distinction among the Ashanti between "things hateful to the tribe" and those deeds which were punished privately has been described in elaborate detail. Private offenses were treated as "household matters" and "were settled by the persons directly concerned or were decided by argument before an Elder. . . . " Public offenses, by contrast, "raised a much wider issue to the African and were thought to result in more serious and widely felt consequences."[54] Of course, this distinction resembles in some respects the Western classification of offenses as "civil" and "criminal" but the use of these familiar categories can be rather misleading. In many tribes, assault, adultery or even murder are treated as if they were "civil" matters, where some indemnity or refund of the "bride-price" is the only penalty. There does seem to be considerable utility, however, in analyzing primitive legal systems in terms of the distinction between "public" and "private" offenses even though this dichotomy may not apply in all situations. Nevertheless, in those instances where it does apply, the investigator will have an opportunity to learn the reasons for the treatment of particular crimes; he may, at the same time, learn that many laws are *not* enforced by centralized authority. Finally, an investigation of the degree to which there is a relationship between the scope of centralized power and the extent to which offenses are treated as public might also prove valuable. In any case, the extent of such treatment provides an important clue to the extent of social cohesiveness in any society.

---

[51] Pospisil, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

[52] P. M. Larken, "Impressions of the Azande," *Sudan Notes and Records*, vol. XIII, p. 99 (1930).

[53] Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 219n.

The extent to which offenses are considered public also provides an important measure of the complexity of a society. Hoebel points out that simple societies have relatively little need for law. "If the more primitive societies are more lawless than the more civilized," he writes, "it is not in the sense that they are *ipso facto* more disorderly; quite the contrary. It is because they are more homogeneous; relations are more direct and intimate; interests are shared by all in a solid commonality; and there are fewer things to quarrel about."[55] Conversely, when a society becomes more interdependent and heterogeneous it inclines to treat an ever greater number of offenses as affecting the body politic. Where anti-social behavior affects only the household or a limited circle of people, social control tends to be confined to this basic sphere; but where the consequences of a misdeed have impact over a wider circle, the range of public offenses is expanded.

Any broadly comparative theory of politics needs to make all possible use of the kind of data concerning primitive societies which anthropology is able to furnish. But there is still a great task ahead in developing more effective cooperation between the two disciplines. If the problems we have discussed and many others like them can be overcome it would surely be a major stimulus to the study of comparative politics. And, perhaps more important, it would provide a readily accessible source of empirical material with which to validate those generalizations which form the core of political theory and science.[56]

---

[54] Rattray, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

[55] Hoebel, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

[56] The recent work of Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston, 1967) utilizes some of this material, as did my *Man and His Government* (New York, 1963), and Karl W. Deutsch's *The Nerves of Government* (New York, 1964).

A NONLINEAR MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS*

FRED KORT
University of Connecticut

Various attempts have been made in recent years to analyze judicial decisions in selected areas of law as functions of controlling facts. At least two of these attempts have relied on systems of simultaneous equations.[1] In both endeavors the assumption was made that the combination of facts on which the decisions depend is linear. In the absence of any clear indication of a nonlinear combination, as well as in view of the significant results that were obtained on the basis of a linear model, the initial approach was justified. The use of high speed digital computers has made it possible, however, to explore the existence of nonlinear relationships where the original assumption of linear relationships was made. The important feature in detecting nonlinear relationships is not primarily the greater accuracy of the results—the linear model has provided acceptable approximations—but the acquisition of new insights into how different facts combine in influencing judicial decisions.

It is the purpose of this paper first to review the linear model, and then to show how it can be extended to a nonlinear model—in general terms as well as in the form of an actual application. Finally, limitations and implications of the nonlinear model will be indicated.

I. THE LINEAR MODEL

In many areas of law, comprehensive sets of facts have been specified by courts as relevant and controlling for reaching decisions, with the understanding that some combinations of these facts would lead to decisions in favor of one party, whereas other combinations would lead to decisions in favor of the opposing party. For example, in the involuntary confession cases under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that each decision depends on the particular circumstances surrounding the interrogation of each petitioner—a rule which has been substantially modified but not fundamentally changed by the decision in the *Miranda* case.[2] Workmen's compensation cases provide another example; reviewing courts have indicated that an award or denial of compensation must be decided on the basis of such facts as the nature of the injury, the circumstances under which the accident occurred and became known, the conditions of employment, etc. Beyond the association of *some* combinations of facts with decisions which already have been reached, it is not known, however, what decisions can be expected on the basis of *other* combinations of facts. This problem can be attacked by representing each case which already has been decided by an equation. The resulting system of simultaneous equations can be stated as follows:

$$\begin{array}{l}
a + b_1X_{11} + b_2X_{12} + \cdots + b_jX_{1j} + \cdots + b_nX_{1n} = Y_1 \\
a + b_1X_{21} + b_2X_{22} + \cdots + b_jX_{2j} + \cdots + b_nX_{2n} = Y_2 \\
\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots \\
a + b_1X_{k1} + b_2X_{k2} + \cdots + b_jX_{kj} + \cdots + b_nX_{kn} = Y_k \\
\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots \\
a + b_1X_{N1} + b_2X_{N2} + \cdots + b_jX_{Nj} + \cdots + b_nX_{Nn} = Y_N.
\end{array} \qquad (1)$$

---

* Support for this research was provided by a grant awarded by the Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes of the Social Science Research Council. The IBM 7040, which was supported in part by Grant GF-1819 of the National Science Foundation, and the IBM 360 at the Computer Center of the University of Connecticut have been used extensively throughout the entire research. The assistance which has been received from the research foundations and from the University is gratefully acknowledged.

[1] Fred Kort, "Simultaneous Equations and Boolean Algebra in the Analysis of Judicial Decisions," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 28 (Winter, 1963), 143–163; and "Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law," in Glendon Schubert (ed.), *Judicial Decision-Making* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 133–197; S. Sidney Ulmer, "Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Processes: Some Practical and Theoretical Applications," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 28 (Winter, 1963), 164–184; and "Mathematical Models for Predicting Judicial Behavior," in Joe Bernd (ed.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, III (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1967). A different approach, employing Boolean algebra, has been used by Reed C. Lawlor; see his "Foundations of Logical Legal Decision Making," *Modern Uses of Logic in Law* (June, 1963), pp. 98–114, and Kort, *supra*.

[2] *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).

These simultaneous equations apply to any number of facts and their weights ($j=1, 2, \cdots, n$) in any number of cases ($k=1, 2, \cdots, N$). The only unknowns are the weights of the facts, b_j, and the constant a. Each numerical value of X_{kj} (0, 1, or an integer larger than 1), which indicates the absence, presence, or several manifestations of fact j in case k, is known. If multiple regression is used,[3] the number of votes of the justices favorable to the party seeking redress (which is known in the decided cases) can be used as a numerical value for Y_k. The *normal* equations which then are obtained by employing the method of least squares are:

$$\begin{aligned}
Na + b_1 \sum_{k=1}^{N} X_{k1} + b_2 \sum X_{k2} + \cdots + b_n \sum X_{kn} &= \sum Y_k \\
a \sum X_{k1} + b_1 \sum X_{k1}^2 + b_2 \sum X_{k1}X_{k2} + \cdots + b_n \sum X_{k1}X_{kn} &= \sum X_{k1}Y_k \\
a \sum X_{k2} + b_1 \sum X_{k2}X_{k1} + b_2 \sum X_{k2}^2 + \cdots + b_n \sum X_{k2}X_{kn} &= \sum X_{k2}Y_k \\
\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots& \\
a \sum X_{kn} + b_1 \sum X_{kn}X_{k1} + b_2 \sum X_{kn}X_{k2} + \cdots + b_n \sum X_{kn}^2 &= \sum X_{kn}.
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

As the normal equations are solved, the weights of the facts are obtained. By substituting these weights for b_j in a case not previously encountered, a numerical value for Y_k—which indicates in terms of the votes of the justices a decision in favor or against the party seeking redress—is obtained.

If discriminant analysis is used,[4] a numerical value is not assigned to Y_k. The system of simultaneous equations which corresponds to the normal equations in multiple regression analysis is the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
b_1 \sum x_{k1}^2 + b_2 \sum x_{k1}x_{k2} + \cdots + b_n \sum x_{k1}x_{kn} &= d_1 \\
b_1 \sum x_{k2}x_{k1} + b_2 \sum x_{k2}^2 + \cdots + b_n \sum x_{k2}x_{kn} &= d_2 \\
\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots& \\
b_1 \sum x_{kn}x_{k1} + b_2 \sum x_{kn}x_{k2} + \cdots + b_n \sum x_{kn}^2 &= d_n,
\end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

where

$$x_{kj} = X_{kj} - \overline{X}_j \qquad (j = 1, 2, \cdots, n),$$

$$\overline{X}_j = \sum_{k=1}^{N} \frac{X_{kj}}{N}, \qquad d_j = \overline{X}_j^{**} - \overline{X}_j^{*},$$

$$\overline{X}^{*} = \sum_{k=1}^{N_1} \frac{X_{kj}}{N_1}, \qquad \overline{X}_j^{**} = \sum_{k=1}^{N_2} \frac{X_{kj}}{N_2},$$

and where N is the total number of cases, N_1 the number of cases in the *con* group (decisions against the aggrieved party), and N_2 the number of cases in the *pro* group (decisions in favor of the aggrieved party).

By substituting the values for b_j which are obtained from the solution of these equations in the "discriminant function"

$$Z_k = b_1X_{k1} + b_2X_{k2} + \cdots + b_nX_{kn} \tag{4}$$

for any case k, a numerical value which places the case in a *pro* or *con* category can be computed.

Whether discriminant analysis or multiple regression should be used depends on the assumption which is made about the nature of the decision. If it is assumed that the decisions represent two separate categories (pro and con), discriminant analysis is appropriate. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that the decisions represent various degrees of support of parties in terms of the votes of the justices—which reveal, of course, whether each decision is pro or con—multiple regression has to be employed. In exploring nonlinear relationships between the controlling facts, there is another consideration which is decisive in the choice of discriminant analysis or multiple regression. Two-group discriminant analysis, which would distinguish a pro category from a con category, assumes linearity. Multiple regression can be linear or nonlinear. It also is true that multiple discriminant analysis encompasses nonlinearity.[5] However, it would be possible to attribute meaning to the results of multiple discriminant analysis in this instance only if the analysis would discriminate groups of decisions representing different combinations of votes. The result then would be virtually the same as the one obtained by multiple regression. For these reasons, multiple regression will be used in the exposition of the nonlinear model.

---

[3] This is the method which was used in my studies cited in note 1. For a somewhat different application of multiple regression to the analysis of judicial decisions, see Werner F. Gruenbaum and Albert Newhouse, "Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Decisions: Some Problems of Prediction," *Houston Law Review*, 3 (1965) 201–220.

[4] This is the method which was used in the studies by Ulmer, see *supra*, note 1. For a somewhat different application of discriminant analysis to judicial decisions, see S. Sidney Ulmer, "The Discriminant Function and a Theoretical Context for Its Use in Estimating the Votes of Judges," to be published in a forthcoming volume by John Wiley and Sons, edited by Joseph Tanenhaus and Joel Grossman.

Before turning attention to the nonlinear model, the use of factor analysis in connection with the linear model should be noted. In employing the linear model, it is advisable to restate the facts in terms of factors for the purpose of multiple regression or discriminant analysis for two reasons: (1) the equations stated in terms of the facts may not contain sufficient information for a unique solution; (2) it is desirable to explore the mutual dependence or independence of the facts. This restatement of the facts in terms of factors can be accomplished by the use of factor analysis.[6] The original equations representing the observations (cases) then can be written as follows:

$$\begin{array}{l} A + B_1\overline{F}_{11} + B_2\overline{F}_{12} + \cdots + B_j\overline{F}_{1j} + \cdots + B_m\overline{F}_{1m} = Y_1 \\ A + B_1\overline{F}_{21} + B_2\overline{F}_{22} + \cdots + B_j\overline{F}_{2j} + \cdots + B_m\overline{F}_{2m} = Y_2 \\ \cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots \\ A + B_1\overline{F}_{k1} + B_2\overline{F}_{k2} + \cdots + B_j\overline{F}_{kj} + \cdots + B_m\overline{F}_{km} = Y_k \\ \cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots \\ A + B_1\overline{F}_{N1} + B_2\overline{F}_{N2} + \cdots + B_j\overline{F}_{Nj} + \cdots + B_m\overline{F}_{Nm} = Y_N. \end{array} \tag{5}$$

These equations apply to any number of factors and their weights ($j=1, 2, \ldots, m$) in any number of cases ($k=1, 2, \ldots, N$). Since the object of the factor analysis is to restate the facts in the original equations in terms of fewer variables, it is expected that the number of factors m is smaller than the number of facts n. Each numerical value of $\overline{F}_{kj}$, which is the *factor estimate* of factor j in case k is known; it has been obtained as a result of the factor analysis. The only unknowns in the new equations are the weights of the factors, B_j. As new cases arise, the applicable facts can be reduced to the factors which have been identified, and by substituting the weights of the factors obtained from the solution of the equations the decisions can be determined. However, since factor analysis is based on the correlations between the original variables (the facts), an assumption regarding linearity or nonlinearity in the correlations between facts has to be made. This, of course, is an assumption which one does not wish to make in exploring a nonlinear model. For this reason, the exposition of the nonlinear model will use the facts as variables without reducing them first to factors. In view of the purposes of factor analysis, which have been indicated, it must be understood that the exploration of a nonlinear model can be pursued only if the equations stated in terms of facts provide sufficient information for a unique solution (in the least squares sense).

II. THE NONLINEAR MODEL

In considering a nonlinear model for the analysis of judicial decisions, it must be noted that there are infinite possibilities. This can be seen from the fact alone that the linear model which has been discussed can be readily extended to a nonlinear model by raising any X_j to a power ranging from 2 to infinity. Obviously, then, even at the initial stage of exploration, only a nonlinear relationship between facts which has a meaningful interpretation can be considered.

For the purpose of exposition, it will be helpful to examine a hypothetical example. Assume that—contrary to reality—the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States consider only two facts in deciding an involuntary confession case: X_1—the defendant was subjected to protracted interrogation; X_2—the defendant did not even complete an elementary education. If the linear model which has been discussed is used, the decision in this instance would be stated as a function of facts as follows:

$$a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 = Y. \tag{6}$$

Since the function represents the regression equation, it takes into account not merely the simple correlations between the decision and each fact, but the multiple correlation between the decision and the facts in combination. It is linear, for in three-dimensional space it can be represented by a plane. (If only one fact were involved it would be represented by a line, and if more than two facts were involved it would be represented by a hyperplane.) The interpretation of the function would be as follows: The influence which the fact that the defendant has not even completed an elementary education has on the decision *adds* to the influence which the fact that he was subjected to a protracted interrogation has. It is quite possible, however, that the subnormal education of the defendant does not add to his protracted interrogation as a fact in favor of a reversal of his conviction, but that it *increases* the impact of that fact on the decision. This possibility can be represented by a *multiplicative* rather than *additive* relationship between the facts in the following form:

---

[5] See David V. Tiedeman, "The Utility of the Discriminant Function in Psychological and Guidance Investigations," *Harvard Educational Review*, 21 (Spring, 1951), 71–80, at 79.

[6] This method has been used in my earlier studies and in the more recent study by Ulmer, see *supra*, note 1.

$$a + (b_1X_1)(b_2X_2) = Y. \tag{7}$$

This function is nonlinear, for in three-dimensional space it is not represented by a plane, but by a hull. In order to maintain a meaningful interpretation of this function, a modification has to be introduced. According to the form in which the function has been stated, the fact that the defendant was subjected to protracted interrogation would have no effect on the decision if his education were not subnormal. For X_2 then would be 0, and the entire term, including X_1 would vanish. Such a result would not be plausible.[7] One would expect X_1 to have some impact on the decision, even if X_2 were absent. For this reason, it would be more meaningful to modify the preceding function as follows:

$$a + (1 + b_1X_1)(1 + b_2X_2) = Y. \tag{8}$$

According to this expression, the subnormal education of the defendant certainly could increase the impact of his protracted interrogation on the decision, but—in the absence of subnormal education—the protracted interrogation still would influence the decision.

In reality, judicial decisions depend, of course, on more complex and more extensive combinations of facts than are indicated in the foregoing illustration. For example, in the involuntary confession cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, 29 controlling facts can be identified. In the workmen's compensation cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, 22 controlling facts appear in the opinions of the Court. Multiplicative relationships therefore are possible not only between pairs of facts, but between sets of 3, 4, $\cdots$, n facts. Moreover, the relationships between some facts may be additive and between others multiplicative. For n facts, in any case k, the decision as a function of facts then would have to be stated in the following form:

$$\begin{aligned}
&a + (1 + b_1X_{k1})(1 + b_2X_{k2}) \cdots (1 + b_{m_1}X_{km_1}) \\
&\qquad + (1 + b_{m_1+1}X_{k(m_1+1)})(1 + b_{m_1+2}X_{k(m_1+2)}) \cdots (1 + b_{m_1+m_2}X_{k(m_1+m_2)}) + \cdots \\
&\qquad + (1 + b_{m_1+m_2+\cdots+m_{l-1}+1}X_{k(m_1+m_2+\cdots+m_{l-1}+1)})(1 + b_{m_1+m_2+\cdots+m_{l-1}+2}X_{k(m_1+m_2+\cdots+m_{l-1}+2)}) \\
&\qquad\quad \cdots (1 + b_{m_1+m_2+\cdots+m_l}X_{k(m_1+m_2+\cdots+m_l)}) \\
&\qquad + b_{m_1+m_2+\cdots+m_l+1}X_{k(m_1+m_2+\cdots+m_l+1)} \\
&\qquad + b_{m_1+m_2+\cdots+m_l+2}X_{k(m_1+m_2+\cdots+m_l+2)} + \cdots + b_nX_n = Y_k, \quad \text{where} \quad (m_1 + m_2 + \cdots + m_l) \leq n.
\end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

In determining which particular form of this function applies to a specified set of judicial decisions, a nonlinear multiple regression analysis has to be performed several hundred to several thousand times—depending on the number of facts and the number of multiplicative relationships between facts which are identified as significant in the course of the analysis. It can be readily seen that such an investigation would be prohibitive without the use of a high speed computer. With the use of a computer, the following procedure can be employed: Linear regression is performed first. Then a multiplicative relationship between the first pair of facts is introduced into the regression equation, and nonlinear regression is performed. If the results of this regression are significant in relation to the preceding one,[8] the multiplicative relationship between

---

[7] It should be noted, however, that precisely this type of function is very meaningful in the analysis of some judicial decisions in Roman law systems. In the latter, the presence of specified facts frequently is designated by legislatures or courts as a set of indispensable conditions for a decision in favor of the aggrieved party. A forthcoming study by the author, to be presented at the APSA Annual Meeting in 1968, will exemplify this point with regard to Swiss cases.

[8] The significance test which can be employed here is the F test for determining significance of nonlinear regression over linear regression or higher order nonlinear regression over lower order nonlinear regression:

$$F = \frac{[\sum (Y_{\text{from higher order regression}} - \overline{Y})^2 - \sum (Y_{\text{from lower order regression}} - \overline{Y})^2]/1}{[\sum(Y - \overline{Y})^2 - \sum (Y_{\text{from higher order regression}} - \overline{Y})^2]/(N - n - 1)}.$$

the first two facts is accepted; if not, the additive relationship is restored. In any case, a multiplicative relationship between the next pair of facts is introduced into the regression equation, and a new nonlinear regression is performed. This procedure is employed for every pair of facts, and in each instance the acceptance or rejection of the multiplicative relationship under investigation depends on the significance test of the higher order nonlinear regression in relation to the lower order nonlinear regression. This procedure then is extended to multiplicative relationships between 3, 4, $\cdots$, n facts. It is possible, of course, that every multiplicative relationship is rejected because of insufficient significance. In that case, the original linear model is retained. It can be seen, therefore, that no assumption regarding linearity or nonlinearity is made in this procedure. The linear model is transformed into a nonlinear model only if the significance tests so indicate.

Of crucial importance in the foregoing procedure is the solution of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The normal equations which are encountered in the iterative regression analysis are nonlinear. This can be seen if one considers merely a few terms in the preceding, generally stated function (9):

$$a + (1 + b_1X_{k1})(1 + b_2X_{k2}) + \cdots + b_nX_{kn} = Y_k. \qquad (10)$$

In accordance with the method of least squares, on which regression analysis is based, the function

$$g = \sum_{k=1}^{N} [a + (1 + b_1X_{k1})(1 + b_2X_{k2}) + \cdots + b_nX_{kn} - Y_k]^2 \qquad (11)$$

has to be minimized. The normal equations, which are obtained by taking the partial derivatives of this expression with respect to every unknown and setting them equal to 0, can be written in the following form (the subscript k is omitted):

$$\begin{aligned}
f_0 &= \frac{\partial g}{\partial a} = Na + N + b_1\sum X_1 + b_2\sum X_2 + b_1b_2\sum X_1X_2 + \cdots + b_n\sum X_n - \sum Y = 0 \\
f_1 &= \frac{\partial g}{\partial b_1} = b_1\sum X_1^2 + b_1b_2^2\sum X_1^2X_2^2 + \cdots + a\sum X_1 + ab_2\sum X_1X_2 + \cdots + \sum X_1 \\
&\quad + b_2\sum X_1X_2 + \cdots + b_2\sum X_1X_2 + 2b_1b_2\sum X_1^2X_2 + \cdots + b_n\sum X_1X_n - \sum X_1Y \\
&\quad + b_2^2\sum X_1X_2^2 + \cdots + b_2b_n\sum X_1X_2X_n - b_2\sum X_1X_2Y = 0 \\
f_2 &= \frac{\partial g}{\partial b_2} = b_2\sum X_2^2 + b_1^2b_2\sum X_1^2X_2^2 + \cdots + a\sum X_2 + ab_1\sum X_1X_2 + \cdots + \sum X_2 \qquad (12) \\
&\quad + b_1\sum X_1X_2 + \cdots + b_1\sum X_1X_2 + b_1^2\sum X_1^2X_2 + \cdots + 2b_1b_2\sum X_1X_2^2 + \cdots \\
&\quad + b_n\sum X_2X_n - \sum X_2Y + b_1b_n\sum X_1X_2X_n - b_1\sum X_1X_2Y = 0 \\
&\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots \\
f_n &= \frac{\partial g}{\partial b_n} = b_n\sum X_n^2 + \cdots + a\sum X_n + \cdots + \sum X_n + \cdots + b_1\sum X_1X_n + \cdots \\
&\quad + b_2\sum X_2X_n + \cdots + b_1b_2\sum X_1X_2X_n - \sum X_nY = 0.
\end{aligned}$$

Since only a few terms were taken from the generally stated function, it should be noted that the normal equations are in reality much more complicated than the equations in the preceding exposition. A solution of the normal equations by graphic methods is not possible. However, with the assistance of a high speed computer, a method of iterative approximation—based on Taylor's theorem[9]—can be

---

See F. E. Croxton and D. J. Cowden, *Applied General Statistics*, 2nd. Ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), pp. 726–732, including the exposition of the t-test on p. 727.

[9] See, e.g., R. E. Johnson and F. L. Kiokemeister, *Calculus*, 3rd. Ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964), pp. 397–401, and M. H. Protter and C. B. Morrey, Jr., *College Calculus* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publ. Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 695–699. This method was brought to the attention of the author by Pro-

used for the solution of these equations.

According to Taylor's theorem, a function of several variables $f(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n)$, which is continuous in the neighborhood of a point $(c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)$, and all the partial derivatives of which up to $p+1$ are continuous in the neighborhood of that point, can be expanded as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} f(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n) &= f(c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n) \\ &+ \sum_{1 \leq r_1+r_2+\cdots+r_n \leq p} \frac{\partial^{r_1+r_2+\cdots+r_n} f(c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)}{\partial x_1^{r_1} \partial x_2^{r_2} \cdots \partial x_n^{r_n}} \frac{(x_1 - c_1)^{r_1}}{r_1!} \cdots \frac{(x_n - c_n)^{r_n}}{r_n!} \\ &+ \sum_{r_1+r_2+\cdots+r_n = p+1} \frac{\partial^{p+1} f(z_1, z_2, \cdots, z_n)}{\partial x_1^{r_1} \partial x_2^{r_2} \cdots \partial x_n^{r_n}} \frac{(x_1 - c_1)^{r_1}}{r_1!} \cdots \frac{(x_n - c_n)^{r_n}}{r_n!}, \end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

where $(z_1, z_2, \cdots, z_n)$ is a point between $(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n)$ and $(c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)$.

If $(c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)$ is so chosen that it is close to $(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n)$, approximate equality can be attained in (13) even if the right side of the equation is limited to the first derivatives. (13) then becomes

$$\begin{aligned} f(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n) & \\ \doteq f(c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n) & \\ + \frac{\partial f(c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)}{\partial x_1} (x_1 - c_1) & \\ + \frac{\partial f(c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)}{\partial x_2} (x_2 - c_2) + \cdots & \\ + \frac{\partial f(c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)}{\partial x_n} (x_n - c_n). & \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

Each of the normal equations in (12), $f_0, f_1, f_2, \cdots, f_n$, is a function of several variables, namely, of $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n$. Any of these normal equations f_j $(j=0, 1, 2, \cdots, n)$ therefore may be expanded in accordance with (14):

$$\begin{aligned} f_j(a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n) & \\ \doteq f_j(c_0, c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n) & \\ + \frac{\partial f_j(c_0, c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)}{\partial a} (a - c_0) & \\ + \frac{\partial f_j(c_0, c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)}{\partial b_1} (b_1 - c_1) & \\ + \frac{\partial f_j(c_0, c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)}{\partial b_2} (b_2 - c_2) + \cdots & \\ + \frac{\partial f_j(c_0, c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n)}{\partial b_n} (b_n - c_n). & \end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

For the purpose of initial approximation, the values obtained for $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n$ from linear regression can be used as values for $c_0, c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n$. Of course, the values of $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n$ as nonlinear regression coefficients in (12) are not known. Furthermore, the values of $(a-c_0), (b_1-c_1), (b_2-c_2), \cdots, (b_n-c_n)$ are not known. However, by solving a system of equations with $(a-c_0), (b_1-c_1), (b_2-c_2), \cdots, (b_n-c_n)$ — designated in briefer notation as $\Delta a, \Delta b_1, \Delta b_2, \cdots, \Delta b_n$, respectively—as unknowns, a first approximation to $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n$ as nonlinear regression coefficients can be found. This system of equations can be obtained by applying (15) to each of the normal equations in (12); i.e., the partial derivatives of each normal equation with respect to $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n$ are taken, the values of $c_0, c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n$ are substituted for $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n$ respectively, and the following system of equations is formed:

$$\begin{array}{l} f_0 + \dfrac{\partial f_0}{\partial a} \Delta a + \dfrac{\partial f_0}{\partial b_1} \Delta b_1 + \dfrac{\partial f_0}{\partial b_2} \Delta b_2 + \cdots + \dfrac{\partial f_0}{\partial b_n} \Delta b_n = 0 \\ f_1 + \dfrac{\partial f_1}{\partial a} \Delta a + \dfrac{\partial f_1}{\partial b_1} \Delta b_1 + \dfrac{\partial f_1}{\partial b_2} \Delta b_2 + \cdots + \dfrac{\partial f_1}{\partial b_n} \Delta b_n = 0 \\ f_2 + \dfrac{\partial f_2}{\partial a} \Delta a + \dfrac{\partial f_2}{\partial b_1} \Delta b_1 + \dfrac{\partial f_2}{\partial b_2} \Delta b_2 + \cdots + \dfrac{\partial f_2}{\partial b_n} \Delta b_n = 0 \\ \cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots\cdots \\ f_n + \dfrac{\partial f_n}{\partial a} \Delta a + \dfrac{\partial f_n}{\partial b_1} \Delta b_1 + \dfrac{\partial f_n}{\partial b_2} \Delta b_2 + \cdots + \dfrac{\partial f_n}{\partial b_n} \Delta b_n = 0. \end{array} \tag{16}$$

---

fessor Elliot S. Wolk, Department of Mathematics, University of Connecticut.

As the values of $\Delta a, \Delta b_1, \Delta b_2, \cdots, \Delta b_n$ that are obtained from the solution of these equations are added to the initial values of $c_0, c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n$, the first approximation to $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n$ as nonlinear regression coefficients is found. The values of $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n$ in this first approximation then are used as $c_0, c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_n$, and the entire procedure is repeated as many times as is necessary for reaching a point at which the residuals between the right and the left sides of the normal equations (12) vanish or become negligible.

III. APPLICATION OF THE NONLINEAR MODEL

For the purpose of testing and demonstration, the proposed nonlinear model was applied to an analysis of the Connecticut workmen's compensation cases. Included in the analysis were all 128 cases which the Supreme Court of Connecticut had decided since the adoption of the State Workmen's Compensation Law of 1913 with regard to the following question: Does the combination of relevant facts justify an award or denial of compensation? Of course, there are several thousand workmen's compensation cases which were never submitted to the Connecticut Supreme Court for review, and there are many cases which the Court reviewed on other grounds. But the analysis under consideration is concerned only with those cases in which the decisions of the Court may be regarded as a function of identified relevant facts. These facts are listed in Table 1.

In accordance with the procedure described in the preceding section, linear regression analysis was performed first. The observation equations, which are stated in general terms in (1), were formed pursuant to the basic regression equation

$$a + b_1X_{k1} + b_2X_{k2} + \cdots + b_jX_{kj} + \cdots + b_{22}X_{k22} = Y_k, \tag{17}$$

with $k = 1, 2, \cdots, 128$ (128 cases). Note again that the value of each X_{kj} is 0, 1, or an integer larger than 1, depending on whether fact j is absent, present, or has several manifestations in case k.[10] The normal equations—stated in general terms in (2)—were obtained by taking the partial derivatives of the sum of the squares of the observation equations with respect to every unknown and setting them equal to 0. As these normal equations were solved, the values of the linear regression coefficients $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_{22}$, which are listed in Table 2, were found. The substitution of these values in the observation equations (1) yielded the estimated values for Y_k.

The significance test for the linear multiple regression gave a value of $F = 7.962$,[11] with a chance probability for such a value of $P < 0.001$. Consequently, the results of the linear regression could be accepted as significant. Nevertheless, the possibility had to be considered that the linear model was merely a good approximation to a nonlinear model, which would show even higher significance. The exploration of this possibility was particularly indicated by the fact that some regression coefficients were negative (see Table 2) and made an intuitive interpretation difficult. For example, one would expect that fact 4—an accident occurred in the course of an activity known to and permitted by the employer—should have a positive rather than negative weight in contributing to a decision in favor of the claimant. It will be seen that even the nonlinear model in its application to this set of data did not eliminate entirely such inadequacies, but it will be apparent that the latter model achieved substantial improvement in this and other respects.

After the completion of the linear regression, a multiplicative relationship between the first two facts was introduced into the regression equation, and nonlinear regression in accordance with the exposition of systems of equation (10) to (16) was performed. Since the results were not significant in relation to the preceding linear regression, a multiplicative relationship between the first two facts was rejected. Likewise, the introduction of every subsequent multiplicative relationship into the regression equation and the corresponding nonlinear regression analysis did not yield significance over the linear model until the pair of fact 4 and fact 18 (see Table 1) were reached. At that point, the significance test for nonlinear regression gave a value of $F = 8.024$, with a chance probability of $P < 0.001$, and the significance test for the nonlinear regression over the preceding linear regression yielded a value of $F = 5.997$ (see note 8), with a chance probability $P < 0.05$. Consequently, a multiplicative relationship between fact 4 and fact 18 was accepted, and the further exploration of the nonlinear model continued on the basis of the following regression equation:

$$\begin{aligned} a &+ b_1X_{k1} + b_2X_{k2} + \cdots \\ &+ (1 + b_4X_{k4})(1 + b_{18}X_{k18}) + b_5X_{k5} + \cdots \\ &+ b_{17}X_{k17} + b_{19}X_{k19} + \cdots + b_{22}X_{k22} = Y_k, \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

---

[10] Copies of the complete set of data and results may be obtained from the author.

[11] $F = \dfrac{\sum (Y_{\text{from regression}} - \bar{Y})^2/n}{\sum (Y - Y_{\text{from regression}})^2/(N - n - 1)}$.

TABLE 1: FACTS IN THE CONNECTICUT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES

Injury Claimed Is an Occupational Disease or the Result of Repetitive Trauma or Repetitive Acts:

1. Injury consists of a disease or a physical disability which is frequently encountered in the occupation of the employee.
2. Injury consists of a disease or a physical disability which reasonably can be connected with the occupation of the employee.

Circumstances under Which an Accident or an Act Alleged to Have Caused the Injury Occurred:

3. Accident or act occurred during working hours.
4. Accident or act occurred in the course of an activity known to and permitted by the employer, or customary and not forbidden by the employer.
5. Accident or act occurred in the course of an activity conducive to efficient work.
6. Accident or act occurred in the course of an activity indispensable to the performance of the work.
7. Accident or act occurred on the premises of employment, in an area annexed to the place of employment, in an area where the work normally is performed, in the direct course of transportation furnished by the employer, or in living accommodations furnished by the employer.
8. Accident occurred as the result of an act or activity which did not involve unnecessary, self-imposed, knowlingly hazardous conduct, such as taking a "joy-ride" on a conveyor belt for unloading coal.
9. Accident occurred as the result of an act by the injured employee, the occurrence of which was known to the employer and not effectively forbidden.

Circumstances under Which the Injury Became Known:

10. Injury became immediately apparent to the employee as a result of an accident or act.
11. Accident or act as described by the claimant was observed by other persons.
12. Injury became immediately apparent to other observers as a result of an accident or act.
13. Injury was reported to the employer as soon as it became apparent to the employee.
14. Accident or act alleged to have caused the injury was promptly reported to the employer.
15. Accident or act alleged to have caused the injury was brought to the attention of a physician when medical treatment for the injury was first sought.
16. Claim for compensation filed as soon as the injury became apparent to the employee.

Conditions of the Employment Which Affect the Probability of an Injury Subject to Compensation

17. Conditions of employment exposed employee to an uncommon risk or to a common risk to an unusual degree, or to an exertion or risk beyond usual workaday labor (including railroad crossings en route to work and adjacent to the place of employment when employer knows of and permits use of crossing path).

Causal Aspects of the Injury

18. The cause alleged by the claimant is the probable cause of the injury, as supported by expert testimony.
19. The injury is causally traceable to the employment other than through weakened resistance or lowered vitality, as supported by expert testimony.
20. The accident or act is the cause of the injury, and no expert testimony is necessary to establish this fact.

Evidence Not Derived from Expert Testimony

21. No contradictions in the evidence given by the claimant.
22. All evidence not derived from expert testimony in favor of the validity of the allegation made by the claimant.

---

with values for a, b_1, b_2, $\cdots$, b_{22} as listed in the applicable column in Table 2. It should be noted that this equation is a particular form of the generally stated equation (9).

The further introduction of multiplicative relationships between pairs of facts did not yield significance over the regression in terms of (18) until the pair of fact 7 and fact 20 (see Table 1) was reached. At that point, the significance test gave a value of $F=9.179$,

TABLE 2. REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS

Applicable to facts (X_i) as listed in Table 1	Linear	Nonlinear, after inclusion of multiplicative relationship between facts 4 and 18	Nonlinear, after further inclusion of multiplicative relationship between facts 7 and 20
a	−1.709	−2.860	−4.836
b_1	−0.330	−0.288	−1.539
b_2	3.388	3.027	3.265
b_3	−0.101	−0.082	−0.540
b_4	−0.529	−0.119	−0.276
b_5	2.443	2.088	3.339
b_6	−0.704	−0.542	−1.154
b_7	1.317	1.263	1.238
b_8	0.484	0.348	0.395
b_9	0.929	0.929	0.530
b_{10}	0.325	0.743	0.727
b_{11}	0.088	0.033	1.114
b_{12}	−1.280	−1.197	−2.986
b_{13}	0.031	−0.100	0.648
b_{14}	−0.178	−0.111	−0.400
b_{15}	0.566	0.479	0.823
b_{16}	−2.235	−2.117	−1.575
b_{17}	1.103	0.982	1.395
b_{18}	2.062	2.989	0.992
b_{19}	0.700	0.237	2.854
b_{20}	2.561	2.773	2.184
b_{21}	0.443	0.449	0.864
b_{22}	0.225	0.085	0.368

with a chance probability $P < 0.001$, and the significance test for the higher order nonlinear regression over the lower order nonlinear regression yielded a value of $F = 99.997$, with a chance probability $P < 0.001$. On that basis, a multiplicative relationship between fact 7 and fact 20 was accepted as part of the nonlinear regression equation, which now could be stated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} a &+ b_1X_{k1} + b_2X_{k2} + \cdots \\ &+ (1 + b_4X_{k4})(1 + b_{18}X_{k18}) + b_5X_{k5} + \cdots \\ &+ (1 + b_7X_{k7})(1 + b_{20}X_{k20}) + b_8X_{k8} + \cdots \\ &+ b_{17}X_{k17} + b_{19}X_{k19} + b_{21}X_{k21} + b_{22}X_{k22} = Y_k; \end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

with values for $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_{22}$ as listed in the applicable column in Table 2.

An exploration of further multiplicative relationships between pairs of facts and multiplicative relationships between more than two facts did not yield any significance over nonlinear regression in terms of (19). To be sure, the proposed procedure is designed to examine multiplicative relationships between 2, 3, $\cdots$, n facts. On empirical grounds, it is not likely, however, that significant multiplicative relationships in all these combinations will be found.

A comparison of equations (17) and (19) shows that the nonlinear model which has been accepted for this set of data is superior to the linear model not only on the basis of statistical significance tests, but also on intuitive grounds. If the applicable values of the regression coefficients $a, b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_{22}$ from columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 are substituted in equations (17) and (19), respectively, the following observations can be made: In the linear model, fact 18 counteracts with a positive weight of approximately 2 the negative weight of approximately 1/2 of fact 4 (which can not be easily interpreted), if both facts are present in the case. In the nonlinear model, the impact of fact 4, with a positive weight of approximately 3/4, is increased twice if fact 18 also is present in the case. [Note $(1+b_4X_{k4})\ (1+b_{18}X_{k18})$ with the applicable values for b_4 and b_{18} and 1 (presence) for X_{k4} and X_{k18} in equation (19)]. The latter relationship is more meaningful, for one would expect that verification by expert testimony substantially increases the influence of an accident in the course of an activity permitted by the employer on the decision. Similar observations can be made with respect to facts 7 and 20. In the linear model, fact 20 adds a positive weight of approximately 2 1/2 to a positive weight of approximately 1 1/4 of fact 7, if both facts are present in the case. In the nonlinear model, the impact of fact 7, with a positive weight of approximately 2 1/2 is increased three times if fact 20 also is present in the case. The latter relationship is more plausible than the former, for one would expect that an undisputed injury does not merely add to the influence of the fact that the accident occurred at a place connected with the employment, but that it decisively increases the impact of the latter on the decision in a workmen's compensation case.

IV. LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

In general, the application of the nonlinear model provides insights into the relationships between facts in judicial decisions which otherwise would be merely speculative. Limitations in the application of the model must be recognized, however. In the discussion of factor analysis in connection with the linear model, it was noted that—without reducing the facts to factors—not enough information may be obtained from the observations (cases) for a unique solution of the simultaneous equations. Another possibility is that enough information for a unique solution of the equations is obtained, but there are too few observations for an indication of significance in the results of multiple regression. This is the problem which was encountered in the analysis of the involuntary confession cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. With 29 facts and 33 cases (only 4 degrees of freedom), the F test did not even show significance at the 0.05 level, either for the initial linear regression or for any subsequent nonlinear regression. Clearly, this is a situation to which the nonlinear model can not be applied. On the other hand, by reducing the facts to factors and employing the linear model as an approximation, i.e., system of equations (5), significant results can be obtained.

As far as the implications of the use of the nonlinear model are concerned, three comments—quite different from each other—seem to be in order: (1) The exploration of nonlinear relationships between facts that determine judicial decisions can be combined with an analysis of the acceptance or rejection of facts by appellate courts.[12] In this fashion, it first can be ascertained under what circumstances facts are accepted by appellate courts from lower court records and appellate briefs as relevant for decisions, and then it can be determined whether linear or nonlinear relationships exist between the accepted facts in influencing the decisions. (2) It can be shown that nonlinear relations between controlling facts are even more dominant in Roman law systems than in common law systems. The Swiss workmen's compensation cases provide a significant example in that respect.[13] On that basis, linear and nonlinear models furnish a criterion for distinctions in judicial decisions between major legal systems. (3) The dependence of decisions on controlling facts is not unique to judicial decisions, although it has special importance in adjudication. Consequently, the proposed nonlinear model can be employed in the analysis of decision-making processes beyond the framework of judicial action.

---

[12] See Fred Kort, "Models for the Analysis of Fact-Acceptance by Appellate Courts," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 9 (April, 1966), 8–10; and "Quantitative Analysis of Fact-Patterns in Cases and Their Impact on Judicial Decisions," *Harvard Law Review*, 79 (June, 1966), 1595–1603.

[13] See *supra*, note 7.

DECISION COSTS IN COALITION FORMATION*

CHARLES R. ADRIAN
University of California, Riverside

CHARLES PRESS
Michigan State University

Choices made in coalition formation are costly to participants, complex, and difficult to measure with precision because observable coalitions are multi-person, non-zero-sum games. At least eight decision costs are included in the process. The purpose of this paper is to identify them and to examine their usefulness in explaining coalition formation. Decisions include: (1) information costs, (2) responsibility costs, (3) intergame costs, (4) costs of division of payoffs, (5) dissonance costs (6) inertia costs, (7) time costs, and (8) persuasion costs.

Coalition building is an essential aspect of decision making within any political system. Whether one is studying the behavior of a municipal planning commission, a committee or sub-committee of a legislative body, the United Nations Security Council, or any other decision-making institution in which more than one person is involved in reaching a decision, the essential problem is often one of establishing a winning coalition within the entire group membership. A winning coalition is any portion of the group that can decide to do or not to do something that is on the agenda of the group and over which it has competent authority. The requirements of what constitutes a winning coalition are determined by the formal and informal rules of the game. Most commonly, one of the rules is that a winning coalition must consist of one-half the members of the group plus one and this assumption is made for purposes of this paper. The size of the coalition needed is important for individual and coalition strategies, but it is not important conceptually. That is, the problems involved in securing a winning coalition on the United States Supreme Court when only four votes are needed in order to agree to hear a case affects the strategy of the members of the court, but is of no theoretical importance to coalition formation. Once the formal rules indicate the size of coalition minimally necessary, the size and makeup of the coalition is theoretically determined by an algebraic summation of the decision costs involved for participants. These costs incorporate a variety of economic and psychological factors and in particular are influenced by three "principles." These are the *unanimity principle*, the *size principle*, and the *indispensable membership principle*.

The unanimity principle is derived from the small-group theories of social psychology. It can be stated as follows:

> Among members of a group capable of direct communication with one another, the dynamics of intra-group interaction produces pressures for decisions of the group to be formally unanimous.
> There are two corollaries:
> (1) Pressures for unanimity vary directly with the cultural salience of the issue.
> (2) Pressures for unanimity vary inversely with the size of the group.[1]

Some studies seem to indicate that the pressure for unanimity is strong only in groups of six or less,[2] and one report on a five-member village council found patient efforts to secure a coalition of the whole group to be the rule,[3] but a preliminary study of a 42-member county governing board in a county where potential rural-urban and urban-suburban conflicts were present, still found the pressure to exist and unanimous votes to be the rule.[4] The few non-

---

* We wish to thank Paul Dawson, Susan B. Hannah, and James Ozinga, all former students in our "choice theory" seminar at Michigan State University, for their critical comments on this article.

[1] For empirical studies tending to support this principle, see Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, *A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), esp. chap. 9; and Robert T. Golembiewski, *The Small Group* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), esp. pp. 144–170.

[2] For a supporting study, see Philip E. Slater, "Contrasting Correlates of Group Size," *Sociometry*, 21 (1958), 129–139.

[3] A. J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 110.

[4] Jean McDonald, "The Theory of Political Coalitions as Applied to the Ingham County Board of Supervisors," a seminar paper submitted to the authors, Michigan State University, March, 1966.

unanimous votes strongly tended to be on nonsalient issues.

The size principle was developed by William Riker.[5] In its briefest form, it is this:

> In n-person, zero-sum games,[6] where side-payments[7] are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only winning minimal coalitions occur. A winning minimal coalition contains the minimum number of votes practicable that is still a majority.

As we will indicate below, Riker has developed an elegant size principle, but it has very restricted explanatory power so far as the observable behavior of coalition formation is concerned. Even so, the size principle is of value, for it can be generalized to apply to far more situations than it does as stated by Riker. We would state the size principle as follows:

> In n-person, non-zero-sum games, where side-payments are permitted, and where information costs are greater than zero (persons have imperfect information), the desire to maximize individual power and individual shares of the payoffs of victory will cause players to seek to approximate a *minimal* winning coalition.

The unanimity principle and the size principle, obviously, work against one another, but there is no theoretical reason why these opposed tendencies could not exist simultaneously in the same group behavior. Interest-group theory, motivational theory in psychology, and the laws of physics are replete with similar examples of countervailing forces.

The indispensable membership principle is this:

> Sometimes, for a coalition to be winning, certain powerful members of the group must be included. They cannot be substituted for by any aggregation of other group members.

The United States Constitution, as originally submitted to the states, could formally be made effective through its ratification by nine of the thirteen states, but it was generally believed by informed persons then (and still is) that the government it would establish could not be effective or even survive unless the two most populous states, New York and Virginia, were among those ratifying. Some decisions of the United Nations General Assembly will not be effective unless both the United States and the Soviet Union support them. Majority leaders in either house of Congress seldom are excluded from a winning coalition on any issue in their house. Their support is ordinarily necessary in order to secure a numerical majority. Leaders always have a number of votes, "in the pocket;" these include those of persons with little seniority and no independent power base, and those who are indebted to the party leader for past favors. A coalition may be able to win almost automatically if just one indispensable person joins—the majority leader in a legislative body, the president of the university student body, or the most prestigeful member of a departmental faculty. His action converts what might otherwise be a risky position for some members of a group into one involving minimal decision (responsibility) costs.

In some cases, the indispensable membership for a winning coalition is the entire membership. Economic sanctions applied by an international agency such as the United Nations are an example. With even a few small nations refusing to cooperate, efforts to apply sanctions to an offending nation may not be effective.

I. DECISION COSTS

Decision costs in coalition formation include the following:

(1) *Information costs.* These are divided into two sub-categories. They involve the costs of collecting information concerning the value ordering and strategies of other members of the group as well as the costs of *communicating* one's own value ordering and bargaining positions.

The communication of information is complicated by the blurring effect resulting from each individual's imperfect perception of reality and by the screening of all communications through one's personal value system. Furthermore, in evaluating information, people may confuse what they believe to be rational information (subjective rationality, in Herbert Simon's terms) with what is rational, that is, what is believed to and in fact does lead to chosen goals.

Because information costs are often high, what is sometimes taken for apathy may represent rational calculation, as Anthony Downs has pointed out, and as many a member of a legislative body has concluded. The amount of power for influencing an outcome or the payoff for being a member of a winning coalition may be so small as to make it uneconomic to be informed.

---

[5] William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1962).

[6] In a zero-sum game, what one player or coalition of players gains, the others lose. The formula is: $1-(a+b+\cdots x)=0$.

[7] Side payments are payments made by players as inducements for other players to join with them in coalition.

Information costs may tend to counter the potential application of either the size principle or the unanimity principle. The effort (cost) necessary in order to determine whether it would be desirable and feasible to include all members of the group in the coalition may be too high to be worthwhile. A leader may assume, for example, that one or two persons who have been consistently deviant members of the group cannot be brought along into agreement on a particular decision while, if he had the actual information, he might have found the situation to be one in which these persons could be convinced to join the coalition with minimal, acceptable cost. On the other hand, where the coalition seeks to apply the size principle in the absence of complete knowledge, as Anthony Downs has observed, the coalition might rationally include, say, fifty-five per cent of the total membership of the group in order to overcome the informational aspects of decision-making costs—it is not worth the effort needed to determine the actual minimal coalition.[8]

(2). *Responsibility costs.* These are costs resulting from having a decision attributed in whole or in part to a given person. Responsibility costs are related to the size of the group. The relative size of a minimal winning coalition varies according to the size of the group—the smaller the group, the larger the percentage of the total that is required for a minimal winning coalition. In the case of a two-person committee, one hundred per cent of the group is the necessary figure; for three persons, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. In the United States House of Representatives, with 435 members, 50.1 per cent (218 Congressmen) is needed if all are present. In cases of very small groups, individual power is relatively high,[9] information costs relatively low, and responsibility costs relatively high. In a fairly large group, on the other hand, the inverse is the case.

Responsibility costs increase inversely with the size of the group. These may vary enormously, of course. They may be negative costs (profits)—that is, the individual may gain social capital, status, or opportunities to participate in other games, but they may also be very expensive, resulting in losses in relation to all of these.

Responsibility costs vary by role and position, particularly as to whether an individual is the coalition builder, the marginal member, or some other member. For the coalition builder, these costs are especially likely to be high, for he cannot usually hide a failure. He also assumes some of the responsibility costs of other members, for in seeking to get them to join, he has to estimate their various costs and will be blamed by his colleagues if his estimates prove to be seriously in error. The costs to the coalition builder are reduced somewhat by the institutionalization of the process. Legislative party leaders and whips build coalitions routinely as part of their role. Their risk is much less than that of, say, George Norris who succeeded in trimming the powers of the Speaker of the House of Representatives in 1910. He carried his proposal around in his pocket for years waiting for the "right" moment to make his challenge. The risk of failure was great and the personal costs would have been enormous. The same kind of risk was taken by A. P. Herbert in the British House of Commons in 1936–1937, when he sought to build a cross-party coalition to change the divorce laws.

The marginal member also bears extra responsibility costs, because his act of joining permits the coalition to win. If the action of the coalition is later seen by relevant persons as having been undesirable, he will be disproportionately blamed. The risk to the marginal member may be reduced, however, by the fact that his identity may not be evident and members of the group, in private session, may agree to hide it, although exposure always remains a threat.

The size principle does not apply whenever the overwhelmingly important objective of the group is to dilute responsibility for a decision; the unanimity principle does. As a corollary, we could say that responsibility costs increase disproportionately as the irrevocability of decisions increases. Where responsibility costs rise, the pressure to minimize error by careful calculation mounts. The more irrevoacble the decision, the more important it becomes to minimize the cost of error.

One way, and very possibly the most effective way, to minimize responsibility costs is to spread them over the largest possible percentage of the total group. The coalition in a legislative body that seeks to lead a nation into war—one of the most irrevocable of decisions that can be made in modern times—would never be expected to apply the size principle. A strong effort at unanimity would be made, as in fact was the case in the United States Congress when war was decleared in 1917 and again in 1941.

---

[8] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1953).

[9] L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this REVIEW, 48 (1954), 787–792.

Many political situations are such that the payoff involves sharing responsibility or maximizing social impact rather than dividing up the payoffs among the members of a winning coalition. Institutions wary of criticism of a particular action commonly seek unanimity. The procedure of "massing the court" has been followed many times by chief justices when the United States Supreme Court has prepared to announce an especially controversial decision. The school integration decision of 1954 was unanimous and the justices worked hard to make it so. The justices and supporters of their decisions are keenly aware of the marginal legitimacy of such decisions and of the political controversy that follows each of them.

Legislators follow the same kind of procedure when raising their own salaries, passing a concurrent resolution, or even in adopting a highly controversial bill, such as Medicare legislation. They seek maximum coalitions to avoid raising questions about the legitimacy or wisdom of such decisions, to help unite the nation in time of crisis, and to lessen the effectiveness of attacks on the decision-making institution.

(3) *Intergame costs.* These are costs in other games for participation in one game, in other words, they are one type of opportunity costs. All games in which an individual participates during his lifetime and all political decision-making are interrelated, although the costs of participating in one game are discounted in relation to other games at different rates. Only if we assume that each game is totally independent of others are intergame costs zero. In empirically observable situations, this is never the case, or at least cannot be observed to be such.[10]

If an individual is left out of a coalition, but believes he should have been included, leaders of that coalition may overcompensate in the next decision as a result of guilt feelings, a desire to be fair, or a need to keep the individual predisposed to give his help on some future issue when his support may be needed. As Morton Kaplan has pointed out, one nation does not rationally destroy another nation, because it may need that nation in a later coalition.[11] Cato's proposal for the destruction of Carthage or a Morgenthau plan for Germany may offer emotional satisfactions to the authors, but they are poor politics.

Even an election is never zero-sum, since losers still commonly participate to some extent in decision making. George Romney, in 1964, paid some costs in relation to his standing with Goldwater supporters and a possible Goldwater victory in order to gain hoped-for payoffs in the 1968 game. Goldwater, likewise, paid some costs for the 1968 game by his 1964 convention attitude toward Republican moderates. Intergame costs must often be estimated and discounted before the game begins (and in anticipation that it will begin). These costs may be discounted to near the zero point, as in 1960 with some John F. Kennedy supporters in consideration of the possibility that Lyndon B. Johnson might, in the near future, become President. A more common example of intergame costs are those involved in vote trading in Congress, where a member surrenders his right to discretion on bill B in order to secure the support of a colleague for bill A.

The serial or processional characteristics of decision making also add to intergame costs. Commonly, they produce pressures for the application of the rule of unanimity, or a close approximation of it. Congressional sub-committees seek as large a vote in favor of reporting out an item as possible in order to strengthen the hand of the winning coalition at the next decision locus, that of the parent committee, which then will tend to follow the same procedure in order to influence the whole house. Congressional leaders, in turn, will sometimes seek as large a majority as possible on a controversial measure in order to reduce the chances of a presidential veto if such a possibility seems to exist. Political party leaders try to maximize the party vote in presidential elections, for the presidential and congressional election games are interrelated and the larger the margin of victory in the former, the larger the size of the party's representation in Congress tends to be.

(4) *Division-of-payoffs costs.* These are in-

---

[10] The theoretical statement is found in Norton E. Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (1958), 251–261; some empirical testing is reported in Paul A. Smith, "The Games of Community Politics," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 9 (1965), 37–60.

[11] Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957).

volved in distributing payoffs among members of a winning coalition. The cost is measured by the loss of payoff to each member by the addition of members to the winning coalition. If, for example, the total payoff for members of a seven-member group is fixed, the highest possible payoff to a member of a winning coalition is twenty-five per cent of the total. If a fifth member is added to the winning coalition, the payoff to each individual drops to twenty per cent. Other things being equal, and with a fixed payoff, a minimal coalition is the rational strategy for the participants. In zero-sum games, the size principle applies for this part of the total decision formula. However, even in zero-sum games, the size principle accounts for only a small portion of the total decision concerning coalition size. (We cannot, however, measure the proportions because we do not have the necessary data or know the weightings of the various costs involved.)

In the empirically more meaningful non-zero-sum situation, however, the amount of individual payoff may *increase* as the size of the group increases. The opposite of the size principle applies. Mancur Olson, an economist, has argued, for example, that "any group seeking an inclusive collective good is not in a zero-sum situation since the benefit payoff by definition increases in amount as more join the group, and as more of the collective good is provided."[12] His point is probably applicable in forming coalitions among nuclear powers to agree upon prohibiting nuclear-bomb testing. He believes it applies for many other types of decision making, too. Such groups as the American Medical Association and labor organizations, within the limits of candidates they consider eligible, seek to maximize rather than minimize their membership in order to increase payoffs. The larger and stronger labor associations become, the larger the payoff for each member. The same is true of any international diplomatic agreement or any agreement among members of a confederation.

TABLE 1. COALITIONAL DISSONANCE COSTS

Proposition:

A controlling non-minimal coalition has a goal consonance less than that of a controlling minimal coalition.

Let

m = a minimal coalition

C = goal consonance (level of interpersonal agreement)

n = a potential member of a coalition, that is, a member of a committee or other small group

$$C_m(n_x n_y) < C_m$$

Proof:

Assuming (1) goal consonance (C) among any two persons in a coalition is imperfect, e.g., $Cna \times Cnb < 1$; and assuming (2) the following interpersonal goal consonance relationships:

n	1	2	3	4	5
1	—	.98	.70	.97	.50
2	.98	—	.89	.99	.60
3	.70	.89	—	.98	.30
4	.97	.99	.91	—	.20
5	.50	.60	.30	.20	—

The index of $C = (n_a n_b) \times (n_a n_c) \times (n_b n_c) \cdots$.

A winning coalition in a five-man committee must have at least three members (a majority).

	Coalition	*Index of C*
1	(1, 2, 3)	.611
2	(1, 2, 3, 4)	.534
3	(2, 3, 4)	.802
4	(2, 3, 4, 5)	.289
5	(1, 3, 4)	.618
*6	(1, 2, 4)	.941
7	(1, 2, 5)	.294
8	(1, 3, 4, 5)	.019
9	(2, 3, 4, 5)	.289
10	(1, 2, 3, 5)	.055
11	(1, 2, 3, 4, 5)	.008

NOTE: Not all 3-person coalitions involving n_5 are calculated. He is the most atypical member of the committee. No non-unanimous winning coalition would include him.

* Optimal coalition.

(5) *Dissonance costs.* These are the costs of conflict and disagreement within the winning coalition that result from the fact that no two persons are ever in perfect agreement with one another and, therefore, the larger the group, the more internal discord that group will experience. Any faction wishing to form a coalition with others in order to control a group will experience greater internal conflicts as the size of the proposed coalition increases. Whenever controlling coalitions seek to minimize their size, their behavior may be motivated not necessarily so much by a concern for maximizing individual payoffs from the coalition as by a desire to minimize decision costs of dissonance within the controlling group. Thus, in Table 1, n₅ might be a member of the Communist Party of the United States or of the John Birch Society. He would not be included

---

[12] Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

in any winning coalition, except possibly only after all other possibilities have been exhausted In 1966, the German Christian Democrats accepted the Socialists as members of the government coalition despite high dissonance costs, apparently as the only way to remain in the winning coalition themselves. Maverick members of Congress are commonly excluded from many winning coalitions because of dissonance costs. (In fact, they usually exclude themselves, to avoid overt rejection.)

(6) *Inertia costs.* These are the costs involved in changing existing coalition patterns. William Gamson, a sociologist, in his study of coalition formation at national nominating conventions, notes that once a coalition is formed, it tends to persist.[13] Inertia costs may outweigh others in determining the size of a winning coalition or they may be the marginal costs that matter. Dissolving a coalition may involve more costs than maintaining an existing coalition that may not be minimal in size or in internal dissonance. (In Table 1, Coalition Three, if already in existence, may be preferred over the more harmonious Coalition Six because of the costs involved in ousting member n3 in order to add member n1.) In other words, where inertia is a factor, a coalition that would be inefficiently large or small if inertia equaled zero, may become the actual winning coalition.

(7) *Pressure-of-time costs.* These are the costs involved because longitudinal factors are involved in coalition building. Time costs are often related to other costs, but are not identical with them. In some cases, the convenience of taking the most available person rather than waiting for the otherwise most appropriate person may also help reduce, say, information and inertia costs, although it may increase other costs, say, dissonance costs.

The pressures of time may introduce costs that are more important than other costs. A factional leader may be faced with having to build a winning coalition by a certain hour on a certain day. Simply getting such a group together, no matter what intergame or other costs must be paid may be the overwhelming consideration. Time costs, furthermore, increase as the decision process proceeds. The nearer to a resolution of a problem a group has progressed, the harder it is to effect a change in its direction.[14]

Opportunity costs are also a type of time cost, for an individual has only a certain amount of time available to him. His decision to participate in building a coalition relative to subject A may prevent him from participating relative to subject B, in which he is also interested.

Time costs are also involved in the fact that all past and future games involve intergame costs that must be discounted for present value in the current game. The more recent the past game and its claims or the closer the future game, the more important are these costs.

(8) *Persuasion costs.* These are the costs of bringing a reluctant member of a group into a winning coalition. Persuasion may be difficult because the individual to be persuaded lacks information that would help convince him of the advantage of joining a coalition, or psychological factors may make him reluctant to accept responsibility costs, or he may see intergame costs as being too high (perhaps because he sees the potential payoff in some other game as being much more valuable than do other members of the coalition), or he may psychologically be unwilling to pay the dissonance costs of being a member of the winning coalition. Persuasion costs certainly vary according to the point at which a member is called upon to make a decision or voluntarily decides to do so. If he is called upon to make the marginal choice that will create a majority, his power is relatively great, but persuasion costs may be high. Once a majority is reached, persuasion costs of other members of the group decline sharply, however. In many cases, it may be that persuasion costs are problems of overcoming ideological commitment. Glendon Schubert, in examining Supreme Court decisions, has noted the difficulty involved in seeking to bring members at the ideological extremes together in the same coalition.[15] Persuasion costs in convincing ideological extremists to enter into a coalition led by non-extremists are always higher than are those for capturing individuals near the ideological center. It is probable that persuasion costs increase disproportionately as ideology becomes increasingly deviant.

II. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

We have argued that decision costs are the major factors to be observed in the empirical study of coalition formation. We conclude that the size principle as developed by Riker is of rather limited explanatory power for such purposes. His argument is that if all other items are assumed to be constant, the size principle will prevail in zero-sum situations. We believe this does not always hold even when Riker's conditions are met, for they assume that the purpose for which a coalition is to be built is to divide resources, to win the spoils. But we have indicated that in many cases involving coalition building, no direct psychological or economic payoffs may exist and even when they do, other decision costs may outweigh the desire to win them.

---

[13] William A. Gamson, "Coalition Formation at Presidential Nominating Conventions," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (1962), 157–171.

[14] James D. Barber, *Power in Committees* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), pp. 62–66.

[15] Glendon A. Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959).

The zero-sum assumption seems especially inappropriate. There is probably never a simple winner or loser in any political game. A contestant who fails to win a presidential nomination may be named Secretary of State after the election. A consolation prize is not equal to the first prize, but having played the game and "lost" may also have been the marginal factor that gave the player the still-important win in the second game. A Congressman who fails to muster a necessary majority vote from a committee in order to have reported out a bill he introduced and considers important, knows that he may well have gained support or good will that may help him succeed at a later time. Furthermore, his having made the effort will have communicated information to the committee members and will have introduced a certain amount of tension and pressure upon members which will have a cumulative effect the next time the matter is raised. And every baseball player knows that no decision by the umpire is completely zero-sum: he may lose one close call, but the umpire will probably tend to give him the benefit of the doubt the next time.

Riker's formulation also assumes a static game and a static payoff. He attempts to avoid the resulting problem by considering all payoffs in future games or in games involving utilities other than the winning of political power as side payments. But this is defining the zero-sum condition out of existence. In considering utilities, all utilities in past, present, and future games must be considered (discounted for present value and future probability) as part of the game. Otherwise to speak of zero-sum conditions is meaningless.

In cases of empirical observation, it is rarely true that members of a coalition are interchangeable—that is, that all count as of equal value because each has a vote. As Thomas Schelling has pointed out, the participants in bargaining do make a difference in the result.[16] Payoffs to a coalition will depend upon who is in it. The winning coalition in the United States Senate in 1919 to defeat the Treaty of Versailles might have made much less impact on history if it had not included a man of the political skill and personal prestige of Henry Cabot Lodge; a coalition to seize control of a political-party organization may depend for its success more upon the resources brought to the coalition by its members than the number of persons involved. The critical question in coalition formation may, in any given case, be on the willingness of the participants to commit resources and on the skills of the participants in reaching their goals. Five skillful men may well out maneuver eight clumsy or naive men. In a formal vote, a numerical majority is needed, of course, but the effective coalition may actually consist of less than a majority. A few members may count upon their ability to secure the needed additional votes through log-rolling (side payments), by status gained from seniority, intimidation, or through some other attribute, and thus may gain the necessary support at low cost from those who have less interest, incentive, information, or ability. Alternatively, the leaders may assume that a sufficient number of persons to create a formal majority will go along with aggressive, confident leaders who seem to have a plausible plan because no other reasonable alternative appears to exist.

The problem of coalition payoff determination is complex: Being in a winning coalition is not necessarily in itself an indication of winning. Interpersonal valuation of utilities varies. A naive person or one simply lacking in sufficient information may cast a vote along with that of the dominant coalition, but may receive no payoff because no commitment, direct or implied, had ever been made to him. Or an individual may be drawn into a coalition that wins a particular office or other payoff, but the payoff may not be the one the individual wants. When conservative Republicans selected Theodore Roosevelt for the Vice-Presidency in 1900, they did so in the belief that they had forestalled his presidential ambitions, and Roosevelt himself moaned his fears of having "shot my bolt."

In conclusion, we have argued that the precise membership in the winning coalition in any group must be determined by an algebraic summation of at least eight decision costs and that these costs are determined by various economic and psychological factors existing in the political setting. In this first approximation, we have not isolated the various factors. They overlap to some extent and present knowledge has not enabled us to make even rough estimates of the weight to be assigned to each of the factors, but like all algebraic equations, each of the components may potentially have either a positive or a negative sign. Because many variables are involved, no one will necessarily be dominant. A winning coalition of minimal size is not necessarily the one that costs participants the least and winning marginally is not always to be preferred to winning by a unanimous or other supra-minimal vote.

---

[16] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

In the absence of necessary empirical data, it is not possible to answer such questions as to whether a particular sub-committee will seek to apply the unanimity principle or the size principle in its deliberations, or which members of a group (if any) are indispensable for a winning coalition. The answers will depend in part upon the given case or issue before the sub-committee, but even information concerning the instance would be only a beginning in an attempt to answer the questions. We believe, however, that the concept of decision-making costs is useful in our efforts to explain the process of coalition formation.

THE MALEVOLENT LEADER: POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN AN AMERICAN SUB-CULTURE*

DEAN JAROS, HERBERT HIRSCH, FREDERIC J. FLERON, JR.
University of Kentucky

Perhaps the most dramatic finding of recent research on the political socialization of children is that youngsters appear to be overwhelmingly favorably disposed toward political objects which cross their vision. Officers and institutions of government are regarded as benevolent, worthy, competent, serving and powerful.[1] The implications of such findings are striking indeed. Childhood political dispositions may represent the roots of later patriotism; we may be observing the building of basic regime-level supportive values at a very young age.[2]

These findings are by no means new; in fact, they might be classified as part of the conventional wisdom of the discipline. Moreover, they are extremely well documented, and the study of childhood political socialization has advanced to consider far more than basic regime-level norms. Despite all this, however, there are still many empirical questions to be asked about such norms. Perhaps the recent assertion that the political scientist's model of socialization is "static and homogeneous"[3] is particularly apropos here. Consider two closely related characteristics of the appropriate literature: 1) the "positive image" which children have about politics and political figures has been synthesized from data gathered largely in the United States and to some extent in urban, industrialized communities within the United States;[4] and 2) empirical explanation of the favorable disposition which children manifest has not progressed very far. Though there may be hypotheses about how children get this way, there has been little systematic testing of the relationships between variables.

There is some danger that the major findings may be essentially "culture bound." There are few data on the political values of children in other countries or even in rural, racial, or ethnic subcultures within the United States. Moreover, what evidence there is hints at important cross-cultural variations in political learning;[5] less positive images may characterize other cultures. Political socialization is the process by which the child learns about the political culture in which he lives.[6] The content of what is socialized may well differ from culture to culture or from sub-culture to sub-culture.

The failure to explain children's positive orientations toward politics may be a function of the cultural problem. If the great majority of children in one culture manifest a glowing image, variance in disposition is not prominent, and empirical explanation in terms of accounting for variance may not suggest itself as a crucial task; also it may be quite difficult. In order to explain children's political images, one has to have a distribution of affect; there have to be some relatively negative images to come

---

* The data on which this paper is based were collected under Contract #693 between the University of Kentucky Research Foundation and the Office of Economic Opportunity.

[1] Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 14 (Winter, 1960), 632–642; Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 27–54; Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Tourney, "The Development of Basic Attitudes Toward Government and Citizenship During the Elementary School Years: Part I," (Cooperative Research Project No. 1078; University of Chicago, 1965), pp. 102–105; Dean Jaros, "Children's Orientations Toward the President: Some Additional Theoretical Considerations and Data," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (May, 1967), 368–387.

[2] David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6 (August, 1962), 243; Greenstein, *op. cit.*, 53.

[3] Roberta S. Sigel, "Political Socialization: Some Reactions on Current Approaches and Conceptualizations," (Paper presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, Sept. 6–10, 1966), p. 14.

[4] The Chicago area, New Haven, and Detroit provided the research environments for some of the studies cited in Note 1.

[5] Robert D. Hess, "The Socialization of Attitudes Toward Political Authority: Some Cross-National Comparisons," *International Social Science Journal*, 14 (No. 4, 1963), 542–559.

[6] Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1966), pp. 23–24.

by. Research into children's political views in other cultures or sub-cultures may provide us with such negative images. But even if it does not generate the necessary data to conduct explanatory analysis, it would lessen the culture bound nature of findings in political socialization.[7]

This paper attempts to realize these desiderata through a study of childhood socialization in the Appalachian region of eastern Kentucky. Appalachia may be classified as a subculture within the United States for at least two reasons. First, the poverty and isolation of the region impose characteristics that differentiate it from most other areas in the country. Secondly and relatedly, many cultural norms of Appalachia differ radically from those considered to be standard middle-class imperatives.[8]

I. TWO EXPLANATIONS OF CHILDREN'S POLITICAL AUTHORITY ORIENTATIONS

There are several relatively untested hypotheses about the sources of the positive notions children are observed to hold toward the political. Many of them prominently involve the family as a socializing agent. Because of the intriguing nature of family-related variables in Appalachia, the region provides an excellent context in which to investigate these assertions.

Among these explanations is the view that the family directly transmits positive values about government and politics to the child while shielding him from stimuli which have negative connotations, such as stories of political corruption, expedient bargaining, etc.[9] In short, the family directly indoctrinates the child as to the benevolent nature of political authority, to view the political world in essentially the same terms as characterize the parents' generally supportive outlook on the political regime.[10] In Appalachia, in contrast to most of the rest of the United States, there is a great deal of overt, anti-government sentiment in the adult population. Rejection of and hostility toward political authority, especially federal authority, has long characterized the region.[11] It is very difficult to believe that here parents could transmit positive images of regime symbols to their children. In fact, ". . . the civic instruction which goes on incidental to normal activities in the family,"[12] suggested as a likely cause of children's favorable affect, would in Appalachia be a source of political cynicism.

Secondly, we might take the thesis that the family is an important socializing agent because the child's experiences with his immediate authority figures (parents) are somehow projected to include more remote agencies, including the political. The father, perceived as providing and benevolent, supposedly becomes the prototypical authority figure.[13] For the child, the regime becomes "the family writ large,"[14] especially sacred as its image benefits from the emotional kind of bond that exists between parent and child. In Appalachia, there is a high degree of family disruption. The father may well not live at home. Far from providing a glowing prototype of authority, he may be a pitifully inadequate figure, unemployed or absent, not providing for his family, deserving of (and receiving) scorn.[15] If the

---

[7] Michael Argyle and Peter Delin, "Non-Universal Laws of Socialization," *Human Relations*, 18 (February, 1965), 77–86.

[8] Several analyses contributory to this assertion are: Virgil C. Jones, *The Hatfields and the McCoys* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948); Jack E. Weller, *Yesterday's People* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1965); Harry M. Caudill, *Night Comes to the Cumberlands* (Boston: Little, Bowrn and Co., 1963).

[9] Greenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 45–46; Easton and Hess, *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6 (November, 1962), 229–235.

[10] Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), Chapter 4; Leonard W. Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 119–126.

[11] Weller, pp. 33–56, 163; Also Thomas R. Ford (ed). *The Southern Appalachian Region: A Survey* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960), pp. 12–15. These may characterize the entire American South. Indeed, some basic socialization data from the South could be most interestingly compared with that gathered elsewhere. But apart from South-wide considerations, there are historical reasons why one would expect such values to be especially strong in Appalachia.

[12] Greenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[13] Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: Viking Press, 1962), pp. 156–159; Sebastian DeGrazia, *The Political Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 11–21; James C. Davies, "The Family's Role in Political Socialization," *Annals*, 361 (September, 1965), 10–19.

[14] Easton and Hess, *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6 (November, 1962), 242–243.

[15] The effects of widespread unemployment in the coal industry and other economic malaises

Appalachian child generalizes the father figure or the family authority structure to the political, he is not very likely to be generalizing a positive configuration.[16]

II. METHOD

Data were gathered from a nearly complete enumeration (N = 2,432) of rural public school children in grades 5–12 in Knox County, Kentucky during March, 1967. Paper-and-pencil questionnaires were administered in classrooms in connection with an evaluation of a Community Action Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity. This paper is based on the responses of a random sample of 305 of these subjects.[17]

Affect toward political authority was measured in two ways: through reports of images of the President,[18] and through "political cynicism" scale scores.[19] Images of the President were used because this figure apparently occupies a key position in the development of both cognitions of and affect toward the regime.[20] The Presidency provides an introduction; notions first held toward this role are probably subsequently generalized to other political institutions and to the entity of government itself.[21] The specific instrumentation is that developed by Hess and Easton.[22]

By contrast, political cynicism, "rather than referring to specific political issues and actors . . . is a basic orientation toward political actors and activity. It presumably pervades all

---

are well known. Because they are unable to provide, men reportedly invent physical disabilities or contrive "abandonments" of their dependents in order to qualify their families for public assistance. Such men become ciphers: Weller, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–78; Ford, *op. cit.*, pp. 245–256. In addition to anecdotal accounts of such situations, there are some hard data which are consistent with these assertions. The great proportion of Appalachian men who are not in the labor force (23% in Knox County, site of the present study, as opposed to 11% in the U.S. as a whole) plus a high unemployment rate (11% in Knox County) suggests a large number of non-providing fathers (Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1960). A high incidence of incomplete families can also be confirmed. Fully 22% of the Appalachian children sampled for the present study reported father-absence, while only 12% of the Survey Research Center's national sample of high-school seniors are from fatherless homes. The authors wish to thank Richard Niemi for the last datum.

[16] At this point, it should be noted that these two general hypotheses do not exhaust the list of suggested socialization processes. In fact, some observers stress the efficacy of altogether different agencies, for example the public school: Hess and Tourney, *op. cit.*, pp. 193–200. But even with this emphasis, such observers believe that some political values are implanted in youth by their parents, namely, those which "insure the stability of basic institutions" (p. 191). This is a reference to what we have called "regime level" values, which are the sole topic of this paper. At least for socialization to this kind of political affect, testing of family-related hypotheses is of undoubted importance. See M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi, "Family Structure and the Transmission of Political Values," (Paper presented at the 1966 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, Sept. 6–10, 1966).

[17] A few schools, not accessible by road, did not participate in the study. The cost of including them would have been very high and the returns realized very small. These schools had a total enrollment of less than fifty and a somewhat smaller number than this in grades five through eight. The questionnaire was administered by regular classroom teachers who had been instructed in its use. Every attempt was made, however, to convince the subjects that despite the context, they were not being tested. Teachers were asked explicitly to communicate this notion. This mode of administration probably produced fewer invalid responses than exposing the subjects to a non-indigenous investigator who would have aroused suspicion.

Knox County was chosen as the site for this study because it to some extent typifies Appalachia. That is, it is isolated, rural, and poor. No air or rail passenger transportation is available and only one U.S. highway crosses the county. Knox county has an annual per capita income of $501 as compared with $2223 for the U.S. as a whole. It is 84% rural while the nation is only 30%. (Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1960).

[18] For commentary on images of the President, see Fred I. Greenstein, "More on Children's Images of the President," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Winter, 1961), 648–654.

[19] For remarks on political cynicism, see Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurements and Meaning," *Journal of Politics*, 23 (August, 1961), 477–506.

[20] Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," this REVIEW, 54 (December, 1960), 936; Easton and Hess, *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6, 241.

[21] Greenstein, *Children and Politics*, p. 54.

[22] Hess and Easton, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 14, 639.

encounters with political objects."[23] In short, political cynicism relates to a basic, general evaluative posture toward politics. Though perhaps a developmental descendant of images of the President, this variable represents far less specifically focussed regime-level affect. The specific instrumentation is the political cynicism scale developed by Jennings and Niemi.[24]

In addition to desiring variables important in the introduction of children to politics and ones which seem to encapsulate a more generalized and developed kind of regime-level affect, we chose these measures because of the fact that they have generated reliable data. We wished to take advantage of direct replicative possibilities.

Unfortunately, no direct information about the political values of the parents of our sample is presently available.[25] Though the aggregate view of political institutions and personalities held by Appalachian adults is reportedly less positive than those of other Americans, the only personal level data available are child-reported. Our indicators of parental affect toward political authority consist of two family-related items from Easton and Dennis' scale of political efficacy.[26] Two problems arise in using these items as indicators of parental values. First, the index in question was designed to measure a variable in children, not adults. However, the items "inquire about the relationship between government and the child's family. . . . " The index is not regarded as a direct reflector of children's efficacy *per se*. In fact, it shows how a child has come to "view expected relationships between adult members of the system and the authorities" as well as tapping a "nascent attitude" of the child himself.[27] Youngsters tend to evaluate political objects in child-related terms.[28] Clearly this index does not measure that kind of dynamic. The items can be interpreted as a report on family (adult) orientations to political authorities. Indeed, such a report, involving the perception of children, may be a more significant independent variable than the actual values of the parents. A person's values, of course, can have no direct impact on the behavior of another individual. Any effect must be mediated through the influencee's cognitive and evaluative processes.

Secondly, given this, can items which tap efficacy be said to reveal anything about "positive" or supportive regime-level attitudes among adults? Though it is easy to imagine people highly enthusiastic about their political authority without possessing "citizen competence,"[29] it is probable that in democratic societies sense of efficacy is in fact related to general affect toward political authority. Inefficacious feelings are related to alienation and what has been called "political negativism."[30] These are the very antithesis of supportive dispositions. Moreover, recent scholarship has specifically considered efficacy to be a crucial variable in regime-level supports.[31]

The nature of the family authority structure is measured by 1) "father image" items analogous to Hess and Easton's Presidential image items[32] and 2) noting whether the father in fact lives at home.[33]

III. THE APPALACHIAN CHILD'S AFFECT TOWARD THE POLITICAL

Our subjects' evaluations of political authority have a very prominent feature: they are dramatically less positive than those rendered by children in previously reported research.

Table 1 describes the affective responses of the Appalachian children to the President and directly compares them to Hess and Easton's findings on Chicago-area children. Though our sample includes children from fifth through twelfth grades and Hess and Easton's from second through eighth, it is possible to make comparisons using only the fifth through eighth

---

[23] Jennings and Niemi, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[24] *Ibid.*, footnote 30.

[25] The evaluation of the Community Action Program in Knox County involved the solicitation of data from a sample of adults. These data can be arranged with those on youngsters to form parent-child pairs. These data are being exploited by Herbert Hirsch.

[26] David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," this REVIEW, 61 (March, 1967), 25–38.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[28] Greenstein, this REVIEW, 54, 938–939.

[29] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), Chapter 6.

[30] John E. Horton and Wayne Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism," *American Journal of Sociology*, 67 (March, 1962), 435–493.

[31] Easton and Dennis, *op.cit.*

[32] Hess and Easton, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 14, 635–642.

[33] On father-absence see: David B. Lynn and William L. Sawrey, "The Effects of Father-Absence on Norwegian Boys and Girls," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 59 (September, 1959), 258–262; George R. Bach, "Father-Fantasises and Father-Typing in Father-Separated Children," *Child Development*, 17 (March, 1946), 63–80.

TABLE 1. FIFTH-EIGHTH GRADE CHILDREN'S EVALUATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT

	Response	Knox County data*	Chicago area data†	Smirnov two-sample test
1) View of how hard the President works compared with most men.	harder	35%	77%	$D = .42$, $p < .001$
	as hard	24	21	
	less hard	41	3	
	Total	100% ($N = 128$)	101% ($N = 214$)	
2) View of the honesty of the President compared with most men.	more honest	23%	57%	$D = .34$, $p < .001$
	as honest	50	42	
	less honest	27	1	
	Total	100% ($N = 133$)	100% ($N = 214$)	
3) View of the President's liking for people as compared with most men.	like most everybody	50%	61%	$D = .20$, $p < .01$
	likes as many as most	28	37	
	doesn't like as many	22	2	
	Total	100% ($N = 125$)	100% ($N = 214$)	
4) View of the President's knowledge compared with most men.	knows more	45%	82%	$D = .37$, $p < .001$
	knows about the same	33	16	
	knows less	22	2	
	Total	100% ($N = 124$)	100% ($N = 212$)	
5) View of the President as a person.	best in world	6%	11%	$D = .19$, $p < .01$
	a good person	68	82	
	not a good person	26	8	
	Total	100% ($N = 139$)	101% ($N = 211$)	

* The Knox County subjects were provided with a "don't know" option apparently not available to their Chicago-area counterparts. This was done to avoid forcing the subjects, who are relatively undeveloped intellectually, to choose among possibly meaningless options. As expected, choice of the don't know alternative was very frequent. For each of the five items above, approximately 30% responded that they did not know. In the interest of comparability, the data do not include these responses. Reported non-responses (about 1%) to items 4 and 5 are likewise excluded from the Chicago-area data.

† These data are compiled from those reported in Hess and Easton, *op. cit.*, pp. 636–637.

grade portions of both. It is clear that for all five President-evaluation items, the distribution of responses of the Knox County youngsters is significantly less favorable than that of the Hess and Easton sample. In fact, when compared against "most men," the President does not do particularly well. In aggregate, he is not a paramount figure, and there are a fair number of youngsters (about a fourth) that express overtly unfavorable reactions to him.

Hess and Easton, it will be recalled, note that age greatly affects the nature of their sample's responses. Generally, they showed that the very favorable view that the very young have of the President's personal qualities (Items 2, 3, and 5) declines with increasing age, while high regard for his performance capabilities is maintained or even increased as the child grows older.[34] The diminution of "personal" portions of the image is not interpreted as a disillusionment with authority, but as increasing realism. The maintenance of the role-filling portions is regarded as most relevant to future adult behavior, translating into respect for political institutions.[35] In short, the changes of children's images of the President with age present a very fortunate configuration considered from the standpoint of loyalty and support for the regime. The Knox County data, bleak to begin with, show few such encouraging tendencies when controls are imposed for age. Even extending the analysis to the older portions of the sample does little to effect change. To be sure, the personal portions of the image appear slightly less positive than those of younger children. Only 31% of the high-school seniors think the President likes almost everybody, while 31% think he likes fewer people than most men; no twelfth graders think the President is the best person in the world, while 31% think he is not a good person. But overall, the picture is static. *Tau* correlations between age and positive responses to the three personal image items range between .02 and .04 and are not significant.

In those portions of the image supposedly more crucial to adult regime-level behavior, there is no increase in favorable response to the President. However, a decline in the proportion of overtly unfavorable reactions does produce a significant relationship between age and positiveness on the item dealing with how hard the President works ($\tau_c = .14$, $p < .05$) and a perceptible though not significant relationship between age and positiveness on the item dealing with the President's knowledge ($\tau_c = .09$, $p > .05$). At best, these are modest trends. There is relatively little ground for saying, "The President is increasingly seen as a person whose abilities are appropriate to the demands of his office. . . . "[36]

Furthermore, the very high incidence of "don't knows" does not decline significantly with age (see note to Table 1). Such a high rate was to be expected of a deprived, unsophisticated population. But the fact that it remains high even among high-school seniors (mean non-response rate is 27%) provides further evidence that, politically speaking, nothing is happening to these Appalachian youth as they mature, They certainly do not appear to be developing into adults devoted to symbols of extant political authority.

Finally, the stark contrast of these data to those on other American children is heightened when the consideration of social class is introduced. It has often been observed that lower class children have a greater propensity to idealize political figures.[37] This may well be due to the fact that such children are less politicized than their middle-class counterparts. Being less developed and less knowledgeable, they have developed fewer critical faculties and continue to exhibit the "immature" response of excessive deference. It is impossible to determine whether the same class phenomenon operates within Appalachia, for the sample as a whole is overwhelmingly lower class.[38] But because of their lower class position relative to the rest of the country, Knox County youngsters generally should be highly idealizing. The data, of course, reveal the diametric opposite. It is clear that Appalachia constitutes a distinct sub-culture, one in which there are operative variables sufficiently powerful to prevent the occurrence of what is by now expected as a matter of course.

---

[34] Hess and Easton, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 14, 635–642.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 639.

[37] See for example, Greenstein, *Children and Politics*, Chapter 5.

[38] No reliable information on social class could be secured from the children themselves. Information on occupation or estimated family income simply was not given by these youngsters. Assigning class on the basis of the neighborhood in which individuals live, as Greenstein did, requires that virtually every subject be placed in the lowest social stratum. These rural residents are universally poor. Only 9% of the county's families have incomes over $6,000, and these are almost entirely to be found in the "urban" county seat, which was not sampled. (Source: U.S. Census of Population 1960).

TABLE 2. POLITICAL CYNICISM SCORES*

		Knox County data (whole sample)	Knox County data (high school only)	SRC national sample	Smirnov two sample test
most cynical	6	8%	26%	5%	Knox County data (whole sample) and SRC national sample, $D=.16$, $p<.001$
	5	11	22	3	
	4	19	11	13	
	3	19	20	37	Knox County data (High school only) and SRC national sample, $D=.40$, $p<.001$
	2	23	15	25	
least cynical	1	21	6	17	
Total		101% N=305	100% N=54	100% N=1869	

* It has been assumed that the Political Cynicism Scale generated Guttman scalar patterns in the Knox County Data as it did in the SRC National Sample. To compensate for the possible invalidity of this assumption, the items were conservatively dichotomized and conservatively scored. Only choice of the most cynical available alternative was considered a cynical response. Failure of a respondent to choose the most cynical alternative *for whatever reason*, including non-response, resulted in the recording of a non-cynical item score.

Table 2 describes the more generalized affect manifested in political cynicism. The scores of the Knox County youngsters are compared to those of the Survey Research Center's nation-wide sample of high school seniors.[39]

The greater cynicism of the sub-culture sample is evident. Since the Survey Research Center deals only with high school students, perhaps comparisons should be made only with the high school portion (grades 10–12) of the Knox County sample. Though this portion is significantly more cynical, the small number of subjects in it perhaps recommends use of the entire sample. One might think that the introduction of younger respondents would depress cynicism scores (age and cynicism are reportedly positively related in children),[40] but this does not happen to any great degree. In any event, even the entire 5–12 grade Knox County sample is significantly more cynical than the SRC twelfth graders. The implication of this, of course, is that in Appalachia, unlike the rest of the United States, there is relatively little change in cynicism with maturation. That this is the case is revealed by the nonsignificant $\tau_c = -.02$ between school grade and political cynicism score. Early in life these children appear to become relatively cynical and they stay that way.

Thus, though at this point it remains unexplained, there is no doubt that Appalachian children manifest far less favorable political affect than do their counterparts elsewhere in the United States. Regardless of the index in question, the responses of our sample stand in sharp contrast to other research. Just as supportive dispositions in citizens have been asserted to have early roots, so may the Appalachians' often-noted rejection of political authority germinate during early years. Moreover, also in some contrast to findings of other research, the affective orientations of these subjects does not change greatly with increasing age. These negative images are relatively static. This nonvariant affect suggests the operation of a pervasive socialization agent early in the lives of these children.[41] This in turn suggests the desirability of examining the causal efficacy of variables related to an early

---

[39] Jennings and Niemi, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[40] Greenstein, *Children and Politics*, pp. 39–40.

[41] This non-variance, a preliminary look at our data suggests, may be due to the homogeneity and isolation of the area. Family, peer groups, schools and other possible agents of socialization indigenous to the region probably manifest substantially the same configuration of values. Thus if families transmit an initial set of political notions to children, subsequent exposure to school, peers, etc., is likely to reinforce rather than change values. The remote location of the county probably insulates it from electronic or printed media and other external stimuli. Any value implications at variance with indigenous norms which such sources might transmit are thus prevented from having a widespread effect on maturing children.

TABLE 3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND CHILD'S POLITICAL AFFECT

Family political orientation item	Child's political affect measure	τ_c	Significance
"I don't think people in the government care much what people like my family think"*	view of how hard President works	.23	$p<.001$
	view of the honesty of the President	.06	$p>.05$
	view of the President's liking for people	.18	$p<.001$
	view of the President's knowledge	.01	$p>.05$
	view of the President as a person	.05	$p>.05$
	political cynicism scale	−.20	$p<.001$
"My family doesn't have any say about what the government does."*	view of how hard President works	.10	$p>.05$
	view of the honesty of the President	.06	$p>.05$
	view of the President's liking for people	.07	$p>.05$
	view of the President's knowledge	.13	$p<.01$
	view of the President as a person	.06	$p>.05$
	political cynicism scale	−.13	$p<.01$

* Disagreement scored as positive value.

agent frequently assumed to be an important socializer: the family. It is to this task that we now turn.

IV. THE FAMILY AS TRANSMITTER OF SPECIFIC POLITICAL VALUES

What kinds of general explanatory propositions about the socialization process are consistent with these data? If parents typically transmit the substantive content of their values about government to their children, then the very negative political affect observed among Appalachian youngsters should be related to similar assessments on the part of their mothers and fathers.[42] Evidence on this can be gained by examining the nature of the relationship between our family political orientation items and childrens' political affect (Table 3).

---

[42] In the absence of additional data, it is difficult to show empirically that the parents of this sample have negative dispositions toward political authority. However, responses to the family political value items, when the distribution is dichotomized, reveal about equal number of agreements (negative dispositions) and disagreements (positive dispositions). Following each item is the percentage of respondents expressing agreement:

"I don't think people in the government care much about what people like my family think," 58%;

"My family doesn't have any say about what the government does," 43%.

The authors are fully aware of the precarious nature of the family value measures. Their

Since responses to family political orientation items were recorded in terms of degree of agreement (from disagree very much to agree very much), they constitute ordinal variables as do the presidential image and cynicism measures. The evidence on the amount of impact they have on these child political affect variables, however, is mixed. Some fairly substantial *taus* are accompanied by others approaching zero. But it is interesting to note where the significant relationships occur. Primarily, they involve Presidential competence items and the cynicism scale. These may be the most important dependent variables. Several scholars have observed that childhood evaluations of the personal qualities of the President, which here do not relate to family political orientation, are "less functionally relevant" to future adult behavior than are assessments of role-filling capabilities. As stated above, these observers express no alarm at the decline with age of evaluations of Presidential benevolence. Similarly, the fact that parental values do not seem to influence them may not be great evidence about the inefficacy of familial values in conditioning important childhood orientations.

If political cynicism represents a more developed kind of evaluation, it is significant that it appears to depend upon these parental variables. Regarded as an important encapsulator of youthful political affect, this construct may be a crucial indicator whose antecedents should be known.

Family political values, then, appear to have some effect on children's political affect. Especially given the fact that the affective variables in question appear to be among the most significant, the direct transmission hypothesis takes on some credibility. This suggests the desirability of more detailed investigations of the content of intra-familial political communication.

V. THE FAMILY AS PROTOTYPICAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE

A totally different kind of dynamic is implied in the notion of relations with the family as a model for political affect. It is not, however, incompatible with the notion that the family transmits specific value content to the young. It is entirely possible that both processes operate simultaneously. Moreover, since the relationships are relatively small, our data on value transmission fairly demand that additional explanatory tacks be taken. Table 4 demonstrates the effects of father-image and integrity of the family on Appalachian children's political orientations. Again, evidence is somewhat mixed. Three father image items[43] are placed against their Presidential-image parallels and against cynicism. There is almost a complete lack of relationship. Not only does the "great overlap of the images of father and President"[44] fail to appear among these children, but the more generalized political affect measured by cynicism does not depend on how they see their fathers. In short, there is no evidence at all to support the hypothesis that evaluations of family authority figures are directly projected to remote, political ones.

If the father image hypothesis thus suffers, another dynamic by which the family might serve as a model for regime affect fares even worse. The presence or absence of the father might be thought to have political consequences for children. A fatherless home is disrupted and generally thought to have negative implications. Children might project their negative evaluations of such homes onto the political authority.[45] If this were the case, children from fatherless homes should have less positive views. Table 4 revels exactly the opposite. There are generally low to moderate, but significant, negative relationships between having a father at home and evaluating the President in a favorable light. Fatherless children are more positive toward the political. How can this remarkable result be interpreted? One could argue that there is a cathartic process at work; that there is some sort of psychic necessity (possibly anxiety-related) to regard authority as benign. Perhaps unfortunate home life heightens this need which is then manifested in positive evaluations of the political.[46]

---

proxy nature makes them somewhat suspect. The data they generate are displayed, however, because they are suggestive and because they indicate the kind of research which, in the authors' opinions, should be performed more often. In subsequent publications based on the Appalachian data, direct information on parental values and children's perceptions thereof will be available (See note 25).

[43] The father image items are analogous to the Presidential image items used by Hess and Easton. Though there are five Presidential image items, only three father image analogues are used because of objection to asking respondents to evaluate their fathers' honesty or diligence at work.

[44] Hess and Easton, *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 14, 640.

[45] Davies, *op. cit.*, 13–15.

[46] Judith V. Tourney, *The Child's Idealization of Authority* (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1962).

TABLE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY AUTHORITY CHARACTERISTICS AND CHILD'S POLITICAL AFFECT

Family authority characteristics	Child's political affect	r_c	Significance
View of father's liking for people	view of President's liking for people	.05	$p > .05$
	political cynicism	−.07	$p > .05$
View of father's knowledge	view of President's knowledge	.02	$p > .05$
	political cynicism	.02	$p > .05$
View of father as a person	view of President as a person	.05	$p > .05$
	political cynicism	−.03	$p > .05$
Father living with family*	view of how hard President works	−.08	$p < .05$
	view of President's honesty	−.09	$p < .05$
	view of President's liking of people	−.12	$p < .05$
	view of President's knowledge	−.23	$p < .001$
	view of President as a person	.00	$p > .05$
	political cynicism	.05	$p > .05$

* This is a dichotomous variable—either the father lives at home or he does not. However, since father's living at home constitutes a less disrupted family authority structure, we continue to apply ordinal statistics.

This does not seem likely, for as we have just seen, specific negative evaluations of their fathers are not related to childrens' positive political orientations.

Rather than resulting in negative authority orientations, father-absence could interfere with the transfer of specific political value content from family to child. A major agent in the transfer process may be absent. Though mixed, there is some evidence in previous research of "male political dominance" in the family. Fathers may be particularly important communicators of political values.[47] Children from fatherless homes become more dependent upon their mothers. But mothers are not typically strong political cue-givers. Hence, the typical adult political values of Appalachia will not be so effectively transmitted in the fatherless home. These adult values supposedly involve relatively unfavorable assessments of political authority. The fatherless child escapes close contacts with these values and emerges more positively disposed toward political authority. When this agent is absent, perhaps the media, or other agents bearing more favorable cues, assume a more prominent role in the socialization process.

This interpretation, which of course returns us to the transmission-of-specific-values hypothesis, is strongly supported by additional

---

[47] Greenstein, *Children and Politics*, p. 119; Kenneth P. Langton, *The Political Socialization Process: The Case of Secondary School Students in Jamaica*, (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1965), p. 119. On the other hand, male dominance in the political learning of the young fails to appear in some research: Hyman, *Political Socialization*, pp. 83–89; Eleanor E. Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews, and Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 18 (Spring, 1954), 23–39.

TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND CHILD'S POLITICAL AFFECT, WITH FATHER-PRESENCE CONTROLLED

Family political orientation item	Child's political affect measure	Father-present children τ_c	Father-absent children τ_c	Significance of the difference
I don't think people in the government care much what people like my family think*	view of how hard the President works	.25	.12	$p<.001$
	view of honesty of the President	.12	$-.10$	$p<.001$
	view of President's liking for people	.23	.04	$p<.001$
	view of President's knowledge	.00	.06	$p<.01$†
	view of President as a person	.10	$-.11$	$p<.001$
	political cynicism scale	$-.18$	$-.26$	$p<.01$†
My family doesn't have any say about what the government does*	view of how hard the President works	.17	$-.15$	$p<.001$
	view of honesty of the President	.10	$-.06$	$p<.001$
	view of President's liking for people	.17	$-.23$	$p<.001$
	view of President's knowledge	.17	.03	$p<.001$
	view of President as a person	$-.06$	.08	$p<.001$†
	political cynicism	$-.13$	$-.16$	$p<.05$†

* Disagreement scored as positive value.
† Relationship not in predicted direction.

analysis of the data. First, it is clear that there is no unknown process operating to produce more positive adult political values in fatherless families. Fatherless and two-parent families are identical in this regard (*tau's* between father at home and family political value items are $-.03$ and .00). Though the starting point is the same, it is also clear that the transmission process is greatly attenuated in fatherless homes. This can be seen by imposing a control for father-presence on the relationship between family political orientation and child's political affect (Table 5). The data for father-present children are very similar to the collapsed data shown in Table 3, except that the relationship between *family value* and *child affect* is generally somewhat stronger. But for father-absent children, the relationship generally declines and in several cases is actually reversed. Not only can the fatherless family not promulgate its political values, but it seems to leave its children very vulnerable to the socialization of other agents, agents with rather different (more positive) values. To be sure, child political cynicism, which is related to family political values, does not appear to be governed by these considerations. Other family-related roots may affect this variable—perhaps those which relate to generalized cynicism.

VI. CONCLUSION

Children in the relatively poor, rural Appalachian region of the United States are dramatically less favorably inclined toward political objects than are their counterparts in other portions of the nation. Moreover, the image which these children have does not appear to develop with age in the fashion observed for others; there is no indication that a process conducive to the development of political support is operative in Appalachia. Here, children's views appear to be relatively static. These findings have two implications. First, they point to the possibility that the often-emphasized highly positive character of children's views of politics may be a culturally bound phenomenon. One should exercise much caution in accepting such views as a universal norm. Secondly, the occurrence of such divergent findings underscores the desirability of *explaining* children's political orientations.

Since, at the sub-cultural level, these atypical findings are paralleled by 1) atypical adult (parent), political values, and 2) atypical family structure, two broad hypotheses involving the effect of family-related variables on children's political affect were tested. Examination of the hypothesis that parents directly transmit the content of their political values to their children produced some confirming evidence. Reported parental values showed moderate relationship to certain aspects of children's political affect. This was especially true of the competence items in Presidential images (supposedly the most important for subsequent behavior) and of political cynicism, a more generalized kind of system affect.

The thesis which posits the family as prototypical authority structure fares less well, however. There is no support at all for the notion that affect toward the father is extended to remote, political authority. Relationships between specific aspects of children's father images and parallel components of Presidential images are not significant. Nor is there evidence that disrupted family structure, measured by father-absence, contributes to negative political evaluations. In fact, father-absence is associated with more favorable political valuations in Appalachian children! This remarkable result is interpreted as supporting the first hypothesis regarding the direct transfer of value-content from family to child. Where the father is absent, an agent communicating the predominantly negative adult political values to youngsters is lost. This notion seems the more plausible when it is observed that there is a marked relationship between family political values and child political affect among father-present families, but no such relationship—if anything a slight negative gradient—among father-absent families.

Thus, of the two broad hypotheses posited at the outset, our data support the notion of direct value transfer, while leading us to doubt that the family is an effective authority prototype. Though these findings are offered as significant in and of themselves—they certainly suggest the importance of closer examination of parent-child political communication processes in the understanding of regime-level values—there are other implications. The explanatory relationships presented here are of relatively modest magnitudes. The small amount of variance in children's political affect which is explained here by the family suggests that we should search for other agents of socialization, or for other dynamics which may operate within the family. A preliminary view of other of the Knox County data suggests that there may be conditions under which other, less personal agents assume a great role. Fortunately, the move toward cross-cultural and explanatory analysis of childhood socialization will proceed and these and related questions will be joined.[48]

[48] The forthcoming doctoral dissertation by Herbert Hirsch explores other socialization agents at greater length.

COMMUNICATIONS

If, As Lipsitz Thinks, Political Science Is To Save Our Souls, God Help Us!

To the Editor:

Professor Lipsitz raises a number of questions. I suppose the main ones are: "Did I say it?", "If so, is it true?", and "If true, is it a good thing or a bad thing or a mixed thing or what?"

I did say it, and I think I meant it. But I do not think I was suggesting anything as extreme as Professor Lipsitz finds. I was suggesting that what has been said about many of the new nations might apply to a society as "secular" as the United States—i.e., that politics might function as religion. The parallels between the kind of ceremony Shils and Young observed at the British coronation and the ceremony associated with the assassination crisis were quite striking, and triggered off a comparison between the functions of such ceremonies and the functions of religious ceremonies that Durkheim noted—the reinforcement of collective identity and the re-dedication to continuity. The parallel can be drawn without assuming identity with political religions in the new states or with political religions like Naziism. A similarity of pattern does not imply a similarity in intensity.

The purpose of the essay was not to argue that such commitments are good or bad. Its purpose was to use the information available on the reaction to the assassination to suggest that such a religious-type commitment existed in the United States and to relate it to political stability.

Is the argument true? I agree with Lipsitz that a lot of evidence supports the general point of view, but that we need more precise definitions and better data.

But what really concerns Lipsitz is the normative question of whether this is a good or bad thing. This represents a different realm of discourse. The argument about the overlap between political and religious beliefs does imply that religious-type beliefs in the political sphere foster acquiescence to political authority and, in turn, stability. That's good if you like stability; bad if you don't. Whether you do or not depends upon your evaluation of the present state of society, and your estimate as to the type of change that would be instituted if there were less acquiescence and more questioning.

On such a question different people will have different views. If my essay implied to Lipsitz that I believe that unquestioning acquiescence because of belief in the sanctity of state authority is a good thing, I am sorry. I am not sure it was appropriate or necessary in that earlier essay to "raise a normative eyebrow," but in reply to Lipsitz it seems proper to raise two. There are times when political authority becomes unworthy of support and should be challenged, and in the spring of 1968 many serious men in the United States are considering such a challenge. But though such challenges may be appropriate now, I would part company with Lipsitz in that I both welcome them and fear them. And here the argument about political acquiescence is relevant. The great tragedy of American politics in 1968—a tragedy centered around Vietnam—is that it has led to a fundamental loss of respect for and confidence in the government among significant groups. One can understand why this has happened and may, indeed, welcome it. But if this implies a long-run decline in fundamental loyalty, the future of the American political community becomes problematic and we may be in for a great time of troubles.

And it is in relation to this normative question that Lipsitz and Thoreau are inadequate guides. To stress acquiescence and stability as the only normative goals is, I believe, a mistake, but it is equally mistaken to stress only the opposite. Thoreau makes an eloquent case for civil disobedience but he ignores the complexity of the problem and one cannot take him fully seriously. He argues for a fully rational and voluntaristic obedience to law. "The only obligation which I have a right to assume," he wrote in "Civil Disobedience," "is to do at any time what I think right." And he says he has no obligation to "the societies which I have never signed in to." But surely Lipsitz knows—though he hardly mentions—the arguments as to why this just will not work. In part it cannot work because citizens are not able and would be foolish to try constantly to "examine the costs, and compare it with the advantages" of their relationships with the government (as Lipsitz quotes Thomas Paine as telling us to do). And a stable system of rule cannot be built on such voluntaristic and easily changeable commitments.

And because Thoreau and Lipsitz look at one side of the argument, they ignore the tough normative question of *when* civil disobedience is justified: in what kind of society and in response to what kind of governmental action? Does one refuse cooperation with any governmental act of which one disapproves or only with certain severely important acts? Perhaps one can hope for the following from religious type commitments to political authorities: that they will prevent civil disobedience from being triggered off by trivial governmental acts (as can happen when people have no "primitive" respect for authorities whatsoever) but they will not be so intensely held that they prevent protest in cases where governmental activities are felt to be major evils. This would all call for some "balance." This I admit is a vague notion and Lipsitz does not like it, but I am not sure how one can avoid considering it.

All this goes beyond social science, but Lipsitz is writing normative theory (which I do not think I was, though he clearly thinks so). Social science can, however, be useful in dealing with normative questions of this sort. This requires, however, that one deal with more complex relationships than Lipsitz considers. Political quiescence—to use Edelman's term—has different consequences depending upon who is quiescent. And we have some data that would help predict the consequences of greater political activity and involvement of different groups. One is not sure whether Lipsitz wants everyone involved; or just intellectuals, or liberals, or who. One gets the impression that Lipsitz is looking for people committed to peace and to a reduction of abuse of freedom by the state. But he cannot dismiss as easily as he does the information from recent polls which suggest that many quiescent Americans (that is, people who are politically inactive and relatively passive before government authority and who only speak up when questioned by a pollster) are committed to more bombing in Vietnam and believe by two to one that people should not have the right to demonstrate against the Vietnam war.[1] Would heightened political consciousness among such a group maximize the values Lipsitz wants? He answers that it is just "state worship" that leads to such attitudes; but the quiescence that goes with deference to political authority keeps such attitudes from being converted into actual pressures for repression of others.

In any case, these are speculations to place against Lipsitz's speculations. He clearly does not like the normative implications of my article. If the implications are the ones he draws from it, neither do I. But I think things are more complicated than he does. I find unquestioned commitment normatively inadequate but pure voluntarism inadequate as well. And whether he likes some implications of my essay or not, the question remains as to whether what I wrote is true. I believe that the kind of commitment I described exists and has a relationship to stability—whether we like it or not. But I am not sure—my original essay was speculative also. Indeed, the essay he cites was written in reply to a request to speculate on the political implications of the more precise studies of reaction to the Kennedy Assassination—which may be the reason (though hardly the excuse) for some of its vagueness. Like Lipsitz, I would welcome some hard and careful research on the subject.

Sidney Verba

Stanford University

To the Editor:

Sidney Verba seems to maintain that the "not-too-intense" political religion we have is somehow what we need. He doesn't seem to take seriously the question of how such a "religion" affects democratic life. Why? The issue is not whether Sidney Verba was personally endorsing unthinking obedience to political authority. The issue is whether we want to ignore the implications of our work. In Verba's case, that work has implications which can only make one complacent about the quality of our political life.

What we need, as Almond and Verba once told us, is "a more sober and informed appreciation of the nature and complexity of the problems of democratization." As a first step toward such soberness, we must stop talking about contemporary America (or England) as if it were the very model of democratic life, or, worse yet, of the good life. We need standards which transcend existing systems unless we are prepared to defend the idea that what already exists exhausts all possibilities of democratization or happiness. Sidney Verba suggests in his reply that activating the undemocratic in America might be disastrous, yet only a few years ago he argued that this same America (with these same "dangerous" people) could serve as something of a model for democracy. Wasn't it short-sighted not to have taken up these undemocratic attitudes as a deep and unfinished problem of our politics? It is exactly this sort of short-sightedness that grows out of theories that build only on what "is" right at the moment, ignoring both history and the tasks of the future. It is here (among other places) that normative and empirical matters get confused. A theory of under-development that included exacting norms of democratization and paid careful attention to human needs, would help us maintain a perspective on these questions. I tried to move into the thinly populated neighborhood of such a theory in the conclusion of my article where I suggested a few steps that might enhance democracy in the United States.

Still, the question of *who* is activated is a real one. The possibility that dissent may be suppressed or become self-destructive is real. Yet here the possibilities are more complicated than Verba suggests. There is no one-to-one correspondence between attitudes and behavior. Involving more Americans in discussion or action concerning the war in Vietnam does not *necessarily* mean suppression of civil liberties. Also, without mass involvement, suppression can still occur. Why doesn't Verba mention the kind of public atmosphere created by HUAC, General Hershey and those leading public figures who find dissent close to treason? Is that also mass behavior? You would think that in this generation the civil rights movement would have demonstrated that mass movements are not necessarily threats to such democracy as we have.

---

[1] See S. M. Lipset, "The President, the Polls and Vietnam," *Transaction* (September/October 1966), p. 24; and the Harris Poll of December 1967 (*New York Times*, December 19, 1967).

Verba says he welcomes as well as fears challenges to authority. That might be sensible, depending on the kind of challenge and the nature of the authority. Yet his emphasis is on the fear, not the welcome. He looks with dread toward the possibility of a decline in fundamental loyalty, yet he makes no mention of how present challenges may make new policies possible, and may in fact alter the nature of national loyalty for the better. Why? Beyond this, isn't it reasonable to fear also the acquiesence that allows authority to go unchallenged when challenge is needed? The issues involved are not only democracy and stability, but survival and human decency itself. Why, ten years ago, were so few political scientists telling us that what we needed was a dose of humane and democratic instability?

LEWIS LIPSITZ
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

TO THE EDITOR:

The authors of "Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952" (December, 1967) stated their study concerned alienation. Yet, it is difficult to understand how the vote for Socialist candidate Salvador Allende can be interpreted as an expression of alienation, no matter how sophisticated the indices. Since their formation in the early 20th century the Socialist and Communist parties of Chile have performed demand aggregation and recruitment functions and have otherwise abided by the norms and laws of a constitutional democracy. Certainly they have not attempted to organize the masses for revolution and the destruction of the "Old Regime."

The vote for Allende well may have reflected dissatisfaction with the policies of the preceding Radical governments, but not alienation. Voting for an "out-party" in U.S. politics usually is interpreted as dissatisfaction with the "in-party," not rejection of the system. Why should that differ in Chile? If there was an alienated vote in 1952, that more probably was the vote for the winner, Carlos Ibanez del Campo who, during his campaign, stated that the traditional parties of Chile were responsible for the existing social-economic problems. He presented himself as a charismatic leader who would rule for the "good of the country" as he perceived that good unrestricted by political parties. Indeed, many people believed, and perhaps even hoped, that Ibanez, if elected, would establish his second dictatorship of the century.

SANDRA POWELL
The American University

TO THE EDITOR:

Deane E. Neubauer's "Some Conditions of Democracy," this REVIEW, (1967), pp. 1002–1009, claims to demonstrate that after a certain level of socio-economic development has been achieved, continued development is irrelevant to democratic institutions.[1]

Neubauer erroneously ascribes to me the view that political development (which he interprets as meaning democratization) will increase indefinitely with further gains in social and economic development. It is obvious from the context of the 1963 article[2] cited by Neubauer that I was not speaking of democratization, but of "the degree of complexity and specialization of its [a nation's] national political institutions." The Political Development Index (PDI) used in that article was not intended as a measure of democracy.

A Political Representativeness Index (PRI) appeared in 1965.[3] In 1967 I added electoral participation to the index, an addition which slightly increases the correlations between the various political indices and socio-economic indicators.[4]

So, even with the post-1963 measurement changes, the general results of the 1963 analysis remain. For the sake of argument, let us assume that I was talking about democratization, rather than political development, in the

---

[1] My thanks to Benjamin Walter for his comments on this rejoinder, and for bringing Neubauer's article to my attention.

[2] Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 569–582.

[3] Phillips Cutright, "Political Structure, Economic Development and National Social Security Programs," *American Journal of Sociology*, 70 (1965), 537–548.

[4] Phillips Cutright and James A. Wiley, "Modernization and Political Representation: 1927–1966," mimeo, Nashville, Tennessee, Department of Sociology, Vanderbilt University, 1967.

1963 article. Is Neubauer's interpretation of my position correct? My major prediction about change in the level of democratization and changes on modernization applied to one *type of nation: a nation at a low* level of modernization and a *low* level of democratization was expected to increase its level of democratization, if its modernization program was successful.

Neubauer seems shocked to find that "very many" (actually 9 of 76) nations received maximum "democratization" scores, but varied in their level of modernization. Yet, I am sure that he would not be surprised to learn that in spite of the correlation between height (independent variable) and weight (dependent variable), men with identical weights will vary in height. Dissatisfaction with the measurement "ceiling" stimulated Professor Neubauer to develop an index of Democratic Performance.

Neubauer wants to test two hypotheses. The first is that nations with *maximum* PDI scores and varying socio-economic development will fail to show a positive correlation between socio-economic development and his Democratic Performance measure. This hypothesis is not tested since his sample (sic) contains countries with widely different PDI scores.

The second hypothesis is that beyond a certain threshold of socio-economic development, variation in socio-economic development will be unrelated to PDI *or* to his Democratic Performance measure. He does not test this hypothesis either, since his "sample" of nations contains only democratic countries, rather than all nations which exceed a certain (unspecified) threshold.

It is important to inspect Neubauer's measure of Democratic Performance in some detail, since he believes it measures degrees of democratization that are not discriminated by my PDI or PRI measures. The Democratic Performance index is composed of four equally weighted (summed T-scored) indicators. The first, "the percent of the adult population eligible to vote," starts off well, but ends up ignoring: (1) whether an election actually occurred; (2) whether the representatives thus elected were seated; and (3) whether the parliament continued over its full term. Obviously the indicator has no general value, except when it is applied to completely stable democracies—nearly all of which have universal suffrage.

The second indicator, "equality of representation," is insufficiently explained. One cannot perform the operations necessary to reproduce it. It appears that a pure proportional representation system would get the highest number of points on this indicator. I wonder whether Neubauer really believes that proportional representation is superior to single-member, winner-take-all methods of electing party candidates to legislative assemblies.

The third indicator, "information equality," *purports to measure the extent to which* "all individuals (in the nation) possess identical information about the alternatives." Lacking adequate data, Neubauer takes per capita newspaper circulation in the *capital* city and *multiplies* this figure by the number of "independently" owned newspapers. One can calculate that the same score can be achieved in spite of huge differences in newspaper circulation, so long as the number of newspapers varies. As a yardstick for what is going on in the nation, the measure is inadequate; only one of every 250 Americans lives in Washington, D.C. Finally, giving this indicator 25 percent of the weight in the composite index contaminates the dependent variable, since all of the measures of socio-economic development are related to newspaper circulation.

The fourth component is "competition." This indicator awards points to nations that have frequent changes in party leadership, and also rewards nations in which the vote was close. But a population satisfied with its leadership may overwhelmingly return a party to power in free and competitive elections for many years. Or a population may reject the leadership of a party in power and replace it with a competitive party by an overwhelming margin. In either case the nation loses points—it is lower on "competition" (hence, Democratic Performance) than a nation repeatedly voting parties in and out of office by narrow margins.

The sources of information for all indicators are unlisted, the procedures are unspecified, and even the time period used is not mentioned. This makes replication impossible.

Neubauer's "sample" of 23 "democratic" nations omits Australia, Iceland, Panama, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, but includes Mexico, Venezuela and India. Clearly some criterion other than my PDI index was used in selecting "democratic" nations, but Neubauer never gets around to saying exactly what that criterion contained.

Neubauer states that "Once above this (socio-economic) threshold, however, the degree to which a country will 'maximize' certain forms of democratic practice is no longer a function of continued socio-economic development." (p. 1007) Since he included India in his sample, one would expect that to test this hypothesis he would have taken all nations at and above India's development level, and seen whether a correlation exists between political and socio-economic scores.

His test is laid out in his Table 1. The test is labeled a "multiple regression analysis." It is the only multiple regression analysis I have ever seen that consists entirely of zero order correlation coefficients. With the exception of the modest correlation between the communications index and Democratic Performance (a result of index contamination), all correlaations with the dependent variable are near zero. The author then concludes that there is no relation between socio-economic development and Democratic Performance. But, given our examination of his measure, one may wonder whether Professor Neubauer has simply created a very difficult technique to apply random numbers to nations.

Although different Democratic Performance scores are assigned to nations, the *lack* of correlation with socio-economic indicators is meaningless (setting aside the sample design problem) unless the validity of the indicator is proven. Neubauer simply *assumes* that differences in his measure really mean what he wants them to mean. Since Professor Neubauer failed to deal with this problem, I have correlated the Democratic Performance measure against five measures to which a reasonable man might think it should be related. For example, we might expect that nation high on Democratic Performance would also be relatively high on redistribution of income through social security programs, but the rank correlation ($N=22$) of Democratic Performance with the percent of GNP allocated to social security programs is only .15, controlling years of program experience, voting participation, and percent of labor force in industry.[5] Nor is the measure related to income inequality; the rank correlation ($N=20$) is positive .19, controlling economic development, PRI, and percent of labor force in agriculture.[6] Perhaps governments high on Democratic Performance will be relatively more active in securing opportunities for occupational mobility; the rank correlation, (N = 11) with the degree to which sons have *inherited* their fathers' occupation[7] is positive .11. Are governments high on Democratic Performance more attentive than low performance governments in fulfilling the educational needs of their populations? The rank correlation with the percent of children 5–19 enrolled in school[8] (N = 17) is only .11. Finally, the rank correlation with a measure of "freedom of the press"[9] (N = 18) is .13. One concludes that the measure's pragmatic validity has yet to be established.

Failure to establish the validity of the Democratic Performance measure leads one to the reasonable conclusion that assigning more than one nation to the same PRI score may not be such a sin after all. For if we cannot explain differences in important nation-wide consequences presumably related to democratization (with Neubauer's measure), this may simply mean that the causes of variation in these consequences do not result from minor variations in electoral participation, party competition, etc., but are a function of other social and economic characteristics that are independent of the political system, as Neubauer defines it.

---

[5] See Phillips Cutright, "Income Redistribution: A Cross National Analysis," *Social Forces*, 46 (1967), 180–190 for data and analysis. The number of cases used in this and the following correlations vary according to the availability of data, unless other reasons for omitting cases are given.

[6] See Phillips Cutright, "Inequality: A Cross National Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 32 (1967), 562–578 for data and analysis.

[7] See Phillips Cutright, "Occupational Inheritance: A Cross National Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, 73 (1968), for data and analysis.

[8] Data from Bruce M. Russett, *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, pp. 218–219. Nations below $400 per capita GNP (data from Russett, *et al.*, *op. cit.* pp. 155–156) are omitted to put a rough control on economic development; Switzerland and Norway are also dropped since only public school enrollments in these nations were available to Russett.

[9] Data from Ralph L. Lowenstein, "World Press Freedom, 1966", Columbia, Missouri: School of Journalism, University of Missouri at Columbia, May, 1967, Table III. In this report nations are grouped into eight levels on a measure of "Press Freedom." Removal of the four nations in Neubauer's list with less than $400 per capita GNP (plus Luxemburg, for which no Press Freedom rating was listed) leaves 18 cases. Ten of the 18 nations are in the upper level and the remaining eight are in the second level on Press Freedom. Within the upper level a rank order is available for the top six nations. (See "A Charter Subscription Offering for *Interplay: A Review of European/American Affairs*," New York: *Interplay*, 200 West 57th Street (January, 1968), p. 1. A common rank was assigned to the remaining four nations in the upper level and a common rank assigned to the eight nations in the second level. For example, Great Britain and France were ranked first and second on Democratic Performance by Neubauer, but were both in the second level (assigned a rank of 14.5) on Press Freedom; Switzerland is ranked in 18th position on Democratic Performance, but is second on Press Freedom.

Phillips Cutright
Vanderbilt University

To the Editor:

Almost ten years ago in what is now a well-known article, S. M. Lipset presented some not very firm evidence illustrating the already familiar proposition that democratic government is more likely to occur in plentiful than wanting environments. More recently Phillips Cutright has attempted to validate the proposition that political development, *per se*, comes about as a result of nations achieving specified levels of social and economic development. In short, Lipset asserts that democracy, as a discrete variable, requires some social and economic requisites, while Cutright suggests that political development is a continuous variable and is related linearly with social and economic development.

The argument and evidence provided by Cutright to support this assertion have confused the whole question of democratic requisites. The empirical support for Cutright's assertion rests upon the relatively high correlations which he obtains between selected socio-economic indices and an index of "national political development" using aggregate statistical data for 76 countries. It is this result which leads him to conclude that there is a strong, linear relationship between social-economic development and "national political development." This index, however, is constructed such that scores are assigned to countries on the basis of whether they sustain institutional patterns which are explicitly democratic in nature, and thus his index is in fact not about political development at all, but simply a more "sophisticated" version of Lipset's explicitly "democratic" measure. Inspection of Cutright's data indicates that all democratic countries cluster toward the high end. One may conclude, then, from his own evidence, that Cutright is asserting a direct and positive relationship between socio-economic development and *democratic* development, not political development, and that, unfortunately, he is misinterpreting the meaning of his own "findings."

The purpose of my article, "Some Conditions of Democracy," this Review, 1967, pp. 1002–1009, is to demonstrate this. Since the primary question now involves the relation, if any, between social-economic factors and *democracy*, it will be useful to examine the variation in these variables for those countries for which an index of democraticness is sensible. The following procedures were therefore employed: (a) I select 23 *democratic* countries from among those for which Cutright reported data. (b) I obtain the same social-economic data for these countries used by Cutright. (c) I create an index of democracy with which to measure the relative degree of democracy of the 23 countries. This last step is necessary because Cutright's index does not permit one to differentiate degrees of democratic behavior among manifestly democratic countries (he insists he is measuring *all* political development, not merely democraticness). The results indicate an almost zero order correlation between Cutright's and Lipset's social-economic indices and my index of democratic performance. I therefore conclude that the model proposed by Cutright is overly simple as a political development model (since such a model "should" include things besides democratic institutional features) and incorrect as a democratic development model.

I fail to find these issues addressed in his above remarks. Let me, however, offer two comments. He attempts to make much of the fact that I have not in this one article tied my index of democratic development to some set of output variables which he thinks should be related to it. He asserts that the low rank-order correlations between my index and his selected variables impeach the validity of my argument. On its face this line of reasoning can only lead to nonsense. Besides the obvious fact that I am under no obligation to provide evidence supporting his hypothetical assertions, his argument, were it to be believed, would strip all researchers of the right and obligation to report evidence disconfirming hypotheses no matter how important such disconfirmations. Indeed, the logic of his argument precludes the rationale of establishing null hypotheses for testing. To the specific point raised, however, Cutright unfortunately is not aware of the fact that I have long been interested in the relationship between democratic performance and system output characteristics and have discovered some interesting relationships of my own which will be contained in a forthcoming report.

Finally, it is understandable that Cutright should be defensive about his index of political development—he has a great deal invested in it. It has appeared in one guise or another in at least four publications (conveniently cited in his above comment), sporting minor modifications to suit the immediate purpose of the day. My remarks concerning its utility as a measuring device stand. It measures the institutionalization of liberal democracy, not "the degree of complexity and specialization of its (a nation's) national political institutions." In short, it does not suit the purpose to which it has been put.

Deane E. Neubauer
University of California, Irvine

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

BOOK REVIEWS

Holt and *Turner*, The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration In Comparative Political Analysis. GERALD A. WEINER 583

Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress. AVERY LEISERSON 584

Wainhouse and Associates, International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast. *Ross*, The United Nations: Peace and Progress. LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD 586

Ashford, Perspectives of a Moroccan Nationalist. *Ashford*, Morocco-Tunisia: Politics and Planning. *Ashford*, National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan. GEORGE LENCZOWSKI 587

Barnett, China After Mao. *Geoffroy-Dechaume*, China Looks at the World. *Goldman*, Literary Dissent in Communist China. *Granqvist*, The Red Guard. ROGER W. BENJAMIN 588

Friedlander, Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939–1941. *O'Neill*, The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–39. *Nyomarkay*, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party. H. P. SECHER 590

Spinelli, The Eurocrats. RONALD INGLEHART 593

Young, The Democratic Republicans of New York: The Origins, 1763–1797. *Prince*, New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans: The Genesis of an Early Party Machine. MANNING J. DAUER 594

Blau and *Duncan*, The American Occupational Structure. M. KENT JENNINGS .. 596

Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History. THOMAS S. SCHROCK 597

BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY 599

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 619

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS 643

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION 671

BOOK REVIEWS

The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration In Comparative Political Analysis. By ROBERT T. HOLT AND JOHN E. TURNER. (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand & Company, 1966. Pp. iii, 410. $4.50, paper.)

Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner have written an imaginative book that is a welcome addition to the growing literature on modernization and political development. They reveal a lack of timidity in their usage of comparative analysis, as they rise above the usual procrustean attempts in Political Science at comparative methodology. The main purpose of their exploratory study is to develop hypotheses which can be tested in future studies. As they admit, they want to generate hypotheses and not to test them. Basically, they are presenting a conceptual framework for the analysis of political factors in economic growth, and they develop hypotheses on the role of these at certain stages of economic development. In order to do this, they utilize an adapted structural-functional perspective based upon pattern variables developed by Talcott Parsons and his associates. These are: (1) adaptation, (2) goal attainment, (3) pattern maintenance and tension management, and (4) integration. They also borrow some of W. W. Rostow's terminology and use his concept of the stages of economic growth, but they do not employ a Rostowian scheme because of their differences on crucial definitions.

The data in their book is taken from four selected societies, France (1600–1789), Manchu China (1644–1911), Tokugawa Japan (1603–1868), and England (1588–1780). According to Holt and Turner, "shortly after the final dates listed, Japan and England entered upon a period of rapid industrialization, whereas France and China lagged behind in varying degrees. If there are significant political requirements for economic growth, and if there was no obvious technological factor at work, we should expect to find certain political similarities between France and China, on the one hand, that distinguish them from Japan and England on the other." It was the patterns of similarity and difference that supposedly provided them with the basis for developing hypotheses concerning the political requirements for economic growth at the stage of early industrialization. Even though the empirical analysis of their four cases was not presented to provide an explanation of why England and Japan managed to achieve take-off quickly after the techniques of industrial production became known, while France and China lagged behind, they did this to a great extent by their excellent handling of the historical data.

A minor flaw that mars Holt and Turner's book is their concern only with domestic political factors that had an influence upon economic growth. They are aware of this problem and dismiss it in their prologue. They realize that there were other factors that were important, such as foreign wars and international involvements, but these lie outside the boundaries of their present interest. I am afraid that in their search for analytical rigor, they sacrifice empirical proof for logical consistency, perhaps, fully knowing that it may well not be epistemologically possible to have both. In two of their cases, Japan and China, domestic political factors that had an influence upon economic growth may be considered secondary compared to the importance of external threats and intervention. In the 19th century, China may have slowly modernized and overcome her national inadequacies had it not been for the depressive and exploitative influences of foreign imperialism. Granted, that the major determinants of China's response lay within Chinese society and not outside it, but if China had not been beaten to her feet by foreign powers, there may have been a greater chance for her to change and modernize. Western imperialism stimulated Japan and the fear of the "White Peril" was a major factor in motivating the samurai elite to bring about many reforms that were responsible for Japan's leap into the industrial age. I think Holt and Turner should have paid more attention to the problem of exogenous forces influencing economic growth even though they do not entirely ignore them. Either way, this is not a major defect and their arguments stand well enough on their own.

In Chapter 1, Holt and Turner give a critique of what they claim to be the most significant methodological works that are related to their research. According to them, "this critique is focused upon the writings of scholars who have made the most significant contributions to the solution of crucial methodological problems." Though they warn the readers who are not especially interested in methodological issues to begin their reading in Chapter 2, there is still a doubt in my mind as to the value of the first chapter. It would appear to be incidental to the main thrust of the book even though it is a lucid attempt to explicate and criticize some of the major approaches to the study of the process of political development. The short treatment of the Soviet Union from 1930 to 1965 in the Appendix also seems apart from the main thrust of the book even though Holt and Turner include it in order to demonstrate how their conceptual framework might be applied at other stages of economic development. They really do not need the section on the Soviet Union since they accomplish the same purpose in Chapter 6—"The Take-off Stage: Japan and England."

Holt and Turner give a series of controversial and challenging hypotheses in Chapter 7. They not only posit a series of stimulating hypotheses on the impact of the functions of government and the procedures of governing upon economic development, but also make an important methodological contribution in their approach to empirically generated hypotheses. They point out that they consider empirically generated hypotheses that are derived from a very small number of cases to possess three marked weaknesses. (1) There is always a probability that the patterns of similarity and difference which emerge from the analysis are idiosyncratic. (2) The scholar has little notion of the level of generality of the hypotheses. (3) It is difficult to develop a research design which can test such hypotheses and at the same time be useful in the testing of a significant theory. In order to avoid these problems as much as possible they attempt to introduce a special step in the development of their hypotheses. First, they examine the patterns of similarity and difference which emerge from their data and formulate hypotheses that appear to be most consistent with these patterns. Second, they examine these empirically generated hypotheses in relationship to a number of social science theories from which the hypotheses could conceivably have been deduced. Third, they modify the hypotheses so that they are consistent both with the empirical data of the exploratory study and with the theories they have examined. Where they have problems with the complexity of the theoretical argument, the two forms of a given hypothesis are kept distinct by labeling the empirically generated form as the preliminary hypothesis. The hypothesis that has been modified in light of what they consider to be relevant theories in the social sciences and is supposed to be ready for "testing" is designated as the final hypothesis.

In summary, the substance of this book is superb. The authors have done an excellent job, although they could have shortened their book by excluding what I consider to be an overabundance of theorization. They also provide a very comprehensive bibliography that shows the extensiveness of their research. All in all, Holt and Turner have written a book that is certainly a major contribution to the study of the problems of development.

GERALD A. WEINER

Indiana University

Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress. BY MYRON WEINER. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 509, $12.50.)

This is Myron Weiner's third volume on Indian politics, rounding out his two earlier studies of the leadership, history and ideological range of all national parties, and how the national regime "manages" the emerging interest-group "infrastructure." The field work for the volume under review was done during 1961–62. The author has steadfastly maintained two only-partly reconcilable objectives (p. 3). He has sought, first, through five intensive case studies at the local-state level in three rural-urban and two primarily urban districts,* to explain "why the Congress party has been relatively successful in winning elections and providing the country with stable government." Second, he has tried to place his work in the context of contemporary development theory in comparative politics "by exploring the conditions under which a modern political organization develops." The latter objective evidently requires a different analytical apparatus than the case studies; at any rate, it turned out to involve no less than an overall appraisal of the impact of the Congress party upon the policy output and structural evolution of the Indian political system. This final report amply confirms Weiner's high status among the well-informed observers and interpreters of Indian society and politics. In overall perspective, however, a fascinating puzzle remains: Why has Weiner apparently been unwilling to join such men as Rajni Kothari, Gopal Krishna, W. H. Morris-Jones and George Rosen, who have ventured to conceptualize "the Congress system," *distinct from the party organization of the I.N.C.*, as the principal *agent* and *vehicle* of Indian political development?

---

* In India the district is the basic common unit of local government and party organization above the village and taluka. It usually contains a dozen or more state assembly districts, two or more parliamentary constituencies, and from one to three million population.

The main body of the book, comprising eighteen chapters, presents case analyses of five differing, local political situations (Calcutta, West Bengal; Madurai, Madras; Belgaum, Mysore; Kaira, Gujarat; Guntur, Andhra Pradesh). Three introductory chapters deal with the methodological and historical aspects of the project; two summarize the author's conclusions concerning Congress' contribution to India's national economic and political development.

In analyzing organization performance at the district level, the author employs an implicit functional approach. He marshalls an impressive array of evidence relating Congress' success to its leaders' unflagging attention, commitment and capacity for: (1) steadily-increasing voter participation, (2) organizational maintenance, (3) open recruitment of "primary" and "active" members, (4) helping individuals from all social strata to satisfy their material needs, mobility aspirations, group (caste, language, religious) identities, and cultural ideals, (5) sharing power with, and accommodating the conflicting demands of traditional and modernizing elites, (6) conciliating and adjusting disputes both within its own ranks and in the community's status and power structure. The materials are relevant, penetrating, always fascinating; but of course case study methods do not produce statistical measures of the relation between party electoral success or failure and variations in voter and elite attitudes with respect to the six variables (see the forthcoming Eldersveld-Marvick study of the Fourth General Elections).

Weiner brings out quite clearly the structural features of Congress party organization that were associated with its success in winning elections and providing stable governments from 1947–57. These were extreme factionalism, reliance upon personal and historical charisma, parochial and particularistic bases of support, constantly shifting coalitions of power, frequent defections from and re-absorptions into the party. But he does not squarely face the problem posed by the question: Were not these *institutional characteristics* of the party simultaneously both functional and dysfunctional to the successful operation of the political system (let alone nation-building)? In this and in his previous books he has shown how many intellectuals and spiritual leaders (the saintly tradition) have been alienated from Congress. He might have gone much further in demonstrating how these and other features of Congress party politics have produced decisions and policy-making practices that retard modernization and economic development; how they foster and sometimes reward groupism and defection from the party; and above all, how they help to undermine attitudes of willing respect, voluntary collaboration and presumptive legitimacy toward the centralizing, nationalizing institutions of both party and the regime with which Congress is identified.

In the final chapter, obviously written after the 1967 General Elections which (aside from Kerala) first produced widespread evidence of the Congress' declining power to govern at the state level, the author contemplates the inevitability of the party's defeat nationally, but in the same breath he rejects the inevitability of its disintegration. In line with the professed purposes of the study, it would have been enlightening if the author's field studies had enabled him to construct more systematically the shape of the more likely alternatives to Congress party dominance at state and local levels, and if he could have specified the organizational conditions necessary for a developing nation "to establish a balanced relationship between the interests and ambitions of individuals and the goals of the institutions to which they belong" (p. 495). His final theoretical position is scarcely distinguishable from that of those formalists and dialecticians who edify us with the truism that if a political system fails to satisfy its structural-functional requisites it will be replaced by another.

Perhaps because of his and LaPalombara's preoccupation with *parties* instead of *party systems*, Weiner evidently has little use for the "developing" typology of political systems (Shils, Almond-Coleman, Apter, Riggs). We can only infer that he would classify India somewhere between (1) the "participant-libertarian, alternating-majority" system-type of political recruitment and policy formation, and (2) the "reconciliatory-adaptive, coalitional-consensus" type, closer to the latter than the former. He would probably agree that continued postponement of economic performance, plus other internal and external pressures, might result in transforming the Indian polity into a (3) "hegemonic-mobilization, pyramidal, mass-indoctrination" system, and he would presumably join most Indian specialists in doubting that she will swing as far as the (4) "sacred-collectivity, hierarchical, modernizing autocracy."

Party Building In A New Nation greatly advances our understanding of the conditions under which one dominant-party system guided the transition during the first twenty years of post-colonial, independent nation-building. Much remains to be done, however, in clarifying and elaborating our empirical theories of how the dominant-party, reconciliation-coalition system increases or decreases legitimacy and consensus, and, further, in improving our analytical instruments for comparing nations as their politico-economic systems converge or diverge under the pressures of time, international conflict, technological change and unsatisfied human demands.

AVERY LEISERSON

Vanderbilt University

International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast. BY DAVID W. WAINHOUSE AND ASSOCIATES. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 663. $10.00.)

The United Nations: Peace and Progress. BY ALF ROSS. (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 443. $8.00.)

International Peace Observation is a solid and uniquely comprehensive examination of a political art invented and put into practice in this epoch. As a source book it fills a gap in the literature and will be a mine of reference for scholars and others for years to come. Its value lies both in its generalities, and in the 70 cases drawn from the experience since 1920 in the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States, as well as several multinational cases outside these formal organizations.

If I may pick one major nit at the outset, by opting for the label "Peace Observation," the authors have, I fear, not necessarily clarified the semantics of what is an already confused lexicon. They define "Peace Observation" as a method "whereby the organized international community initiates a third party intervention as soon as possible in a threatening situation with a view to permitting calmer judgments to allay the potential or actual conflict." This covers far more than observing, patrolling, and reporting. It subsumes much that has in the past been called "Peacekeeping" (which they unaccountably limit to collective acts by "considerable" military forces to bring about a cessation of hostilites). Their definition of "peace observation" also includes other kinds of activities that have in the past paraded under the label of "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." The functions of ascertaining facts and calling for as well as supervising a ceasefire in fact lend themselves to all three rubrics. But it is certainly far too late to quarrel with the authors about this, and we should gracefully accept their idiom while making the best use possible of their splendid research efforts.

Their treatment of cases usefully describes and evaluates international action for each. They remind us that under the League of Nations, when Great Britain and France were in accord, the League succeeded (for example between 1920 and 1930, except for the Vilna dispute), but after 1930 the presence of other great powers fouled up this harmonious situation. It is helpful to be reminded of some of the useful modalities of pacific settlement under the League of Nations such as the Commissions of Enquiry, and of fact-finding efforts which were able to suggest solutions as well (there were some who would call this "Peacemaking"!). Their findings for the League of Nations successes, while not surprising, are useful: speed in taking up the case was most important, as was the cooperation of the parties, the agreement of great powers, and the quality of observers. My only quarrel with this section is with such extraordinarily guarded statements as: "Whether Facist or Communist governments after 1931 would have permitted their nationals such freedom from government control, or whether such freedom is enjoyed by Soviet officials operating under the United Nations today, is a question of some significance" (p. 11).

Useful data, gathered here on OAS actions, are not usually presented in conjunction with United Nations material. The Inter-American Peace Committee has exercised peace observation functions, the authors tell us, bringing the parties together and suggesting procedures to them (didn't we used to call that "Pacific Settlement of Dispute"?). Written in June 1965, the authors assert "there has never been a peace-keeping operation in Latin America"; it is too bad they did not wait a month or so. Also, it is not clear why the Guatemalan case study is included, since no peace observation was carried out by any international organization. The conclusion is that OAS peace observation machinery is ample, "effective, and useful." But I cannot help feeling that the authors dismiss OAS-type peace observation operations elsewhere—for example Africa—a bit too cavalierly, considering for example the OAU peace observation operation actually conducted in 1964 in the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute. As for the UN, their discussion of cases is comprehensive and generally excellent.

In the last hundred pages the authors look at the future character and role of peace observation arrangements under the UN, including an examination of possible conditions in a disarming or disarmed world. They consider the establishment of a UN peace observation corps and the earmarking of observation units by member states. They examine such practical problems as the selection, training, size, and composition of standing or *ad hoc* peace observation groups; terms of reference; procedures and methods of activating such an operation under the UN; reports and reporting procedures; and the relation of a peace observation corps to international military peacekeeping operations. An annex contains a detailed plan for organizing and equiping such a corps.

In terms of thoroughness, exhaustive coverage, and sound scholarship, the work in question is of high value. Despite my quarrels with its semantics, I do not choose to be anti-semantic, and salute the authors for a splendid piece of work.

Professor Ross teaches law at the University of Copenhagen. The purpose of his book is the always commendable one of seeking to understand the United Nations as a political phenomenon, and the author succeeds in wisely conjoining realism with idealism. He correctly presupposes that only a Soviet-American *rapprochement* can save the world. He not so correctly is critical of the United States but not its potential partner, for lack of foresight in this regard.

The book is less a text than a series of essays. It covers the history, functions, membership, and what Mr. Ross calls the "apparatus" of the UN. Unlike some other professors of law, Mr. Ross seems to see clearly the relationship between the development of community and consensus, and the growth of law. In his eagerness to criticize McCarthyism in the United States I found him a little naive concerning the use of the United Nations by the Soviets as an espionage base—a fact that is well established and available on inquiry even in Copenhagen.

The principal problem with this book is that, although it was published in 1966 and was written in early 1965, many of his references are considerably out of date. I could find only one reference in the entire book later than 1962, nothing later than 1961 in most sections, and most of the references date back to the 1950's. Surely American and Western European literature is not that slow in penetrating to Denmark.

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Perspectives of a Moroccan Nationalist. BY DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD. (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminister Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 171. $6.00.)

Morocco-Tunisia: Politics and Planning. BY DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1965. Pp. xx, 65. $2.75 paper.)

National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan. BY DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 439. $10.00.)

Professor Ashford's three studies have a common theme in that they all explore problems of nation-building and modernization in recently emancipated ex-colonial Islamic societies. Each, however, deals with a different aspect of development and their geographic coverage is not identical.

In his *Perspectives of a Moroccan Nationalist,* the earliest of the three studies, the author describes and analyzes the Moroccan Istiqlal Party on the basis of an extensive questionnaire circulated among the party members in 1958. The implied assumption of this procedure has been that the Istiqlal, as the main political instrument of the Moroccan struggle for independence, should be considered as representative of Moroccan nationalism. The questionnaire was addressed to over 1,200 party secretaries, of whom 337 responded. Of the latter number the replies of those who had more than five omissions and/or partial responses were rejected. As a result, 93 duly-filled questionnaires served as a basis for this study. The detailed character and careful organization of the questionnaire provided the author with ample material for analysis, thus offsetting the disadvantage of having to deal with a sample representing only one-sixteenth of the party secretaries. No important facet of the secretaries' personal background and service as functionaries of a major organization was neglected. A number of questions addressed themselves to the respondents' attitudes on questions of national and local interest. What emerged was a detailed profile of an important segment of society throwing light on the problems and challenges of the Moroccan polity in transition.

In his brief, comparative monograph on planning in Morocco and Tunisia, the author deals with the often neglected (by economic planners) political aspects of planning. As Bertram M. Gross justly observes in his preface to the study, plan implementation "requires, in addition to economic plans that are technically implementable, institutional change, managerial capacity, and political action." Professor Ashford employs in his discussion of planning two notions borrowed from cultural anthropology, those of "symbolic change" and "ritual change." The first of these represents a change in attitudes, the second a change in behavior. One without another cannot assure success of the planning process. What is needed is the interaction of the two. In the two central chapters the author discusses, first, the political forces in the commitment to planning, and, secondly, participation and the planning effort. His conclusions regarding Morocco tend toward pessimism largely on account of "the capricious political system" which may "prevent adaptation to the needs of planning . . . and growing political awareness." By contrast, according to the author, Tunisia's "single-party system has shown itself well suited to mobilizing popular opinion and influential groups on behalf of planning." The author warns, however, that "the single party may operate with effectiveness at Tunisia's present stage of development, but it may also be contributing to the social transformation that will make its hegemony more difficult to sustain."

Compared with the two preceding studies, *National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan* is a major work of comparative politics in which the author focuses on political participation, especially on the local level, as a key to the process of development affecting the totality of an emerging new nation. His inquiry embraces three systems: "the traditional approach of the Moroccan monarchy, the activist solution advocated by the Tunisian single-party system, and the highly professional view of politics represented by Pakistan." "The burden of inquiry," states the author, "is to elaborate and describe how each government does indeed respond to the developmental challenge." The book is divided into four major sections of varying length. The first contains a thought-provoking discussion of broader issues arising from the quality and intensity of the government's purposeful intervention in the process of modernization. The second, entitled "National Politics and Localized Authority" offers a detailed historical and contemporary review of the Moroccan commune, the Tunisian municipal council, and the Pakistani system of Basic Democracies. The third, devoted to planning and rural development, deals with problems of land reform, public works, education, and administrative reform. The fourth aims at an analysis of the national development and "attitudinal change." In this last section the author further develops some of the themes initially introduced in his monograph on planning in Morocco and Tunisia; namely the conceptual articulation and ideological manifestation with regard to perceptions of national development in the three countries under review. He also distinguishes three periods in the shaping of attitudes: the pre-national, the national, and the post-national. He claims that "in the national phase it is difficult to use institutions to build participation and involvement" inasmuch as, as Tunisia's case illustrates, the main motive force for development is to be found in "a high degree of ideological manifestation." Throughout his study Dr. Ashford lays emphasis on the primacy of politics in the developmental process, a view which today will find considerable consensus as against the earlier oversimplified technoeconomic approaches.

Well organized, combining a wealth of empirical data with the depth of analysis, Dr. Ashford's volume constitutes a significant contribution to the understanding of the problems of modernization in the three selected Islamic countries.

George Lenczowski
University of California, Berkeley

China After Mao. By A. Doak Barnett. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. 287. $6.00.)

China Looks at the World. By Francois Geoffroy-Dechaume. (New York: Random House, 1967. Pp. 237. $4.95.)

Literary Dissent in Communist China. By Merle Goldman. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. xvii, 343. $7.95.)

The Red Guard. By Hans Granqvist. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. ix, 159. $5.95.)

The Geoffroy-Dechaume and Granqvist volumes are relevant for the non-specialist. Barnett's work is also primarily for the non-specialist and teachers of Chinese politics. Merle Goldman has published a serious piece of scholarship. All four books are concerned about various aspects of the Communist Chinese revolution.

Hans Granqvist is a Swedish journalist who has twice in the past four years taken trips of two months duration to mainland China. He has woven an account of events leading to the "cultural revolution." The author sets the stage for the "cultural revolution" by discussing the economic and political environment prior to 1966. Though the author's observations add little of substance to our small store of knowledge about Communist China, the reader might profit by reflecting on this latest set of journalistic images brought from the mainland. The author feels, for example, that confidence in the regime had returned by 1964 and that Mao ". . . had clearly arrived at the point where he was able to launch a new revolutionary tidal wave." Perhaps more startling is the statement, apropos of 1964, that the Chinese in Peking seemed better off materially than the Russians in Moscow. No evidence is offered for these statements. The author is content to put the rise of the Red Guard down to Mao's continuing attempt to legislate equality and achieve a Utopia where no groups are superior to the masses. To reach this conclusion it is assumed that Mao is a "revolutionary romantic," one who is "happier" in times of revolution than periods of peaceful change.

The central theme of Geoffroy-Dechaume's *China Looks at the World* is Chinese culture or civilization and inter-societal images about China and the West. The author is a French diplomat with extensive training and experience in Sinological affairs. His personal effort toward greater understanding between the Chinese and Western world results in a curious Spenglarian-like historical synthesis. An erudition of a very personal and metaphysical quality characterizes this work which ranges from writing systems to political conflict to the broadest eclectic intellectual history imaginable. The author states that he is aware of the pitfalls of this effort, but feels that scholars too often remain on the "platonic" level.

Doak Barnett's latest effort, *China After Mao,* falls also in the food for non-specialists' category with one qualification. Political scientists not primarily concerned with China may ignore the first two works, but would profit from the summary essay provided by Barnett. Barnett, one of the most sensitive and prolific China watchers, presents no new material, but focuses on the social, political, and economic background factors which provide the environment for current events on the mainland. The author reviews the considerable achievements of the Communist Chinese elite, creation of a disciplined and successful revolutionary movement, a mass political party without parallel, and the initiation of ". . . a significant program of industrialization." The major section of the introductory essay deals with the basic economic and social challenges facing the regime, the imminence of a very critical change in political leadership in the Party, and the basic prescriptions in Mao's ideological dream for the future. The rest of the volume reprints selected key documents emanating from the Chinese Communist Central Committee on the "cultural revolution," Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of People's War," and other documents reflecting Mao's thought.

Merle Goldman offers an original piece of scholarship on the problem of conflict between the Chinese Communist party and leading leftwing Chinese writers in the 1940's and 1950's. The conflict between the Party and the literary intellectuals, one of conflicting values—ideological conformity versus the need for free inquiry—has left many scars. The author presents impressive evidence that the Party leaders have not entirely succeeded in purifying their writers of unorthodox tendencies.

The basic problem is that imperatives guiding writers of any, and including Maoist, ideological inclination demand a degree of independence of thought often found unacceptable to political elites attempting to industrialize. The author does not speculate on the reasons for the tension, but rather unravels the Kafka-like environment in which, in historical order, writers of the ilk of Hu Feng, Hsiao Chun, and Ting Ling were "constructively criticized" through Cheng Feng campaigns. Cheng Feng movements, originating in the early 1940's, were designed to create a disciplined devoted cadre and intellectual core. The movement was developed in order to alter basic behavior patterns of intellectuals to conform with the Party line. We are taken through a series of Cheng Feng campaigns and thus see the development of the most extreme psychological techniques, such as public criticism, self-criticism, and re-criticism, which are used against the writers. Yet the author concludes that after two decades of denunciation and self-depreciation, the writers remain alienated, often counter-productive, and independent. The one sanction the writers apparently unconsciously exploit, namely the political elite's dependence on their productivity as a group, may partially explain the series of relaxation periods throughout the 1950's culminating in the Hundred Flowers Movement.

Literary Dissent in Communist China joins the painfully small group of volumes which provide valuable information about contemporary China. An excellent bibliography and glossary citing major Chinese language source material adds to the usefulness of the work.

It would be unfair to criticize the historian Goldman for not writing a sociological analysis of the problem investigated. Likewise, Barnett's work is introductory and historical. Yet the two works reflect a general malaise in works on China of potential relevance for political scientists. Perhaps the most crucial difficulty is that of concept formation and evidence. Nowhere does Goldman define the concept intellectual; rather, and improperly, common intersubjective understanding of the term is assumed. Neither author attempts to explain events under analysis. Without dwelling on the problem of "facts speaking for themselves," frameworks of considerable power are available for application. If, for example, central political organizations such as the Chinese

Communist party are viewed as reference groups and ideologies as guides for societal communication networks which are very difficult to maintain in the absence of a set of relatively stable social values and norms, the political elite's constant attempts to exorcise ideological deviation may be more understandable. Imaginative comparative analysis of other regime's efforts at controlling their intellectual class might yield generalizations of improved value.

Major difficulties paralyze our attempts to create a genuinely profitable academic political science dialogue about Communist China. First, there is the absence of scholars who have the sufficient language and area training plus enough political science discipline concentration. Second, analysis of political problems in a closed society poses critical data problems. Granting these difficulties, more careful explication of the unit of analysis and the elements of the research design apparatus, and the employment of strategies such as content analysis on substantive questions and comparative analysis of social background characteristics of inter-societal political elites may facilitate the dialogue thus far conspicuous by its absence.

ROGER W. BENJAMIN
University of Minnesota

Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939–1941. BY SAUL FRIEDLANDER. (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1967. Pp. xi, 328. $6.95.)

The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–39. BY ROBERT O'NEILL. (New York: J. H. Heinemann, 1966. Pp. xiii, 286. $8.50.)

Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party. BY JOSEPH NYOMARKAY. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967. Pp. 161. $5.00.)

Three separate but very intriguing facets of the rise and fall of the Nazi regime are highlighted by these penetrating scholarly studies: the internal convulsions of the movement on its way to power (Nyomarkay), the crucial rivalry between the party hierarchy and the officer corps (O'Neill), and the policies of moderation vis-à-vis the U.S. pursued by the Third Reich to keep the U.S. from abandoning its isolationist stance which abetted Hitler's control over the Continent (Friedlander). An unexpected but distinctly discernible theme underlying all three works would seem to be the obstacles that lay in the way of Hitler's ascendancy to power. That he could mold the rabble of his early followers into a compact political force, that he could prevail over prestigious and established representatives of the military and, at a later date, through skillful diplomatic maneuvering keep the U.S. at least at arms length, would seem to be less the result of well thought out and prepared plans than of Hitler's almost uncanny ability to take advantage of the weaknesses and unimaginativeness of his adversaries. The ideologically unsophisticated, even primitive character of his early following was no match for Hitler's unscrupulous techniques of persuasion, the officer corps was blinded by its own arrogance, and the Western powers' hesitancy always left most foreign policy options at the discretion of Hitler.

It is especially Friedlander's competent and profuse documentation that conveys a sense of the opportunistic rather than carefully planned nature of Hitler's foreign policy. From Friedlander's meticulous perusal of diplomatic correspondence and other foreign policy documents Hitler emerges as a much less arrogant or politically naive dictator than later assessments have portrayed him. Surprisingly it is FDR who, in his determination to foil Nazi policies in Europe even at the risk of war, barely escapes being cast in the role of sinister Machiavellian. If evidence as presented by a scholar of Friedlander's acknowledged sympathetic objectivity to the Allied cause can give this impression, there is reason to be apprehensive about the interpretations of future generations of scholars who may have less cause to skew their impartiality in the direction of the democracies! Between 1939 and 1941 Hitler was extremely careful to keep the U.S. out of the war, to the point even of wanting to avoid a confrontation at all costs. Despite the urgings of his admirality to the contrary, he gave strict orders not to provoke any naval incidents with the U.S. FDR, on the other hand, wanted to assist England in every possible way without necessarily foregoing the risk of involvement. To be sure, much of Hitler's diplomatic moves vis-à-vis the U.S. derived from his continued probing of the strategic potential of the U.S.; he did not want the U.S. to mobilize its full military strength prior to the successful completion of the campaign against Russia. Certainly the influence of neutralists and isolationists in the U.S. was sufficiently strong to lend a great deal of plausibility to Hitler's political calculations. Foremost among those was his speculation that Japan's entrance in the war against England and the Soviet Union would keep the U.S. neutral because of her fear of becoming involved in a two-front war. But somehow FDR had long since decided that a risk of a two-front war could be borne and that Japan's expansionist policies would not act as a deterrent to legitimate American goals in the Pacific; thus American diplomatic maneuvers were deliberately designed to give Japan only the option between war or a total reversal of her foreign policy. Toward Germany, American policy was quite openly one of entrapping her into a crass act of aggression against American shipping on the high seas. But Hitler simply would not oblige—and then obliged only too well by issuing his declaration of war subsequent to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. It will probably always remain one of the more fascinating exercises to speculate on whether in the absence of such a declaration the U.S. and the Third Reich would have gone to war against each other. Friedlander does not make a wholly convincing case for the inevitability of Hitler's action. He suggests Hitler's loyalty to his Asian allies and his conviction that a quick victory over Russia would confront the U.S. with a nearly invincible Germany dominating a vast, monolithic continental bloc. Friedlander's own exposition of the logic of Hitler's action up to that point weaken this explanation. Undoubtedly Hitler did believe that he could yet destroy Russia militarily according to the timetable he had set for himself—but might not such a quick defeat of Bolshevism have created entirely new opportunities for the relationship between the Reich and a still non-belligerent U.S.?

The second work before us is yet another attempt to penetrate the real attitudes of the German Generals toward Nazism and to provide evidence that even if the Generals cannot be relieved of the parts played by them in putting Hitler into power they can at least be shown as having fought his aggressive and criminal designs for world conquest every step of the way. The author has engaged in very serious and careful scholarship designed to overcome the picture of the German General Staff as willing and pliable tools for the execution of the Führer's will. Based on the minute investigation of official documents, as well as unofficial records and conversations with surviving German Generals, Dr. O'Neill has tried to arrive at an explanation as to why the conservative, exceedingly professional and Christian German High Command could allow itself to be used as it was by Hitler and his cynical political supporters. Briefly his argument is that this highly patriotic, professional officercorps fought Hitler's unprincipled machinations every step along the way toward rearmament and aggression; that certainly prior to Hitler's personal assumption of the office of Minister of War in 1938, the army never harbored any independent aggressive design. Though many officers certainly had clear ideas with respect to the restoration of German military strength and appreciated the favorable climate for such policy offered by the Nazi government, they were also equally repelled by the intrusion of Nazism in the form of political indoctrination and made a determined effort to keep the army free of such contamination. O'Neill is especially concerned to cast the person and role of General v. Fritsch in a new and more favorable light by showing that he was among those who manfully tried to stem the tide of Nazification of the military. But the author's labors cannot be said to introduce any new evidence that would justify a reversal of the impression that Fritsch and most of his peers left to the world: of a military leadership that was undoubtedly disdainful of Hitler's methods, and some of whom even despised him personally, but who supported his policies willingly enough as long as they could be expected to lead to a militarily powerful, internationally respected and economically autonomous Germany. Even O'Neill has to admit disconsolatedly in the end that "there was much about the Third Reich in its prewar years which seemed to the German Army at large wholly right and proper."

What the work does provide is less an explanation of the ambiguous role of the Generals than a series of rather sketchy portraits of the personal views of a selected number of Generals. The overall impression is that of the self-serving and sycophantic nature of Generals Blomberg, Reichenau and Keitel whose personal ambitions and weak character alone contributed to making Hitler's policy of breaking the will of the army a success. This is a decided oversimplification of the known circumstances that surrounded the subjugation of the army to the party. Much more than personal predilections, there was a distinct orientation away from real political involvement bred into the army under the leadership of von Seeckt who correctly, if arrogantly, assumed that the state owed its existence to the army. The estrangement of the army from the republic played directly into the hands of the Nazis who could play upon the hostility of the officer corps to the republic. That officercorps became the prisoner of its own ideology when it equated Hitler's vulgar nationalism with its own and permitted, especially its younger officers, to embrace Nazism with enthusiasm because of its promises of new opportunities, adventure and prestige. But even those who supported the republic feared the power of the one group, the military, with whose aid that republic would have to be defended against its enemies. A fearful liberalism either ignored or retreated before the Reichswehr and it became the tragedy of the Weimar republic that the initial attempt to build a republican army following the armistice had to give way so quickly to the forces of tradition and restoration that succeeded in the establishment of the Versailles decreed 100,000 man army. Thus it was the spirit of the arrogant General von Seeckt which imbued the Reichswehr and led to its near alienation from political leadership. That the counter revolution from which Hitler drew his strength could succeed, was made possible by the fact that the state in which an alienated army merely "camped" felt indebted to that army for having redressed the balance between civilian and military authorities in favor of the former. No one ever addressed himself directly to the basic problem of how to integrate a professional army, and especially an officercorps shaped along specific, i.e., monarchic, concepts of duty, honor and loyalty, within a democratic state that did not accord with its own conception of nation or state! The Reichswehr, as Benoist-Mechin has pointed out so perceptively was an army without a nation. It was not merely Hitler's promises of rearmament and universal military training that intrigued the army but his ability to recapture the "nation" again for its soldiers that made him so invincible in the eyes of the Generals. Also, Hitler was very careful during the early years of power to recognize and respect the insistence ef the military on autonomy vis-à-vis the political organs of the state—and he could do this the better because of the reliability of the two key-figures among the Generals: Blomberg and Reichenau. Blomberg was only following von Seeckt's guidelines when he saw in Hitler's policies the opportunity for the Reichswehr to be relieved of political problems and intrigues so that it could dedicate itself wholeheartedly to its original task of the creation of a military expertise. It was this withdrawal of the officercorps into "purely" expert problems of military strategy and rearmament that made possible its ignoring of the brutal realities that led to the bloodbath of June 30, 1934. It was none other than v. Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army at the time, who noted the murder of two of his fellow officers, with the recorded remark: "We cannot change Politics, but we must do our duty." Because the Reichswehr ideal was that of autonomous power within the state, it could no more oppose the trauma of dictatorial government than it could fulfill its correct role within a democratic framework.

Professor Nyomarkay's extremely provocative study centers on the role of Hitler's charisma as a factor which elevated him above the factional strife of his movement making him thereby the object rather than the subject of rivalries among his followers. In discussing the differences between Nazi factionalism and that of other totalitarian movements, the author hopes to generate fresh thinking on the relationship of factional behavior to the legitimacy of power leading toward a new typology for factional behavior based on the nature and degree of group cohesion. Nyomarkay's theory hinges on two considerations: his distinction between ideology and *Weltanschauung* and his use of charisma as a means for the integration of widely diverging factional behavior. *Weltanschauung*, according to Nyomarkay, unlike ideology, projects the metaphysically unlimited world of thought, denoting its necessarily esoteric and vague content, unconcerned with any immediacy of action. Consequently it lends itself admirably to personification by an imaginative leader who bends its essentially unshaped form to suit his highly personal goals. Thus general feelings of racial superiority, veneration of tradition, and suspicion of the outside world could be exploited to accept antisemitism, authoritarianism, and militarism as means to control a hostile environment. Because the success of such sentiments depended primarily on their effective articulation by a personal leader, it was less important to test their validity than believe in the integrity of the leader. Thus factions caused by disagreements on certain programmatic points could be permitted to exist as long as their members did not waver in their loyalty to the leader. By contrast, the highly complex philosophical and scientific apparatus of an ideology such as Marxism, with its process of constant refinement and reinterpretation fosters exactly the kind of splinter groups, sects and deviations that resist the integrative effect of a powerful personality unless they are subjected to outright, violent, repression. This distinction between ideology and *Weltanschauung* is indeed useful since it restores to ideology its role as the creator of authoritative concepts that make politics more meaningful by infusing it with a systematic and central organizing principle. Also, Hitler emerges as an essentially antipolitical personality whose goal was not the reconciliation of divergent facets of his program but the undying loyalty of his lieutenants to his person.

While the proposition concerning factional behavior in the early Nazi movement merits serious attention and contributes to our understanding of its powers of attraction for those who needed a mythos to overcome their insecurities, the use of the charismatic category would appear to suffer from a lack of theoretical precision. Certainly Hitler's personality acted as an important crystallizing force and his singular dedication provided the kind of psychological comfort that permitted the concentration on his person of many of the aspirations that agitated his contemporaries caught in the throes of a disintegrating political system. But can irresponsible, ruthless, albeit skillful manipulation be equated with the power radiating from charisma? Must the ability to deal successfully with variously aligned factions be necessarily attributable to the kind of power that precludes rational explanation? Even the author appears to hesitate over his use of this category since he supports his argument with examples of leaders who were patently not charismatic types yet successfully dealt with factions among their supporters. Besides, such attribution courts the danger of circular reasoning since the very recognition of Hitler's charisma presupposes solidarity among his followers without providing any cogent explanation for its existence. Would not the really charismatic leader ignore factions altogether, refusing to deal with them either positively or negatively? Factionalism implies sectarianism and such a process has been known to accompany the demise of charisma rather than its ascendancy. As used in this work the principle of charisma could easily be applied to nearly every powerful American president thereby leading unavoidably to its dilution. If charisma is to retain operational significance it should be reserved for those whose inspirational, prophetary, ethical, and aesthetic qualities enable them to lead by the power of their example rather than by manipulation of those whose weaknesses seduce them into attaching themselves to an irrational personality.

All three volumes provide worthwhile new and stimulating insights into the nature of Hitler's National Socialist regime. Their shortcomings also would seem to indicate that a great deal of painstaking scholarship remains to be done before we can arrive at operationally useful and objective criteria for the evaluation of totalitarian movements.

H. P. SECHER

Case Western Reserve University

The Eurocrats. BY ALTIERO SPINELLI. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 229, $5.95.)

Written for a broader audience than the academic community, *The Eurocrats* nevertheless provides a valuable complement to the leading scholarly accounts of the process of European integration. Its author furnishes a concise and thoroughly readable introduction to the background and institutions of the European Communities—but his emphasis is on the problems of unification, told in terms of contending concepts and their partisans. Spinelli is one of the partisans. For him, the central issue has been a struggle between federalists, functionalists and confederalists. A dedicated federalist, his targets include not only the Gaullists, but also the "Eurocrats"—top-level administrators of the European Communities.

Chief among the pro-European forces today, this last group's functionalist techniques have failed to adequately exploit Europe's opportunities, Spinelli charges, and this failure reflects their bureaucratic mentality: cautious, orderly and suspicious of parliaments and publics, those creators of disorder. More specifically, Spinelli criticizes the European Commission for its failure to treat the European Parliament as a real decision center: it could have been developed as a basis for democratic legitimation of the European institutions. Unduly influenced by Monnet's success with the French *Plan*, the Eurocrats fell into the trap of placing excessive confidence in technocratic methods of gaining acceptance for potentially controversial policies. Their source of legitimacy was based on the myths of economic rationality rather than the myths of popular representation. Their concept of European unity became one of a community founded on economic interests, regulated by professional administrators, rather than one based on a popular consensus, and hence governed by political institutions.

Spinelli rejects this "Europe of Offices"—not only because he finds it undemocratic, but because it can furnish no basis for ultimate political choices—choices which had to be made. His goal would be a federal "Europe of Peoples," drawing authority directly from the electorate.

Given the existing decision-making structure, however, the functionalist alternative was probably necessary. Despite the fact that by the 1950's, a pro-European popular majority already existed, decisions in the Communities could be blocked by any one government; virtually since the Common Market came into being, one government has been in the hands of confederalists, dedicated to a "Europe of Nations." It would not tolerate any change which gave European institutions direct contact with the electorate. Faced with this situation, the Eurocrats made shift to justify decisions having strong political implications on technical grounds. As Spinelli concedes, they were quite skillful at expanding the role of the

Brussels institutions in this way. In his book he seems torn between a painful awareness that power based on a direct popular mandate was not immediately possible, and a conviction that it should have remained foremost among the goals, with a tendency to blame the administrators for the current European stalemate.

The lag in European unification does not seem due to the functionalists' failure to choose sufficiently ambitious goals; we must recall that they were attempting to depart from existing patterns. Spinelli may be right in saying that the easiest time to do this would have been in the immediate post-war period, if we consider solely the problems of institutional resistance: it *was* a time of relative flux. But it was also a time of relative weakness and pessimism in Europe. The self-confidence necessary for great innovating ventures was not yet present; time was needed to develop the new institutions which were to replace the familiar nation-state; and time was also needed to heal the animosities engendered by the war. By the early 50's, with a considerable measure of recovery—and with the stimulating example of the European Coal and Steel Community in view—bold ventures *were* proposed. France's rejection of the European Defense Community and the stillbirth of the European Political Community were a defeat for the federalist cause. Though the defeat was narrow, it indicated that, for the time being, traditional fears and passions were still strong enough to block a federal solution. The European strategists shifted back to functionalism—a policy designed to gradually work *around* traditional opposition, rather than attempt another frontal assault. It seems clear that they retained federalist goals, even if in the background. A decade later, with a series of incremental successes behind them, the Eurocrats attempted another major move toward supranationalism; the European Commission's ambitious package of proposals was countered by France's boycott of the Community institutions in 1965–66. This time, unlike in 1954, action was not met with widespread indications of nationalistic feeling in France (quite the contrary happened); nor was it rejected by broad-based groups in Parliament: it was blocked by the will of one man. For de Gaulle has at least one thing in common with Monnet: he, too, sees the European Commission's version of functionalism as all too likely to lead toward federalism. Given the policy preferences of his five partners (and their frequent reluctance to submit to leadership from the Elysée), this would bring with it an intolerable limitation of France's freedom of action.

In short, Spinelli's basic charge against the Eurocrats is not necessarily convincing. Nevertheless, his book performs an important service. Arguing with eloquence and grace, he calls attention to an area which tends to be underemphasized in much of the leading empirical work on European integration—the realm of ideas and values. It is underemphasized, perhaps, because these things do not fit readily into the leading analytic schemes (which tend to be written from a functionalist point of view and to share its emphasis on socioeconomic determinants). Yet, clearly, they can carry great importance. To cite a prominent example, the policies of de Gaulle, which often dominate the European scene, can not readily be derived from the imperatives of economic, technological or strategic reality, but reflect a bold and dramatic assertion of traditional values. In a protest against the greyness which threatens to overtake the "Europe of Offices," Spinelli seems to be calling for an equally bold assertion of new ideas and policy initiatives.

Spinelli never quite spells out how this is to be done, but the success of Servan-Schreiber's recent book *Le Défi Américain*,* illustrates the impact which a new statement of the European idea can have. Like the Eurocrats, Servan-Schreiber draws on the symbols of modernism, rather than the mythology of a glorious past. He takes a new course, however, as he rechannels existing anti-Americanism into a new but more restrained form (one which takes as its first premise the overwhelming *success* of American society). Playing on fears of American domination, he appeals to European desires to play a significant role on the world stage and to maintain an "advanced civilization," based on advanced technology and computerized management. In his estimation of both the success of American society, and the degree to which it constitutes a threat to Europe, he may be overstating his case. He has, however, assembled a set of arguments for a united Europe (including Britain) which has generated widespread interest and even excitement among elite groups within the Europe of the Six. It is a Europe which would, almost necessarily, be federalist enough for Spinelli.

RONALD INGLEHART
University of Michigan

The Democratic Republicans of New York: The Origins, 1763–1797. By ALFRED F. YOUNG. (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, by The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. xv, 636. $12.25.)

---

* Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *Le Défi Américain* (Paris: Denoël, 1967).

New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans: The Genesis of an Early Party Machine. By CARL F. PRINCE. (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, by The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 266. $7.50.)

These two studies of the beginning of political parties and party machinery in the United States are of excellent quality. Furthermore they add to our understanding of a number of problems pertaining to the role of parties in the democratic process, problems which continue to the present day. There are also other problems treated in these books that are common to the process of development, and that still appear in some countries which today are in a comparatively early stage of development.

To come to specifics. Both works are the product of diligent examination of much new material. Each author has examined all the newspapers that are available for the years covered in the respective states—New York and New Jersey. Furthermore the surviving manuscripts of national, state and local political leaders have been systematically culled. The result is a wealth of new information. The work by Young on the *Democratic Republicans of New York* is the broader of the two. It covers political coalitions, the class conflicts of the period, the development of party organization, the decision process, and the relationship to national politics. While long and detailed, it is very rewarding. So, too, is Prince's book on *New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans* but in a more restricted scope, that of party organization, machinery, and leadership.

What is new that emerges from these studies and what confirms earlier findings? Both writers agree with the recent figures of Chilton Williamson in his book *American Suffrage . . . 1760–1869*, that after the American Revolution the suffrage in the states extended to 65 percent of the white male population. Earlier estimates had been for a numerically much smaller electorate. Furthermore this electorate divided according to socio-economic groups. In this respect Young and Prince confirm, although with many changes and refinements, the basic concepts of the economic and social basis of parties. The studies of Charles A. Beard on the *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy* and on the movement for the Constitution are basically confirmed with changes as to detail by Young. There is an excellent bibliographic essay at the end of Young's book, covering the Beard literature and other writings relevant to the period. At the same time the writers confirm the earlier findings of Wilfred Binkley, Peter Charles, Noble Cunninghain, and myself on the economic and social forces behind the Federalists and Republicans. There is also confirmation of the thesis of such writers as Robert Dahl in *Who Governs*, on the transition from aristocracy to democracy.

On the other hand there are many refinements in comparison with the above works and such refinements are developed by Young. In the Colonial period of New York much of the legislative struggle had been between two proprietor factions, the Delanceys and the Livingstons. The Delancey's became Tories. After that the conflict developed between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the movement for the Constitution. Politics developed on a broader scale. The larger families and commercial interests supported the Constitution. The Clintons and a few other large proprietors, led the opposition. The Federalists led by the Schuyler, Hamilton, and Jay families broadened the basis of their support by adopting popular slogans and bringing in broader participation. But most of the small landholders followed the Clinton faction. An exception should be made of the squatters, who organized movements for acquisition of land without compensation. In contrast, the Federalists and Republicans, with an overwhelming majority, supported the system of property and there was no serious threat to the basic system. Mechanics (laborers) in the cities at first supported the Federalist commercial leadership. But after 1793, with the development of a state-federal political party around Jefferson, the mechanics changed to the Democratic Republicans. Some commercial interests, such as those around Aaron Burr, supported the rising Democratic Republicans and Clintonians. This was because the Federalists had access to the Bank of the United States. Therefore others accepted in the commercial groups, but excluded by the Federalists, desired access to banking resources through the channels of a state charter. Also they desired access to state government for land sales, for political positions, for access to power. The outcome was two parties, each providing for vertical mobility within. This likewise provided multiple access to political and social leadership.

It is also true that the frontier threat from the British (until Jay's treaty of 1795), and from the Indians, produced Federalist strength in the frontier area. There was demand from the frontiersmen for the stronger policies of the national government.

The politics of the New Jersey picture is treated in less detail, but the role of party organization is clearly developed in Prince's book.

Party organization played a dominant role as New Jersey was transformed from a Federalist to a Democratic Republic state. The term caucus was used by the early New Jersey Democratic Republicans for the state party legislative caucus during the period of sympathy for the French Revolution, in the early 1790's. Link and others have previously shown the importance of the Democratic Republican societies in increasing the extent of political participation and in broadening the basis of political authority. But the development of party organization also shows what may well be a heritage from the committees of correspondence of the pre-Revolutionary War period. These were revived as campaign committees at the township and county level. Then by 1800 there was the convention that was added at the county and then at the state level. Also in each county there was the party weekly or daily newspaper. Finally the party activists were at the head of this apparatus. These individuals were well rewarded. Over a sixteen-year period from 1801 to 1816, 64 percent of 256 identified party activists received political jobs or other rewards. Citizen participation was broadened but the new leadership received specific rewards. This may raise a question for other developing countries if in modern times complete stress is placed on professionalization of the civil service. Such may well be necessary in complex organizations but the problems of reward for political activism still remain.

In summary, what is presented in these works is the picture of a pluralist society, and a society offering considerable social mobility. Definite rewards for political activity emerged. These included bank charters, land leases, job preferment, social advance, and the use of power. But there also was a spirit of accommodation to new policies, to social change, to emerging new groups of the population, and to new leadership. Fortunately many of the leaders supported policies which were broadly based and, in the end, political opponents were not proscribed. Some of these changes were embraced by the Federalists. But the Democratic Republican Party was the more popular vehicle. Hence except for a revival by the Federalists during the War of 1812, the Democratic Republicans ultimately overwhelmed the opposition. But no single party could encompass all the rival demands. After the demise of the Federalists, new policy differences developed to prevent one-party rule. Even as the Democratic Republicans emerged victorious there developed the seeds of later divisions, and the party struggle continued.

MANNING J. DAUER

University of Florida

The American Occupational Structure. BY PETER BLAU AND OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967. Pp.xi, 520. $14.95.)

Ever so often a work appears which is not about political phenomena in a strict sense, but which many political scientists find valuable. Such a work is represented by this inquiry, in which two of the foremost students of occupational sociology combine their talents. Observers of political life have long been intrigued by the interrelationships between a man's work orientations and his political values, between the allocation of occupational status and political power, and between the occupational structure and political development. I doubt that political scientists concerned with the interlacing of political life and such matters as social stratification, occupational mobility, socialization, achievement orientations, and minority group behavior (to name a few) can ignore this work.

It is well-nigh impossible to summarize the undertaking. Perhaps the best way to begin is to describe the study design. Through cooperation with the Bureau of the Census the authors were able to utilize the interviews obtained with 20 to 64-year-old males as part of the Current Population Survey in March 1962. This was supplemented by questionnaires left with the eligible males; approximately five-sixths of the latter filled out this instrument. The questionnaire and interview data were then collated. In all an unadjusted N of 20,700 resulted, easily the largest and best sample ever obtained for a study of this type.

One of the acknowledged limitations of the study is that no attitudinal, motivational, or perceptual information was gathered. That is, the survey data are almost exclusively "hard" rather than "soft." While this is a handicap in developing a comprehensive model of occupational achievement, it at least has the virtue of highly valid and reliable measurement. Another constraint is that the authors were allowed very little interaction with their data. Due to the special circumstances of the project, all tabulations had to be specified in advance. It is a tribute to their knowledge and perspicacity that the analysis suffers only occasionally from this handicap. In the eyes of some readers a final limitation will be the lack of an explicit theory to guide the research and analysis. The authors are quite clear about why they have not pursued this course, and in any event various theoretical perspectives are found throughout.

In examining the dynamics of the American occupational structure Blau and Duncan employ five keystone variables: the respondent's

1962 occupational status, his first-job status, his education level, father's occupational status, and father's education. With these five variables alone an impressive story can be unfolded about inter- and intra-generational mobility, the relative determinants of status beginnings and destinations, and secular trends.

The initial task was to make a broad sweep of movements among occupational groups (not individuals). Of the many conclusions two seem especially salient for political scientists. First, the white-collar, blue-collar, farm occupational classes serve as more than convenient handles for typing occupations. They also form distinct psychological and skill boundaries severely limiting the flow of downward mobility while permitting upward mobility of greater than chance proportions. The archetype here is the lackluster son of a white-collar father who elects a low-level white-collar position rather than a more remunerative job across the blue-collar boundary. A second salient conclusion deals with structural rigidities. Some observers have claimed that the traditional opportunity structure associated with an egalitarian and open society shows signs of hardening. Using varied data, including four age cohorts from their sample, Blau and Duncan argue that the impact of social origins on occupational destinations has changed hardly at all in the last few decades. Despite changes in immigration flows and fertility rates there seem to be inherent factors facilitating continued mobility.

Having charted the broad movements, the authors then turn to the major task of unravelling the determinants of occupational status and mobility. Among the four major predictors—father's occupation and education, and respondent's education and first job—it is respondent's education which exerts the most powerful effect and first job second most, even though social origins do have an enduring effect. These variables are most assuredly interrelated, but it is one of the great virtues of the book that a basic model employing path coefficients has been utilized to tackle such knotty problems.

A number of additional factors help determine a man's eventual status, although a convincing case is made that such factors are primarily important because they affect educational attainments. Political scientists may be most interested in the several chapters dealing with these other matters. For example, there is a timely chapter on "Inequality of Opportunity" which portrays the fashion in which region, race, and immigration affect occupational chances. While the authors demolish the popular conception of self-perpetuated status, they do demonstrate how the American Negro becomes the victim of an accumulation of disadvantages, resulting in a vicious circle. It appears, incidentally, that it is the better educated Negro who suffers the most from racial discrimination per se.

The bearing of kinship and marriage patterns on careers is taken up in some detail and carried off with consummate skill. Classic and tantalizing questions are considered: the importance of birth order, family size, broken families, social origins of spouse, assortative mating, and so forth. Students of political socialization will find these chapters particularly engaging. By the same token those concerned with the effects of spatial mobility and urbanization on the political process will find the extended material on these topics enlightening.

Most political scientists who use this book will probably be selective since not all of the subject matter is of equal pertinence. At least one set of readers, however, might value the entire effort because it is a virtual primer on data manipulation. There is a dazzling array of analytic and presentation techniques, including transition matrices, smallest space analysis, multiple classification analysis, regression, covariance, path coefficients, and cohort analysis. Furthermore, the authors provide clear and contextually related descriptions of their techniques. They also pinpoint the crucial linkage of methodology to questions of theory and substance.

For the political scientist there is a sobering afterthought. Occupational status is of singular importance in the real world, and it is susceptible to powerful analytic techniques and theoretical treatment. Starting from the single construct of occupational status the sociologist can generate an immense amount of vital information about society, across generations and throughout the life cycle. The question arises as to whether there are any such constructs in the political world, constructs which are of analogous importance, which are amenable to rigorous and quantitative treatment, and which can be extended over time.

M. Kent Jennings
University of Michigan

The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History. By Mark DeWolfe Howe. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. 180. $4.50.)

This book is written with grace and good nature. It leaves the reader feeling he has been instructed by a master teacher who must also have been a "genuine, solid, humble, thoughtful man."[1]

Howe's concern in these Weil Lectures was the theory and therefore the history of church-state law in this country. He accepted the Supreme Court's working maxim that theory and decision must be supported by history in all cases where professions of wisdom can be mistaken for mere assertions of preference. He went on to argue, however, that the theory of much recent church-state law has been infirm because it was based on *bad* history.

The Court's historical premise has been that the First Amendment was the work of men who wanted their government neutral between religion and irreligion. Howe's research led him to assert a different proposition: that, ignorant of this kind of neutrality and remote from Jeffersonian anticlericalism, the enactors of the Amendment were moved by benevolence for the cause of religion. Adoption of the First Amendment was a political decision in favor of religion, reflecting the framers' assumption "That the realm of religious interests and religious convictions occupied a special constitutional status" (p. 160). Evangelical separatists, who gave the religion clauses their purport, wanted the State voluntarily to build a wall between its Wilderness and the Church's Garden, for the sake of the Garden.

Howe believed, in other words, that one of the "most important purposes of the First Amendment was the advancement of the interests of religion" (p. 31). And he was willing to face a possible implication of this finding: that government aid to religion might be called for by the deeper intention of the Amendment. For would not a successful disputation of the minor premise that total separation is in fact beneficial to religion transform the evangelical argument *against* establishment into an argument *for* a mild form of church-state cooperation? On Howe's hypothesis, would not every argument that government *can* help the Garden grow without corrupting it (see p. 152) tend to the conclusion that government *ought* to help it grow (cf. p. 15)?

To say the least, this is a startling conclusion. Howe removed some of the paradox simply by noting that neither the original Constitution nor the First Amentment granted the national government *power* to sponsor religion. But, of course, the original Constitution left this power to the states, and from 1789 until long after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment few thought the First Amendment took it away from them. In that interval state courts developed their own constitutional law of church and state. And Howe insisted that the development of state-court doctrine in those years is a relevant chapter of our legal history: it too must be allowed to inform our present theory. According to Howe, Judge Alphonoso Taft of Ohio represented the nineteenth-century state-court view tolerably well when, in 1870, he said that "'the government is neutral, and while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none'" (p. 150). Although this passage has been quoted recently by the Supreme Court as if it were a true anticipation of present doctrine, Howe tells us that the neutrality Taft had in mind was not the neutrality between religion and irreligion that our Court champions. Taft meant only "the government's neutrality between its associates in a common enterprise" (p. 151).

After passage of the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme Court had the option of (1) not applying the First Amendment to the states, (2) applying it with its evangelical presuppositions, thus sanctioning the kind of non-discriminatory cooperation with churches that state courts had consistently approved, or (3) reading back into the First what Howe regarded as the a-religious presuppositions of the Fourteenth. The Court has done the latter, by "the familiar process of incorporation carried out, as it were, in reverse" (p. 31; and see, p. 157). Howe deplored this result. In particular, he insisted that the non-establishment clause ought not have been forced to support "that broadened rule of neutrality [between religious and non-religious interests] that our times require" (p. 161). While Howe knew very well that disestablishment enhances the liberty of non-believers and heterodox believers (pp. 96–102, 106, 117), he contended nevertheless that the disestablishment *clause* ought to be kept true to its origin. The way to do that is to restrict it to the function, within Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, of assuring equal treatment of the friends of religion.

Howe thought it possible for government to help religion without hindering non-religion. This belief may be hard to reconcile with his affirmation that separation of church and state enhances the liberties of the non-religious. Here I can say only that Howe typically preferred to see more evidence before choosing between apparent contraries. Disharmony didn't bother him as much as forced harmony. So, he took a bold stand on the issue of aid to religion: government can help religion without hindering irreligion *and* states make out a *prima facie* constitutional case when they argue that their acts will benefit religion. Of course, Howe promptly entered the necessary qualification, i.e., that any particular act of cooperation may impair the liberties of the non-religious. That question, however, must be resolved under the clauses designed to protect non-religious liberties, and not under the religion clauses. For, properly understood, the non-establishment clause merely assures equal governmental treatment of religious interests, while the free exercise clause itself amounts to a constitutional establishment of religion (see pp. 90, 100, 110, 154). Neither clause is the appropriate protector of the free exercise of *irreligion*. The office of protecting non-believers belongs to the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment and to the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth, clauses fully adequate to their office (pp. 153–54, 156–57, 160–61, 165).

---

[1] Griswold, "Professor Mark Howe," 80 *Harv. L. Rev.* 1631 (1967).

Howe contrasted his own understanding of the First Amendment with the present Court's in chapters on the cases from *Cantwell* to the present. In that development he saw two antagonistic efforts to the same end—constitutional parity of religion and irreligion. The first was Mr. Justice Jackson's endeavor in *Barnette* to assimilate religious freedom to secular freedom. It was still-born. Howe's reading of the opinions in *Barnette* led him to think that, Jackson's dismissal of the case's religious elements to the contrary, the Court in fact exempted the Witnesses from West Virginia's patriotic ritual because their objections were religious: he doubted that secular objections to the flag salute would have moved the Court to the same result. In other words, as late as 1943 religious freedom possessed *de facto* "a special constitutional status" (p. 114; see also pp. 165–66; but see pp. 109–10, 135, 148). The second effort was successful because its chief strategist, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, realized the unbelieving conscience would gain parity only when it was sheltered by the religion clauses. He overcame constitutional and judicial favoritism for religion by employing the establishment clause, neutralized to the difference between religion and irreligion, to protect the free exercise of irreligion. He accomplished parity by bringing irreligion within the sheltering confines of the religion clauses, and not by removing religion to the more exposed reaches assigned to the protection of the secular clauses. Howe quoted Justice Frankfurter from the Sunday law cases: "'The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief'" (p. 156; and see pp. 116–18). To this simple, symmetrical, and false proposition, the closing sentence of Professor Howe's book is an adequate response: "The complexities of history deserve our respect" (p. 176).

Thomas S. Schrock
University of California, Santa Barbara

NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Political Science and Ideology. By William E. Connolly. (New York: Atherton Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 179. $5.95.)

It is not unusual in the history of political thought that an idea or concept, developed and honed as a weapon against the opposition, has been captured by the latter and, with minor alternations, effectively turned against its former proponents. The concept of ideology is such a case. While radical writers, following Marx, developed it as an instrument to unmask the hypocrisies of the ruling class it has now as is commonly known, been captured and effectively employed by spokesmen of the status quo. The confusion of the concept today largely stems from the attempt of both camps to apply it in a pejorative sense to the political interpretation of their opponents and to deny its relevance to their own position. In the tradition of Karl Mannheim, William Connolly argues that it is time that ideology be neutrally defined and its applicability generalized to encompass all political interpretations, from radical polemics to orthodox and scientific treatises in political science. He further argues that political scientists are not only obliged as scientists to become aware of the ideological dimensions of their own work, but that they also have a social obligation to construct interpretations of politics sufficiently broad to meet important problems of the day. In a word, political scientists must responsibly face up to the problem of ideology rather than attempting, under the guise of science, to expunge it.

Ideology is not conceived by Connolly as moral commitment nor as basic political values that serve as criteria for judging whether a given event or position is good or bad. Rather, he defines ideology as "a set of empirical claims not fully tested, and for practical purposes not fully testable, which functions both to orient political activity and to preserve from destruction values and higher level beliefs cherished by its authors and supporters" (p. 49). Conceived in this way, ideology serves as the essential link between an individual's values and his view of reality.

In a perceptive and in a closely analytical manner, Connolly applies his concept of ideology to the conflicting "pluralist" and "power elite" interpretations of the American system by Robert Dahl and C. Wright Mills. However, in the course of showing that their ideologies pre-determine their findings, he tends to overplay his hand. Mills did not focus, to the extent that Connolly claims, on the nondecision-making process—if he had done so, his case, in my view, would have been stronger; and Connolly's effort to show that Dahl, independent of his ideology, "conveys a mood of complacency" (p. 46) toward reform of the system, is pretty thin. The significant point is not that Dahl's "cherished beliefs" are reflected and protected by his ideology, but that the implications of his ideology are profoundly conservative.

Until "empirical claims not fully tested" (ideology) are subject to empirical validation, the question of whether a given ideology is distorted (a departure from reality) cannot be completely determined. The temptation, which Connolly strenuously rejects, to solve the problem by restricting political inquiry to subjects susceptible to hypotheses that can be narrowly constructed and rigorously tested, is in reality no solution. In the first place, as Connolly points out, there is no assurance that a precisely formulated hypothesis, subject to empirical validation, will encompass every significant aspect of the problem under investigation. More importantly, for the political scientist to restrict his analysis and inquiry to that which is countable and measurable is, according to Connolly's argument, to fail to meet his intellectual and social responsibility to society. Connolly engages in a provocative and rewarding discussion on the nature and need of ideological detachment *and* involvement. If he had, however, applied his thesis to his own ideology, which is implicitly reflected throughout the book, and how it protects values which he strongly embraces, his case would have been even stronger.

Professor Connolly by no means lays to rest the opposition or the issues; nevertheless he offers a strong, and often penetrating, argument that should be taken into account.—PETER BACHRACH, *Bryn Mawr College.*

The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays. By GEORGE LICHTHEIM. (New York: Random House, 1967. Pp. xviii, 327. $5.95.)

This book is a collection of twenty-two essays, review articles, and shorter reviews all written and published in the years 1962-66. Some of the pieces first appeared in learned journals of history and sociology; others in such literary periodicals as *Commentary, Encounter,* and *The New York Review of Books.* Lichtheim's tone, that of the politically conscious intellectual addressing other intellectuals, is uniform throughout. Lichtheim is a scholar, as his two books on Marxist thought make clear; but it is also clear that his natural mode of address to the world—a mode he doubtless prizes above the cautious neutrality most other scholars impose on themselves—is engaged, passionate, and verbally proud and virtuose. To be sure, Lichtheim pays a price: in his strain to be both readable and *au courant,* he is occasionally either hasty or entirely too artful. But the price is small. His best traits are abundantly displayed in *The Concept of Ideology,* which will appeal to all those who love politics as a complex moral phenomenon, and who sympathize with the view that the best understanding of politics comes from a humanistically trained intelligence struggling to make sense of politics in order to make sense of life.

There is no use in pretending that these pieces are held together by anything but Lichtheim's preoccupations. But certainly no apology is called for, when a miscellany is as consistently interesting as this one is. The only point is that often one wishes that an argument Lichtheim could only sketch because he had to be brief had been carried further. Even the longer articles in the book are tantalizingly inconclusive. In any case we should be satisfied with what we are given.

Lichtheim's preoccupations are with Marxist thought, its Hegelian antecedents, its influence on movements in Germany and practice in the Soviet Union, and its influence on recent radical speculation. While not the sustained theme of the book, the continuous and variegated betrayal of Marx by most who claimed to act or to philosophize in his name does dominate Lichtheim's general approach. Only five of his pieces do not touch directly on Marxism and its career: an omnibus review of Toynbee (towards whom Lichtheim is unfailingly and unjustly unkind), Louis Halle, and Louis L. Snyder; a review of Hannah Arendt's *On Revolution* (which he spiritedly finds reactionary); a review of Guéhenno's life of Rousseau and Jack Lively's edition of de Maistre (an effort not up to Lichtheim's usual standard and that lacks the elegant subtlety of John Plamenatz's review of Guéhenno in *The New York Review of Books*); a review article on Hans J. Morgenthau's three-volume work, *Politics in the Twentieth Century* (in which Lichtheim struggles with some success to establish the difference between Morgenthau's realism and that of Hobbes); and an article on Leo Strauss's commentary of Xenophon's *Hiero,* and Strauss's controversy with Alexandre Kojève on the nature of tyranny (in which Lichtheim is on Kojève's side, mocking Strauss for his horror of atheism). Though the subjects of these pieces are not central to Lichtheim's concerns, and do not add to his study of Marxism, they are inherently valuable, if only for the brilliance of particular sentences and passages.

As for the remainder of the book, the student of Marxism will find much to admire. The title-essay, the longest piece in the book, usefully traces the development of the concept of ideology, from the time of the rationalists of the French Revolution, to Hegel and Marx, and beyond to Weber, Mannheim, and the positivists. Lichtheim stresses the twofold sense of the term present in Marx: ideology as faithful but unselfconscious reflection of social conditions, and ideology as narrow, self-interested rationalization. Lichtheim finds that later so-called Marxists, as well as positivists, err in not retaining that distinction, and in abandoning altogether Marx's belief in the possibility of an intellectual transcendence of social conditions. These latter thinkers have been too eager to unmask: in the process they have carried relativism to the point of irrationality and despair. The second piece, a review article on the writing of the Polish Marxist, Ossowski, tries to point out those elements in Marx's thought which would allow an elaborated Marxism to be not only a critique of capitalist society, but also of advanced industrial society whatever its system of political economy. The third piece, "Society and Hierarchy," deals brilliantly with Marx's ambivalence towards "backward countries." Though concluding that Marx never shed his ambivalence, he shows how the younger Marx applauded Western incursions into Asiatic countries as intimations of progress, but how the mature Marx grew appalled at the human cost of such progress and wondered whether ancient communal economic forms could not, when suitably modified, remain as the basis for communism. Lichtheim's best writing, is in these three essays: they are remarkably stimulating and wide-ranging.

Mention must also be made of the review article on J. P. Nettl's life of Rosa Luxemburg, and the essay on Trotsky. Generous as he is to both revolutionary figures, Lichtheim succeeds in deflating the romanticism that has come to surround them. He gives no consolation to contemporary disillusioned radicals who go back to an earlier generation to find their heroes. Lichtheim's closing essay, "Sartre, Marxism, and History," centers on that dreadful perplexity: the link, if link there is, between the unrelenting individualism of existential morality and the collective activism of Marxist-inspired political tendencies. The perplexity is still with us after we finish Lichtheim, but at least its nature is specified more exactly. To deal thus with perplexity is, all in all, Lichtheim's great gift. He was right to collect his pieces.—GEORGE KATEB, *Amherst College.*

The Study of Total Societies. ED. BY SAMUEL Z. KLAUSNER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. xx, 220. $6.00.)

A decade has elapsed since Karl Wittfogel heralded the "macroanalytic revolution" to come. Since that time the "revolution in the behavioral sciences"—so far as it touched political science—has largely been in the opposite direction, i.e., "behavioralism." In the present volume concern with significant "larger issues" of theory and practice has finally surfaced into full view, a welcome arrival since, as William Mitchell supposes, it is a level of analysis "potentially more rewarding to political science." Political modernization, for example, can be celebrated for only so long without taking recourse to the "comprehensive analytic tools" and "big-structured concepts" advertised by Wittfogel—whatever one's views on Cold War ideological competition with Marxism as a "universal idea system" (although Ellsworth Bunker's analysis of the "political solution" in South Vietnam as an exercise in "nation-building," e.g., the conferral of political legitimacy through "democratic elections," puts the question squarely in the arena of world politics).

As a *societal* phenomenon, the study of political modernization necessarily evokes a general interest among social scientists and enlists a wide range of their talents. The multidisciplinary nature of societal analysis is clearly reflected in the catholicity of the contributors to this symposium and in the ecumenism of their own careers. The fields broadly represented are sociology (Klausner, Coleman, Etzioni, Levy, Tiryakian), economics (Boulding), political science (Pool), psychiatry (Kardiner), and Anatol Rapoport, who defies classification. Collectively they construe "total society" as a unit, not only of intradisciplinary analysis, but also of interdisciplinary *synthesis,* and for this reason the "total study" of total societies is defined as involving the formulation of cross-disciplinary, cross-level propositions. This is *not* a book about political modernization, but that topic may again serve as illustrative; its *total* study would readily engage questions of political socialization in a family setting (Levy), and through mass media exposure (Pool), to the subjectively meaningful symbols of political legitimacy (Tiryakian) as institutionalized aspects of political culture (Kardiner) the "macrolearning" (Boulding) of, or psychotic fixation (Rapoport) on, would crucially influence political articulation of institutional sectors intrasocietally (Coleman) and political unification, e.g., of "mini-states" intersocietally (Etzioni), among other things.

No apologies are necessary for the involuted last sentence; total societal analysis *is* that complex. The trick is being "just complicated enough" to avoid wrong simplification on the one hand and overdetermination on the other. Ways of coping with "organized complexity" in the analysis of total societies are discussed under three main headings: "methodology" (Klausner, Coleman, Pool), "conceptual issues" (Tiryakian, Boulding, Rapoport), and "opening research strategies" (Etzioni, Levy, Kardiner). Klausner's epilogue provides a skillful résumé of the conference proceedings. Inventorying the resources for rational control over the unruly topic of total societies, we may likewise identify three major areas: societal descriptions, societal indicators and societal models. As to the first, the conferees agreed that exhaustive, general purpose descriptions are impractical, and moreover, irrelevant; Pool announced "there is no consensus on any such grand schemes for the description of a total society . . . there will be none" (p. 47). Nonetheless, both he and Boulding take the creation of a representative sample of the population as a first step, while Levy would contend for basic demographic data on family size and age structure as strategic in the analysis of any society. Apart from which data are to be collected, Boulding further emphasizes *methods* of data collection and especially its cross-national character, "because the collection of knowledge, like any other social process, has to be legitimated if it is to be continuous" (p. 113). Reposing societal facts in a United Nations data bank would obviate compromising national interests, witness Project Camelot. At the same time, Kardiner considers United States society unique in its possession of sufficient knowledge for self-correction (p. 188).

More than descriptions of total societies, what is being requested is a basic set of societal indicators which tap its major dimensions, particularly those of a changeful nature. Along these lines Tiryakian proposes three "lead indicators": (1) rates of urbanization as measures of institutional capacity, (2) rates in the distribution and public acceptance of sexual promiscuities as measures of egoistic anomie, and (3) rates in the outbreak of non-institutional religious phenomena as measures of the extent of sharing of and commitment to societal values (pp. 92-94). These may provide upwards of 30 years "early warning" of discontinuous societal changes impending—of "revolutionary potential." Again, Boulding speculates about "key roles" in a society, a point underscored in Kardiner's discussion of occupational and other institutional factors in individuals' life organization.

The selection of societal indicators raises inescapably the question of *what* is being indicated, and the position of such in a total societal model. Most comprehensive in this respect is Tiryakian's explicit societalization of Parsons' "systems problems" (AGIL) schema, an exchange model relating for any social system the functional problems of Adaptation (economy), Goal attainment (polity), Integration (family) and Latent-pattern-maintenance-and-tension-management (religion). Tiryakian's focus on non-institutional religion as the source, symptom and symbol of societal change is novel and valuable. What seems missing from Parsons' model is an empirical input-output analysis, a system of "societal accounts" expanding on Leontief's economic activity analysis. Also conspicuous by its absence is further development of "structural-functional requisite analysis" as originally formulated by Levy himself and strongly seconded in Almond's "Introduction" to *The Politics of Developing Areas*. The recession from requisite analysis impairs what is perhaps the most systematically powerful and theoretically promising method of societal analysis available (Levy here devotes himself to an illuminating discussion of family structures as *the* strategic factor in total societal analysis; his collaboration with Coale, Westoff and others is the most fruitful to date between sociological theory and formal demography). On the other hand, Coleman's game approach and Pool's on simulation secure new ground for future exploitation, not only as techniques for data gathering and processing but also for model and theory construction.

In closing and I cannot fail to mention that the conference was held under the auspices of the Special Operations Research Office "as a part of SORO's long-term research interests in the problems of analyzing societies" (p. xv). The image of society entertained in government circles for purposes of policy formation and programming is of urgent concern in regard to both international relations (e.g., China) and national politics (e.g., President Johnson's "macropower" model of United States society and his style of private politics adapted to it, as recently commented on by Max Frankel). It would be interesting to learn what impact, if any, this conference has made in decision-making circles. For their part, academic specialists may conclude that societal analysis has considerable distance to go, even to reach "the actual design for the study of a concrete total society" which Klausner prophesies (p. 193). The general reader may conclude that the $1.25 Doubleday paperback edition (A 574) is a better investment. In any case, it cannot be said, as G. K. Chesterton said of Christianity, "the trouble is not that it was tried and found difficult, but that it was found difficult and not tried." The difficulties of societal analysis are apparent; however gropingly, the contributors at least tried.—C. P. WOLF, *Brown University.*

The Technological Society. BY JACQUES ELLUL. (New York: Random House, 1967. Pp. xxxvi, 449. $2.45.)

This is a recently issued paperback edition of a work by a French sociologist that was first published in France in 1954. The translation by John Wilkinson is excellent.

Once the reader has adjusted his orientation away from the concept of "technique" as being synonymous with technology and "the technological society" as being about the same thing as the industrial state, it becomes apparent that Jacques Ellul has provided a commentary on the present state of society and the direction in which it is heading that will stand as an important contribution to the sociological explanation of the deterministic influences that shape human actions and associations.

Ellul defines "technique" as the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency in every field of human endeavor. With such a definition, it is no wonder that at times his use of the term is less than precise. In fact, the term is used so ubiquitously throughout the book it acquires an almost metaphysical connotation.

Technique changes not only the structure of states, but also political doctrines. The doctrines of traditional democracy—liberty, equality, personal rights—are not adaptable, Ellul believes, to the technological society, and they must give way to the great god efficiency, which is typified in practice by the dogma of the people's democracies. Doctrine, instead of providing goals and values, has come to serve the purpose of justification for the methods of the state and reinforcement of its role as the symbol and coordinator of technical progress. The technique causes the state to become all-encompassing and totalitarian.

There is no counterbalance to technique that Ellul can visualize. Every new cultural tendency that threatens to disturb the march toward progress is restrained by the forces of morality, public opinion, the social structure, and, above all, the state. These restraining forces are all instruments in the service of technique. Performance and efficiency, whether in an athletic contest or in economic planning, have become ends in and of themselves.

The role of the state in the development of technique, as Ellul sees it, is both indispensable and inevitable. It is the state with its vast resources and control mechanisms that coordinates the integration of technique with the traditional culture, and in the process the traditional culture is bent and twisted and carried along with the tide of progress. The traditional culture is of course, dehumanized in the process and relegated to a role as part of the supporting superstructure of the technological society.

It seems appropriate that this moving and sometimes emotional critique of the technological society should have been written by a citizen of France, one of the last great bastions of the traditional culture. De Gaulle, however, since 1958 has emphasized technical progress, and the momentum of technique has wrought a gradual but profound change on French society. This serves to reinforce the validity of Ellul's predictions.

Political socialization has come to mean a process of integration and adaptation to technical methodology in all aspects of societal activity, an adaptation that leaves the actor less of an individual. As Ellul describes it, the sacrifice of personal identity is accomplished unwittingly and as an almost natural transformation, with conformity to the standards of performance and productivity accepted as the price of socialization. Although these new standards appeal to technological man with promises of happiness and material comforts, they bring tensions, insecurity, and, in many ways, more serious problems than the ones they replace.

The author presents an eloquent and persuasive plea for man to retain control over his values and goals and to resist becoming the captive of a methodology that subverts humanism for the sake of efficiency. He foretells a grim future where the scientists offer happiness, but it is a happiness purchased at a tragic price to the individual, and a happiness that may even be a fraud induced by the use of sophisticated tranquilizing drugs. This is a pessimistic outlook, but Ellul holds out some hope that man may be able to anticipate his fate and take positive measures to alter it.

He strikes a responsive chord with many political scientists when he deplores the fact that even with all of the enormous power wielded by the scientists and technologists, they are incapable of anything but the emptiest platitudes when they stray from their specialities and enter the political dialogue. Unfortunately, unless the trend is changed these are the very men who will exert the greatest influence upon governmental planning in the future.—WILLIAM R. NELSON, *United States Air Force Academy.*

The Elite in the Welfare State. BY PIET THOENES. Ed. by J. A. Banks. Translated from the Dutch by J. E. Bingham. (New York: The Free Press, 1966. Pp. 236. $6.95.)

This work is a twofold enterprise. First comes a discursive treatment of historical efforts to systematize elite theory—including concise commentaries on Mannheim and Geiger as well as Mosca and Pareto. What follows is a stimulating but inconclusive analysis of the distinctive problems created by the emergence of the kind of politically-nurtured society we call the Welfare State and by the unavoidable presence of a functionary elite, convinced of their superiority as scientifically-trained specialists. Neither part is carried out systematically, nor is much empirical evidence marshalled by Thoenes. But his work is full of distinctive formulations and suggestions.

In contrast to the Lasswellian formula that elites are those who get the most of what there is to get, Thoenes holds that an elite emerges because its members view themselves as an elite. They are a chosen people; they view themselves as superior. An elite is a group that has a special quality or a special mission to perform: the instrument of God, the vanguard of ineluctable historical forces, or the custodians of as much warranted knowledge of the universe and of humanity as has yet been achieved. Thoenes does not hold that every group saddled with the job of preserving the existing order is by definition an elite, but only that the sense of spiritual superiority and the sense of a socio-political mission to perform—the hallmarks of a self-conscious elite—are likely to be engendered, among other reasons, by a fear that letting go will lead to retrogression. Quite simply, lesser breeds cannot do the job.

Historically, when men came to feel their present situation was not the end-product of a divine plan, humanistic interpretations of history were put forward. Progressives and conservatives alike came to view the existing order as a *phase,* either the fruition or the germination phase of man's effort to create a reasoned social order. *Historical elites* set themselves specific tasks—to declare a message, to carry out a plan, to conserve an order. Yet it is sometimes easy for them to regard themselves as *natural elites*—whose superiority is timeless and whose mission is indispensable to the maintenance of a system.

The scientific elite in the twentieth century—including the social scientists—claims a key mission, sees itself as possessing a crucial intellectual superiority, and seeks power in order to introduce or preserve the spiritual values that ought to characterize the socio-political order. We do not yet have a clear understanding of what constraints shape man's efforts or what aspirations give them direction. But at least there is a method—the scientific method—for improving our understanding and clarifying our aims.

In the twentieth century, the Welfare State came into being in the West after crises, war and depression, when people knew "what they did *not* want: danger, hunger, thirst or cold, unemployment, dictatorships or squandering of either food or talents" (p. 133). Without abandoning the economic hallmarks of capitalism—private property and profits—and without forsaking democratic processes—free elections and party rule—a complex system of governmental controls and services was created and staffed. Through the Welfare State, the economy could be controlled and a guarantee of collective social care could be made to all citizens.

To do the job, a new elite emerged—"an elite of scientifically-trained officials, in government departments, in semi-official departments, serving with big firms, with trade unions, and with professional organizations" (p. 129). So long as the Welfare State functioned in a context of scarcity and under-employment, and so long as basic health, education, retirement and social welfare programs needed to be set up, the scientific "functionary elite" posed no basic threat to democracy. As a plan-fulfilling elite, needed in particular historical circumstances, the functionaries helped to articulate a distinctive political program. But now, as an order-maintaining elite, the functionaries are inclined to justify their prerogatives as due to natural superiority. Politically, nobody propagates the Welfare State very enthusiastically; to each it seems like a makeshift halfway house. Nevertheless, it does perpetuate itself, as a system based on the avoidance of fatal social and economic tensions. And the experts who man the system are reasonably confident that it can continue to be a workable system. "Hence, in this system they are a natural elite. Their special task is to preserve the new order" (p. 188). And control over their actions rests with people who only occasionally and by chance are competent to judge them.

With this diagnosis, it is not surprising that Thoenes calls the functionary elite illegal, a blindfold to science and a halter to democracy. The scientific community must also be blamed, so long as it holds to its pretensions to objectivity, turns away from controversial social problems, and relies uncritically on a static picture. He calls for more deeply-probing social science inquiries, which frankly aim to stimulate political awareness. He calls for a politicized sociology, whose practitioners must be a new elite—an intelligentsia that dares to take responsibility and that formulates a free range of choices about the shape of a new society.—DWAINE MARVICK, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi. BY E. VICTOR WOLFENSTEIN. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 330. $7.50.)

Freud might have been referring to the difficulties of political psychobiography when he observed, in an essay on Dostoyevsky in 1928, that "Before the problem of the creative artist analysis must, alas, lay down its arms." The problem of the politician and statesman is hardly less complicated, which may be why Freud himself did not attempt such analyses (excluding the highly controversial book, with Bullitt, on Woodrow Wilson to which he may or may not have contributed), although there is a sense in which his *Moses and Monotheism* can be regarded as a political psychobiography. The complications include the reluctance of political figures to expose themselves to public view during or after their lifetimes; they are notoriously a secretive lot, and any inkblots they have inadvertantly left behind are usually wiped clean by their loyal posterity. Crucial childhood experiences may not be remembered or recorded, and those that have not been lost may be reworked into memories of a childhood-that-never-was. And even if the past can be traced, at least in part, there is no certainty that Early Events *A*, *B*, and *C* were responsible for Later Events *X*, *Y*, and *Z*. For these reasons no completely satisfactory political psychobiography has yet been written, and it is not likely that any will be written until better techniques are developed for recapturing life histories and forging links between the experiences of childhood and adolescence and the later political behavior.

Almost all efforts to write political psychobiography, nevertheless, are to be welcomed, because without such explorations we are not likely to know or even be able to guess much that is important about certain key figures. While most political leaders neither require nor merit a psychobiography, the form is particularly appropriate when we are dealing with odd or deviant political careers. Thus right and left extremists—that is, leaders who depart sharply from the conventional political beliefs and behaviors of their eras—are especially suitable subjects for psychobiography. Those who suffer from psychosomatic illness, or whose afflictions are known to affect decision-making processes, are also eligible, as are alcoholics and those whose careers end in suicide. Another category includes political actors who compulsively (it appears) and therefore more or less consistently snatch defeat from the jaws of victory—the phenomenon of the "born loser" in politics has never been explored—and those who invariably transmute defeats into victories. Finally, there are the politicians who careen back and forth on the spectrum of ideologies and parties, or whose political belief systems seem totally divorced from the values operating in their private worlds. Anyone will think of names to fit these categories, and it may be hoped that the half dozen or so political psychobiographies so far written will not long be stranded on the bookshelf.

Professor Wolfenstein's study of Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi is a worthy addition to that small number although, like the others, it is not and could not be wholly successful, given his approach and the inevitable complications referred to above. The "common characteristic" of the three revolutionaries, according to Wolfenstein, was that each "carried with him into his adult life unfinished business with his parental generation. Each carried a burden of guilt he had been unable to relieve in the context of the family or, in Gandhi's case, in the context of the family extended to include his wife. Each had to come to grips with a primitive image of parental authority." But such conditions are not enough to cause revolutionary involvement. The necessary catalyst in all three cases was the harshness of treatment accorded them by the established political order, a harshness that included imprisonment, discrimination on account of color or religion, the execution of a close relative (Lenin's brother), and other repressive acts. Wolfenstein appears to be saying, in short, that guilt and unresolved internal psychological conflicts, especially unresolved Oedipal situations, *plus* aggressive treatment by established authority set the stage for the revolutionary personality.

The application of this equation to the lives of Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi illustrates the promise and the limitations of psychoanalysis as a tool for exploring political behavior. On the one hand, psychoanalysis can provide us with a psychodynamic explanation of how it is that the early life experiences of some individuals cause them to reject ordinary career choices in favor of major roles as political or religious leaders, and surely such explanations are essential to an understanding of the great traumatic events of history. But on the other hand, psychoanalysis in its present state is a rather crude device for exploring the behavior of leaders long since dead. Because it is one of the younger behavioral sciences—it is, after all, less than thirty years since the death of Freud—it is racked by disputes over theory and technique, and if there is some doubt both inside and outside the profession that it has much to offer the living patient on the couch, there is even more doubt that it can be effectively applied to the deceased statseman in his tomb who literally has taken his dreams and fantasies, his Oedipus complex and identity crisis, with him.

Hence Wolfenstein is not altogether convincing when he suggests that Lenin's "basically mistrustful nature"—a characterization that would be questioned by some authorities—may have dated back to the birth of his sister Olga when he was two years old, and that Lenin's failure to walk until he was three possibly derived from his having been "uncertain about how his environment would react." Trotsky's indecision and hesitation at certain crucial moments, on the other hand, are traced to internal conflicts in childhood and adolescence that were more complex than those of Lenin, conflicts that included contradictory feelings about his father (Trotsky allegedly was torn between being his father's favorite son and hating his father). Gandhi, who loved his mother and both respected and feared his father, suffered all of his life from guilt and anxiety partly because the "aim to be like the father implies overturning the father, which in turn leads to anxiety and guilt." Because Gandhi was having sexual intercourse with his pregnant wife when his father died, Wolfenstein hypothesizes that in Gandhi's mind the intercourse was held responsible for his father's death and the death four days after birth of the infant. Gandhi himself, in his *Autobiography,* confesses to his "great shame" aroused by these incidents, but is Wolfenstein justified in suggesting that Gandhi unconsciously regarded the sexual activity and the deaths as connected? Gandhi's own reference to the baby's death is almost an afterthought, and while he eventually did renounce sex in favor of abstinence, it was not until twenty years after his father's death when he was thirty-six years old. And it was then, he writes, not because of shame and guilt, but because he was opposed to contraception and wanted no more children (he and his wife had had four).

Much of this may appear to be "nit-picking," but it is well to keep in mind that it is the nits in psychoanalysis, the seemingly trivial episodes to which, at the time, little importance may be attached, that often supply the principal clues to personality development. Indeed, it is in these and other guilt-generating events that Wolfenstein finds the sources of Gandhi's later commitment to passive resistance or non-violent action, viewed by Wolfenstein as "the indirect expression of almost overwhelming guilt—and vigorous self-assertion."

Of course, he may be right in this interpretation; the point is, given the present state of psychoanalysis and the paucity of information, there is no way of ascertaining whether Wolfenstein has brilliantly illuminated the whole personality landscape of his three revolutionaries. It is a fair comment, however, that many psychoanalysts whose own work is no less enterprising would regard his use of psychoanalytic theory as rather pedantic, mechanical, and old-fashioned; a prime example is his contention that Gandhi's campaign against the salt tax may have had something to do with the fact that, according to Ernest Jones, salt is symbolically significant as semen, hence Gandhi's personal renunciation of salt (sex) in his diet and desire to claim for the Indians tax-free salt manufacturing rights (potency, virility, self-respect, etc.).

Wolfenstein may also be unduly simplifying in casting Lenin as the most effective administrator, Trotsky as the most impressive agitator, and Gandhi as surpassing the others in charismatic appeal. Lenin, according to contemporary accounts, possessed considerable charisma, and Trotsky was an extremely skilled military administrator and *litterateur.* It is arguable that Wolfenstein does not attach enough importance to the so-called catalytic or precipitating agents—the fact, for example, that when Trotsky was a boy Jews in Russia were restricted to a certain territory (the Pale), forbidden to take up certain professions, prohibited from owning land, and limited to quotas (the *numerus clausus*) of from three to ten per cent at schools and universities. The coincidence that all three revolutionaries suffered from stomach trouble (Trotsky attributed his own "chronic catarrh"—could it have been an incipient ulcer?—to "nervous shocks") is not explored.

These reservations, however, do not fundamentally detract from Wolfenstein's daring and impressive achievement in elucidating, at long range and under considerable difficulties, the personality patterns of three of the most significant figures in the twentieth century. Perhaps what is needed most now in the developing field of political psychobiography are psychoanalytic case histories of political men to clarify relationships between the early experiences and later careers. It is no secret that a number of men in public life have been psychoanalyzed or have visited psychiatrists; is it too much to hope that some of them, in the interests of behavioral science research, will authorize their doctors to make their case histories available after their deaths? Much could be learned from such histories that would lend depth and precision to studies of the type Wolfenstein has attempted. In the meantime, Wolfenstein may be congratulated for succeeding in his effort to frame tentative hypotheses about revolutionary personalities, and by so doing to remind us that the study of politics can not and will not be complete without psychological analysis.—ARNOLD A. ROGOW, *City University of New York.*

The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. BY DOUGLAS W. RAE. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 173. $5.00.)

Douglas Rae has produced a succinct comparative study of a classic question: How much difference do the rules make? The rules of concern are those which regulate the translation of voters' choices at the polls into partisan shares of seats in a legislative chamber. The objective of the analysis is to assess the consequences for the party system, specifically the competition among parties, of the structural variables we know as electoral laws. Rae's study is distinguished by its careful empiricism, its comparative focus, and its lack of theoretical pretension.

Roughly a third of the text is devoted to developing the variables and classification scheme used in the subsequent analyses. Rae gives a careful qualitative treatment of the major properties of electoral laws in the twenty Western democracies covered by his study. The result is a classification of the laws by the rules for assigning seats to districts (district magnitude), the rules governing the form of choice available to voters (ordinal or categorical ballots depending on the non-exclusive or exclusive choice required of the voter), and the rules specifying the translation of votes to seats (electoral formulae). The discussion of electoral formulae is extraordinarily compressed and will require close reading by one unfamiliar with different voting systems. The major distinction in formulae is, of course, that obtaining between plurality decision rules and the variety of proportional representation schemes. The principal distinction developed within the class of P. R. formulae is between "highest average" and "largest remainder" seat allocation rules. Electoral formulae are designed to deal with an inherently quantitative problem and Rae introduces a convenient notation to facilitate his comparative discussion.

The second half of Rae's methodological problem is developing descriptive measures for party systems. The choice of variables is dictated by a concern with party competition and by the data on which analyses are based. The data are aggregate election returns and the resulting distributions of partisan legislative seats for 121 lower house elections occurring between January 1, 1945 and January 1, 1965. Rae's strategy is to develop a set of parallel variables which can be used to measure a property of the party in the electorate, and simultaneously, an analogous property of the party in parliament. This strategy results in five dual variables: number of parties, competitive share of the strongest party, competitive share of the strongest two parties, fractionalization of the party system, and average change of shares between two elections. To these is added the variable of minimal number of parties required for a parliamentary majority. The most interesting of these variables is the measure of party fractionalization. It reflects both the number of parties and the distribution of seat or vote shares among the parties in one well-behaved quantity.

The simplicity of the variables is deceptive. The tools Rae fashions are designed for a particular comparative task and when applied do their work well. The basic analytic device is to compare party electoral vote outcomes with the resulting party share of parliamentary seats. This is done initially with no variation in electoral law categories to demonstrate the common effects of electoral systems. Next, plurality and P.R. formulae are compared to demonstrate differences in effect, not of kind but of degree, and a brief treatment of some special cases is given. Finally, the consequences for parties of district magnitude and ballot structure are examined. The results of analysis are set off in the text as propositions and these are brought together in an appendix.

Rae demonstrates that the consequences of electoral laws conform to the rule "them that has, gets," although the advantages to large parties are not of startling magnitude. On the other hand, the fundamental role assigned to majority rule in parliaments magnifies these mild effects into consequences of considerable significance for parties. For example, of 42 one-party parliamentary majorities, 27 were the result of electoral laws translating electoral minorities into parliamentary majorities. The British case is relatively well known but it is surprising to note the frequency of the phenomenon and also that it is widespread, not being restricted to systems operating under plurality electoral formulae.

There are many other generalizations in this monograph, not all surprising, but invariably analyzed and evaluated with great care. Perhaps of greatest general interest is the evaluation of Duverger's "sociological law" connecting multi-partism with electoral formulae. Duverger comes off well. Those who are interested in political engineering may find some results uncomfortable for they imply the impossibility of simultaneously realizing certain goals. Three classes of scholars, however, must own this book—those who concern themselves with politics in Western liberal democracies, those who specialize in political parties, and those who focus on elections and electoral politics.

Some political scientists will be disappointed in the author's decision to avoid extensive treatment of particular cases or discussion of system properties he did not measure. Rae casts this as a choice between literature and science and opts for the latter thus restricting himself to only those statements his analysis will support. The resulting product is a tightly reasoned and sharply focused empirical treatment of a classic political problem. —JOHN SPRAGUE, *Washington University, St. Louis.*

Politics and Communication. BY RICHARD R. FAGEN. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1966. Pp. x, 156.)

Content Analysis of Communications. BY RICHARD W. BUDD, ROBERT K. THORP, AND LEWIS DONOHEW. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. x. 142. $5.95.)

In current political analysis, the researcher is faced with the problem of dwindling field resources. Political officials are confronted with an increasing volume of interviewers, foreign governments are looking askance at foreigners asking prying questions of their citizens and officials. In this growing desert, there is one area of growth and increasing attention—Communications. Each nation, government official, department, governing unit, etc., pours out a greater mass of written, spoken and visual communications every year. As media technology improves, access to these materials also increases. The problem becomes one of developing analysis techniques and methods to process this data as well as evolving necessary propositions, hypotheses and definitions in this area. These two books offer different introductions into this field.

Richard Fagen considers communications as one theoretical tool to facilitate insight into the political process. His view of communications is the familiar model of Wilbur Schramm which is based on information processing. Relating this model to the Lasswellian paradigm, "Who Gets What, etc.," Fagen examines political information. He discusses the various channels through which information moves and the association of these channels in a communications network, relating the structure of this network to the functional approach to politics. Various recent surveys including the work done on the Kennedy assassination and the Almond-Verba work, help illustrate and categorize the content of information. Probably the most interesting chapter in the book is devoted to communications and change. Here Fagen presents and discusses two models, the Deutsch exogenous change model and the endogenous model arrived at during some of Fagen's own work on Cuba. Finally, Fagen poses some of the political problems in media growth, increased technology and massive communications volume. Here he tends to consider communications as those things connected with mass media or socialization.

Fagen's work is not a comprehensive treatment of politics and the communications field. Rather, it represents a survey of some of the more interesting instances of recent note where the fields have overlapped. Much current work is being done, for instance, with the problem of international images which he treats in his discussion of information content. As an introduction to current theory and research, the book provides a variety of information and some synthesis. It is unfortunate that Fagen's survey has an absence of references to other communications work. Much of interest for politics is being done today by sociologists on the problem of meaning, by psychologists and anthropologists on language, and by engineers and mechanics on the communications process. In spite of its limitations, this remains a valuable introduction to the complex field and a good look at some recent research.

Both books under consideration here begin with Schramm's model. From that point on they are completely different. Budd, Thorp and Donohew have written that rare tool for analysts, a cookbook with valuable recipes for content analysis. To them communications is a process which must be dissected and explained. To do this one particularly valuable tool is content analysis and the authors propose to instruct the uninitiated in a step-by-step way to use this method. They begin with hypothesis formulation where they reveal their preoccupation with mass media and journalism (they are all in schools of journalism or communications). Then they discuss sampling, measurement, and categories, in minute detail including most of the problems a student faces doing research. They consider sample size, show how to use a random number table, define stratification, explain coding, illustrate category development, etc. In short, they consider most of the problems encountered by a researcher in his initial attempt at work of this kind. An especially good section deals with reliability and validity, problems which plague any communications research. The authors review some of the major solutions to these problems offered by Osgood, Holsti and others while discussing alternatives of research. In their section on analysis, the authors simply offer a few of the many varieties of statistical techniques applicable to studies they propose. Obviously where so many techniques apply and there are ample illustrative possibilities some selection had to be made. But instead of presenting a few techniques, omitting such major areas as analysis of variance, and a few examples, the authors might better have discussed the process by which a researcher in this area chooses among statistical techniques and analytic methods. It is only in the last chapter of the book, a brief five pages that the authors consider content analysis by computer. With today's access to machinery and the tendency for large amounts of data, the majority of content analytic studies are going to be computer processed. Although most of the topics apply to any research of this sort, it is apparent that actual research will be computer directed. This leaves the user with the question, if the computer is used how do the authors' considerations have to be modified. In spite of these problems, the book is a valuable tool which is much needed for current work. As political analysis becomes more productive in the communications area, these books should provide a stimulus for research work and further, theoretical offerings.—Ellen B. Pirro, *University of Minnesota.*

Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic. By J. R. Pole. (London: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. xvii, 606. $16.50.)

This is a very scholarly analysis of the theory of suffrage, majority rule and representative government in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England, the American colonies of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and in the United States during its formative period by a reader in American history and government at the University of Cambridge who has spent considerable time teaching and studying in the United States. Dr. Pole begins by analyzing the political theories of James Harrington, Algernon Sydney, and John Locke. He next discusses the impact of the ideas of these theorists on the development of political institutions of the three colonies and later the three states that he selected for intensive analysis. He traces the influence of Harrington on the thinking of John Adams and William Penn and the influence of John Locke on Thomas Jefferson. In a final chapter he compares the evolution of ideas and institutions in the eight jurisdictions which he has selected. He relates the theories of suffrage, majority rule and representation to the rights and functions of local governments, landed and property rights, and individual rights. He describes how "interest representation" displaced the old notion of representation of estates.

In a brief review it is impossible to do justice to the wide range of learning and the penetrating insights contained in this lively-written volume. Dr. Pole has done his research well in the archives of New England, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and other parts of the United States. He has also done a fine job on the English archives. An Appendix furnishes election statistics on Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina from eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In a felicitous manner, Dr. Pole has combined political philosophy and detailed description of political and electoral behavior on the basis of widely scattered historical materials available.—HAROLD F. GOSNELL, *Howard University.*

The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome. BY DONALD EARL. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. 1,167. $4.95.)

Professor Earl has written a book about the "moral and political tradition of Rome." On the basis of what he has written, it is interesting to examine what he conceives to be the essence of that tradition, that is, the moral and political components of that tradition. At the outset, Earl makes three assumptions which dictate his eventual conclusions and totally constrain his scope of investigation. One, a moral and political tradition exists only with respect to the nobility and/or those portions of other classes which from time to time intrude into the ruling oligarchy. Two, one assesses a moral and political tradition on the basis of belief rather than behavior. And, three, the essence of that tradition is contained in a few summary concepts, the meaning of which one can examine overtime to determine the continuity and variation which occurs in the tradition.

Depending on what one wants from the book, these assumptions may or may not be detrimental. If one wants only a description of some basic Roman beliefs over time (e.g., *virtus, gloria, nobilitas,* and *respublica*) expressed through the extant writings of the major Roman writers and historians (e.g., Sallust, Cicero, Polyibus, Cato, Virgil, Horace, Livy, Marcellus, and Augustine) then the book is perfectly adequate. If, however, one wishes to investigate the manner in which certain beliefs and values affect the political world in which they exist, then the above assumptions are quite inhibiting and the book somewhat of a major disappointment. One should hasten to acknowledge that Earl is a Classicist, not a political scientist, and that he is obviously writing for different purposes than that for which he is being read. Still, the question here is to what degree such a book is useful to political scientists; consequently such questions, though hard on the author, are still appropriate.

Let us therefore examine the affect of the above assumptions on this particular exercise. First, it is not unusual to find scholars (especially historians) who treat the literary remains of a given aristocracy as evidence of the motivating values of a particular political system in a given period of time. In this respect then, Earl's description of the presumed dominant values of the ruling oligarchy as indicative of the "moral and political tradition" stands in good company. But if one is writing for any other purpose than the purely descriptive (and such is rarely the case), to make this assumption is to implicitly adopt a very simple, naive theory of politics, one which would, if made explicit, rarely if ever be defended by the same authors. Such a theory would assume, of course, that other groups outside of the political and/or social and cultural oligarchy are unimportant to the study of a "moral and political tradition." From other kinds of evidence, we know that this is obviously not the case. The urban mass of Rome was always an important factor of Roman politics. As the Republic gave way to the Empire, it became increasingly clear that the values and attitudes of a variety of groups outside the oligarchy, administrators, the army, allied citizenries, were as important to the continuance of Roman power as were those of the oligarchy. The consummate skill of the Roman Empire was organization, perfected to a degree unmatched in the Western world prior to the industrial revolution. This organizational skill, a central part of the political, if not the moral, tradition of Rome, was to a significant degree held and transmitted by groups other than the dominant oligarchy. In sum, by studying only the values and beliefs of the dominant oligarchies, Earl is forced to ignore other kinds of values and beliefs (such as the beliefs of the urban mass as to what constituted a legitimate government) which are useful for explaining the course of Roman History.

Second, one must ask of this, as of all intellectual histories, what does one know of a political tradition if one knows only the values upon which it is ostensibly predicated? As we are only too aware, professions of value, especially when stated in the abstract, frequently differ from practices. One wonders especially about the relevance of the views of a Virgil or a Horace in the assessment of a moral and political tradition. That powerful figures in art are frequent contributors and critics of the moral language of an age is acknowledged; that they are representative of the motivating intellectual tradition of an age is a subject for considerable empirical research.

And, finally, given the above two caveats, what is the significance of tracing this intellectual development over eight centuries through the medium of a few basic summary concepts? At the least we are forced to accept the word of the expert, in this case Professor Earl, that these are the ideas central to Roman thought. But, again, one is sceptical about the relevance of these particular ideas with respect to others which might be equally interesting for suggesting how the Roman Republic and Empire sustained themselves over such an extended period of time.

In sum, Professor Earl has presented us with a pleasant, descriptive statement of what he calls the Roman idea, a set of beliefs characteristic of Roman civilization, beliefs presumably of high relevance for understanding the moral and political tradition of Rome. Political scientists, I fear, will find the definition of what constitutes the political a bit thin.—DEANE E. NEUBAUER, *University of California, Irvine.*

Peter and Caesar: The Catholic Church and Political Authority. BY E. A. GEORNER. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965. Pp. 282. $5.95.)

Professor Goerner has written a good preparatory discussion of the relations of church and state. It is good in that it expresses learning and distinction of mind. It is merely preparatory, however, in that it provides little more than an introduction to the problems with which it is concerned. It concentrates on the Catholic Church. And, contrary perhaps to the aims of the author, it does not arrive at the kind of broad, ultimate principles that constitute political theory.

The contents of the book are easily described. They consist in descriptive and critical comments concerning several theories of church-state relations, these covering an historical and philosophical range as wide as that bounded by Giles of Rome and John Courtney Murray. The final three chapters of the book are the author's own reflections. These in general are on the side of a Church which uncompromisingly stands by the faith in its own infallibility in matters of doctrine and teaching but gives up the lingering notion that the "special graces" of its clergy fit them for political sovereignty.

Professor Goerner skillfully summarizes and criticizes the thinkers whom he considers. He is graceful and judicious. And he is concerned with a great problem: not simply the relations of the Catholic Church and the state, but also the spiritual quality of earthly society. He powerfully expresses his apprehension of this problem, and suggests a noble conception of the political role of the Catholic clergy, when he asks of the Church, "Is it too much to hope that it discover a mode whereby it might give new birth and sustenance to statesmen who could speak with such a voice as spoke in Lincoln's Second Inaugural? Is it too much to hope that it discover a mode whereby it might give new birth and sustenance to a people that could hearken to such a voice?"

Professor Goerner's central problem, however, is that of obviating the hierocratic principles which seem to follow from the infallibility claimed by the Church. He emphatically resists such principles, but it does not seem to this reviewer that he found any solid philosophical ground on which to do so. His main contention seems to be that the sanctity of the Church does not imply any special political competence. But does it not? Can political matters be cleanly severed from the moral and theological matters on which the Church is, according to Catholic faith, infallible? Can an institution with unconditional authority in morals and faith be denied such authority in politics? At several points in the book Professor Goerner seems to rely simply on the practical impossibility of instituting hierocratic regimes in the twentieth century. Yet he is clearly aware that this is a consideration without weight as political theory.

The traditional claims of the Catholic Church can be reconciled with the idea of freedom, if at all, only through the idea of a community embracing Catholics and all others. Why should Catholics speak and listen to obdurate non-Catholics? In the absence of a philosophical answer to this question it seems that proposals for institutional reorganization, such as Professor Goerner discusses at length, cannot be of much avail. *Peter and Caesar* explores the borders of this realm of speculation but hardly enters it.

Among the chief problems in this realm are the nature of truth and the manner in which it is known. In one of his few reckless statements Professor Goerner asserts, in an attack on "Victorian superficialities," that "after Auschwitz, Mill is irrelevant." But one of the reasons for thinking Mill is not irrelevant—especially after Auschwitz—is that he wrote a humane and moving essay on liberty, part of which was a meditation on the relationship of men to the truth. Can an organization claim to be infallible and still engage in genuine communication? This is the sort of question Mill reflected on in his essay *On Liberty* and Professor Goerner will surely have to join in such reflection if he continues to work upon these problems.

And if men who care for freedom must consider the nature of truth, Christians who care for freedom must devote particular attention to the nature of Christian truth. In what way is it different from scientific truth? Can it be fully and accurately embodied in words? Christianity is a religion of love and thus of community; yet Christians have not been very good at entering into community with, as distinguished from imposing their faith upon, non-Christians. Tolerance has flourished only as faith has waned. In an effort to moderate the monarchical structure of the Catholic Church Professor Goerner suggests, on the grounds that grace is not restricted to the clergy, the idea of the priesthood of all members of the Church. But the problem he is concerned with points to the idea of a priesthood reaching beyond Catholic laymen and even beyond all believers. If a Christian is fully in earnest about entering into community with all men must he not go so far as to entertain the notion that there is in some sense a priesthood of non-believers?

Professor Goerner suggests that excommunication should not be commanded without lay assent. But—to take the concept of excommunication in its literal sense—can a Christian ever have adequate grounds for so drastic an act as severing communication with another human being?

Such questions of course open heretical doors. But does the concept of heresy have any place in a religion of love (and thus of openness to all men), in a religion of humility (thus alive to the imperfection of all human doctrines), in a religion of faith in the sovereignty and indefeasibility of God's address to men?

Liberal Christians must open these heretical doors, even if only to allow them to be closed again in the assurance that their use will not contribute to freedom and unrestricted community. And it will be well if this is done by scholars with the learning, the seriousness, and the analytical skill which are manifest, despite its failure to dwell upon the most radical questions, in *Peter and Caesar*.—GLENN TINDER, *University of Massachusetts, Boston.*

History of Indian Social and Political Ideas—From Rammohun to Dayananda. By BIMANBEHARI MAJUMDAR. (Calcutta: Bookland Private Ltd., 1967. Pp. xi, 332. Thirty rupees.)

For some thirty years now, an item entitled, *History of Political Thought from Rammohun to Dayananda, 1821-84, Volume I: Bengal* (Calcutta, 1934) by Bimanbehari Majumdar has been staring at me from my library shelves. I have often wondered what Professor Majumdar did with his projected second volume. Comes now this new title with the author's prefatory explanation that "The present volume completes the work undertaken in 1931, possibly establishing a record in perseverance or procrastination as may diversely be interpreted by friendly or hostile critics." Two questions present themselves immediately: How does the new work relate to the earlier study? What effect has the thirty-three year delay had on the quality of the final product?

The present work is not entirely new. Eight of its fourteen chapters are a revised version of the original Volume I, with identical chapter titles. Of these, seven are substantially unchanged, while the chapter on "The Muslim School of Political Thought" is thoroughly recast and extended, to give a greatly improved picture of muslim ideas. The new compilation adds an introductory chapter on "The State and Society—the Problem of Social Reform," and another on "Social Thinkers and Reformers of the pre-Congress Era." The author thus justifies his use of the new title, *History of Indian Social and Political Ideas,* which, he states in his Preface, was advisable because "the condition prevailing in the last century in this country made it impossible to separate these two aspects." Finally, in response to the implied promise of the 1934 volume, he has added four chapters, covering Western India, South India, and Dayananda and Harischandra in the North. The author's new Introduction puts the whole in much better perspective than did the prefatory material of Volume I.

As to the effect of a third of a century delay in bringing out the final version of this study of the 1821-84 period: The later chapters appear to be in the same style and consistent with the earlier sections. From the perspective of the present, however, there is a distinct aura about these discussions which savors of earlier times. Bacon, Bentham, Blackstone, Calvin, Hobbes, John Stuart Mill, Proudhon, Rousseau and Spencer are the principal Western theorists cited. This is all in the spirit of the nineteenth century British India of which Majumdar writes. Marx is mentioned only once: to point out that *Das Kapital* had not been translated into English and was therefore not mentioned by Bankimchandra when he wrote his *Samya.* It is instructive of the profound change in the premises and issues and personages of political thought during the last century to read through the dialogues of the Victorian era in India which this volume presents.

The author has provided a wealth of historical insights. In a passage on the nineteenth century he comments that "the proper climate necessary for propounding political philosophy was totally absent in India . . . Intellectual leaders . . . took recourse to journalism, therefore, as the vehicle of expression. A major portion of the social and political ideas of India . . . is to be found in the . . . journals owned and edited by Indians" Dayananda, is, of course, an exception and the author gives an excellent analysis of the Swami's contributions and his relationship to Rammohun Roy. Despite a style which may strike the reader as a bit flowery at times (Roy: "the great Vedantist . . . one of the earliest champions of the noble ideal of international co-operation"; Dayananda: "the Rishi or Divine Seer of modern India,") he is capable of sharp critical evaluation of leading writers—a quality sometimes lacking in other Indian historians of the period. He quotes, for instance, the now discredited theories of Indian political thought held by K. P. Jayaswal and says that he seems to support Dayananda's views on kingship and dictatorship. But he is very careful not to assume that such views are valid and, in fact, refers to Dayananda's claims of "Republicanism in the Vedas" as the product of "distorted vision." In summary, the book is well written, informed, scholarly. It presents a most useful analysis of the period, richly larded with citations from contemporary sources.

Professor Majumdar is well known to South Asian scholars, having served as President of the Indian Political Science Association and written or edited various works, including *Public Administration in India, The Gandhian Concept of the State,* and *Militant Nationalism in India.* It is to be hoped that the projected two volume *History of Social and Political Ideas from Ranade to Nehru,* completing the series of studies from 1821-1964 (which Majumdar advises us is to be brought out by the same publisher) will now be promptly available.—D. MACKENZIE BROWN, *Prescott College.*

Russian Political Thought: An Introduction. BY THORNTON ANDERSON. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 444. $9.75.)

"Political thought" can mean two things—what politicians think, or what thinkers say about politics. Professor Anderson's history of political thought in Russia is devoted almost exclusively to the first kind, but of necessity: the history of Russia is singularly deficient among great nations in the production of original and significant treatises on the nature of government. From Kievan to Soviet times, public political discussions in Russia have been almost exclusively confined to sloganeering and propagandizing, whether by the government or the opposition. It is as though the history of American political thought had to be written from provincial editorials and Washington news releases.

Professor of Government at the University of Maryland, Thornton Anderson has shifted, after some eminent work in the history of American political theory, to the field of Russian intellectual history. He recently edited a useful anthology, *Masters of Russian Marxism* (New York, 1963). In the work under review, he has produced a most readable and well-organized introduction to the history of political ideology and controversy in Russia. With its copious Western-language bibliography, *Russian Political Thought* will be an excellent text for courses in general political theory or Soviet government where an account of the opinions of Russia's leaders, pre- and post-revolutionary, is desired with a good deal of historical context. Of systematic philosophical depth, on the other hand, there is very little, particularly in Anderson's section on the Soviet period. Even where Lenin's *State and Revolution* invites some exposition and critique, the author slows down for no more than a couple of paragraphs of summary.

The thesis emerging from Professor Anderson's pages and re-affirmed in his conclusion is the inseparable link of Russian political thought, as ideology, with the concerns of governmental power. Such were the political formulations of the Orthodox Church, the messianic pretensions of the Muscovite Tsars, and the ethereal reform notions of the eighteenth century, which Anderson pursues chronologically for the first third of his book. The same was true for the nineteenth century, with the difference that various schools of opposition—Anderson has chapters on Westerners, Slavophils, Anarchists, Populists, Liberals, and Marxists—declaimed their views along with the Official Ideology of Orthodoxy-Autocracy-Nationality. And the Soviet period (comprising the last quarter or so of the book) saw a return to the one official belief, enforced with all the authority of the state.

Marxism, Anderson feels, fitted in psychologically with the Russian bent for messianic commitment despite its logical incompatibility with the revolutionary movement of a backward country where the bourgeoisie had been too weak to accomplish its own revolution. The Russian Marxists (even Plekhanov, Anderson points out) had to contrive a rationale for the party of the proletariat to accomplish the bourgeois revolution, a prospect that did considerable violence to the prescriptions of historical materialism. They were Anderson observes, "under pressure from the urgencies of the revolutionary movement to deny strict economic determinism and to act through politics without being unduly restrained by the backwardness of the national economy. The habits acquired and the theories that justified them led ultimately to Lenin's explicit assertion of the priority of politics over economics and to Stalin's idea of revolution from above."

On the Bolsheviks and the Soviet period Anderson is on firm ground in stressing the subordination of theory to practice and the subjection of political doctrine to constant manipulation. There are some unfortunate omissions of independent and interesting people—Bogdanov and the prerevolutionary Left Bolsheviks, and the legal theorists of the 1920's and '30's. But the principal controversies of the 1920's are well described, and the maneuvers of Stalin and Khrushchev are recognized for what they are, even to the extent of Khrushchev's amendment of the theoretical triumph of Communism to exclude any Soviet obligation to give aid to China. Anderson wisely cautions against the notion that the Soviets have cynically abandoned theory: "It is important to remember that, at each step along the way, the new departures were integrated into the remaining fabric of Marxist theory. This was accomplished through a polemical process of exceptional vigor, which set a pattern that continues to prevail in international Communism. A new orthodoxy was established, again connected with the government but standing above it and not below it as the Orthodox Church had stood."—R. V. DANIELS, *University of Vermont.*

Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century: A Yugoslav Philosopher Reconsiders Karl Marx's Writings. BY GAJO PETROVIC. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967, Pp. 237. $1.25.)

The task that Petrovic sets for himself in this collection of essays is "to penetrate to the essence of Marx's original thought and to think further in its spirit about the momentous philosophical questions of the contemporary world and man."

In Part I, Petrovic deals both directly and indirectly with the first half of this task; the penetration of the rigid dogmatism of Stalinism that has surrounded some Marxist philosophy, to the essence of Marx's original thought. The "original" Marx is not to be confused with the "young" Marx, however, since Petrovic rejects any analysis that does not acknowledge the essential unity of Marx's thought. *Capital* and *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* possess "an essential identity" in that they represent a philosophical critique that is based on a concept of man as a "free creative being of praxis." The deficiency of Stalinism, therefore, lies not only in its rejection of Marx's early writings but also in its distortion of his later works.

According to Petrovic, the return from Stalin to Marx is a return from a system of philosophical dogma to a "creative Marxism" that questions old solutions and new problems. The duty of a renewed Marxist philosophy, then, is to critically expand Marx's thought to include new realities and to examine new philosophical trends "in the spirit of Marx." This is the second half of the task Petrovic has set for himself, and the rest of his book is devoted to essays which attempt to explore the possibilities of applying a renewed, critical, creative Marxism to various questions about man and the contemporary world.

Thus in Part II, in what is probably the most interesting section of the book, Petrovic deals with the topics of "Marx's Concept of Man," "Man as Economic Animal and Man as Praxis," "What is Freedom," "Alienation and De-alienation," and "Philosophy and Politics in Socialism." A review of this length cannot do justice to the wealth of detail and interesting comment in these essays, but a brief summary of some of Petrovic's conclusions will indicate the direction of his argument.

Among other things, Petrovic rejects the idea that man, according to Marx, is an "economic animal" whose "entire activity is determined by the economic sphere of his existence." He sees Marx instead as emphasizing man as a "universal, creative and self-creative social being." In his essay on "What is Freedom" the author commits himself to a view of freedom as self-determination in repudiation of those who consider freedom to be either the knowledge of necessity or the absence of external restraints on activity. In line with this argument, Petrovic also claims that the problem of "de-alienation" cannot be reduced to the problem of social transformation or the abolition of private property as some "Marxists" have claimed. He does not think it possible that a social system could be created that would automatically produce non-alienated individuals. De-alienation results from an individual's own activity and not from some external source.

Finally, in Part III, Petrovic examines certain apparently epistemological and ontological topics; "What is Meaning," "Truth and Reflection," "Praxis and Being," "Logic and Mathematics." He reviews the writings of Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Feuerbach and others on these questions and critically analyzes them "in the spirit of Marx." As Petrovic points out, however, his essays in Part III are no less "anthropological" than those in Part II, and the essays in Part II also deal with ontological problems. Traditional terminology, therefore, cannot adequately characterize all the elements of their essays.

Petrovic realizes that the type of critical discussion he is advocating will be questioned by some "Marxist critics" who might feel that such discussion can only lead to a weakening of Marxist philosophy. To this charge he answers "why should a living Marxism be weaker than a dead one?" and he expresses a hope that the time will soon come when it can no longer be said that "Jesuits have written more studies about Marx and Marxism than Marxists themselves." This collection of essays is welcome evidence of the potentialities of a living Marxism that rejects both a blind acceptance of Stalinist orthodoxy and a mere compilation of Stalinist "errors," and attempts to creatively interpret new realities.—EDWARD D. WILDE, *Moravian College*.

Two Tracts on Government. BY JOHN LOCKE. Edited, with an introduction, notes, and translation by Philip Abrams. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, Pp. x, 264. $7.50.)

This book contains the first English publication of Locke's earliest writings on politics (an Italian edition appeared in 1961). These are two short untitled works that have been culled from the Lovelace Collection of Locke manuscripts in the Bodleian Library. The first is an English tract written in 1660, the second a Latin essay composed a year or two later. Both works represent defenses of the affirmative position on the question (to quote the heading of the English tract): "Whether the Civil Magistrate may lawfully impose and determine the use of indifferent things in reference to Religious Worship." This was, of course, an emotion-charged political issue in the England of 1660, but it is difficult to get very excited about or even vicariously involved in it today. Furthermore, for the most part Locke's handling of the argument strikes me as heavy-handed, tedious, and pedestrian. On the surface, these tracts seem to possess only a tenuous antiquarian or biographical interest for the contemporary reader and thus to be scarcely worth the trouble of publishing them.

I do not, however, believe that this is so. The real value of these early works is lucidly explained in a lengthy introduction written by the editor, a Fellow of Peterhouse College and Lecturer in Economics in the University of Cambridge. Students of political thought—especially those who are interested in the origins of modern, secularized political theorizing—can acquire from this volume considerable insight into the assumptions and problems of the intellectually pivotal seventeenth century. And the mind of John Locke—one of the most deceptively complex writers in the history of political philosophy—is much clarified as well. Pre-eminently, this book helps us to begin to understand precisely *how* and to some degree *why* Locke's thought served as a bridge between the antecedent classical-Christian tradition and the predominant science-minded, secularized framework of modern political thought.

It is certainly true that Locke's two early tracts support a conservative viewpoint, upholding the right of authoritarian government, rather than the individual conscience, to set standards of religious behavior. Yet, as Dr. Abrams points out, Locke defended his position in such a way as to call into question the fundamental assumptions of the scholastic tradition. Divine and natural law are merely asserted as true, but no effort is made to buttress their authority by demonstration. In large measure, Locke's attempt to justify authoritarian government is utilitarian, premised upon the threats to social order posed by human ignorance, passion and partiality.

Furthermore, even at this early stage of his development Locke presents a contractual justification of governmental authority. At this juncture he claimed not necessarily to believe in this theory, but in fact he attempted to present at least a minimal defense of it and none at all of the divine right doctrine. The latter is only mentioned as another possible theoretical support for government. In sum, the philosophical assumptions—and dilemmas—which undergirded Locke's mature "liberal" political thought are presented embryonically or at least hinted at in these expressions of a youthful conservatism.

Dr. Abrams is to be commended for his excellent editorial work and even more for his successful and illuminating effort to place these early works in the context of Locke's intellectual development. I have only two minor criticisms of points in his introduction. He maintains that Locke's tracts represent a late statement of an "old ideology" but set the terms for a career culminating in the formulation, by the 1690's, of a "new ideology." I assume that the editor does not use the term "ideology" in Marx's sense but rather as short-hand for philosophical system. But his meaning would have been clearer on this point if he had avoided the equivocal and, in this context, tendentious-sounding term, ideology. Finally, Dr. Abrams contends that Locke's argument ended in an epistemological crisis (concerning the status of traditional claims to moral knowledge) which no one prior to Locke was willing to face. Surely Hobbes, at least, had previously confronted this problem in an even more head-on and unequivocal fashion than Locke ever did. None of this critical commentary should be taken, however, as minimizing in any sense the value of this excellent work of editorial and interpretative scholarship.—FRED H. WILLHOITE, *Louisiana State University*.

The Phenomenology of the Social World. BY ALFRED SCHUTZ. Translated By George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert. (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1967. Pp. xxxvi 255. $9.00.)

Within the past decade or so, English translations of European phenomenological literature have been appearing at a rapid pace. The "Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy" has added the welcomed, invaluable translation of Alfred Schutz's (1899-1959) pioneering work, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie* (1932; 2d ed., 1960) which was highly praised by the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). The translated version includes George Walsh's "Introduction" (pp. xv-xxix), a short German-English "Glossary" (pp. xxv-xxxvi), a "Selected Bibliography" (pp. 251-52) and an expanded "Index" (pp. 253-55).

Schutz's *Phenomenology* is an analysis of the meaning-structure of the social world and suggests a new way of investigating the social sciences. In describing the *invariant* and *typical* structure of the social world, Schutz utilizes the central categories of Husserl's early phenomenology such as intentionality, internal time-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Schutz attempts to *describe* social "phenomena" and to establish the meaning of "objectivity" in the social sciences from the perspective of the lived experience of man in the "natural attitude" (*natürliche Einstellung*). He accepts the fact with justification that what is essentially human is qualitatively different from what is natural and, accordingly, adopts radically different procedures in the social sciences from those of the natural sciences.

Schutz's *Phenomenology* is divided into five sections (a total of 50 sub-sections). In Section I, he formulates the basic methodological problems of "interpretive sociology," clarifies the basic ambiguities in a series of tacit presuppositions of Max Weber's sociological concepts such as the "intended meaning" and "motive" of action, and attempts to go beyond Weber. Section II shows the meaning-structure of action as a lived experience (*Erlebnis*) from the standpoint of the solitary ego by means of Bergson's notion of lived time as "duration" (*durée*) and above all of Husserl's analysis of internal time-consciousness. Section III deals with the problem of intersubjective understanding (*Fremdverstehen*) or our knowledge of the *alter ego*. In Section IV, Schutz describes the structure of the social world and formulates a typology of social relationship. In Section V, he reformulates some basic questions concerning "interpretive sociology" in view of the four preceding sections and hints at a direction in which sociological problems may be more fully analyzed. In the remainder of this review, I shall attempt to state the focal insights of Schutz in Sections II, III and IV of his *Phenomenology*.

1. By action Schutz means something more than a mere physical event; it is the unity of an actor's lived experience. Action has its temporal, meaningful and motivational dimensions. It is a uni-directional and irreversible on-going process. It acquires meaning when it is grasped by the Act of attention (i.e., reflectively). This reflective glance is called "Act" (*Akt*) which has a reference to "having behaved," never "behaving." Thus a distinction is made between "action in process" (*Hendeln*) and "the completed act" (*Handlung*). Moreover, the distinct element of an action is its "project" (*Entwurf*) which is a preconceived plan by the actor in advance before the execution of his action. It is thought of in the future perfect tense (*modo futuri exacti*), i.e., "I shall have done." As "a phantasying of action," project is in principle independent of the actual performance of action. Now, motive is the meaningful ground for action. There are two kinds of motive: (1) the "'in-order-to' motive" (*Um-zu-Motiv*) and (2) the "because-motive" (*Weil-Motiv*). The first refers to the orientation of action to a future event and the second to a past lived experience. Hence they have the temporal character of futurity and of pastness respectively.

2. The realm of intersubjectivity begins as soon as we assume the existence of others. Since all the social sciences take intersubjectivity for granted, the philosopher of social science must clarify the structure of intersubjectivity. In a *genuine* intersubjective understanding, it is not sufficient to know the external "indications" (*Anzeichen*) of other's behavior. In direct social experience, the body is a field of expression. In case of a "sign" (*Zeichen*) intended for communication, it is always the "sign for" (1) what it signifies and (2) what is expressive of the lived experience of its user. In "a sign system," the user and the interpreter place a sign or a group of signs in a configurative context of meaning expressive of their lived experiences. Intersubjective understanding thus takes into account the lived experience of the other self. This is possible because (1) I know *that* the structure of other's lived experience is analogous to mine or has the same form as mine, (2) the idea "I and you co-exist" suggest that the stream of your intentional acts is "simultaneous" or "contemporaneous" with my own, and (3) I can observe the course of your action as it actually takes place in a direct social encounter, whereas I must attend to my lived experience reflectively in order to observe it. Schutz, however, is advancing neither a "projective theory of empathy" nor a solipsism. In Schutz's theory, I recognize another self *other* than mine and I comprehend this lived experience as *other* than mine (i.e., the distinction between the "intended meaning" of *my* lived experience and *my* interpretation of *his*).

3. Section IV is by far the most important and original contribution of Schutz's *Phenomenology* to the theory of social science. By the social world, he means a complex network of relationships. The starting point of all social science is found in our ordinary social life, and other people are both our "objects of experience" and "objects

of thought" as well. Four regions of social relationship are (1) the *Umwelt* (the world of consociates), (2) the *Mitwelt* (the world of contemporaries), (3) the *Vorwelt* (the world of predecessors or "history") and (4) the *Folgewelt* (the world successors). The *Vorwelt* and the *Folgewelt* have the temporal character of the past and the future respectively. The *Umwelt* is the social world in which we directly experience others as "consociates" (*Mitmenschen*) here and now. In "We-relationship" I encounter the bodily presence of the other in the face-to-face situation. Only in the *Umwelt* and the *Mitwelt*, can I be both actor and observer. The *distance* of social relationship ranges from "We-relationship" to collective entities such as "state," "government," "law," etc., with of course the varying degrees of anonymity. The *Mitwelt* which has a reference to "They-orientation" is of immediate significance to the political world. In it we do not directly experience our "contemporaries" (*Nebenmenschen*) but only *infer* their typical characteristics on the basis of our immediate social relationships, namely, we understand the "contemporary" as "an ideal type." Thus he is always experienced predicatively (*Erfahrung*). Moreover, there are two ideal types of knowing (by inference) the behavior of others as "contemporaries": (1) "personal ideal type" and (2) "course-of-action type." Both types are used together because to know another person as a "diplomat" or "politician" we must know the job or functions he performs. The anonymous collective entities such as "state" can also be reduced to these ideal types: "every 'action' of the state can be reduced to the actions of its functionaries" and "the term 'state' is merely an abbreviation for a highly complex network of interdependent personal ideal types" (p. 199).

In conclusion, Schutz's *Phenomenology* contributes to a philosophical clarification of the very roots of human social existence. It is (or was) the significant beginning of a new way of theorizing about social science. To evaluate and appreciate his thought fully, one has to read his available and posthumously forthcoming writings. The phenomenological movement today is far broader and richer than when Husserl initiated it. Moreover, phenomenology as a philosophy also seeks the value of science for human existence. Now political theorists of all persuasions can and should no longer ignore the wealth of phenomenological insights, although they have often been misunderstood by political theorists.—Hwa Yol Jung, *Moravian College.*

Mathematical Applications in Political Science, II. Ed. By Joseph L. Bernd. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966. Pp. 208. $4.95.)

This is the second volume to emerge from Southern Methodist's 1964 and 1965 summer conferences on "Mathematical Applications in Political Science." It appears to differ from the first by virtue of having been devoted to advanced topics, the first having been devoted to fundamentals.

This volume contains seven papers, the first two addressed, ostensibly, to "Solutions to Methodological Problems," the third to "Statistical Techniques," the fourth and fifth to "Applications to Practical Politics," and the last two to "Models of the Political System." I shall summarize them briefly in that order.

Hayward R. Alker, Jr. has written an instructive discussion and application of causal modeling techniques, both recursive and circular. If read carefully, one can even find occasional warnings concerning the limits of such modeling. One such obvious warning, though remaining unmentioned, concerns a direct linkage found to exist between urbanization and literacy in the recursive model which is perforce eliminated from the circular model to satisfy the conditions of identifiability in the set of equations.

The use of the term reciprocal where circular should have been used and an enigmatic discussion of free choice and causality, in which it appears that free choice must appear as random behavior in a casual model, mar an otherwise good review of causal modeling.

Richard L. Merritt's paper on cross-national content analysis gets no closer to mathematics than a mention of sampling, counting and coder reliability but it is a better than adequate review of some of the recent work in content analysis.

Carl F. Kossack's paper must rate as the most frustrating reading experience of recent history. A discussion of factor analysis, power spectrum analysis, cluster analysis, general linear hypotheses, simultaneous regression, response surface analysis and classification techniques in 25 pages must set a new record for confidence in the efficiency of language. The task was too much, however, for only those who can make the necessary leaps and generalizations can view this as, at best, a listing of some available techniques while for those others among us it becomes simply impenetrable. This is unfortunately compounded by a badly constructed type set making certain of the equations quite difficult to read and other typographical sins of both omission and commission.

Frank S. Scalora's article on stochastic models is a nice review of McPhee's 1960 Wisconsin primary study and Buzzell's research on company recruiting. Mr. Scalora is a good reviewer.

Gerald H. Kramer's article, "A Decision-Theoretic Analysis of a Problem in Political Campaigning," presents an imaginative model of the relationship between canvassing and the maximization of vote plurality where there are constraints on resources available. He develops a simple algorithm for ordering precincts in terms of their probable contribution to such maximization. Assumptions concerning the precincts and, in particular, the assumption that there is no opposition candidate substantially limit the generalizability of the model but its treatment of decision rules in campaign behavior is step No. 1 of any more general effort.

William H. Riker's article is a detached appendix to his *The Theory of Political Coalitions* intended to replace its Appendix I, or parts of it. He merely simplifies his proof of the size principle.

Otto O. Davis and Melvin Hinich conclude the book with a nicely developed model of "policy formation in a democratic society." Their announced intention is the determination of the relationship of voter preferences and governmental policy. Proceeding from some basic, and fairly well known, assumptions concerning decision rules and the nature and distribution of preferences they find that a "beneficent" dictator would provide the same policy outcomes as the winner of an election campaign, that minority parties can win if the parties differ in cohesion, that a party may improve its chance of winning by nominating a candidate whose position is somewhere between its internal mean preference and that of the other party, and that a candidate can maximize his chances by catering to specialized "mutually exclusive" sets of interests in the electorate.

Such then are my assessments of the contents of the book. It remains to be suggested that this is the type of book which will be purchased for only a small part of its contents. I doubt that there are many who would be able to find those contents, in their entirely, uniformly informative.—ALDEN E. LIND, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Theory and Methods of Social Research. BY JOHAN GALTUNG. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. 534. $10.00.)

Books, like people, are often divided into those that do, and those that reflect on doing; and if this dichotomy fits abrasively, blame the reflective people (who thought it up). *Theory and Methods of Social Research* by Johan Galtung is exactly what its title suggests—a book which reflects on doing. It is an excellent work.

The reflection is, however, of a particular sort. The author states on page 1 that neither philosophical foundations nor nuts-and-bolts techniques will be disucssed in depth. Instead, a middle road of analysis is chosen which ties together a variety of approaches to data collection, data processing, data analysis, and theory formation.

It is part of the book's merit that the author does not always succeed in staying on this elusive middle ground. The text runs all the way from discussions of statistical tests to the epistemological status of theories. Even Quine's views on truth and falsity are invoked. At the end of the book, one is not even sure if there *is* a middle road.

The organization of the book is superb. Beginning with the observation that he is interested in correct methodology, or what researchers should do rather than what they actually do, Galtung moves comprehensively over almost every phase of research design. Indeed, the book itself is arranged like a gigantic research design, containing reflections on the range of moves open at each stage of the analysis.

The main divisions of the book are two: data collection and data analysis. In the first section are found discussions of the data matrix, units of analysis, variables, values, collection of data, and surveys. The second section of the book contains data processing, distributions, patterns, hypotheses, analysis of data, and theories.

The subject of a data matrix contains a series of initial distinctions which recur throughout the book: synchronic (spatial) *vs.* diachronic (temporal) variables; manifest *vs.* latent data; and the basic sequence of background—personality—behavior variables. Some confusion results from distinguishing latent and manifest data on the basis of inference (i.e., *all* data involve some form of inference—a philosophical point, sad to say), but this is minor.

In discussing units of analysis the author separates analytic levels, warns the researcher of the ecological fallacy (and others), and provides the reader with a good summary of the Lazarsfeld-Menzel system of separating variables. A very clear and brief point is made of the sometimes overlooked difference between substantive (sample) and generalization (sample to universe), hypotheses; and generally the discussion of sampling is quite good, especially the business of linking sampling techniques to research purposes—a nuts-and-bolts point, I believe.

Some generally good distinctions are made between levels of variables, but the reader will look in vain for values other than those which are strictly empirical. Galtung is concerned with actor evaluations, not justification beyond this. Even so, the author is clear-headed enough to separate norms and evaluations (the former as action-oriented), and generally handle the subject well. The same is true of the subjects of data collection and surveys, although applying the Parsonian phase system to questionnaires (p. 133) is a bit too much.

Data processing, statistical distributions, patterns and indices are all discussed with aplomb and wit (if that is possible). There are some especially interesting discussions of the mathematical relations between Lazarsfeld's manifest and latent variables (p. 274 ff.), but only a brief allusion is made to factor analysis. (Enough, however, is perhaps enough—no matter what the size of the book.) Hypotheses are given a different twist, being defined in terms of form and not the meanings of the words contained. Hence, "God is infinitely good" is an hypothesis, and *then* is treated in terms of the conditions under which it is tenable (instead of the reverse). The final section on theories is especially good.

In a brief review, any thorough criticism of such a book is impossible, and in this case hardly needed. I will take up only a few brief points (if just to avoid a vacuous summary). The choice of examples does not always come off. Some used to demonstrate the ecological fallacy (p. 47) demonstrate only that they ought not to have been included. It would also be helpful to have more examples from the social sciences in the discussion of hypotheses (p. 337 ff.).

There is also some confusion over the meaning of a tautology, which (contrary to the author's belief) is *not* defined in terms of probability (p. 338) but rather in terms of the linguistic or quantitative terms used; hence, the question of probability is irrelevant, for a tautology is not a factual claim. Further, the sociology of knowledge *is* related to epistemology (p. 336), leading to a position of epistemological uncertainty. And so on.

But, as can be seen, none of these criticisms is anything to get excited about. The book is good enough to escape its minor flaws easily. It is sprinkled liberally with charts (the author obviously finds the spatial dimension a fertile area for his ideas) which clearly present the main distinctions made in the work. The book as a whole is probably too much for any but the most advanced undergraduates and graduate students, but anyone with some background in methodology will immediately appreciate the competence and élan with which Galtung has handled his much-discussed subject.—FRED M. FROHOCK, *Syracuse University*.

Divisiveness and Social Conflict. By ALAN R. BEALS AND BERNARD J. SIEGEL. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 185. $6.00.)

At first sight, this book by two well-known anthropologists seems to have considerable promise. A new theory of conflict, based on the comparison of divisiveness and factionalism in two widely different agrarian communities (Taos pueblo in New Mexico, and a village in southern India called "Namhalli"), should be welcome and useful to political scientists. Unfortunately, the promise is deceptive; although others may disagree, I have the feeling that an interesting opportunity to contribute to an interdisciplinary theory of social and political processes has been missed.

Some of the problems may arise from the book's organization, which seems—peculiarly enough—to be backwards. Is it not confusing to read the theoretical conclusions (chapters 4, 5) *before* the data from which they are drawn (chapters 6, 7)? Should the reader be given a survey of the existing literature—and the only clear statement of the authors' central thesis—in the *last* chapter? If we are to be told, in chapter 2, that size is an important variable in determining the cohesiveness of a rural village (p. 41), should the actual populations of Taos and Namhalli only be mentioned, as if in passing, far later in the exposition (pp. 98, n. 2; 100; 138)?

The central hypothesis of Beals and Siegel is not without interest: "a stress which is low in visibility, high in randomness, high in complexity, high in selectivity, and long in duration is most likely to produce factionalist dispute" (p. 115). But the political scientist will be struck by their failure to develop clear and objective measures to test the proposition. Equally disappointing is the failure to cite relevant work in other social sciences: theories of political conflict, studies of community power in the U.S., and analyses of the impact of modernization on agrarian societies are conspicuously absent from the bibliography.

Indeed, *Divisiveness and Social Conflict* is, to a considerable extent, a tract directed to other anthropologists, condemning the excesses of the so-called "functionalist" interpretation of conflict. Beals and Siegel repeatedly criticize the concept that social conflict serves positive functions; asserting that functionalism necessarily treats society as a static and "closed" organization, they insist instead on a distinction between "normal conflict," which is defined as "nondisruptive" and "nonviolent," and "disruptive" or "unregulated" conflict, of which the "pervasive factionalism" in Taos and Namhalli are prime examples (chapter 1).

This perspective raises more problems than it solves. It results in the assumption that "fighting" and "warfare" apply only to situations "where opponents do each other physical injury outside of any system of rules and meanings," thereby cutting off possible comparisons between international conflicts and feud or violence in primitive stateless societies (pp. 18, 170). The distinction between an organization's internal "strains" and the environmental "stresses" to which it is subject is useful, but it is approached with an evident bias in favor of cooperative responses to problem-solving (esp. pp. 20, 166).

Conflict and violence may well be deplorable, but this perspective does not increase our understanding of the role of headhunting, feud, and group fission in many primitive systems. Nor does it illuminate the consequences of violence in the process of economic and political modernization (so brilliantly analyzed by Barrington Moore in *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*). Whether or not looting and rioting in American ghettoes may actually contribute to an improvement of the negro's status is an open question, but Beals and Siegel do not help us to pose it more clearly.

Both in its empirical analysis and its theoretical conceptualization, the book has an opaque character that will frustrate political scientists. The authors' conclusion is representative: "let there be proposed a range of theories of conflict and let there be collected much information relevant to the causes, the course, and the concluding stages of divisiveness" (p. 170). In such a quest, it is to be feared that this slim volume will contribute less than it might have.—ROGER D. MASTERS, *Dartmouth College*.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Prestige and Association in an Urban Community: An Analysis of an Urban Stratification System. BY EDWARD O. LAUMANN. (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966. Pp. vii, 218. $2.95.)

Cities in a Race With Time: Progress and Poverty in America's Renewing Cities. BY JEANNE R. LOWE. (New York: Random House, 1967. Pp. x, 601. $10.00.)

The Regional City: An Anglo-American Discussion of Metropolitan Planning. ED. BY DEREK SENIOR. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, Pp. viii, 192.)

Professor Laumann in *Prestige and Association in an Urban Community* assesses the social stratification system in an urban area by directing his investigation at three main questions. First, do we have separate indentifiable social classes in urban areas or does a social continuum exist with no distinct boundaries between the classes? Secondly, what types of social interaction patterns exist among friends, neighbors, and relatives given the observed stratification system? Thirdly, what relationships exist between the observed social structure and certain political and economic attitudes?

Laumann used relatively sophisticated statistical techniques to analyze the occupational ranks, social interactions and attitudes of a sample of 422 white male residents in Cambridge and Belmont, Massachusetts. Occupation was the primary variable used to assess the stratification system. For each occupational category a subjective measure (preferred social-interaction) and an objective measure (observed social-interaction) was used to determine the dimensions of the stratification system.

An individual's subjective description of the social system differs from his objective social interaction patterns. The respondents describe the system as open and state social preferences for individuals with higher social status than themselves. However, their objective social interaction is confined primarily to individuals of equal occupational status. The American ideology of an open class system with a great deal of social mobility most reflects subjective descriptions of the system not actual social interaction behavior.

The research indicates that neither a status continuum nor a social class system is descriptive of the urban stratification system. Rather, a stratification system exists with both the top and bottom exhibiting crystallized boundaries and the large middle group socially undifferentiated. The middle occupational groups show considerable differentiation in subjective social preferences along prestige lines and less tendency to confine social-interaction with status equals than do the top and bottom occupational groups. This conclusion makes suspect findings of past studies that state a social continuum or identifiable social classes characterize the urban stratification system. The stratification system is mixed, combining certain features of social-class and status continuum.

Given the above description of an urban stratification system Laumann finds that social-interaction, particularly friendship, was primarily confined to individuals of similar occupational groupings. Social-interaction among relatives and neighbors was less confined to equal status individuals. The top and bottom occupational categories exhibited the greatest degree of equal status contact and the middle category the least.

Individuals with high status sensitivity, strong class identification and consciousness and desiring social interactions with status-equals exhibited more extreme economic and political beliefs of either a liberal or conservative persuasion. This finding indicates relating status characteristics to political and economic attitudes is no longer a sufficient enterprise. Greater emphasis should be placed upon intervening variables, such as, social mobility and social-interaction networks of individuals which may play an important role in the formation and support of economic and political beliefs.

It is unfortunate that Negroes were not included in the sample for they are an important segment in most of our urban areas. Occupation may not be a reliable indicator of prestige and social interaction for Negroes. It is understandable that their inclusion in the sample may have jeopardized the validity of the findings. However, valuable insights about the Negroes' position in the stratification system could have been obtained from the responses of the white respondents.

Professor Laumann makes a major contribution with his penetrating analysis describing and explaining an urban stratification system. His study will not only be of interest to persons concerned with social stratification, but it should prove useful to researcher's utilizing social class as a major variable.

Miss Lowe in *Cities in a Race with Time* focuses upon the development of urban renewal and public housing over the past twenty years in five major cities. (New York, Pittsburgh, Washington, Philadelphia, and New Haven). In a descriptive fashion she outlines the experiences of each of these cities by vividly portraying the individuals and groups involved in urban renewal. Miss Lowe has exhibited astute political awareness and understanding of the forces and values involved in renewal in each of the five cities.

Miss Lowe superbly describes the roles of Robert Moses and Richard Lee in their respective cities. By focusing on these two men the author illustrates the complexity of problems inherent in initiating and carrying through urban renewal in New York and New Haven. But, by concentrating on urban renewal, many related problems and priorities of the cities were overlooked. Urban renewal and public housing were not examined as part of the total political process in the cities examined. Urban renewal issues were examined as if they were top priority issues in the cities. Local political leaders may not think that urban renewal is the major problem facing their city and this affects the politics of renewal.

Cities in a Race with Time is a case study of five cities. The urban renewal experiences of the cities were not adequately compared with one another. No theoretical framework was incorporated to illustrate similarities or differences which might lead to greater understanding of the politics of urban renewal. Would Mayor Lee be as successful in New York as he was in New Haven? Would the Mellon fortune accomplish similar success in Philadelphia as it did in Pittsburgh?

Miss Lowe describes the emerging problems of cities and relates the effects of urban renewal upon them. In general, urban renewal and public housing barely scratch the surface of the social, economic and racial problems of cities. Nevertheless, the book concludes that the very process of trying to solve urban problems may constitute the good life. With urban problems so great and solutions so difficult to reach, what else can be said?

The Regional City consists of papers and discussion of American and British planners during a conference on regional planning held in England in 1964. The book represents the opinions and observations of the 32 conferees toward differences and similarities of planning in the United States and Britain. Because of the large number of participants and varying shades of differences in their points of view the book makes difficult reading.

The major difference between planning in the United States and Britain stems from the historical role of local government in both countries. In the United States great emphasis upon local determinism, Jacksonian Democracy and private economy shapes and limits what planners can accomplish. In the United States planners follow market forces closely when constructing their plans. Whereas in Britain, regional planning follows closely national priorities. Local government in Britain has never enjoyed the autonomy of local government in the United States and as a result is more receptive to regional plans.

The surprising conclusion is reached that "given the general will to use them, taken in all, American social control over land use are inherently no less powerful than those in Britain, and the compensation price to be paid need be no higher." Then why hasn't the United States used their social controls over land? Again, the conclusion is the historical role of local government. The conference also suggests that the pressure to plan is not as great in the United States because of its vast open spaces and great wealth.

Given the limitations on American Planners they appear to employ more sophisticated techniques such as urban simulation models and general systems theory which take into account the urban area as a totality. The British focus primarily upon physical planning stressing to a lesser extent social and economic factors. The planning techniques available in the United States will not be really useful until values concerning planning and governmental organization change. The book concludes that a major change in important public objectives is needed if comprehensive planning is to be effective in American urban regions.—VINCENT L. MARANDO, *University of Arizona*.

Urban Research and Policy Planning. ED. BY LEO F. SCHNORE AND HENRY FAGIN. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1967. Pp. 638. $20.00.)

Urban Research and Policy Planning is an ambitious book. As the initial volume in a planned series of annual reviews sponsored by Sage Publications, it attempts to survey major urban research and policy planning developments which have occurred in the twenty-year period since World War II. In the first half of the book, thirteen authors utilize a disciplinary format to discuss urban research developments in the fields of psychology, social welfare, economics, regional science, history, geography, political science and political sociology. In the second half of the book, eleven authors cut across disciplinary lines to analyze urban policy planning developments in terms of concepts, technology and organization. Thus, the book's organization begs the question of the potential relevance which the more academic-oriented research discussed in Part I has to the policy planning developments described in Part II.

Despite the fact that the book's title implies the existence of a meaningful interaction between academic research and policy planning, the introductory chapter by Leo Schnore and Eric Lampard tends to minimize the extent of this potential interrelationship by arguing that "serious scientific research must continue to be concerned with fundamental questions of understanding the whole urban phenomenon and not just those aspects that currently appear to be problems to the social engineers." In line with this philosophy, Part I authors such as Anselm Strauss advise that urban sociology is weak "not in how to verify theory, but in how to discover theory." As a result, Strauss suggests a series of research strategies that focus on such issues as "the unstudied" (e.g., urban icons, the symbolism of time and space) and "the unusual" (e.g., the trivial, the odd).

While the unstudied and the unusual undoubtedly represent intriguing areas of investigation, it is difficult to reconcile such Part I research "emphases" with the agonizing dilemmas which policy planners, such as Lyle Fitch, describe in the second half of the book. As Fitch warns, "social planning in the United States in the mid-1960's represents many influences, strains of thought, and conflicting sentiments. . . . One may ask if social planning is in danger of overreaching itself. . . Such are the uncertainties that social planning must be in the main based on probabilities . . . rather than with neatly constructed models based on known facts."

Besides such differences in intellectual outlook between many of the book's Part I academic researchers and Part II policy planners, there are a number of disparities among the academicians, themselves. John Kain, in an extremely stimulating discussion of "Urban Transportation Behavior," emphasizes that the real problem confronting the transportation researcher is to impose some order on "the truly phenomenal outpouring of data" that has occurred in the post-war period. Conversely, Harold Mayer, in discussing problems relative to research in transportation flows in urban geography, argues that "unfortunately, much potentially useful research on flows is inhibited or prevented by lack of adequate data."

These, and the other, divergencies of viewpoint that are apparent in this book suggest that it is difficult to reconcile much of our present *Urban Research and Policy Planning* efforts under the covers of one neatly organized volume. Indeed, at various points in the book, hints are droppped that the quality of our present-day academic research may be unduly complicating the already complex task facing the policy planners. Norton Long, for example, questions whether some of our current research in urban politics may not fall into this category by suggesting that "an ironic effect of the 'community power structure' literature has been to teach civil rights leaders to seek a confrontation with a putative white power structure" that may well be non-existent, or at least incapable of responding effectively to the kinds of demands which are placed upon it.

Despite the book's numerous inconsistencies, the quality of many of the individual articles is certainly high enough to warrant the careful attention of serious observers of the urban scene. In addition, the book does make it obvious that, in at least one crucial respect, the modern city is very decidedly being influenced by the products of modern research. Britton Harris emphasizes this fact in his discussion of "New Technology and Urban Planning." As Harris points out, such technological breakthroughs as the development of new power resources, more sophisticated techniques of microprocessing, new innovations in communications and computational capabilities, and recent advances in the biological sciences are all having a very decided impact on the modern metropolis. Thus, while many of us in the social sciences may be fascinated with the odd and the trivial, the scientific technicians are grinding ahead relentlessly, reshaping our cities for better or for worse. Perhaps in the future the social sciences will develop a more sophisticated capability to apply their own new technology to urban planning processes in a manner which Harris discusses. Books such as *Urban Research and Public Policy* make it clear, however, that we still have a long road to travel before we can expect any such development to take place.—FRANK SMALLWOOD, *Dartmouth College.*

Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems. BY ALAN K. CAMPBELL AND SEYMOUR SACKS. (New York: The Free Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 239. $7.95.)

Political scientists in recent years have increasingly turned their attention to systematic (i.e., comparative and quantitative) analysis of the fiscal patterns of political systems. Perhaps this is a function of their new theoretical focus on system outputs, or, equally plausibly, it may be because state and local budgets (and national ones) provide a gold mine of quantitative data, hitherto explored only by the economists. In this book, two distinguished students of metropolitanism, a political scientist and an economist, have brought together an enormous amount of data and a sophisticated methodology to explain variations in metropolitan fiscal behavior.

There are inevitably two vexing problems which confront anyone who hopes to explain municipal spending and taxing as dependent variables. First, problems arise out of the division of governmental labor between the state and local units. In 1962, for example, cities in New York made 77.8 per cent of the total state and local expenditures in that state, while the comparable figure for Vermont was 39.4 per cent. Because of these differing functional responsibilities, one would expect a city in New York to spend more than an exactly comparable city in neighboring Vermont. Campbell and Sacks deal with this difficulty by introducing as an independent variable an expenditure (and tax) assignment variable, i.e., the amount of state and local spending made by local governments. Even reckoning with the state-local question, however, will not solve a second complexity, for even within the metropolitan area the incredible mosaic of municipal corporations and special districts leads to a varying pattern of expenditures and taxation. The latter problem can be reasonably well handled, as the authors do, by aggregating expenditures into larger units, for metropolitan areas as a whole, for central cities and for outside central city areas. Unfortunately, in doing so, one must make some inevitable compromises with the empirical world, for policy decisions are not made by these analytically useful aggregates, but by decision-makers in fragmented governmental units.

The independent variables used in the analysis are for the most part the traditional ones used by economists in explaining variations in state and local spending—per capita income, density, per cent urban, state aid, federal aid, and the authors' tax and expenditure assignment variable. If the goal in the expanding research on policy outputs is to maximize one's multiple correlations, then Campbell and Sacks have done better than anyone else. The coefficient of multiple determination (R^2) between these six independent variables and per capita expenditures of metropolitan areas is .914. Statistically speaking, this must stand as a high-water mark in the search for the determinants of fiscal variations.

While one should hesitate to quibble with such a disarmingly high multiple R, I nonetheless detect a troubling conceptual difficulty with these independent variables, one suggested by Elliot Morss (in "Some Thoughts on the Determinants of State and Local Spending," *National Tax Journal,* March, 1966). Morss suggests that three kinds of theoretical concerns might justify efforts to study the determinants of state and local spending levels: *normative* views about the value of spending patterns; efforts to *predict* outputs; or efforts to understand or *explain* fiscal levels. He argues, I think rightly, that variables like state and federal aid payments are handy predictor variables, but next to meaningless for purposes of explanation. Presumably, both Parkinson and the average taxpayer, *sans* data, might guess that the more money governments obtained, the more they spent. Campbell and Sacks' assignment variables seem more useful for prediction than for explanation. Political scientists who read *Metropolitan America* might wish that the authors had pushed their search for independent variables further back in the funnel of causality, to borrow a metaphor from the voting studies. The assignment variables might then have been used as control variables in partial correlation analysis.

Partly for this reason, I suspect that the book will find a wider audience among economists than among political scientists. It is clearly more in the tradition of economists like Brazer and Fabricant than in the newer political science literature stemming from the work of Dawson and Robinson and Dye, among others. It is similar to the latter research, however, in suggesting the overwhelming importance of economic (as opposed to political) variables in determining variations in municipal outputs. As the authors would readily concede, this might reflect the paucity of data on relevant political variables of cities. But what data on political variables they could utilize (e.g., measures of governmental fragmentation and of state interparty competition) were rejected in preliminary analysis as insignificant.

My conceptual quibble notwithstanding, this book reflects both excellent research and reasoned analysis—the methodological rigor one expects from an economist and the policy concerns of a political scientist. The implications for policy issues like metropolitan reorganization are spelled out in the final chapter. Interestingly, two measures of governmental fragmentation (area per government and population per government) showed no relation to fiscal variations. Income, however, emerged as second in importance only to the assignment variables in predicting spending and taxing. Since income plays such a dominant role in determining municipal spending, the immediate response might be to suggest that effective metropolitan reorganization would provide a broader resource base for the central city. Sober second thoughts, however, would note that fiscal levels are considerably lower in outside central city areas. Thus the latter areas might indeed exert a conservative drag on metropolitan spending if real metropolitan integration were to (magically) come about. A second public policy implication is no less important. Despite the concern (or rhetoric) of some, federal and state aids are clearly not substitutive of local effort; if anything, they are stimulative. Increasing roles in tackling metro-problems by higher levels might be reasonably expected to produce spillover effects in the form of greater local initiative.—ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, *University of Texas.*

Metropolitan America: Challenge To Federalism. BY BERNARD J. FRIEDEN. (Washington: Advisory Commission On Intergovernmental Relations, 1966. Pp. x, 176.)

This confused volume unwittingly offers a powerful insight into the character of our urban problems, for it reveals how badly understood those problems are at the highest levels of our governmental system. Based on proposals published by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations during the period 1961-65, and pulled together by Professor Bernard J. Frieden, the report argues that inadequate public services, racial and economic segregation, fiscal imbalance, and other urban problems cannot be dealt with effectively because of the fragmented structure of government in our metropolitan areas. This fragmentation is caused not only by the multitude of local governments, but also by the many special district governments, state agencies and federal agencies that are now active in each of our metropolitan areas.

To eliminate this near-chaos the Commission proposes a series of measures: the powers of local governments should be reduced; counties, metropolitan planning commissions and state governments should become more active; and the federal government should encourage co-operation and planning, as well as discourage the further growth of special district governments. Worked out in laborious detail, these notions produce some 53 recommendations, including a series on water supply and sewage problems, and a series proposing improvements in relocation procedures.

There is no denying that government in metropolitan areas is fragmented, of course, but that such fragmentation constitutes a "problem" for anyone but the people who write these kinds of reports is less self-evident. As the Commission recognizes, few residents of metropolitan areas pay much attention to reorganization proposals and, whatever inefficiencies there may or may not be, "Local governments . . . keep the metropolis running. They operate the schools, maintain the streets, take care of police and fire protection" (pp. 7-8). What, then, is the difficulty? In truth, it is impossible to tell, for this report rarely moves beyond the level of slogans in developing the criteria by which it determines that a "problem" exists. Inadequate services, particularly in the newly-developing suburbs, is said to be a major difficulty, but in the absence of any Commission criteria of "adequacy" in service levels, the charge has little meaning. "Poor co-ordination and conflicts of interest among governments often block effective action to deal with metropolitan problems," says the Commission (pp. 10-11), but again, we are not told what "effective" action would be, for what range of problems. Special districts are said to be both confusing and expensive, but the Commission presents neither evidence of confusion nor standards of "efficiency" in expenditure.

Absence of criteria which define adequacy and efficiency of governmental performance is crucial, for it marks the failure of the Commission to enunciate a philosophy of purpose from which performance standards might be derived. This failure is partly conscious, for the Commission adopts a "realistic" stance (pp. 33, 117) which prohibits proposals for radical change. A more important source of the failure, however, is the remarkable confusion which characterizes the Commission's perception of how the present system works. On the one hand, the Commission sees no sharp separation between levels of government in the metropolitan area. Indeed, the simultaneous operation of local, county, state and federal agencies in metropolitan areas is regarded as a source of confusion and thus a target for remedial action. Alongside this view, on the other hand, the Commission presents another, which stresses the independence of each level of government. The Commission's attack on the powers of local governments is in fact rationalized as an attempt to modify the "Home Rule" principle, which the Commission seems to think is equivalent to a grant of absolute independence from external control. Local officials will surely be surprised to learn of their excessive independence, and the nation's governors and state legislators will be equally surprised to learn that the influence of local officials stops at municipal boundaries.

This uneasy juxtaposition of two contrasting views of metroplitan reality undermines the Commission's recommendations, not only because it suggests a lack of comprehension, but also because it allows the Commission to evade the problem of devising a realistic strategy of reform. Availability of two images of reality enables the Commission to use first one image, then the other, as rationalization, without regard for the frequent contradictions thus created. The powers of local government should be reduced because municipalities are too independent, but strong local government should be preserved; state agencies are a source of confusion in metropolitan areas, but states should expand their activities; the federal government should retain an essentially advisory role, but it should use its grants-in-aid to force acceptance of metropolitan planning, whether or not local governments see any point to such planning. In the midst of such a grab-bag of ideas, undisciplined by consistency of viewpoint, the Commission's repeated claim to have developed a "philosophy" of Federalism must be regarded as pompous nonsense.

A few years ago, a report proposing the sort of organizational tinkering suggested by this Commission might have been dismissed as a harmless entertainment. After Watts, Harlem, Newark and Detroit, such a judgment seems entirely too charitable. Confused in its analysis, undisciplined in its proposals for change, and pompous in presentation, this report is itself a sign of how deep are the roots of our present urban crisis.—THOMAS J. ANTON, *University of Stockholm.*

American Federalism in Perspective. ED. BY AARON WILDAVSKY. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1967. Pp. ix, 277.)

When invited to write this review I accepted with alacrity, for a book under the above title by Aaron Wildavsky promised to be exciting. The volume in fact turned out to be in the best tradition of modern American publishing: that is, it is (1) a reader, (2) a paperback, and (3) comparatively cheap (as to the last I can only conjecture, for no price is given; but the publisher's intent to reach a wide audience seems clear). Wildavsky on American federalism as author and Wildavsky on the same subject as editor are of course two quite different things. It is the latter we have here; let us see what he has brought forth.

It is perhaps appropriate to begin with the editor's declaration of purpose, which is presented in his brief Introduction. Asserting that the literature of federalism is often polemical and the "debate" on the subject shopworn, he concludes (at p. ix):

> It seemed desirable, therefore, to concentrate on analysis, instructive both in its own right and as a better preparation for those interested in political dispute. Hence, the emphasis here is on conceptual clarity, empirical theory, and comparative analysis.

Presumably all readers, and especially those which are in any wise selective (as this one is), reflect the editor's point of view. It is well to have a statement of that view in the beginning.

In the pursuit of his goal Wildavsky has assembled 13 essays. They cover the period 1945 (two brief pieces) to 1966 (one), a long enough time span surely to provide at least reasonable longitudinal perspective. Seven of the essays were written in 1960 or later. One is an original contribution, the remainder are reprints. The comparative analysis sought by the editor is served by papers on aspects of federalism in Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United States, and by collateral or incidental attention to practice around the world in other essays. Further, several of the papers whose titles promise no great breadth actually achieve an ecumenism which raises them above provincial concerns. In sweep, then, the volume is wide indeed.

In coverage otherwise the book merits high rating—as far as it goes. Every essay is a worthy piece of scholarship in its own right, a judgment certified by the fact that all save one have been published previously. The authors, too, deserve the confidence of the reader, for among them are several of the scholars most active in the field of federalism in recent years. All this is to say that the editor has chosen well both contributors and contributions. If he has selected five essays from two sources (two from Arthur Macmahon's *Federalism Mature and Emergent,* three from the late Morton Grodzins' federalism workshop), his choices indicate only where and by whom much of the productive work has been done.

Yet there is to one reader an inexplicable omission from this otherwise wholly worthy anthology. A perspective, I had thought, is meant to provide a comprehensive view of the scene beheld, from near foreground to distant horizon. The far sight is here, but an essential element is—or seems to me to be—missing from the front yard. I refer to what has come to be called creative federalism, or by some (with a different emphasis) intergovernmental relations. Call it what you will, it is here, and it has drastically modified the practice of American federalism. Some observers maintain that it provides linkages necessary to the operation, and even the survival, of the federal system in the onrushing world of tomorrow; other damn it as the perversion of true federalism. But few indeed command the Olympian view which permits them to ignore it altogether. The addition of a single essay, whether critical or approving does not matter, on contemporary trends would, in one man's judgment, have converted a very good collection into an outstanding one.

A word now (but not a lugubrious word) on the seamy side. Those who write or arrange books must be forever mindful of the ancient truism that typesetters are the sworn enemies of authors. The only known sure way to escape destruction at their hands is to eschew publication. An alternative is to allow approximately as much time for proofreading as was devoted to writing. This must be done by the author (or editor), he being the only one who has the slightest interest in the internals of the book in the end. Another alternative—and of course the one most often adopted—is to let proofing slide—that is, to leave it to the reader to figure out what the writer meant. Normally this is not hard, but sometimes it places the consumer in double jeopardy. In the argot of the day, the proofreading here was not *that* bad; but it was not *that* good either.—ROSCOE C. MARTIN, *Syracuse University.*

Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society. By Arthur Niederhoffer. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967. Pp. vi, 242. $5.95.)

Quite simply, this book is worth reading because it offers interesting insights about a vital subject, police responses to social change. In their emphasis on education, these responses are similar to the predominant reactions of many others in a society characterized by rapid change. Because of this similarity Niederhoffer is correct in his contention that social scientists have for too long ignored the study of law enforcement. With a Ph.D. in sociology and twenty years as a New York police officer, Niederhoffer offers a unique perspective on the relationship between the police and their social milieu. In his opinion, "Police systems can be understood only as institutions in interaction with the rest of the social structure" (p. 12). Though other departments are mentioned, he focuses on the New York City department.

Using primarily the concepts of professionalism and cynicism, his analysis of this interaction is the book's most valuable contribution. Professionalism develops as a manifestation of law enforcement officials' attempts to adjust to social change. Cynicism is a characteristic almost inherent in police work. The author states that the cynicism developed in the young police officer is more permanent than the type characteristic of those trained in other professions.

The goals of professionalism include more education, greater specialization, a rigid code of ethics, and, more implicitly, a certain amount of secretiveness and cliquishness. He offers some interesting evidence to show that the achievement of some goals of professionalism may be declining. For example the number of college-graduate New York police recruits has greatly *declined* since 1940. Also, professionalized officers have often opposed the very changes professionalism is supposed to help them accept. In an analysis of the battle over the continuation of the New York City civilian review board, Niederhoffer demonstrates the effects of these less desirable ramifications of professionalism. Despite, and sometimes because of, the adoption of the standards of professionalism, the ethos of the police professionals is still often contrary to the goals of those advocating social change.

He defines cynicism as "diffuse feelings of hate and envy, impotent hostility, and the sour grapes pattern [which resembles Merton's concept of *ressentiment*] . . . in which the *anomie* of the police organization is reflected in the individual policeman" (pp. 93-94). Such *anomie* develops particularly when old values of a social system are supplanted by new ones. Consequently, professionalism may increase cynicism for at least two reasons. First, the ideals of professionalism are often preached in an organization where the criteria for "good" police work are still based on the older values. Secondly, officers who best achieve some of professionalism's goals become impatient and thus more cynical about the lack of promotional opportunities than do other officers.

The book also offers a wealth of other information, from a discussion of the plight of the Jewish policeman to a much needed new look at the question of police authoritarianism. Unfortunately the author is not clear in his discussion of the relationship between police systems and the social structure. He does consider the public's perceptions of the status of police occupations as well as police perceptions of some of their social milieu. These considerations, however, are organized in a manner making it virtually impossible to discover what effect these factors have on police activities. He never systematically considers what constraints the public places on police behavior. A concluding chapter which more specifically considered these "outside" factors and their effect on police behavior would have improved his analysis.

He fails to use adequately his experience as a participant observer in an analysis of police behavior. The bulk of his empirical evidence about cynicism comes from a questionnaire administered to 220 New York City policemen. This sample includes men at virtually all stages of the police career. They really form the core of his study, but he chooses to use these men only to test the intensity of their cynicism and to some extent to test the relationship between cynicism and professionalism. No attempt is made to analyze the actual *behavior* of any of these men. His discussions of police activities (as opposed to police attitudes) are based on data not directly related to observations made of this 220-man sample. With his sample data he clearly establishes that cynicism exists, that it develops rapidly and permanently only after one joins the department, and that professionalism may increase cynicism. But he never explains the *effects* of cynical attitudes on this sample of police. One can only try to infer these effects from his other data, much of which is not taken from the New York department. As a result, he cannot show, for example, how this increase in cynicism affects actual behavior toward minority groups. An investigation of this question, as well as other questions involving police behavior, is certainly most vital to an understanding of police-social structural interactions.—Neal Milner, *Grinnell College.*

Corporate Management in a World of Politics; The Public, Political and Governmental Problems of Business. By Harold Brayman. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967. Pp. xii, 272. $7.95.)

Addressing himself to the management of large corporations, the author will bore the academic reader with his shorthand rationalizations of the business position, his recitation of current business tribulations, his easy optimism that ills can be cured by sound public relations. His grammar is popularized; his analysis is often superficial special pleading: his sycophancy can try the patient reader. But his prejudices are frank; his understanding of political forces and the meaning of political debate is often shrewder than that of many businessmen.

The central theme is that *public opinion* has become the great new force in politics, that public opinion is made by events and by the "communicators." These include, among others, journalists, commentators, script writers and academics, a rather mixed bag. The scheme gives relatively little credit to the substance of the public affairs dialogue and much to access, which may not endear the author to political scientists. Yet precisely the latter is one of his objectives. Unlike many politicians and most businessmen, he understands the influential role of the intellectual in our present-day politics. He admonishes businessmen to give highest priority to finding ways to communicate with the academic community. He has shown skill in organizing the interchange of ideas between business and professors at du Pont, where he served for many years as director of public relations. He is quite right that a scholar, or most any "communicator," seeking an audience in a business corporation will usually be turned over to a public relations man. Often this is a youngish man, product of a major in English, cross-pressured by a fancied role as office intellectual, well dressed and well paid, often big with the unborn American novel, and clearly not on the main career line to the top. For many of these reasons, the public relations man cannot serve the corporation well except in the routine dissemination of news releases. Nor does top management itself deal easily with intellectuals. Whether management can, by an effort of will, do better is not so easily argued. The differences in mode of discourse and style of thinking are hard to bridge. Such gaps are bridged by sensible people who want to do business together. But the intellectual does not necessarily want to do business with businessmen. The intellectual, on the whole, is bent not on understanding business but on competing with it as an influential élite in the political system.

So the author is correct to sound the alarum. His prescription, energetic top management leadership of the corporation's outside relationships, sounds reasonable. He lists the current attacks on business and provides tidy policy answers. But it rather seems as though he had the argument upside down. The attack is really on the autonomy of corporate management itself, more especially on the status and power corporate management enjoys in the political system. He is correct in saying that the academic knows little at firsthand about the large corporation. Academic faith in the wickedness of business does not need the inspiration of contact with reality. So one must discount the author's prescription of intelligent and diligent communication to reach the "communicators." Perhaps business will have to borrow from the experience of politics. The emerging élite may best be dealt with by making room at the top. Politicians are learning to do this with intellectuals. But in business only a few economists have reached top management in large banks. A few students of administration have consulting relationships with large industrial corporations. Occasional physical scientists and engineers turn up running their own corporations. Lawyers easily move over to senior management. Corporations often send executives back to the campus for "liberal" orientation. But making room for academic élites in management has not been thought of by the troubled writers of the business creed. Indeed, it still sounds like a silly idea and reminds one of Roosevelt's "Brain Trust."

Short of partial incorporation of the rival élite, business must assuredly learn to listen better than does this author. He would meet the challenge of "consumerism" by taking the lead in pollution abatement, drug policing, control of egregious advertising and so forth. But city air is probably cleaner than in a 19th century coal burning factory town. Drugs are safer than the conventional medicine of the 18th century or the wonderful nostrums of the 19th. Consumerism has blossomed in American politics, after innumerable false starts, only after the consumer was lavishly and durably served. Consumerism reflects not an increase in consumer hazards, but the failure of affluence to meet the aspirations of the liberal man. Having won the struggle for enough goods, enough choices, enough diversion, enough leisure, the consumer is frustrated precisely by his passive and essentially irresponsible role as consumer. The businessman, high priest of production, is therefore confronted with a more elusive and complicated dialogue than this book prepares him for. The book serves as an admirable example of the difficulty business discourse has in dealing with ideas in the political process.—OLIVER GARCEAU, *East Boothbay, Maine.*

The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Governorship. BY JOSEPH E. KALLENBACH. (New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. xii, 622.)

In writing this book, Professor Kallenbach had an interesting and novel idea. He has provided a comparative treatment of the fifty-one chief executives who reign in the federal and state governments. The effort has been well worth it, since, to the full extent that his subject permits, the author has used the governorship to throw light on the presidency, and vice versa.

The net result, however, does not equate the two offices. Similar in form, they are so dissimilar in the range of their functions that the difference of degree virtually becomes a difference in kind. This can readily be seen by contrasting Parts 1 and 2 of this book with Part 3. In the two former, where the author discusses the "constitutional foundations" and then the "structure of the office," the governorships are amply analyzed and as much space appears to be devoted to them as to the presidency. But the subject-matter in places becomes tedious, as usually happens when one attempts to summarize all the systems prevailing in the various states and to detail the various exceptions to the various generalizations.

When Professor Kallenbach reaches Part 3, which is concerned with "Executive Power and Functions," he comes alive—as does his reader. At the same time, almost inevitably, the presidency takes over, and the governors for the most part receive short shrift. And, how could it be otherwise? The office which is invested with national political power, which is the object of the most intense inter-party rivalries, and which is at the same time the leader of the country—for good or ill—in its external relations, cannot fail to have deeper significance than any governorships. Only three or four of the latter truly encompass a range of problems whose depth and import admit meaningful comparison with those of the president.

In the course of this general analysis, the author offers some interesting judgments. He reminds his reader that the earliest governorships paved the way for the presidency as that office emerged in the Constitution, and that the latter has since presented a norm to which the state offices have tended more and more to approximate. Although, in theory, the states are sometimes considered as laboratories for experimentation, in practice the experimenting has been conducted within a much narrower scale than the opportunities permitted. Indeed, as Mr. Kallenbach notes, "fundamental variations in the organizational pattern and role of the chief executive were wider and more significant among the original 13 state governments than they are now. . ." (p. 242).

Professor Kallenbach considers the arguments which have been advanced in favor of altering the structure of the presidency and assimilating it to a cabinet-parliamentary system. He rejects this possibility, rightly and realistically, because he thinks that the American type of chief executive has become such a part of our accepted tradition, and works on the whole so effectively, that drastic change in its character is out of the question. To this office, particularly at the federal level, he pays the deserved tribute that it has provided a focus for effective national leadership in public affairs.

Leadership, however, can have its dark or dangerous side. In the closing section of the book, the author peers into the future and observes the perils which arise increasingly from the aggrandizement of the military powers of the President and from the response to conditions of international crisis. Could even a form of Caesarism result from present tendencies, if extrapolated? These are not idle questions, especially since they are raised at a time when presidential action has led the country into a full-scale war which the Congress has never been asked to declare, and by gradual escalation has contrived to make support for executive actions politically synonymous with upholding the nation's honor.

Perhaps, these contemporary facts suggest an epilogue to this study of our chief executives. It is the salutary reminder that executive power exists in authoritarian regimes as well as in democracies. The key institution of government, however, which distinguishes democracy from dictatorship is the legislature, since there, and there alone, is the public forum for the continuous confrontation of the power to govern and the power to criticize.—LESLIE LIPSON, *University of California, Berkeley.*

Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government: The Controversy Over Executive Reorganization 1936-1939. BY RICHARD POLENBERG. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 275. $5.95.)

The thesis of this book is that Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to order the structure of the welfare state he had fathered when he appointed the Brownlow Committee in 1936, and that the defeat of the Executive Reorganization Bill by the House of Representatives in 1938 after months of bitter controversy and with the crucial defection of more than one hundred of the two hundred and twenty-five who were members of the President's party, was a major setback and therefore a turning point in the history of the New Deal as a reform movement. On this defeat Polenberg approvingly quotes a New York *World Telegram* editorial to the effect that history would probably mark it as the crisis of FDR's political career, and Frank Gannett's comment that "It may be the turning point in our history" (pp. 175-176). According to Polenberg, "it was a shattering blow to Roosevelt's prestige. The vote indicated that the President had lost control of Congress" (p. 176). Again, "Nothing better illustrates the erosion of the New Deal than the contrast between Roosevelt's bold proposals of 1937 and the bland Reorganization Bill offered in 1939" (p. 185).

The thesis is advanced with fetching style but is unconvincing. First, historians are fond of spotting "turning points" and it is not clear why this defeat should be so regarded rather than FDR's 1937 defeat on Supreme Court reorganization, or, for that matter, the 1938 defeat in his effort to purge the Democratic party. Second, there is an implication that FDR's first term, through the 1936 elections, is the norm against which the President's relations with Congress and his party should be judged. But historians as well as political scientists regard the 1933-36 period as atypical. Third, FDR's ability to get significant legislation from Congress did not end with any of these three "turning points." For example, a few weeks before the April defeat of the Executive Reorganization Bill, the same Congress had enacted the second AAA; and a few weeks afterwards in June it enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act. Finally, the "bland Reorganization Bill" that became law in 1939, while different in major respects from the measure that failed, assured the development of the "institutionalized presidency." And, while it is customary to distinguish it from New Deal measures, repeal of the Arms Embargo in late 1939 points to the dominance that marked FDR's leadership of Congress and his party throughout the years of the war.

There is an elaborate apparatus of historical documentation. Forty-nine pages are filled with more than eight hundred references to items in fifteen pages of bibliography covering published documents, newspapers, biographies, books, articles, and unpublished manuscript papers of Congressmen, Senators, advocates and opponents, and various Government papers. Noticeably absent, but apparently unavoidably so, are any papers of two key Democaratic opponents of the Brownlow Report—Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia and Representative James Buchanan of Texas. An interview with Louis Brownlow in 1962 and one with Henry A. Wallace in 1963 are referred to briefly, and there is also some indication that James A. Farley was interviewed. The book is carefully indexed.

The chapters on the sources of opposition and the legislative conflict are impressive in the detail of the findings. But Polenberg's interpretation, especially of autonomous agency-legislator-interest group subsystems that successfully opposed the president, is weak. This was heady stuff for political scientists when the first Inter-University Case Program studies began to circulate nearly twenty years ago in mimeographed form, and when they were first compiled and published, Harold Stein, ed., *Public Administration and Policy Development* (1952). The relating of these kinds of data to a theory of the political process dates at least from David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (1951), and J. Leiper-Freeman, *The Political Process: Executive Bureau-Legislative Committee Relations* (1955). Further, Polenberg's interpretation is cut to a pattern that sees white-hat liberals and black-hat reactionaries joined in battle; this was a battle that the guys in the white-hats lost. Such an interpretation, while perhaps engaging, overrides known complexities. That there were many stakes in the various proposals and counter-proposals for reorganization was clearly expounded by Schuyler Wallace, *Federal Departmentalization: A Critique of Theories of Organization* (1941).

Polenberg's volume may be regarded as a sequel to one published in 1963 by the same university press, *Executive Reorganization and Reform in the New Deal: The Genesis of Administrative Management, 1900-1939,* by Barry Dean Karl. Together they document an important controversy during Franklin D. Roosevelt's second term. Karl looks at the Brownlow Committee in relation to antecedents in the administrative management movement that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. Polenberg looks at the defeat of the Committee's proposals in 1938 and subsequent passage of the Reorganization Act of 1939. Karl's treatment is more compatible than Polenberg's with that of Schuyler Wallace. Karl's volume is based on his 1961 doctoral dissertation in history at Harvard ("Twentieth Century Concepts in Public Administration: Merriam, Brownlow, and Gulick") and was awarded the 1963 Faculty Prize of Harvard University Press. Polenberg's is based on his 1964 doctoral dissertation in history at Columbia ("Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Reorganization Controversy: 1936-1939").—MALCOLM B. PARSONS, *The Florida State University.*

Presidential Vetoes: 1792-1945. BY CARLTON JACKSON. (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1967. Pp. x, 254. $8.00.)

During the period 1792-1945, 1,762 vetoes were handed down by twenty-five different Presidents. Of these vetoes, only fifty-eight were over-ridden by Congress. During this same period, seven Presidents, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, Martin Van Buren, William Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and Millard Fillmore chose not to exercise their veto power.

Prior to 1870, the Presidential veto power was exercised only eighty-five times; thus Professor Jackson is able to give each of these vetoes individual attention. With few exceptions, he approaches each veto in the same way. He presents the necessary background information followed by the President's stated reasons for vetoing the measure, the Congressional reaction to the veto, and the popular reaction as recorded in major national newspapers. Finally, after indicating whether or not the veto was sustained, he compares this veto with those previously considered. One gets the distinct impression that nearly every President expanded or redefined the use of the veto power in some way. For example, Andrew Jackson was the first President to use the veto power as an instrument to mold public opinion. Use of the veto enabled Jackson to play the intermediary between the people and the Congress. In fact, Jackson's veto of the Bank Rechartering Bill of 1832 was a major factor in his re-election. On the negative side, Jackson was the only President to use the veto "as an instrument of personal malice" (p. vii); his Maysville veto of an internal improvement proposal, ostensibly based on grounds of Constitutionality and national expediency, really was motivated by bitter feelings toward Henry Clay.

After the Civil War, the great number of pensions and private relief bills which inundated Congress forced both the President and Congress to alter their procedures for handling vetoed bills. When the President could no longer give personal attention to each bill, cabinet members and other subordinates made the final decisions on whether or not bills should be vetoed. Congress, finding it could no longer take a formal vote, simply referred many vetoed bills to committees where they were permitted to die.

From 1870 on, Professor Jackson groups the Presidents in an attempt to discover major themes within their administrations. The vetoes of Grant, Hayes, and Arthur fall into four distinct groups: (1) vetoes of private bills relating to the Civil War, (2) vetoes in defense of the gold standard, (3) vetoes to protect the executive authority from Congress, and (4) vetoes to prevent strict immigration laws. The Presidents from 1885 to 1909 cast most of their important vetoes with regard to the protection of the Treasury against unwarranted intrusions and the maintenance of personal principles. Then Taft and Wilson manifested such an unyielding posture on matters of principle that their vetoes evoked bitter reactions in Congress. The vetoes of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, like those of Pierce and Buchanan, were out of touch with the times. They dealt primarily with pensions, farm relief, Government competition with private industry, general relief, and Philippine independence.

The last chapter of this book is devoted to the vetoes of Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt handed down a record 631 vetoes. He also began the practice of returning vetoes to Congress en masse, and on one occasion he personally delivered his veto message to a joint session of Congress. FDR was similar to Jackson in his pragmatic and occasionally inconsistent use of the veto. In addition, both Roosevelt and Jackson used the veto as an instrument to stir up popular support.

For the sake of continuity, it would have been helpful if Professor Jackson had prefaced his book with a survey of the thoughts of the men who inserted the veto provision into the Constitution. This might have demonstrated, as Edward Corwin pointed out, that the veto was seldom used as the framers had anticipated. In addition, more discussion might have been devoted to the reasons why seven Presidents chose not to use the veto, and some attention could have been given to the vetoes which were written since 1945. Finally, from the standpoint of the political scientist, it would seem that the major theme of this book would have been clarified if the book had been organized in a functional rather than chronological order. By the same token, it would have been of immense value if Professor Jackson had provided a concluding chapter uniting the minor themes. As it is, the book stops abruptly at 1945, and the reader is left to draw his own conclusions. In sum, although the major theme is almost lost in the over-abundance of minor details, *Presidential Vetoes* contains many interesting and informative episodes concerning Presidential vetoes.—ROBERT J. KULISHECK, *University of Iowa.*

The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. BY JOHN W. SPANIER. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1965. Pp. viii, 311. $1.85.)

This is a second edition, although not labeled as such, of the same work published under the same title by the Harvard University Press (see this *Review,* March 1960).

In this edition, Professor Spanier's dual objectives remain the same as in the original: first, to analyze "the basic decisions which American policy-makers had to make during the Korean War" in order to set the stage for his more fundamental and second purpose, an analysis of "the problems of civil-military relations during a limited war." Mr. Spanier identifies these decisions as follows: the initial one, "to repel the North Korean invasion by force; . . . the neutralization of Formosa; the Inchon landing; the crossing of the 38th Parallel; the 'home by Christmas' offensive; the decision not to extend the war to China after Communist China's intervention; to condemn Peking as an aggressor; and MacArthur's dismissal."

Each of these decisions is thoroughly and reasonably considered. The objectives and the objections, the frustrations and the fears, Korean strategy and global implications, international relations and domestic politics, the roles of the military field commander and his superiors at home—all is woven into a single fabric. Washington started out with the limited objective of pushing the North Koreans back across the 38th Parallel. However, after MacArthur's success at Inchon, Washington was perfectly willing to buy his views and attempt to unite Korea by military force. Then it returned to its original position after MacArthur reached the Yalu River and Communist China intervened. Vacillation with respect to basic policy hardly makes the task of the field commander easy. In spite of this, it is supposed to be a cardinal sin in the military not to follow the lawful orders of one's superiors. In instance after instance, Spanier indicates that MacArthur was either incapable of or unwilling to follow the policies of his Commander-in-Chief. In fact, he even issued public statements which contradicted Presidential policy. In this context, the question of who was right and who was wrong is irrelevant. The only question that is relevant is who was President—Truman or MacArthur. No one could possibly picture President Truman as a vassal; it is not surprising that he exercised his constitutional prerogative and relieved the General. What is surprising, and perhaps indicative of MacArthur's psyche, is that the General could have expected any other outcome.

The main issues raised by the Truman-MacArthur controversy are the recognition that "nuclear bombs have outmoded total war as suicidal and made the world safe only for limited wars," and the maintenance of civilian supremacy over the military during a limited war crisis. Although these problems are discussed throughout the book, they are central to the first and last chapters; they are the chapters that have been revised in this edition and they are also the best and most significant.

Mr. Spanier is convincing in his argument that military considerations for a total victory must not be permitted to dominate political considerations for limited victory. He observes that the enemy would not accept total defeat and thus would escalate what was originally a limited war into a total war. But he is less convincing in depicting MacArthur's dismissal as the "first real test" of the doctrine of civil supremacy over the military authority. Spanier himself notes that the State Department and the Defense Department were in agreement on the relationship between military strategy and political objectives. He also notes that President Truman relied more on Generals Bradley, Vandenberg, and Collins, and Admiral Sherman (the Joint Chiefs), rather than on Secretary of State Acheson, when presenting the Administration's case at the Senate hearings. While the State Department and the Joint Chiefs were in agreement, Spanier doesn't present evidence as to who influenced whom; it is possible, then, in this context also to conclude that the civil authority emerged as merely the arbiter between two military authorities, rather than the master of both. Would the President have been able to prevail if the Joint Chiefs and the field commander had been in agreement and both in opposition to the State Department? What may be concluded is that even a politically strong and popular field commander as MacArthur cannot withstand the combined will of a determined President supported by the Defense Establishment and the State Department. But this is not the "first real test" even in this limited view: President Lincoln had trouble with his generals, too, and dismissed a number of field commanders until he found one to his liking.—FELIX RACKOW, *Case Western Reserve University*.

Charles Evans Hughes: Politics and Reform in New York, 1905-1910. BY ROBERT F. WESSER. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. ix, 366. $8.50.)

The name of Charles Evans Hughes is forever linked to the odious appelation of "the nine old men." This study, focusing only upon the gubernatorial years, explains clearly why this man never attained the stature of a great political figure. Hughes trained for the ministry, took up law, and then made a reluctant entry into politics. As a public investigator, in 1906, he gained widespread attention by uncovering misdeeds of insurance companies in the State of New York. Because of this prominence as a reformer, and the party's need for a new face, Hughes received the nomination as the Republican choice for governor. He was a hesitant candidate, having once declined to run for mayor of New York City; but with the able assistance of Theodore Roosevelt, Hughes defeated the Democratic "prophet of unrest," William Randolph Hearst.

During the tenure as Governor of New York, Hughes tried to implement reforms, secure regulatory legislation, and further the cause of clean government. Hughes' "independence of character" and dedication to the general welfare were noteworthy, but the Governor's lack of political acumen was a distinct liability. He failed to gain control of his party and, in fact, seemed to disdain working with key political leaders in the state legislature. Instead of using the political machinery at his disposal, Governor Hughes relied far too much upon public opinion. The results of this approach proved disappointing as far as legislative achievements were concerned. Hughes did not supplement his moral fervor with the political maneuvering needed to assure success. He failed to provide party leadership and, because of his aloofness, the Governor did not impress Theordore Roosevelt as potential material for the presidency.

Charles Evans Hughes was not temperamentally suited to the hurly-burly of politics. Despite his good intentions and stoic-like exterior, he, as the author substantiates, "never quite emerged as an assertive force." Theodore Roosevelt was distinctly disappointed in his amateurishness, calling it "mugwumpism." The President placed the mantle of succession upon William Howard Taft in 1908 instead of selecting the New York Governor. Hughes ran for a second term, winning by a plurality of 69,000, while Taft won New York's presidential electors by a margin of 203,000. Hughes seemed to have learned little from his first term. He continued to alienate party leaders, refused to use patronage to his advantage, and continued the practice of uttering moral preachments without commensurate political activity to attain legislative objectives. In 1910, Hughes admitted privately that he was "tired" of politics. He notified President Taft, "I do not dare to run the chance of breaking down mentally. I must get out." His escape from politics came that same year when a vacancy on the Supreme Court allowed Taft to nominate him for the position. With the Republican party in disarray, the stage was set for the defeat of Henry L. Stimson in 1910.

Charles Evans Hughes preferred the quiet atmosphere of the high court. He had one more political date with destiny in 1916; but after narrowly missing the presidency, Hughes served as Secretary of State and then received another appointment to the Supreme Court—this time as the Chief Justice. In that capacity he asserted his leadership only once, and that was after Franklin D. Roosevelt threatened to strip the Court of its power of judicial review.

This monograph, although narrow in scope, is an extremely valuable study. It reveals concisely why high-minded men sometimes fail in the realm of politics. By making judicious use of the papers of Hughes, and those associated with him politically, as well as utilizing the Roosevelt correspondence, the author presents a factual record of the period in question. The picture of Hughes that emerges is that of a legal-minded moralist who never completely understood the mechanics of professional politics. It was obvious from this fine work that Charles Evans Hughes was a good man who lacked the necessary requirements for statesmanship.—Frederick H. Schapsmeier, *Wisconsin State University, Oshkosh.*

Back to Back: The Duel between FDR and the Supreme Court. By Leonard Baker. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. 311. $6.95.)

This is the first book on the Roosevelt Court-packing fight since Alsop and Catledge's *The 168 Days*, published in 1938. Like them, the present author is also a journalist, and the book has the virtues and defects of a journalistic account. Baker has the advantage of almost thirty years of perspective and accumulated historical data, and he has utilized the papers, among others, of Borah, Hughes, Morgenthau, Norris, and of course Roosevelt. The surprising thing is how comparatively little new light has thereby been thrown on this historic controversy.

The principal new material has to do with Herbert Hoover's ill-fated effort to use the affair for refurbishing his image. According to an unnamed Republican "prominent in the Court dispute" whose papers Baker saw but whose name he agreed not to mention, Hoover was unwilling to accept the Republican strategy of allowing dissident Democrats to kill the plan. Hoover was the first front-line Republican to deliver a public speech attacking the proposal. At the same time he commissioned an agent to go to Washington and urge Brandeis to retire and then make a speech against the Court plan. If this scheme worked, Hoover proposed to take credit for masterminding it. Actually other people had already made this suggestion to Brandeis. In any case, Hoover's emissary, who did not know Brandeis personally, made the hilarious faux pas of going to see Justice McReynolds, who had not spoken civilly to Brandeis for years, and asking him to suggest to Brandeis that he resign. McReynolds sent the hapless agent on to see the Chief Justice, who declined to get involved. He then wound up his mission with Senator Borah and offered Hoover's help in lining up the country, but Borah replied that he hoped Hoover would stay out of the fight entirely. Baker concludes that Hoover was "the first political casualty of the Court fight."

For general readers Baker has told one of America's great political stories interestingly and well. Only the captious will be bothered by reference to the income tax decision as occurring in 1885 or to *Adkins* v. *Children's Hospital* as involving a state minimum wage law.—C. Herman Pritchett, *University of Chicago.*

Earl Warren: A Political Biography. By Leo Katcher. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967. Pp. 502. $8.50.)

At first I was not sure that Leo Katcher's biography of Earl Warren merited review in the A.P.S.R., but since the book has received a good deal of acclaim, much of which may not be warranted, a few comments should be raised.

Katcher has put an amazing amount of energy into researching the life of Warren and presents the reader with some good insights, especially during the earlier period of Warren's life when he manifested a strong conservative philosophy cut from the mold of Herbert Hoover. One would have hoped that the overall endeavor could have resulted in a product not unlike Alpheus Mason's books *Brandeis: A Free Man's Life* and *Harlan Fiske Stone, Pillar of the Law*. The Katcher book, however, falls far short of this mark. This is not attributable to the energy which went into the research and the writing of the book; rather, it is because of the imprecision and sloppy manner in which some of the data are handled. The book simply is filled with a number of factual mistakes and erroneous interpretations of judicial decisions. Admittedly, a reviewer can become intoxicated with "nit-picking" thereby destroying the purpose of the review, but in the case of this political biography the mistakes are of sufficient magnitude to significantly detract from the book as a whole.

What the Katcher book needed was a legal editor who could bring some precision and interpretation to those aspects of the book requiring more than a journalist's understanding of the law. Indeed the blame for this spoilization of what could have been a fine piece of work may not rest with Katcher at all. It more appropriately may be attributed to McGraw-Hill for not giving Katcher more assistance in this area. Katcher cannot, however, escape the responsibility of certain journalistic writing habits that have an annoying impact upon the reader. For instance, upon Warren's ascendency to the Supreme Court, Katcher notes that within a year "Warren was a peacock among sparrows." If a reviewer were to take the same liberties in comparing Katcher's book with that of other political biographies of Supreme Court justices, Katcher could be characterized as an Edgar Guest in a room full of Longfellows. Obviously neither of these analogies is well-founded. In sum, *Earl Warren, A Political Biography* makes for enjoyable reading, but it must be read with a very careful eye.—CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, *University of Arizona*.

The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy. BY LEROY N. RIESELBACH. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966. Pp. xvi, 240, $2.95.)

This fine study is an analysis of roll-call votes, principally concerning foreign aid and foreign trade, in the House of Representatives. The data come from four Congresses, the 76th, 80th, 83rd, and 85th; a research design which yields a twenty-year time base and four different combinations of partisan control of the White House and Capitol Hill. Professor Rieselbach has organized the roll-call data into Guttman scales to determine the extent of "isolationism," "moderation," and "internationalism" in these Congresses. Social, political, and constituency characteristics are related to these three forms of roll-call behavior by means of correlation and time series analyses.

Professor Rieselbach finds that isolationism is a multidimensional phenomenon. "On the whole the data of this study show that isolationism cannot be explained in terms of any one factor, that its correlates are not fixed but rather change in response to alterations in the political and legislative situations, and that at any given time the shape of isolationism may differ with respect to different issues. There are different 'isolationisms' at different times and on different subjects." In the 76th Congress, isolationism was associated with the Republican party and internationalism with the Democratic party. Beginning with the 80th Congress for foreign aid, and with the 83rd Congress for foreign trade, there was a damping of the sharp inter-party division on foreign policy with coastal Republicans shifting toward internationalism and southern Democrats shifting toward isolationism. In a postscript, Professor Rieselbach notes a re-emergence of Republican isolationism and Democratic internationalism in the 88th Congress.

Few personal attributes were found to be consistently related to foreign policy voting behavior, but Catholicism, a business background, election from a competitive district, and service on the Foreign Affairs Committee were frequently associated with internationalism. These personal factors were better predictors if they tended in the same direction as the broad political forces operating at the time in question. Constituency characteristics, on the other hand, were consistently related to roll-call votes. After the end of the straight inter-party contests on foreign aid and foreign trade, eastern, high ethnic (over 1% born in Germany or Ireland), high education, urban, and high socio-economic districts were significantly more likely to send internationalists to the House of Representatives.

Professor Rieselbach has made a thorough canvass of the literature on isolationism and has related his own findings to it. This feature makes his book a particularly useful contribution to a cumulatively developing body of knowledge. Throughout one finds such helpful footnotes as: "This finding is in direct contrast to that of Smuckler ("The Region of Isolationism," pp. 399-400) who found a negative relationship between high education and internationalist voting. Our data tend to support the findings of much survey research that internationalism and high education are positively correlated. Again, we should note the possibility that the difference in the findings results from different procedures in measuring educational levels."

Whether one finds inconsistencies in the analysis of this complex subject matter depends on how one reads the author's many propositions. For example, Proposition 2-1 states "There exist in Congress clusters of issues, foreign and domestic, which are sufficiently distinguishable to be considered as distinct segments of congressional activity." Proposition 2-2 says "Beyond foreign aid and foreign trade, there can be no constant definition of the content of congressional isolationism." This seems illogical if foreign issues constitute a "distinct segment of congressional activity." However, the first proposition rests upon a table giving correlations between scales representing four different policy domains in four different Congresses, correlations reflecting relationships between some 47,000 individual votes. If these data are taken as evidence which simply confirms the proposition, then there is inconsistency. But if the correlations are recognized as subtle and complex statements in a probabilistic argument and the proposition is regarded as a less refined summary statement, the only inconsistency is that caused by the inability of a single sentence to capture all the rich detail of a correlation matrix.

The limitations to this study result from the use of bivariate technique to study a multivariate phenomenon. The two-by-two relationships identify the variables associated with isolationism, but the analysis does not go very far beyond that point. It is hard to understand why Professor Rieselbach did not take the natural step into multivariate analysis, especially since he presents bivariate correlations and percentage distributions (but not correlations) with one or more controls applied. If he had told us what happened to the correlations when controlled with appropriate test factors, his statements about the relative influence of independent variables ("Political variables seem to be stronger than social forces when they push in opposite directions.") could have been strengthened.

Both the weaknesses and the strengths of this study as a contribution to political science are derivative from its focus on foreign policy voting behavior. Because of the weak negative association in this policy domain between constituency attitudes and congressional voting pointed out by Miller and Stokes, and because of the well-known presidential preeminence on foreign policy, such data are not very good *general* evidence about congressional voting or presidential-congressional relations. However, there is also a fast-developing professional interest in the domestic sources of foreign policy. And on this, his chosen topic, Professor Rieselbach has much to say and says it very well.—JOHN H. KESSEL, *Allegheny College.*

Sectional Stress and Party Strength: A Study of Roll-Call Voting Patterns in the U. S. House of Representatives, 1836-1860. BY THOMAS B. ALEXANDER. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967. Pp. xvii, 284. $10.00.)

At a time when the ICPR is training historians in empirical techniques and amassing historical data for analysis, Thomas B. Alexander's book should be a welcome addition to the work done by Joel Silbey and William O. Aydelotte. Unfortunately it is not. Seemingly enchanted with the ability to analyze pre-Civil War roll call votes in the United States House on the University of Alabama's computer he neglects to tie his findings into any sort of meaningful interpretation of the politics of the period. Indeed, the bulk of the book—220 out of 280 pages—is devoted to presentation of scalograms, graphs, computer printout, and computer programs rather than text.

Alexander's primary goal is to examine sectional and party splits in Congress in the twenty-four years preceding the Civil War. To do this roll calls from only the first session or from special sessions preceding the first regular session were used as the basic data; roll calls for the second session were omitted because the sessions were "lame duck" and "since a substantial proportion of the House membership failed to return to the subsequent Congress, the element of personal attitude or even frustration might enter more freely into decision-making in the 'lame-duck' sessions" (pp. 3-4). The Representatives were divided by section—New England, Middle Atlantic, South Atlantic, South Central, Northern Northwest and Southern Northwest (composed of the southern sections of Illinois, Indiana and Ohio)—and by party. The 268,000 individual roll call votes were Guttman-scaled into scalable sets and analyzed in terms of section and party.

In examining each of the twelve sessions of Congress from 1836-60 Alexander finds that only two scalable sets of roll call votes appear with any continuity, economic considerations and slavery involvements. The extent to which the issues formed unidimensional scales purposively rather than through random chance is an issue to be raised since the economic issues facing the 24th Congress involved such unrelated topics as the location of a national military foundry, Bank of the United States, Cumberland Road construction, tariff reduction, and Michigan and Arkansas statehood. Alexander's treatment of the Cumberland Road votes is curious since they are included as economic issues in the 24th Congress, dropped in the 25th "because local interest dominated the positions more than party or sectional interest" (p. 26), and re-included in the 26th Congress.

After examining economic and slavery issues for each session Alexander concludes that prior to 1850 party was the far more salient factor in voting in the House although sectional differences were beginning to arise. After 1850, however, the Democratic party position on economic and slavery matters began to conform to southern sectional attitudes. "By the mid-1850's the consequence of this fusion of southern and Democratic position on economic matters, reinforcing a comparable blending on slavery concerns, had cost the northern Democrats so dearly in political appeal that the demise of the party in New England and its virtual elimination throughout the upper north was immediately to follow" (p. 110). While the data support this conclusion it is unfortunate that Alexander did not attempt to relate shifts in party positions with party activities outside of Congress for that same period. Or failing this, far more could have been done in analyzing the more than a quarter-million roll call votes. Alexander must have realized this; in a footnote in his concluding chapter he states:

> It is not the purpose of this appraisal to pursue all relevant conclusions that might be indicated by the roll-call analyses offered. One of the reasons for making available these data and the patterns exposed by certain research designs is to furnish conveniently prepared information for use by students of the period. This appraisal seeks only to explore some of the promising avenues for question framing and further investigation (footnote 1, p. 110).

Under these circumstances *Sectional Stress and Party Strength* may have its greatest value as a kind of pre-Civil War version of *America Votes* for the House of Representatives.—JAMES J. BEST, *University of Washington.*

Water Research. ED. BY ALLEN V. KNEESE AND STEPHEN C. SMITH. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. 508. $12.50.)

Northern California's Water Industry. BY JOE S. BAIN, RICHARD E. CAVES AND JULIUS MARGOLIS. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 729. $15.00.)

For political scientists, public investment theory focuses on a central concern of the discipline—power in the service of purpose. Normative in its basic premises, this body of theory draws attention to the need for designing decisional frameworks which optimally promote the public interest. The challenge posed by such theory to fruitful collaboration between "neutral" empiricists and normative institutionalists is a formidable one. Sadly, the tension between these, for all its potential benefits, has often yielded little in the way of viable results.

Both volumes suggest new areas in which political scientists of varying persuasions may labor with profit. The collection edited by Kneese and Smith consists of 26 papers originally presented at the seventh Western Resources Conference by scholars working in the physical and social sciences. It includes Bains' condensed summary of the larger, separately published, opus.

Attempting to cope meaningfully with issues raised by the presence of "public goods" and economic externalities (an index of current preoccupation with environmental quality), several participants call for a restructuring of traditional interest-group politics. Their essays describe a continuum of estrangement from the pluralist model. The range embraces Irving Fox's plea for a more public-oriented alignment of forces representing mixtures of centralized and decentralized perspectives to Hubert Marshall's, and Bain, Caves and Margolis' (BC&M) a-political recipe for rational resources policy. Fox endeavors to confer greater leverage on politically disadvantaged groupings by changes in organizational and intergovernmental relationships.

Infatuated by claims for disinterested professionalism, Marshall and the California study group opt out of politics and advocate a transfer of decision-making responsibility almost exclusively to impartial panels of experts. While "non-political solutions" may be highly politic in some situations, the proposed schemes are neither feasible nor sufficiently sensitive responses to the complexities and subtleties (note Gilbert White's remarks) of resources problems to warrant serious consideration. Marshall's reliance on economists to rectify distorted agency benefit-cost ratios reflects a misreading of the professional pulse. Increasingly, economists are becoming critical of the undue concentration on economic efficiency as the *summum bonum.* Striving to incorporate more elusive psychological dimensions in their analysis, they have fashioned the concept of option demand as a substitute for demand expressed through the market-place. But this tool, admittedly vague and imprecise, has hardly won widespread acceptance. Professional debate will doubtless increase in intensity on the suitability of measures of willingness to pay (or their surrogates), and the parameters of option demand (conflicting treatments of this problem appear in papers by Knetsch and Davis, and Davidson, Adams and Seneca). Further disagreement among economists will probably emerge from a heightened awareness of the salience of "intrasystem and intersystem trade-offs" (Smith). Krutilla's piece, for example, on the Columbia River Treaty alludes to external political factors which may have influenced the negotiations, even though these elements remain outside his analytical structure.

BC&M need not have skewered themselves on the rusty "Board of Review" idea if they had studied the prospective impact of legislative reapportionment, desalination for the urban coastal region and consequent shifts in water-related values. To be sure, BC&M observe that "various fragments of evidence, not previously discussed, suggest the forthcoming possibilities of rivalry and effective alternatives. One such element is the rapid increase in the number of retailing agencies with economical access to alternative sources of water" (p. 497). Surprisingly, this insight is never really cranked into their prescriptive analysis. Inasmuch as technological advance (note impact of improvements in pumping technology on political behavior in 1890's, p. 431) may work its greatest influence on growing urban areas which traditionally have displayed most anxiety over anticipated shortages, misallocations of scarce resources may not be as troublesome a problem in the future. Under these conditions, a polycentric political system, as described earlier by Vincent Ostrom in this *Review,* may function quite rationally in the public interest. The authors, however, are too fixated on the idea of scarcity to allow for sufficient degrees of freedom in their theoretical formulation. Indeed, the evidence which they themselves adduce to demonstrate this overriding fear of water famine is not entirely consistent. BC&M point out that many water districts have failed aggressively to pursue new sources of supply (see especially material on Santa Clara and Sonoma counties). Several have willingly traded water for cash. Some "potential customers wishing to defer a decision" have been threatened by the State development authority. Most disappointing in this regard is the absence of discussion on patterns of conduct and performance in the amply-endowed North Coastal Region. BC&M deserve praise for eschewing the simplistic Milliman-Hirshleifer approach, recognizing the externalties problem, and for proceeding along "behavioral" lines when economic data were unavailable. But it is unfortunate that their rich lode of political observations was not sifted and ordered by a political scientist.

Normative perspectives may open new paths for empirical research. In turn, empirical analysis can test the viability of proposals drafted to realize more transcendent interests. Arthur Maass couples these differing orientations in assailing welfare economics for its almost exclusive preoccupation with the objective of economic efficiency. He insightfully suggests that the secondary benefit methodology issue may be more effectively handled by explicitly confronting the existence of multiple objectives. In a daring paper which probes the capacity of the legislative process to furnish systems analysts with a specific set of objectives against which to evaluate alternative projects, he has accumulated evidence of trade-offs among various goals in the urban renewal and interstate highway fields. Maass would be the first to acknowledge the relative crudity of his technique and the difficulty of deriving acceptable inputs from the political sector (Fox and Robert Davis are far more sceptical). Hopefully, this pioneering attempt to associate empirical analysis and normative theory will inspire still more sophisticated efforts by other scholars. Ultimately, it may prove possible to understand the nature of the rigidities in the social environment and to find the means to surmount them.—ASHLEY L. SCHIFF, *State University of New York at Stony Brook.*

The Politics of Federal Aid to Education in 1965: A Study in Political Innovation. BY PHILIP MERANTO. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 144. $3.25.)

Professor Meranto's argument is that changes in several interrelated factors converged in 1965 to enable Congress to enact a general aid to education bill. He concludes that it is not possible to rank these factors "systematically in order of importance."

Passage of the 1965 Act is regarded as political innovation that was induced in part by such "environmental changes" as the rediscovery of poverty, a metropolitan trend and the civil rights movement. Such "demand articulators" as the President, political parties, organized interests and constituents underwent changes sufficient to contribute also to the momentum for the bill's success. Finally, changes within the House of Representatives, namely a larger Democratic majority on the Education and Labor Committee, Graham Barden's replacement by Adam Clayton Powell as committee chairman, and enlargement of the Rules Committee, facilitated the task of enacting aid-to-education legislation.

The strength of Professor Meranto's book lies in the clear exposition of the necessary conditions for a legislative breakthrough. There is a convincing grasp of how those non-congruent sub-issue conflicts that for years had paralyzed Congress in this policy area finally and one-by-one were surmounted. Quite importantly (and somewhat rare for a legislative case study) there is a demonstration of detailed understanding of the end product as substantive policy and of its relationship to the activity that produced it. For these virtues the book is a scholarly contribution.

Aside from a few minor embarrassments that should have been corrected in proof—incorrect references to the "House Subcommittee on Education" (p. 36) and the "House Committee on Education and Welfare" (p. 53), and repeated allusion to voting "blocks" (p. 86 *et seq.*)—there appear to be two weaknesses. These are a misapplication of systems analysis, and a disturbing reluctance to even try to determine the relative importance of the independent variables.

Systems analysis as I understand it enables one to abstract sets of behavior (along with their antecedents and consequences) that are interrelated and have meaning analytically, but whose boundaries as a system do not necessarily correspond to the boundaries of concrete entities, such as institutions. When the boundaries of the analytical system are simply those of an institution which is the real object of analysis, then the language of the systems approach may degenerate into *blague,* and otherwise lucid arguments may become unnecessarily obfuscated. Although Professor Meranto intends to employ the concept of legislative system in the manner of Wahlke and his associates, it becomes apparent early in the book that what he means by "legislative system" is simply "legislature."

Professor Meranto's reluctance to make statements regarding the relative importance of a group of presumably causal factors that are not amenable to symbolic treatment is understandable. I should have hoped, however, that his obvious mastery of the subject matter would have provided the necessary encouragement for a qualitative judgment. Surely the metropolitan trend was not of so great importance as the other "environmental changes"—the rediscovery of poverty and the civil rights movement. The impact of metropolitanization had not yet struck Congress in 1965. Between *Wesberry* and the November 1964 election only four states had redistricted. There is no evidence that non-metropolitan Congressmen would have been receptive to an urban oriented bill in the absence of provisions that would aid the deprived pupils wherever they lived.

I would guess, moreover, that Presidential commitment and large Democratic majorities in Congress were of greater importance than changes in either interest group positions or constituency attitudes. As the author makes clear, "The Democratic vote alone . . . was sufficient to gain passage of the bill in the House and in the Senate as well . . ." (p. 93). The book itself demonstrates that the data on constituency attitudes are inconclusive, and are of dubious comparability from one survey to the next. The ability of the National Education Association and the National Catholic Welfare Conference (now the U.S. Catholic Conference) to coalesce was a result of administration strategy and the wording of the bill.

The three internal changes mentioned by the author certainly contributed to a more favorable milieu for education legislation. It is about time, however, for political scientists to take a new look at the Education and Labor Committee. The old cliches about this committee, generated in the late fifties and repeated in part by Professor Meranto and others, still contain a germ of truth. To be sure, there is much partisan bickering. But this results from the committee's jurisdiction over high conflict issues and not over the nature of committee members. At least since 1959, the committee has included moderates from competitive districts, and on those occasions when it has confronted negotiable issues the committee has been able to achieve bipartisan consensus. The Brademas *ad hoc* subcommittee on higher education emerged in 1961 with a unanimous report, and the success of the college aid bill in 1963 was due in part to extensive bipartisan agreement on Edith Green's special subcommittee on education. My point here is merely that any assessment of changes in the Education and Labor Committee ought to account for these factors as well as the changed party ratio that resulted from the 1964 election. Success in the Education and Labor Committee is not *always* a product of raw power.

On balance, Professor Meranto's discussion of each contributing factor is knowledgeable and convincing. His reluctance to distinguish their relative importance to the passage of the bill is a type of intellectual caution that is laudable in some contexts. Perhaps a reviewer ought to respect the author's intellectual tastes in such matters and let it go at that. I feel denied something, however, and I believe that what is a good book could have been even better.—LAWRENCE K. PETTIT, *The American Council on Education.*

The Politics of Poverty. BY JOHN C. DONOVAN. (New York: Pegasus Press, 1967. Pp. 157. $5.75.)

Professor Donovan, former assistant to Willard Wirtz, has given us a sketchy, highly superficial but readable review of the formation of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and of the political issues involved in its first two years of operation. He makes several arguments worth noting here.

(1) The Office of Economic Opportunity had a multitude of goals and aspirations, many of which were unachievable in the short run, others of which were highly contradictory. This led to grave administrative problems within OEO, and to difficult relationships with other agencies.

(2) Neither the authors of the EOA, the President, the Congress, Sargent Shriver, the Bureau of the Budget, the press nor the public realized the meaning or import of the Act's politically potent requirement that community action programs be "developed, conducted and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served."

(3) Although the EOA is an almost classic example of what has been called "the professionalization of reform" and of an executive-originated proposal, the day has not yet arrived when Congress will give up to the executive ultimate control over program development and operation.

(4) The war in Vietnam killed any possible chance for real commitment of the nation's resources to the search for solutions of the country's domestic problems.

(5) Fundamental reform, and for that matter, abolition of poverty, were, with a few exceptions, mere flights of rhetoric rather than real objectives of the President, the Congress, and the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Professor Donovan's book is a frightening one for several reasons. First, it clearly demonstrates how irrational our decision-making system can be. Assisted by the emotional shock which followed the Kennedy assassination, and eager for success in domestic matters where he was mistrusted, President Johnson called for and claimed to establish a war on poverty which apparently neither he nor any of his advisors understood. Even Congress overlooked the fact that the legislation contained within it a mechanism which could fundamentally alter the allocation and exercise of political power—and of the rewards and benefits which the political system distributes. It is not at all disturbing that such an alteration should be made; to the contrary, it is essential that we do so. It is, however, unsettling that our political leaders often do not comprehend the implications of their words and deeds.

In the face of such circumstances, it becomes essential that we, as political scientists, recognize the role played by ignorance, chance, and lack of information. We need not and should not start with the assumption that decision-making, or for that matter, the political system is a rational process.

Second, the impact of the book is distressing because it clearly demonstrates that the administration, either wittingly or unwittingly, created hopes for winning the war on poverty without developing and supporting a program for that purpose. The Johnson administration has refused to commit to the war on poverty the necessary resources to begin to make a change in the way the poor exist. Professor Donovan at one point characterizes this as a "cruel hoax." It is more than that. If social science has produced any finding related to the war on poverty, it is that when a people's expectations far exceed achievements, unrest and revolutionary activities are to be expected.

Third, the book implies, convincingly, that Johnson failed completely in his attempt to fight the war in Vietnam and the war on poverty. After identifying the war on poverty as his personal crusade, the President virtually abandoned it. The decision to pursue the former at the expense of the latter, whether rationally decided upon or not, may have serious implications for the continued survival of the country's basic political values.

Finally, I am troubled by Professor Donovan's overly optimistic view as to how a solution of this country's racial problems can be achieved. He argues that "the Negro has real and substantial political power in his hands *now*," and that change can and will come through the use of this present political power. The situation is actually far more complicated and much less hopeful as is easily seen by a careful review of the literature on Negro politics. Negro political power is highly restricted by whites, largely undeveloped and greatly lacking in experience. Moreover, there remains a great deal of white political power—not just in Mississippi but in Newark and Boston and Washington—that is potentially more effective than black power. This white power is also determined not to give up either the power or the benefits which accrue therefrom. Moreover, as Professor Donovan's chronicle of the experiences with community action shows, the system can win even when it mistakenly gives to those who would bring about reform the very powerful weapons of office, money and legitimacy. The 1967 Green Amendment easily removed these legitimate political weapons from the hands of the poor. With such demonstrations that the system is closed to normal political demands, is it any wonder that it is being threatened by force?

In the December 1967 issue of this review one reviewer suggested the withholding of the publication of a book until the author could answer this question: "How can sufficient change be brought about through the political process so that the 'have-nots' will not feel compelled to resort to violence and destruction in order to gain 'equality.'" I advocate no such reticence (the publishing houses would have to close up!). I do suggest, however, that Professor Donovan's hope in the present political power of Negroes is naive. Militant community action, within the system as it operated those few brief days between 1964 and 1967, is more likely to be the answer than Professor Donovan's faith in Negro political power. Perhaps President Kennedy put it most succinctly: "Those who make peaceful revolutions impossible make violent revolutions inevitable."—JOHN H. STRANGE, *Duke University.*

The Negro in Federal Employment. BY SAMUEL KRISLOV. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967. Pp. 157. $5.00.)

Professor Krislov's work in the field of public law and the judicial process is well known and is rightly admired. It may come as a surprise to some that his most recent book mentions not at all, the federal courts. This is altogether appropriate for one who sustains an abiding interest in the civil rights movement, for the cutting edge of that movement has shifted from legal to political and economic concerns. In considering Negro jobs, constitutional questions reflecting the aspirations of the group are not so much raised as they were when voting and educational policy set the priorities of civil rights leaders. The national debate now focuses on a new set of planning and economic priorities, and Professor Krislov's slim volume makes an outsized contribution to that debate.

The author has set himself the task of describing and evaluating the major elements of the equal employment program within the federal service. The assumption which gives broad gauge relevance to this exercise in reviewing minority group employment in the federal government is that "if elimination of prejudice cannot be achieved in the public bureaucracy, it is unlikely that it will be achieved anywhere."

The issues raised by this new quest for economic equity are described in the opening three chapters principally in an historical and administrative context. In these chapters, a certain amount of Leonard White-style historicism and Max Weber-style reification blur the statement of the issues as they are uniquely relevant to the 1960's. The balance of the book more successfully supplies an analysis and evaluation of today's problems of civil rights and civil service. The last four chapters give the book its very considerable strength, and here the discussion is shaped by contemporary behavioral and personnel theory perspectives, Professor Krislov's own analytical skills, and the results of interviews which he conducted between 1963 and 1965 in every department and agency supervised by the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.

Krislov elaborates a view of "representative bureaucracy" (the extent to which administrative personnel do and should reflect the class, ethnic and group bases of society). Where Negroes are concerned, their position as one-tenth of the American population suggests something of their fair share in federal employment. Taken as a rough norm, what kinds of problems does this standard raise for the merit system?

> The challenge of the civil rights movement to past practice in the federal service has two facets in relation to the merit system. Insofar as it stresses elimination of artificial barriers, the movement enforces the principles of the merit system and reduces dissonance between articulated values and actual practice for the bureaucracy. . . . But insofar as the movement seeks to apply new standards to alter past patterns, it arouses fears in many defenders of the merit system. When leaders of civil rights groups speak of "compensatory employment" or "benign quotas" they evoke absolute hostility.

But as things stand, the relationship between the supply of qualified Negro applicants and the demand for added federal employees yields "an uneasy, unstable equilibrium" between the urgings of civil rights leaders and the merit system advocates. It is "uneasy" because political, economic and population changes may generate more insistant demands. It is "unstable" because it is neither legitimized nor internalized in the minds of either participating group. "Both see problems that they think could easily be solved," but their solutions differ. "So far the current situation is accepted because there is pragmatic movement in the direction desired by both; only time can tell whether that fortunate conjunction of interests will perdure."

While acknowledging the catalytic influence of the Equal Opportunities Commission and the potential of the Civil Rights Commission in exercising newly acquired watchdog functions, Krislov looks chiefly to the departmental or agency level for progress. The zeal of top administrators who are in control of their agencies makes critical differences where jobs for Negroes are concerned. This is borne out by the 15 percent Negro-of-total-employees figure attributable in 1966 to the Department of Housing and Urban Development under Secretary Weaver. The comparable figure for the Justice Department was 5.9 percent in 1966 (the Department employs nearly as many attorneys as there are Negro lawyers in the whole of the United States). Krislov describes the Department of State as "the most receptive to the incorporation of Negroes into its service." At least this is so in theory because the concept of representativeness is said to underlie the requirement of geographical distribution in the Rogers Act which governs personnel selection for the Foreign Service.

Providing for equality of opportunity, even within the ranks of federal government employees, involves complex institutional and programmatic problems which demand detailed consideration. Professor Krislov has treated these problems with the sophistication and realism which they deserve. The book should be recommended to students and required of administrators.—RICHARD CLAUDE, *University of Maryland.*

The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902-1965. BY ANDREW BUNI. (Charlottesville, Virginia: The University Press of Virginia, 1967. Pp. 285. $6.00.)

This book is a detailed chronological description of the role of the Negro in the politics of the Commonwealth of Virginia in the twenteith century. The author uses the first eleven chapters of the book to describe the long era of Negro noninvolvement in the State's politics. During that era, from disfranchisement in 1902 to the end of the 1950's, Virginia's Negroes were objects and subjects of politics, but, except for isolated cases and moments, seldom were they political participants. During this era, of course, the Negroes made determined efforts to involve themselves in politics. However, the poll tax, literary tests, the White Democratic primary, Republican lily-whitism, and the stultifying effects of habitual nonparticipation were difficult to overcome.

In the last three chapters—two substantive chapters and one very brief concluding chapter—Buni describes the recent era of increasingly meaningful Negro political participation in Virginia's politics. He concentrates on the attraction of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential campaigns for Negroes in Virginia. For a change, candidates of both major parties appealed for the Negro vote. This, coupled with the greatly increased tempo of the civil rights movement nationally, and the reaction of varied factions in the State to the "massive resistance" stand of the Byrd organization on school desegregation, produced a milieu in which the Negro became a meaningful political participant.

Clearly the book deals with an era of political history of real interest to historians and political scientists. Unfortunately, the author follows methodological routes which will satisfy few social scientists. The author's willingness to use one interview as an adequate sample for generalizing about the attitudes of all Negroes in Virginia during an election, his willingness to depend on the personal reminiscences of four informants for basic interpretations and generalizations, the author's willingness to depend on newspapers' analyses of electoral data for his basic interpretations, and his unwillingness to develop any tables of data indicate an approach to political analysis which few social scientists currently accept as adequate. No effort is made to document the switches in the Negro vote from period-to-period within the era covered. Raw data from secondary sources are spewed out page after page without any effort to treat the data systematically. Even such elementary techniques as percentages and percentage-point gain and loss are ignored. Much ado is made of the rise in the number of Negro candidates for public office during the 1940's and 1950's, but no data is presented to support this. The social backgrounds of these candidates are discussed, but the author presents no data to show that he has systematically studied this phenomenon.

In short, this is a disappointing book. The greatest disappointment is that the author seems to know enough about Negro politics in Virginia to make a real contribution, but his unwillingness to present what he knows in a systematic fashion casts doubt upon his entire effort. Also, he often fails to raise or to pursue the important questions. What part did Negro leadership play in the politics of the era? What ties existed between Negro and white political leaders? What alliances were possible? What were the nature of the Negro organizational efforts over the years? Why were Negroes in various sections of the State unable to cooperate? Why were the Negro leaders in various sections of the State unable or unwilling to cooperate? How has Negro politics in Virginia compared to that of other Southern States? Even though the author has footnotes which direct the reader to the recent books and articles of Everett Ladd, James Prothro, Donald Matthews, and Ralph Eisenberg, he does not incorporate their findings about Negro political leadership and voting patterns in other Southern States—and in Virginia in the case of Eisenberg's work—into his textual treatment, except in the most superficial manner.

The author deals not at all with the key questions which the book raises: (1) Why did the Negroes' votes become so important in Virginia's politics in the 1960's? and, (2) When is it feasible for the major aggregates in a society to seek the support of the society's marginal aggregates? In other words, when can Negroes or other minority aggregates expect to be involved as participants in Virginia's politics, and when can they expect to be excluded? The author raises this question in writing the book, but he does not answer it. If he had used data at hand to speak for that question as well as he did that from the Luther Porter Jackson papers at Virginia State College to document and describe the Negroe's disfranchisement in the 1930's and 1940's, he would have made an important contribution to our understanding of the Negro in Virginia politics.—LEWIS BOWMAN, *University of Virginia.*

Race and the News Media. ED. BY PAUL L. FISHER AND RALPH L. LOWENSTEIN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. x, 158. $4.95.)

Electronic Journalism. BY WILLIAM A. WOOD. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 175. $5.00.)

Race and the News Media is a report of the eighth annual conference held during November 1965 at the Freedom of Information Center of the University of Missouri. Conducted after the Watts riot but before Newark and Detroit, it consists of a series of brief speeches by the participants, most of whom are active in the fields of press or television. The editors contribute a short introduction. Topics canvassed during the conference include: reporting the racial crisis in the North and South; the changing content of racial news; an evaluation of broadcasting's role; and the role of the Negro press in the civil rights struggle.

Clearly the conference, in bringing together a wide assortment of individuals active in press and television to discuss the presentation of race in the news media, served a worthwhile purpose. Since oral eloquence diminishes in print, it is less certain that the proceedings deserved to be published. And cramming over twenty contributions, which range from prescient and concerned to platitudinous and preachy, in 160 pages results in skimpy treatment of significant issues.

From a political science prespective the discussions are instructive to the extent they illuminate the dilemmas of responsibility and integrity faced by workaday editors and reporters who must decide how to present news bearing on race relations. The best articles have a blunt honesty. Martin S. Hayden, editor in chief of the *Detroit News* explains that his paper does not publicize in advance events calculated to disturb the public order, such as planned picket lines or economic boycotts, and it ignores them after they have begun. He bemoans the lack of Negro reporters, raising the thorny question of what beats to assign them. And he admits that only during the last five years has the *Detroit News* covered Negro engagements and weddings in its society columns.

Hodding Carter, III, managing editor of the Greenville (Miss.) *Delta Democrat-Times,* provides a sensitive and extemporaneous delineation of the personal problems facing a conscientious journalist in a small southern town. As he puts it:

> It is one thing to live in a community and be detached from it, as in fact one can be in a metropolitan area. It is another thing to live in a town of several thousand people and have a close relationship with the news makers themselves on a day-to-day basis.

The symposium raises many questions. What is news? What is the power possessed by the media and is it exercised responsibly? Aren't the media excessively concerned with conflict and controversy to the detriment of analysis? What changes in group actions are wrought by the knowledge that, as one participant observes: "quieter tactics starve for lack of attention?" In other words, to what extent are the media participants in the activities they are attempting to report? These questions blend with complaints: the civil rights movement is not fully and fairly reported; violence and conflict are given space to the detriment of analysis and interpretation; the white press creates Negro leaders in large northern cities; and the press sides with the police in police-Negro disputes. All these issues are raised but scarcely explored.

The results of the conference are a series of recommendations by the editors. These include: assigning the best reporters to the police beat; increasing the number of Negroes in all departments of the news media; providing additional training for reporters responsible for coverage of racial news; and, in general, the admonition to emphasize analysis and interpretation. What is missing, however, is any consideration of the implementability of these proposals. For they are directly related to the way the media are organized and the temporal, financial, and community constraints under which the press and television function.

Professor Wood, in *Electronic Journalism,* attempts a balanced assessment of the accomplishments, problems, and prospects of television news and public affairs programs. Instead, employing a prose style riven by stock phrases, he produces a panegyric.

The difficulty in discussing the mass media, especially television and its informational role, relates to the demands or expectations one places on it. Is it sufficient, for example, for television to depict combat and thus claim to cover the war in Vietnam, or should we demand that it examine and evaluate the strategy and policy of all protagonists in depth? Certainly such an approach would be controversial, but the problem of responsibility is not resolved by eschewing controversy. For Professor Wood such a dilemma scarcely exists.

The worst lacuna in *Electronic Journalism* is the author's reluctance to place the programs in context. News on television is surrounded. The dramatic half hour of news expires and is followed by the imaginary drama of a western or a World War II adventure. Within the news period the program flits from death in Vietnam to French truffle tribulations. A program on the Vietcong is interrupted by commercials for Buick. Surely this jumble of reality and invention, annihilation and salesmanship has an impact on viewers that is different from other media? Moreover, television is foremost a means of selling products; yet it is difficult to recall, while reading Professor Wood's frequent ingenuous citations of television executives' rhetoric, that he is describing what the institution's former CBS news director Fred Friendly called "the profit machine."

In both books a major impact on our social and political life is claimed for television. Television, bringing the outside world to southern Negroes and whites, penetrated the closed society and accelerated the Negro revolution. Furthermore, it showed conditions in the South to the North, thus facilitating passage of civil rights legislation. Television, in its entertainment and commercials, provides an image of affluence alien to the urban black masses and, indirectly at least, is a stimulus to discontent and therefore riots. And Professor Wood, citing a Roper poll finding that "people give television the highest rating for credibility of all the mass media" proceeds to claim for it "a peculiarly personal and graphic impact on its viewers which the printed word cannot match."

In recent years the complex interrelationships between politics and the mass media of communication received insufficient attention from political scientists. The insights of, among others, Lasswell, Lerner, and Lazarsfeld, have not been developed. It is time, I would suggest, for us to return to the medium's messages.—DAVID L. PALETZ, *Duke University*.

A Body Incorporate: City-County Separation in Virginia. BY CHESTER W. BAIN. (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1967. Pp. x, 142. $4.50.)

Professor Chester Bain has written a short study of local government in Virginia which deals with that state's interesting practice of city-county separation. Much of *A Body Incorporate* is taken up with the historical development and legal description of this practice, in which cities of ten thousand population or more may completely separate from the county and perform within its jurisdiction all the functions normally assigned to the county (cities of five to ten thousand, or "second-class" cities may also separate save for the judicial function). Not only are cities of ten thousand population or more responsible for carrying out all municipal functions, but they are also responsible for performing all functions normally required by the state of its counties when the city separates from the county. They are financially and electorally independent.

The final and longest chapter is titled, "Separation: Boon or Cross?" and takes up the important evaluation of separation. Bain lists as major reasons for desiring independence these factors: dual taxation, threat of annexation of a town by an independent city, civic prestige, property assessment, disaffection with county officials by city folks and their ensuing desire for concentration of political power, and wishes for separate (and usually more expensive) schools. Dual taxation, school standards and the annexation threat seem to be the most important issues, and all appear to stem from basic rural-urban conflicts.

Separation as practiced in Virginia has certain advantages: reduction of functional overlap, economy, no buck-passing of responsibility between city and county officials on crucial local problems, and acceptance by the Virginia public of the practice. There are problems, though, especially relative to the low population figure at which cities can separate from counties, a level which tends to encourage too-small governments with inadequate financial resources. Another hardship is the time-honored distinction between first- and second-class cities.

Finally, Bain evaluates the practice of city-county separation as one which has served Virginia well in the past, but one which must be immediately adjusted to operate well in the future. However effective at local self-determination these independent local units may be, "local self-government is a myth without the financial resources to make it operational."

Bain has traced the historical development of separation clearly and his style is quite readable. The reader does get the impression that a few examples have perhaps been leaned on too heavily and that some key sources on current issues are not as recent as would be expected. The closing chapter, however, is an excellent weighing of the pros and cons of city-county separation, and his analysis of the Virginia experience with this approach deserves careful attention.—WENDELL BEDICHEK, *Lamar State College.*

Politics in New Mexico. BY JACK E. HOLMES. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1967. Pp. 335. $10.00.)

Historically students of American state politics have been frustrated by the paucity of comparable studies on political behavior and institutions of the various states. But in recent years this problem has become less acute. This volume by Jack E. Holmes can be added to a growing list of studies which should lead to a comparative analysis of state politics. Although this book is limited to a single state, its focus and approach should be of general interest. Holmes' general approach and analysis are similar to those employed by V. O. Key, Jr. in *Southern Politics* and *American State Politics*.

The prime focus of the book is on the changing nature of the party system in New Mexico as reflected in voting behavior, the legislature and the governorship. Holmes makes judicious use of election results, legislative roll calls, interviews and historical records. In addition he enriches his material with personal experiences. Holmes was a resident of New Mexico for sixteen years and during that time he taught at the University of New Mexico, was director of the Legislative Council Service and served as the state's chief tax commissioner. Because of this varied background, Holmes brings to his work the skills and perspective of a political scientist as well as the sensitivity of a political practitioner. The result of this combination of talents is a solid piece of research which should appeal to political scientists and lay readers alike.

New Mexico provides an opulent cultural setting for a political system. It is a curious blend of "old-settler" Spanish Americans who initially cultivated the fertile Rio Grande Valley, transplanted Texans who located in the state's eastern tier of counties, the native American Indians of the northern counties, cosmopolites who migrated to Albuquerque from all over the United States and a band of scientists who have migrated to the state's research installations. When one adds to this cultural and sociological potpourri the elements of rapid population growth, urbanization and industrialization, the result is an excellent social laboratory of which Holmes makes good use.

Through the use of an historical comparison of election results Holmes demonstrates the political significance of ethnic and economic groups in the state. Some of his findings are surprising. For example, one might assume that the Spanish Americans traditionally have supported the Democratic party, but Holmes shows this not to be the case. Today the Hispanic counties vote Democratic but from statehood (1912) to the middle 1930's these counties provided the basis of the Republican party. One might also assume that liberal Democratic support and a high voter turnout would characterize the scientific communities like Los Alamos, but Holmes shows that this is not always the case.

As is true in other states of rapid growth, the political complexion of New Mexico has changed considerably in the last few decades. In statewide elections the party balance in the Hispanic counties has shifted from Republican to Democratic, but the eastern counties of "Little Texas" have moved from a once extreme Democratic attachment to a two-party balance. Like other states in the South and Southwest (especially neighboring Arizona) urban growth in New Mexico is augmenting Republican strength.

In his brief discussion of the legislature Holmes uses roll call analysis to show the declining significance of the party label among the legislators. Holmes also maintains that the legislature has become increasingly independent from the governor; however, his coverage of legislative-gubernatorial relations could have been improved with an analysis of the governor's success with his legislative programs, appointments and vetoes.

In this book one can find readable prose, careful and convincing scholarship, and a fascinating account of the politics of a colorful state.—ROY D. MOREY, *Denison University*.

A Stripe of Tammany's Tiger. BY LOUIS EISENSTEIN AND ELLIOT ROSENBERG. (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1966. Pp. xii, 300. $5.95.)

Keynes' Law of Ideology holds that all self-professed practical men are at bottom slaves to some defunct social theory. Until the publication of Mr. Eisenstein's book I had believed Keynes' Law to be an inviolable axiom. The author—I use the singular since the entire book is written in the first person—opens his book with the claim that "This book is about politics, not political science." He then further boasts that the reader would find no generalizations, abstractions, formulas or laws. That being the case I had planned, following Keynes' Law, to review the book by picking out a long list of generalizations the author made despite himself. But much to my astonishment he accomplished his purpose. He wrote a book completely without relevance to anyone not a present or past member or enemy of the author's own extended family. And that is a pity. The situation about which he writes was ripe for a good book.

The author, one of a dying breed of lower politicos who lived off politics as well as for politics, has tried to write his autobiography as a tribute and an epitaph to machine politics in New York. He is not the hero. He is the Jewish Boswell to a Lower Eastside Irish family dynasty, the Ahearns. The Ahearns can justly be said (although the author does not say it) to have epitomized everything that made machine politics succeed and ultimately fail. The Ahearns are literally the poorman's *Buddenbrooks*-on-the-East-River. Patriarch of the dynasty was John F., founder of the Fourth Assembly District club that bore his name from the late 1880s until the early 1950s. As A. D. Leader he successfully spanned the transformation of the Lower Eastside from an Irish to an almost totally Jewish quarter. He was dynamic and beloved, but he was also the regular's regular who accepted from Tammany Leader Murphy the treacherous task of engineering the impeachment of Governor Sulzer. John F.'s son Eddy, at the age of 30, inherited the Leadership. The author describes as a "meteoric" career the fact that the post fell into the young man's lap. Upon Eddy's death in 1934 the Leadership in this now even more concentratedly Jewish district fell to William, the younger brother. Willie was a pitiable figure who, due to a childhood head injury, was rendered virtually moronic by adulthood. Yet he held the leadership for 16 years. Toward the end real power in the District devolved upon Bert Stand, an extraordinary opportunist who during much of the same period was also behind-the-scenes co-leader of Tammany Hall itself. The author was for forty years the Captain of the Banner Election District (precinct) of the Banner Democratic District of the city and state.

The situation has all the makings of a classic, but alas the author has preferred sentimentality and petty preachment. Political scientists do lack the author's extensive experience. Almost no such machine exists any more, and there are probably no districts or wards anywhere equal to the old Fourth in special, savorable political characteristics. The author was as wasteful with all this as Mayor Wagner was wasteful, in the author's judgment, with City Hall's patronage. Shed of all sentimentalities there is little history in the book worth recording. But in better hands those few items could have been made into good history—useful even to political scientists. The author's brief account of John F.'s removal from the Presidency of the Borough of Manhattan proves that this was not a case of corruption. But his account never turns to the positive question, that of whether party professionals were uniquely incapable of operating as amateurs in the modern administrative apparatus of city government. The author also bemoans the rise of issue- and candidate-oriented politics as that which undermined good old party loyalty in the Banner District. But his blindness to what was significant in his own experience deprives us of possibly valuable insights into (1) how it came to pass in the first place that the most advanced of all immigrant groups in the past century and a half, the Jews, so peacefully accepted half a century of Irish hegemony, and (2) how an Ahearn club that could capture the primordial loyalties of Jews could not survive against the presumably more superficial identification of the new educated masses with programs or ticket leaders. His sentimental attachment to the local particularities also prevented him from reporting sufficiently upon the most fascinating account in the entire book—how Eddy Ahearn worked out the settlement whereby Mayor Walker agreed to resign his mayoralty in time to save presidential candidate Roosevelt from what could have been a tragic decision. Local parties decentralized power in the United States to an incredible degree apparently; and with the decline of machines so there might be also an increase in national centralization. But for an appreciation of the decentralization effected by local political organization one must return to the writings of political scientists like Schattschneider and Grodzins.

The author's sentimental hearkening to the political pattern of Boss Croker is equivalent in quaintness to the neanderthal Republicans' hearkening to the economic pattern of McKinley. Mr. Eisenstein would be amazed to learn how many political scientists share his appreciation of the machine's importance in American urban history. Pity he does not on the other hand share the political scientist's "framework of possibilities" within which he might have been guided to what was really significant in his experience. Since he did not his book was doomed from the start. The book was doomed because it was not the result of forty years' experience but rather the result of one year's experience lived forty times.—THEODORE J. LOWI, *University of Chicago*.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto. BY HAROLD KAPLAN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. 320. $8.50.)

Harold Kaplan's book, the seventh in the Metropolitan Politics Series edited by Wallace S. Sayre, is an attempt to apply the theory of "structural-functionalism" to an analysis of the municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. Drawing primarily upon the work of Talcott Parsons, the author, in his first chapter, reviews the major concepts involved in functionalism, particularly as they relate to the study of urban political systems. The essence of Parsons' functional approach, according to Kaplan, is ". . . the attempt to define certain basic requisites for the survival and success of social systems and to see the structure of a system as a set of mechanisms that attempt to fulfill these requisites" (p. 10). The Parsonian model, particularly its focus on normative order, is held to have severe limitations when applied to the analysis of urban political systems. Metro was found to have no normative order of its own, but rather shared the normative standards of the nation; a normative order was necessary to the Metro system's functioning, but was not the responsibility of the Metro system itself. After making several modifications of the Parsonian model, Kaplan completes his functional framework by formulating an analytical construct comparing the Metro Toronto system with two other types of systems —the business elite and the broker leadership.

The remainder of the book is concerned with a functional assessment of the Metro system. After a brief discussion of the origins and initial developments of Metro Toronto, the performance of the system and its subsystems and the social context of Metro politics are analyzed. Kaplan defines success of the system as ". . . the ability to perform its integrative and adaptive functions to the satisfaction of relevant actors within and without the system" (p. 246). Relevant actors are those whose behavior and attitudes have direct implications for the system. A rudimentary level of non-normative or calculative integration was found to have emerged, but normative integration, central to the Parsonian model, did not develop. Performance of the adaptive function was assessed on the basis of "objective indicators" (p. 249). Metro achieved a role differentiation or an institutionalization of the problem-solving (adaptive) activity, but Kaplan's indicators show net satisfaction scores of discontent upon the part of the adaptive-oriented actors.

Although the book is focused upon the Metro Toronto system, the author repeatedly refers to other systems in a manner that encourages comparative analysis. Particularly striking are numerous observations about Metro Toronto that are in sharp contrast to those that have been made about urban systems in the United States. For example, Kaplan analyzes group involvement in fifty-five major issues that came before the Metro Council between 1953 and 1965, and found that the political parties and the Real Estate Board did not voice an opinion on any of the issues. One would be surprised if comparable groups in American urban areas remained silent for such a long period of time. A comparison is made of the administrative politics in the "executive-directed" Metro system and the "broker-leadership" system in New York City. In New York, the pattern is one of department heads becoming the spokesmen for the institutional interests of the departments and often striving to frustrate the mayor's interest in coordinating departments. In contrast, Chairman Frederick Gardiner was successful in mediating between Metro's departments. Kaplan found it paradoxical that ". . . the New York mayor, officially the head of the administration, in fact presides over a feudal system, while the Metro chairman, lacking the formal powers of a chief administrator, in fact plays a dominant role in a united cabinet" (p. 76).

Metro's first chairman pursued a "gradualist" strategy in bringing issues before the Council. Only those issues upon which there would be a high level of consensus were initiated. The effect of this policy was greater emphasis on public works projects rather than on programs in the nonconstruction field. The Chairman believed that by pursuing noncontroversial issues first, unity would eventually develop on the Council and permit the consideration of "soft" programs. According to Kaplan, ". . . Gardiner's gradualist strategy was a failure" (p. 121). As far as the application of this strategy to the United States is concerned, it is doubtful that American urban areas can afford the luxury of a "gradualist" approach. Gardiner's legislative strategy was also governed by the norm of regional parity—that each municipality receive benefits roughly in line with its tax contribution to Metro. Although this norm may contribute to integration, it would not facilitate the resolution of many urban problems in the United States that require some degree of redistribution of resources. And, it is this type of problem that is the most critical in many urban areas.

Kaplan found the level of group influence in Metro to be very low, and he delineates ten factors that seek to explain the "low pressure environment." The author's conclusions about group influence are quite similar to V. O. Key's "opinion dikes." Group influence was found to be more the ability to help structure Council's general attitudes than the ability to affect the course of decision-making in specific instances.

The book is well-written and exceptionally well documented. The extensive footnotes provide an excellent bibliography of both functional theory and urban politics. The emphasis is theoretical exposition, and the author comments that students more interested in Metro than in theory may be disappointed. The book's orientation requires no apology. The literature on urban politics is abundant with purely descriptive studies, but few exist that soundly combine a conceptual framework with a specific research problem. Professor Kaplan's book is a valuable contribution toward achieving this combination that is so badly needed if an understanding of urban politics is to develop. —JAMES L. COX, *University of Delaware*.

Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis. ED. BY LEWIS J. EDINGER. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967. Pp. vii, 376.)

"Statecraft," writes Stanley Hoffmann in this group of essays, "is of the essence of all politics"; yet its study has been the "orphan of contemporary political science." That seems both curious and ironic, for the tradition of writing on political leadership includes some of the most imaginative and perceptive works of this discipline's inheritance; yet lions and foxes, philosopher-kings, heroes and leviathans have led a rather quiet existence in the deep methodological shadows of systems analysis and the behavioral persuasion. Leadership studies have continued, of course, and have recently begun to approach the level of a flood tide. This book may be viewed as an effort to channel, or perhaps only to label, the flood; to define, that is, the subject matter of "political leadership" as a subfield of modern political science. What emerges is a very broad definition, one Machiavelli would be unlikely to recognize.

The book opens with an essay by Edinger, who seeks to give some conceptual order to the variety of concerns of students of leadership, and is followed by nine separate studies, a concluding article by Harold Lasswell, and an excellent annotated bibliography prepared by Edinger and Donald Searing. It is the great disparateness—in subject-matter, method, and quality—of the nine studies that gives the book its value as a reflection of the state of the study of leadership. As individual essays, three of the nine seem to me particularly well-wrought and worthy of special comment: those by Alfred G. Meyer, Samuel H. Barnes, and Hoffmann.

Meyer puts forward a perceptive analysis of authority in Communist systems. The draconian authority style of Stalinism, he argues, is characteristic only of the period of Communist "system-building," a phase of transition between the initial authority crisis of the revolution and a crisis of system maturity centering in the challenge of new elites to the party bureaucracy. The West has defined Communism by the attributes of the system-building stage; the authority relationships now emerging, Meyer suggests, will not only undermine that definition, but may put an end to the very distinctivenss of Communist rule. There lurks here, then, an implicit theory of convergence, but a subtle and persuasive one which does not require that Western and Soviet systems become identical.

It might be useful to apply to this perspective Barnes' thesis that leadership systems must be congruent with the degree of participatory competence of the led, defined as political skills plus a sense of efficacy. Any increasing pluralism in Soviet decision-making would then have to be matched by enhanced mass participation in politics—a development for which there is in fact some evidence. Barnes' general hypothesis is plausible, and his discussion of the relevant literature (e.g., the Kurt Lewin experiments with groups of children) fills it out and lends it appropriate qualification. Unfortunately the empirical portion of the essay rests on too slender a reed—a single survey question asked of Italian socialists—to provide much additional confirmation.

Whatever uniformities of leadership style the Soviet bloc and the West may be developing, the French, if we are to believe Hoffmann, remain determinedly *sui generis*. The dominant authority style of French society (here Hoffmann leans heavily on Michel Crozier) produces an almost cyclical alternation between routine and crisis. Since the routine in the political sphere comprises a "multiplicity of brakes and the absence of a motor," crisis is necessary to bring forth the heroic leader who, operating under a partial suspension of the rules of the road, is permitted to save the nation so that it may once again wallow gratefully in the routine. Hoffmann's argument, which examines the cases of De Gaulle, Pétain, and Mendès-France, is brilliantly put; yet one wonders whether non-French examples (Roosevelt? Churchill? Hitler?) might not reveal similarities as great as those between his diverse Frenchmen.

Additionally, there are psychoanalytic studies by Alexander Mitscherlich and Victor Wolfenstein; useful comparisons between the political cultural "resources" available to leaders in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, by Erwin Hargrove, and between supreme court justices in four countries, by Glendon Schubert; and studies of recruitment and career patterns in relation to party structure by Joseph Schlesinger and Lester Seligman, the second somewhat less ambitious and considerably more successful than the first.

It will be noticed that there is no study here dealing primarily with Hoffmann's "statecraft"—i.e., the techniques of leading, "leadership" in its most narrow and traditional sense. Political culture, leadership styles, and the problems of congruence between them are the recurrent themes. With their importance to the understanding of statecraft there can be no quarrel. I wonder, however, whether there is not a useful distinction to be made between the study of leadership *per se* and that of elites and political recruitment. The Schlesinger and Seligman essays, which belong to the latter category, do not really seem at home with the other studies of this volume.—THOMAS A. BAYLIS, *Duke University*.

The Communist Movement in Iran. BY SEPEHR ZABIH. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 277. $6.00.)

Planning and Development in Iran. BY GEORGE B. BALDWIN. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. xv, 212. $6.95.)

Politics in Iran continue to confound the initiated and novitiate alike. These two works dealing with central problems of Iranian politics are no exception. Both raise fundamental issues which remain unsolved and perhaps, by the nature of the subject matter itself, insoluble. Both treat notable failures: in the former case, the failure of the Iranian Communist Party or Tudeh to seize power and in the latter, the failure of a planning effort to take hold in an essentially hostile political culture. But both conclude with an unmistakable sense of success—success for which the record of unmitigated failure have ill-prepared the reader. In the former work, the ability of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to defeat his internal opponents and develop rewardingly close ties to the present Soviet leadership are as unexpected as are, in the latter work, a burgeoning Iranian economy and entrepreneurial elite which befuddle economic planners.

Zabih's work is a painstakingly researched examination of materials in Persian, Russian, and Western languages whose bibliographical discoveries and thorough treatment will serve as a guide and reference source for future investigators. Woven throughout his presentation, and often unstated, are strands which highlight several central facets of Iranian politics. Of major importance is the issue of continuity: continuity in Iran's relations with the U.S.S.R., in her political leaders, and in the dilemmas of her political opposition.

Zabih illustrates the startling consistency of the Soviet Union in its willingness to sacrifice indigenous communist movements on behalf of Soviet relations with Iran and the West. The abrupt withdrawal of Soviet support for Kuchek Khan and the Gilan separatists in 1919-20; the pull-back of Soviet troops from Northern Iran and the signing of a draft agreement with Prime Minister Ghavam in 1946; the conclusion of technical, economic, and even military-arms agreements in the 1960's highlight Soviet pragmatism, flexibility, and caution—all, of course, at the expense of Iranian communists.

The author understates the present disarray of the Tudeh as a result of these developments. He mentions, but fails to attribute sufficient importance, to the little-noted event in 1964 where the U.S.S.R. returned to the Iranian Government one of its subjects. This hapless pawn of international politics had been a prison guard responsible for perpetrating a jailbreak in the 1950's whereby a significant portion of the Tudeh leadership was able to escape confinement and flee to the Soviet Union. His subsequent execution at the hands of the Iranian Government and the nearly simultaneous conclusion of the steel mill agreement between Iran and the U.S.S.R. had an impact on the Tudeh similar to that of the 1939 Soviet-Nazi pact on European and American communists and fellow travelers. Of perhaps even greater importance was the impact of these events on the non-communist opposition. The Shah, whom they considered their domestic enemy, had apparently "won over" the Soviet Union, whom they had viewed as their only foreign friend.

A second major strand in Zabih's work is the continuity of Iranian élites—among both the opposition and the *shahparastis*. Individuals playing a central role in early political events persistently reappear, a decade, two, or even five decades later. Mohammed Saed, for example, was the Iranian Consul General at Baku who fled from the attack on his consulate by the precursor of the Persian Communist Party, the Adalat (Justice) group in 1918. Saed went on to serve several terms as Prime Minister and in 1968 remains active as a member of the Iranian Senate.

But if the rolls of the supporters of the regime contain persons of extraordinary political longevity, how much more replete with such political veterans are the ranks of the Communist Party. Zabih's discussions of the various Communist central committees both within Iran and in exile reveal an amazing continuity in leadership. The inability or unwillingness of the Iranian Communists to include new blood at high levels is another indication of their political failures.

A final central and dominant issue which Zabih poses as continually confronting the Tudeh is one which also unceasingly challenges all Iranian opposition groups. The issue is a policy one—the extent to which it is legitimate to cooperate with a sympathetic government or one which agrees to effect at least sections of an opposition group's political platform. When the policies of the regime coincide with those of the opposition, a common-front policy of cooperation has frequently resulted in the subversion and cooptation of the opposition. A failure to support such policies, however, puts the opposition in the stance of opposing not only the regime but policies which they, the opposition, had so loudly urged for so long. This dilemma has perpetually plagued the Tudeh, the National Front, and, indeed, all groups who consider themselves in opposition to the regime.

Unfortunately, two substantial flaws mar this otherwise excellent work. Professor Zabih appears on unsteady footing when he ventures into the quagmire represented by the application of social science techniques to historical investigation. A perfunctory and abbreviated analysis of the "social characteristics" of Tudeh leaders; the attribution of support for the Tudeh to "alienation" where the term remains indistinct and poorly linked to particular social or economic groups over time; and a cursory examination of the "backgrounds" of the members of Dr. Erani's Marxist circle of the 1930's all indicate the author's difficulties.

Finally, the study is short on analysis, especially in key areas which beg for analysis. Why did the Communist movement fail in Iran when it seemed on so many occasions to be on the verge of seizing power? What is the significance of this failure for Iranian politics, for the Soviet Union, for the West? These and similar issues must await future treatment, hopefully from this same author who has established here such a sound foundation.

George Baldwin brings impressive credentials to his task. Author of previous works on the British coal industry and economic development in South India, he served as a member of the Harvard Advisory Group to Iran's Plan Organization from 1958-61. Immersed in the minutiae of planning for Iranian development he has nonetheless retained a capacity for achieving perspective.

Baldwin's basic argument is that given the subordination of planning to politics in Iran and the fundamentally inhospitable political climate, planning may very well not be of direct value. Rather, he proposes that the Government undertake large, economically unprofitable projects, if it must, while fostering the development of the private sector.

In a detailed analysis of Iran's impressive economic development in the late 1950's, he demonstrates that basically this pattern of events occurred. The author attributes that development to government generated demand and the availability of government credit for industrial investment. To the astonishment of the planning groups, the private sector responded vigorously, providing the dynamism behind Iran's growth.

At the root of this expansion lay oil and the massive revenues which annually accrued to the Government. Baldwin astutely notes the substitutability of oil for human resources, especially for the administrative skills which the author found so sadly absent.

It may well be that these human skills are in short supply because of the primacy of politics already noted. The author has culled numerous examples of political considerations overriding planning interests (and also we might add, the canons of proper administration) from his personal experience. The Shiraz fertilizer plant, Iran's three mammoth dams, and the land reform (which had not even been included in the Third Plan) are but three of the more blatant examples.

In addition to a wealth of little known details of Iran's politics and economy, the author provides some general considerations of planning for development which will be of relevance to those with no interest in Iran.

While invigorated by personal experience, the work suffers from an absence of more general research and documentation. Numerous errors of fact and typography impair the work. But perhaps more disappointing is the author's failure to match his planning projections, made in 1962, with data on Iranian economic performance available for 1965 or 1966. The reader might then have had a better sense for at least the theoretical value of the planning effort in Iran and the developing world in general.—MARVIN ZONIS, *University of Chicago.*

Modern Yemen, 1918-1966. BY MANFRED W. WENNER. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 257. $6.95.)

After an introductory section on the land and its people, Professor Wenner has written a judicious and objective account of the government of Yemen—religiously divided between the highland and northern Zaydīs and the lowland and southern Shāficīs—by the Zaydī Imams Yahya and Ahmad. The withdrawal of Ottoman authority in November 1918 was "as far as Yahya was concerned . . . merely the first step in making Yemen a nation-state" (pp. 47-48, 50); but what in this socio-religious setting *was* a nation-state? The two Imams successively strove to recover a historic Yemen extending eastward more than 600 miles along the southern coasts of Arabia, despite the fact that the tribes and minor rulers of these regions were not Zaydīs and had secured their independence of the Zaydī Imams as long ago as 1728.

It is in discussing the ensuing conflict between the two Imams and the British, who had established a coaling-station at Aden in 1839 and during the following century had gingerly extended a protectorate over the disorderly tribes of their hinterland, that the author's objectivity flags. Following closely, though without acknowledgment, Harold Ingrams's demonstration that the British were slow to realize the verbal ambiguities in the valid Arabic text of the Anglo-Yemeni treaty of 1934 (pp. 158-60; cf. Ingrams: *The Yemen* [1963], pp. 68-70), he concedes that Imam Yahya was ready to accept a temporary *status quo* with them only because his territorial aggression to the north was about to involve him in war with Saudi Arabia. Yet while characterizing subsequent British arguments as "quite specious," he refers without qualification to the Imam's "legitimate rights" and relegates to a footnote the admission that there was "some question" about their legality (pp. 164, 167 n. 53). The fact was that both Imam Yahya and the British were imposing their respective authority and public security on many reluctant and unruly tribes; but what for Professor Wenner was laudable in the Imam was apparently reprehensible in the British (contrast pp. 71-81 with 161-4).

The Imams' insistence on reasserting their sovereignty over non-Zaydī tribes that had rejected their predecessors' control two centuries earlier was for them as unproductive as it would be for Mexico to demand the retrocession of Texas from President Lyndon Johnson. Professor Wenner shows that Imam Ahmad's "monomania" on this theme (p. 159), neglecting the growing educated opposition to his despotic rule, opened the way for that systematic Egyptian radio incitement that led to the military coup d'etat of 1962. In this respect the title of the final section, "The Civil War," is something of a misnomer, since Egyptian paratroopers and war material began to arrive in Yemen within a week of the coup and a "Republic of the Arabian Peninsula" was proclaimed as the ultimate goal of the revolutionaries.

The author's narrative closes in mid-1966 on a note of military stalemate and "the unwillingness of the extremists on both sides . . . to come to any rational compromise" (p. 228). Since then, both the Egyptian and the British socialists have yielded to financial necessity and withdrawn their respective armed forces, leaving in Sancā and Aden two exhausted army-dominated "republics" looking for support to the Soviet Union, while the Imamate still has the support of the Zaydī tribes and a base in Saudi Arabia.

There are frequent discrepancies between the transliteration of place-names in the text and that used on the map (p. 22): thus Bayḥān, Beihan; Bayḍā', Al Beidha; al-Huḍayda, Hodeida. The port of Ghulayfiqa, of tactical significance (p. 75), is not shown on the map, which has no scale of miles and does not illustrate the Yemeni territorial claims as well as the two-page map in the preface to Ingrams: *The Yemen.*—GEORGE KIRK, *University of Massachusetts.*

Public Opinion and Constitution Making in Pakistan, 1958-1962. BY EDGAR A. AND KATHRYN R. SCHULER. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967. Pp. 286. $6.00.)

It takes a certain spirit of adventure to write a book about public opinion in a country which had experienced a military coup, a suppression of existing political figures, the destruction of parliamentary institutions, and the imposition of martial law restraints on freedom of the press as a prelude to the process of constitution building. One is tempted to ask, what public opinion? The authors believe that Pakistan public opinion played a significant role in the political process during the four years which the book covers: the period of "constitution making." To what sources do the author's turn for support of this thesis?

The Schulers, while they were in Pakistan during much of the martial law period, were not in a position to undertake personal interviews or other forms of data collection. Their study draws largely on an exhaustive reading of three English language newspapers in the Indian subcontinent.

The Pakistan Observer, published in Dacca, East Pakistan, is used for the East Pakistan viewpoint; *Dawn,* a Karachi paper, provides a source for West Pakistan opinion, and the Calcutta *Statesman* is used for the third source because of its fairly heavy news coverage of Pakistan affairs, and because it was sometimes an avenue of expressions of opinion which could not be aired in the more restrained Pakistan press. The authors' basic approach to their information is not encumbered with any systematic data collection technique, such as content analysis. More typically they are satisfied to take a certain action or public statement by the government, i.e., Kyub Khan or one of his ministers, and record the public reactions of various groups and public figures in Pakistan society as reported in the English press. As a result of both the complexity of many of the issues, and the narrow strata of the "relevant" body of opinion on political issues, which might be reported in the press, the opinions most often reported are those of the articulate, educated elite. Students and Bengali intellectuals, Karachi lawyers, the Ulema or religious leaders in Islamic society, and the journalists and editorial writers are the sources of public opinion which form the bases for this book. Occasionally a disenfranchised politician would voice his dissent with the government, a practice which sometimes resulted in the arrest of the politician, as in the case of H. S. Suhrawardy, a leading East Pakistani politician and a former prime minister. Much of the book is organized in terms of an "action-reaction" dialogue between government and public opinion. This approach and the sources used may ignore significant but less "public" bodies of opinion in Pakistan which for a variety of reasons largely supported the government's efforts at establishing a controlled democracy. There is little discussion, for example, of business and industrial leadership opinion, or of the opinion of newly created Basic Democrats. Nor does one find recorded the attitudes of the large landholders who appear to be of some importance in district politics in parts of West Pakistan.

The authors agree with many observers of the Ayub Khan regime that it has been the mildest of dictatorships, and that it has taken positive steps to encourage at least the appearance of public debate, especially during the period of constitution making. Ayub Khan has shown a remarkable concern for the legitimacy of his governmental experiment, hoping, like Charles De Gaulle in France, that the strong presidential system which he has introduced will survive his own demise. As part of this search for legitimacy, Ayub created a Constitution Commission, to recommend the guidelines for the new constitutional order. This Commission undertook a rather novel approach to developing public opinion. It sent out a questionnaire containing forty questions to twenty-eight thousand persons. About one-third of the questionnaires were in English. To this survey there were over nine thousand replies. Given the complexity of the questions asked, one wonders about the information developed by this approach. For example, question seven reads, "If you prefer the federal form of government (a) what should be the federating units; (b) what form of government would you suggest for each of the units; (c) how would you distribute legislative power between the centre and the units; and (d) what provisions do you suggest for the administration of the federal capital?" One suspects that even in the most sophisticated circles of the oldest Western democracies, such questions could be answered adequately only by constitutional lawyers and political scientists.

The basic format of the book is a chronological development beginning with the military coup through the announcement of the final constitution. The chapters are organized by months in terms of the events or issues which dominate each time period. These chapters are quite short. Chapter IV on the Constitution Commission is six pages and Chapter V on the attitudes of the legal profession seven pages. Two somewhat more analytical chapters conclude the book, one dealing with the various provisions in the constitution and the other discussing briefly who "gained" and who "lost" in the new constitution. As to the impact of public opinion, the authors conclude that except for the establishment of provincial governments as a result of strong East Pakistani opposition to a unitary state, on all other issues, strong central government, indirect elections, and a unicameral legislature, Ayub Khan's wishes prevailed. One can only wonder if there was ever any real contest.—RICHARD N. BLUE, *University of Minnesota.*

The Origins of Malay Nationalism. BY WILLIAM R. ROFF. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. xx, 297. $8.50.)

Here is a gracefully written, careful and insightful historical study that carries considerable import for the political science of Southeast Asia and of the post-colonial world at large. The author's intention was to, "trace the slow growth of communal, ethnic, and national feeling among the peninsular Malays in the first four decades of this century, and the expression of this feeling in voluntary associations of a predominantly modern and potentially political-nationalistic kind." In doing this he identifies three distinct social movements and their component organizations, and elaborates their interactions with British colonial policy and the relatively stable structure of Malay peasant society. One was a religious reform movement which found its ideological origins outside of the Malaysian area and its base of operations largely in the Straits Settlements of Singapore and Penang. It met violent opposition in the traditional Malay establishment, which British policy had developed and supported. Although the movement developed a form of pre-nationalism, "it never succeeded in elaborating, either organizationally or programmatically, a political nationalism capable of attracting mass support." A movement with a more obvious impact on the course of national events developed out of the indigenous administrative elite fostered by British policy. Its motivations were quite conservative: to preserve Malay privileges against the demands of non-Malays which resulted from the rapid social and economic changes taking place in the non-Malay sector of society. The third and most radical movement drew upon the locally-based intelligentsia turned out by the vernacular education system. Although it revived indigenous literature and provided personnel for later leftwing movements, its political impact was small.

This book meets well the general tests of scholarship. Since the topic deals primarily with ideas and organizations the author appropriately draws much of his evidence from Malay newspapers, magazines, and novels and from the official records of the associations studied. Interviews are extensively and appropriately used and judicious inferences about what was going on are made where no direct evidence is available. The social movement and their attendant organizations are not presented naked but couched in appropriate descriptions of the political, economic, and anthropological background. Dr. Roff is an objective historian, but not one who extinguishes his sense of values. It is obvious that he is unhappy about various British policies, especially the vocational and vernacular education policy promoted by Winstedt. Roff's joy at the irony that this regressive policy should have provided the base for the radical intelligentsia does not push him to overstate the significance of that movement. It would be interesting to speculate, as the author does not, whether the intelligentsia might have been more radical and their movement more widespread had not the British tried so successfully to keep the Malays down on the farm.

Any speculation of this sort would be out of tune with the temper of the work, and that is a cause for sadness. *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* deals with materials central to the concerns of political science but it is not a work of political science. It would have been too much to expect an explicit analytical framework, or a grounding in theory, new or used. However, one might have expected a more comparative form of analysis in which Malaysian developments are related to coordinate events in Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, or, failing all else, India. This the author did not do, beyond making a few references to Indonesian experience and indicating Indonesian origins or influences on Malaysian events.

Despite Dr. Roff's disinclination to compare or speculate, his firm and fulsome job of historiography helps make the Malayan case a fertile field for analysis of the twin processes of nationalism and decolonization. Any true understanding of Britain's relatively successful application of a "go slow" colonial policy will gain much by building upon Roff's careful tracing of the not so radical roots of Malay nationalism.—JAMES F. GUYOT, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

The Emergence of Pakistan. BY CHAUDHRI MUHAMMAD ALI. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. ix, 418. $11.00.)

One of the lacunae in research materials during the last two decades since the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan has been in the genre of memoirs and accounts by those who helped establish these two new nations. In the case of Pakistan, the need was particularly acute for nothing comparable to the autobiography of Rajendra Prasad, India's first president, or the two volumes, *The Integration of the Indian States* and *Transfer of Power in India,* by V. P. Menon, had appeared.

This condition has been partially remedied in the short span of a few months in 1966 and 1967 by publication of books by three architects of Pakistan. The first to appear was *From Memory,* by Firoz Khan Noon, the last prime minister before the declaration of martial law in 1958. Published in Lahore by Ferozsons, it has had limited circulation in Pakistan and is virtually unknown elsewhere. In contrast, a second work, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography,* by President Mohammad Ayub Khan, published by Oxford University Press, was widely distributed in Pakistan and is relatively well known in other countries as well.

The third volume, presently under review, is a thoughtful, temperate account of Pakistan's establishment by one of that nation's most distinguished civil servants. A professional administrator, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali played a key role in organizing the government of Pakistan as its first and only secretary-general. Later he became finance minister and prime minister and in 1965 was one of the leading figures in the Combined Opposition Party (COP) which contested for the presidency against President Ayub.

A little less than half the book is devoted to problems after the establishment of Pakistan. The first half deals with the familiar prelude to partition: the Lahore Resolution, cabinet mission plan, partition itself, and integration of the states. The analysis is remarkably lucid and judicious, excelling that found in V. P. Menon's two volumes alluded to earlier. A full chapter is devoted to the Radcliffe Award which determined the boundaries between India and Pakistan in Bengal and the Punjab. The aspect of the Radcliffe boundary settlement of the Punjab which continues to rankle Pakistanis is the division of Gurdaspur tehsil in a manner giving India its only means of land access to Kashmir. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali sheds some new light on this controversy. If what he reports is correct, there is now some reason to believe that the division of Gurdaspur was not the sole responsibility of Cyril Radcliffe, the commission's chairman, but rather was made with knowledge of and prior consultation with Lord Ismay, the viceroy's military advisor, and perhaps even with the viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, himself. The heart of the evidence is found on pages 218-219 of the book. The author visited Lord Ismay in Delhi to convey the Quaid-i-Azam's fears concerning Gurdaspur. Being told that Ismay was closeted with Radcliffe, he waited to see him. Ismay professed ignorance of the Gurdaspur boundary issue, but when the author went to a wall map and pointed out a pencilled boundary line drawn across the Punjab, "Ismay turned pale and asked in confusion who had been fooling with his map" (p. 219). This, of course, is circumstantial evidence to which we cannot assign final historical credibility. But it is a personal account which may help to illuminate further this important decision.

The principal disappointment in this well written and otherwise well conceived book is the fact that only thirty-one of its 387 pages are devoted to the activities in which the author played a paramount creative role, namely, in constructing the administrative system of the new government of Pakistan. This reviewer had long awaited this book hoping that it would deal extensively and authoritatively with this aspect of Pakistan's development. Since the death of the Quaid-i-Azam, his successor, Liaqat Ali Kahn, such administrative figures as S. Ikramullah and virtually all the key politicians of the 1947-50 period, Muhammad Ali is clearly the only Pakistani in a position to have dealt with those problems. Our disappointment is mitigated somewhat by the deft and excellent manner with which Muhammad Ali treats the few problems he has selected in these thirty-one pages. We learn, for example, that the appointment of the controversial first pay commission in 1947 headed by Justice Muhammad Munir "was a mistake" (p. 361). There is a strong suggestion that the origin of the commission's statement that the "correct place for our men of genius is in private enterprise and not in the humdrum career of public service" can be traced to Ghulam Mohammad, the finance minister rather than to Munir.

The book ends with promulgation of the first constitution in 1956. We can hope for a second volume by Muhammad Ali covering the forty-four months of martial law and the period of the second constitution (1960 to the present) during which the administrator became a politician opposing the government in power. Whether or not this hope for a second volume will be fulfilled, we can say of the book now under review that it is a forthright, balanced, moderate account, reflecting the constructive disposition of its author. It ranks clearly with the best of the books on India and Pakistan by those who helped create those states. —RALPH BRAIBANTI, *Duke University*.

Minority Politics in the Punjab. BY BALDEV RAJ NAYAR. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 360. $9.00.)

"Minority" in this study is interpreted by the author to include only the Sikh Akali Dal and its campaign to obtain Punjabi Suba, that is, partition of the Indian province of the Punjab into Punjabi-speaking and Hindi-speaking sections. Although Nayar had the misfortune to publish his dissertation just before the Sikh party's aim was unexpectedly achieved in the wake of the Indo-Pakistan War, his failure to predict the outcome does not detract materially from his excellent work.

The overall organization of the book is behavioral. The author arranges his data into: the social context of the demand for Punjabi Suba, the motivations behind it, the recruitment patterns of the opposing party elites, the resources at their disposal, and their conflicting strategies. However, this framework tends to get lost in the detailed historical exposition within each chapter. Only in the Summary do the more general propositions emerge upon which comparison with other provinces and other minorities in India and elsewhere in the developing world might be based. As it is, these relate more to the general problem of "system maintenance" in a situation of linguistic and religious diversity than to the problems of minorities as such.

Nayar's first finding is that the demand for a separate Punjabi linguistic province has really been a camouflage for creating a Sikh theocratic state. The latter goal he attributes to the fears of orthodox Sikhs that modernization will lead their people to be re-absorbed into Hinduism unless the machinery of the state can be controlled in order to enforce conformity to the external symbols of Sikhism. In other words, it is an example of "boundary maintenance" between two socially close and philosophically similar faiths. Nayar dismisses the Akali Dal's charges of Hindu discrimination against the minority. On the contrary, so successful have Sikh politicians been in prying concessions out of the Congress government, that it is more likely the majority community which has suffered disadvantages.

The generalizations most susceptible to formulation into comparative propositions are those about leadership recruitment and strategies. Regarding the former, the author discovers a striking similarity in social background and education of Akali and Congress Sikh legislators. From this, he is driven to the conclusion that "the commonplace assumption is not valid that those who make 'parochial,' 'primordial,' or 'particularistic' appeals are in any way less advanced than those who make 'secular,' 'rational' and 'nationalistic' appeals." Part of the explanation lies in infiltration of the ruling party, one of the three Akali strategies he explicates. (The others are constitutional and agitational.) Nayar observed a high turnover rate in all but the top leadership of the Akali Dal. Periodically a merger would be negotiated with the Congress and a layer of ambitious young Akalis would be absorbed into its ranks, there to form a cell for promoting Sikh interests from within. The Congress on its side felt obliged to raise ex-Akali Sikhs like the late Chief Minister, Partap Singh Kairon, to power in order to combat its opponent's charges of discrimination. One wonders why this bargaining technique hasn't worked as well for other Indian minorities like the Muslims. The combination of legal and illegal tactics is reminiscent of the Communist Party, and indeed Nayar makes a qualified comparison explicit.

How then was the Akali Dal unable for so long to achieve its major goal? In his analysis of the Sikh community, Nayar demonstrates that despite its emphasis on equality, fissures between Harijan and non-Harijan, Jat and non-Jat persist and vitiate communal political solidarity. Because caste cuts across religious, linguistic and cultural lines, he concludes that it functions to fragment separatism and promote national unity. The Akali Dal, he demonstrates, never enjoyed majority support even among Sikhs. Thus, contrary to the assumption that all social cleavages are inherently detrimental to national integration, Nayar urges the acceptance by Indian national leaders of the inevitability and potential utility of group conflict.

The author's further extrapolation that "given a democratic framework, only a political party or coalition which is secular and broad-based can remain in power in the government of the state" has been belied by the post-election events of 1967. His own secularism and political preference ("continued control of the government by the Congress party is of crucial importance to the maintenance of the political system") apparently blinded him to a fourth Alkali strategy: coalition with its antithesis, the Jan Sangh.

Lastly, although the level of theoretical abstraction obtainable from this kind of configurative study-in-depth is not very high, it seems preferable that comparative theory should be built up from the solid empirical base of "area" knowledge it offers than down from the premature category-mongering recently fashionable.

As a postscript, it is regrettable that Nayar mars his otherwise admirable objectivity by characterizing the Sikh grievances as "alleged" and the Punjabi-speaking area as "so-called."—THEODORE P. WRIGHT, JR., *State University of New York at Albany.*

Panditji: A Portrait of Jawaharlal Nehru. BY MARIE SETON. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1967. Pp. 515. $13.95.)

The author of this highly personal biography of Jawaharlal Nehru is a British journalist who visited India in 1955, and who being introduced to Nehru, became a frequent house guest in the following years. As would be expected, the author is adulatory in her praise of Nehru and his distinguished daughter. The contribution of the book consists principally in the insights which its rambling chapters give of Nehru's great urbanity, gentleness, humanism, his catholic interests, and his desire to promote all sorts of good works. His interest in the poor is indicated by his practice of setting aside a half hour every morning to see all persons, however lowly, who came to see him, listening patiently and kindly to their stories, and rendering whatever aid he could. No appointment was required, and no screening was conducted of those who called to see him. It is little short of astonishing that the head of a great and populous state today could follow this practice.

The last two thirds of the book, by far the most important part, consists largely of an account of the author's visits and conversations with the Nehru's and other important Indian personalities, written usually in the first person. No household item is too small to be related. In this fashion the author describes the major public events and crises which Nehru and the country faced during the ten years after she became a guest of the Nehru household. Interspersed are frequent accounts of the author's other activities, including trips abroad, quite unrelated to the subject of the book. Facts, opinions, hearsay, and sometimes gossip are woven together to throw sidelights on major problems and issues and to portray the attitudes and concerns of Nehru.

The first five chapters, which review the life of

Nehru prior to 1955, are drawn largely from his own writing and are sketchy. They do not reveal the forces, personalities, ideas and ideals, struggles, and disappointments which greatly influenced his character and ability to win the devotion of the masses of Indian population, second only to Mahatma Gandhi, whose heir he became. The book largely fails to explain the basis of Nehru's greatness as a leader, his philosophy, ideals and values. One cannot understand Nehru as a person and as the leader of his country without an awareness of the great influence exerted over his character and career by his distinguished father, Molital Nehru, and Gandhi. Equally important are the factors and events which brought Nehru into the leadership of the fight for independence. The nine prison terms which he served from 1922 to 1945 had a profound effect upon him and his future leadership of the movement for independence. Son of an aristocratic Brahmin of great wealth and distinction, his first contacts with the poor in the large cities and the rural peasants occurred after his return from England where he received his education at Harrow and Cambridge. A student of Fabian Socialism, the dire poverty of the Indian masses led him to become an advocate of government enterprise as a means of elevating the standard of the poor at a time when the leadership of the Congress Party was largely conservative.

One would look in vain in this book for a discussion and assessment of Nehru's leadership of his party and his country, for the basic tenets which guided his life, including his belief in democracy, parliamentarism and free elections; his devotion to Indian nationalism; his support of secularism instead of religion as the basis of the state; and his egalitarianism, indicated by his opposition to the caste system. The book adds to the growing number of biographies of this great statesman, but little to the understanding of his leadership.—JOSEPH P. HARRIS, *University of California, Berkeley.*

The Political Economy of South Africa. BY RALPH HORWITZ. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 427. $10.00.)

This is a valuable scholarly contribution to our knowledge of South African economic and political history. Mr. Horwitz has written a thorough, indeed, exhaustive volume detailing South Africa's economic development and to a lesser degree its political evolution. And to the extent that anyone can write interestingly *and* factually about such essentially undramatic topics as "Economic Geography and Uneconomic Transportation," and "The Political Economy of Food," Horwitz has succeeded. The book reads well and the substantial amount of factual detail he incorporates into his study is accomplished with professional competence. He has combined an obvious scholarly competence with his extended involvement in the South African academic and economic environment. This involvement included an appointment as Senior Lecturer in Economics and Business Administration at the University of Capetown and a fifteen-year tenure as general manager and editor of groups of business periodicals in the country.

Despite its very real descriptive value the book is marred to a degree by an inadequate interpretative framework. Horwitz accepts implicitly two assumptions which cause him some problems. The first is a causal relationship, the second in the nature of a value commitment. Although it is presented somewhat amorphously Horwitz holds that in the relationship between the political system and the economic, the political is the causal agent. Aside from this point to which we shall return Horwitz values the free market as opposed to the managed market as the political-economic strategy guaranteeing maximum levels of economic development, and he scores apartheid repeatedly for its meddling with the economic lesson making environment.

Simply put it is suggested that South Africa's economic development has been managed and managed negatively by a political leadership committed to controlling economic development in order to render that development functional to the maintenance of a society ordered according to the dictates of apartheid. The concomitant economic growth in industrialization, urbanization, technological advance and secularism was seen by the Afrikaner leaders as being inimical to the preservation of their way of life. Thus, these by-products had to be controlled so as not to destroy the fabric of the social life desired by the Afrikaner. We do not quarrel with his commitment to free enterprise nor his opposition to a bureaucratically directed and controlled development process. Nor can we seriously question his statement that, "the determination of wages, working conditions, range of jobs and field of employment by custom rather than by competition became from early on the characteristic feature of the labour market." But when this "custom" (read apartheid) filtered through the political structure is hypothesized as bringing about a reduction in the country's level of economic development a demurrer has to be entered. There just doesn't seem to be adequate empirical evidence available in the development literature to support this kind of interpretive model. That is to say that in assessing the relationship between the political system and the economic we are as yet not able to justify utilization of the political as independent and the economic as dependent and his decision to portray the political system as independent in this case would appear to be arbitrary.

This, of course, renders a commitment to free enterprise as the optimal development strategy somewhat academic until the precise relationship between the economy and the political system is empirically defined. That is, the related argument as to which *kind* of relationship is most conducive to rapid economic growth is quite a sterile one. Competition uncontrolled by government may indeed be most advantageous for economic growth, or it may not be. At present, however, this must be considered an empirical question. To believe in the efficacy of an unmanaged economy as opposed to a managed economy is to believe in the supported proposition that levels of economic development are dependently related to the political system. Such a belief would appear to be unwarranted at this time.

In summary the real and overriding contribution of the book is its well-documented description and it stands on that and should be welcomed by concerned scholars. The theoretical approach is not, however, without some problems and deserves question.—DAVID GUGIN, *University of Georgia.*

Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development. BY HENRY BIENEN. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. 446. $11.50.)

Those of us who deal with African affairs know that it is extremely difficult to arrive at an accurate assessment of how African political systems function. It is even more difficult to correlate this data for meaningful comparative analysis. In recent years, analysts have devised numerous met-empirical typologies in an effort to organize information about African politics and make it relevant to the comparative study of developing areas. However, the utility of these typologies has not been tested because of the scarcity of empirical data on "entire" African political systems.

Bienen's empirical case study indicates that the models constructed for the study of African politics by Coleman, Rosberg, Tucker, Apter and other analysts are inadequate to explain the political process in Tanzania. These models are based on the study of formal roles and statuses which provide only a superficial understanding of the élites' normative expectations of the system. The models do not specify (1) the ways in which the central institutional processes function, (2) the nature of relationships within the party, or (3) how the party relates to society as a whole.

The focus of the model builders has been on political structures, and especially on political parties. Kilson, Carter, Hodgkins, and Schachter have all asserted the primacy of the party in the allocations of values within the society of underdeveloped countries. Bienen's data provides little evidence to support these views. In fact, his data indicates that the structures of both the party and the state are not even operative everywhere in Tanzanian society. Local communities exist in which there is no effective party presence. Authoritative values are allocated without regard for the dictates of either the party or the state. While this does not completely negate the value of the various models, it certainly creates serious doubts as to their general utility.

A major concern in the comparative study of underdeveloped areas is the relationship between economic and political development. The two have been tied together in various formulas proposed by Pye. Buchanan and Ellis have established that performance in the political sphere is a precondition for economic development. Coleman has outlined this relationship so that correlations between political types and economic indices appear.

Bienen studies this relationship in Tanzania by focusing on the interaction between economic factors and the TANU's operations. He determines (1) what the party is doing to change the economy of Tanzania, and (2) what changes are taking place within the party as it organizes to achieve economic development. In so doing, he seriously questions the validity of the many formulas previously devised in an effort to explain the relationship between economic and political devlopment.

Bienen concludes tht the TANU does not provide an institution which can transform the economy and make itself more effective in the process. The party is too weak, too loosely organized, and has too few human and material resources to solve developmental problems. Thus, it is questionable whether countries similar to Tanzania can have highly organized monolithic single-party systems capable of transforming the economy.

Another major area of concern in the comparative study of developing areas is the question of national integration. Most analysts (Almond, Coleman, Lipset, Organski, Deutsch, Pye) assume a linkage between political-economic development and national integration. National integration is considered as a positive corollary to political-economic development.

Bienen approaches this question in Tanzania through an analysis of intra-party relationships: recruitment to party posts; vertical-horizontal communications among the party hierarchies; and the dissemination of ideology as legitimizing doctrines and guides to action. This framework enables him to translate the problems of national integration into questions about the political functioning of élites. (This study, however, is not a systematic study of élites.)

The author concludes that the party itself suffers from integrative problems. The party is without a powerful center. It is essentially decentralized and fragmented. Thus, the instrument designed to bring about national integration and economic development reflects the very same lack of integration found throughout society.

The conditions needed to centralize the TANU and enable it to control from the center do not exist in Tanzania. The lack of economic development has prevented the formation of economic interest groups potentially hostile to the regime. There have been no urban or demographic changes which have altered existing social patterns and increased social cleavage. Thus, conditions of Tanzania do not facilitate the building of a centralized, desciplined party, they have impeded the formation of social classes or emergent political élites who might threaten the present regime.

This case study presents an ideal opportunity for testing the typologies and models currently being used to study African political systems. While it creates doubts about their utility, it provides additional data that may be useful in modifying them. Towards this end, the author has provided an analytical framework which focuses on the political party and its interaction with the economy. The analysis of the evolution of specific political structures as this evolution relates to economic change is a unique and significant contribution towards the comparative study of the problems of developing areas.—Paul Saenz, *University of Arizona.*

Planning Without Facts: Lessons in Resource Allocation from Nigeria's Development. By Wolfgang F. Stolper. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. 348. $7.95.)

Stolper draws on his experience in Nigeria—he was an architect of that country's 1962-68 development plan—for an analysis of the problem of resource allocation in developing nations. He observes a hiatus between development theory and practice: the practitioner, often lacking basic economic data, tends to be skeptical of the theorist's assumptions that starting points can be fixed and the future known. *Planning Without Facts* attempts to bridge the gap. Stolper's prescriptions are summarized below:

1. Given the paucity of data, development must be a process of "optimizing as one goes along" (p. 4); i.e., the long-run is conceived as a series of short-runs involving decisions based only on what is reasonably known of the future. Decentralized decision-making—control responsibility for planning and coordination, decentralized responsibility for execution—will facilitate continuous examination of planning decisions.

2. Aggregative and disaggregated data must be joined for purposes of development planning. Models based on aggregative data will provide checks on the consistency of planning decisions.

3. An investment (or commitment of resources) is profitable when it yields an increase in available resources and in the productive capacity of the economy. According to Stolper, "the only valid investment criterion is economic profitability. . . . Other investment criteria are either invalid, nonoperational, or implicit in economic profitability" (p. 5).

4. Development planning must not impose a high degree of austerity. In order to avoid demoralization, distortions in the allocative process, and political instability, it is necessary to have a rise in the standard of living, albeit at a rate slower than that anticipated for economic growth.

I shall direct my comments to the third prescription for the following reasons: (a) The economic profitability criterion is central to the analysis in *Planning Without Facts;* (b) That criterion is controversial, as we shall see, even among students of economic development; (c) The argument for the elevation of that criterion to a preeminent position exposes the "underdeveloped" character of our own discipline; and (d) Stolper overlooks important implications for the Nigerian political system of resource commitment based solely on considerations of economic profitability.

Some economists challenge the notion that development planners ought to rely solely on economic criteria. Ralph Turvey, for example, argues "that where [decisions to commit resources yield side effects on the environment, reliance on economic considerations] alone may not produce the best allocation of resources" (in Henry Jarrett ed., *Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy: Essays from the Sixth Resources for the Future Forum,* 1966, p. 49). In such cases, "who should do what how much is often a question which cannot be decided on a purely technical basis by an economic calculation. Political considerations—judgments of what is equitable—are also required" (p. 52). This group views the economic calculation as a necessary but often not a sufficient condition for decision-making.

While he recognizes that equity considerations will affect decision-making, Stolper comes down hard on the side of profitability when economics and equity are in conflict: "first things first; redistribution requires something to be redistributed. Equity considerations become self-defeating if they prevent growth altogether" (p. 164). He also observes that it is "by no means self-evident that economic profitability is inconsistent with . . . other social and political considerations when the facts of the case are considered" (p. 165).

I shall not dwell on the matter of equity in development planning; it is sufficient to note that there are those in the developing nations who would regard the subordination of equity to economic growth with trepidation. Instead I shall turn to the question of the relationship, generally and in the case of Nigeria specifically, between economic profitability and other social and political considerations.

Stolper's observation that economic, social, and political considerations need not be inconsistent eventually leads him to conclude as follows: "Bad economics create unnecessary political difficulties, and good, or at least better, economics can substantially help in the process of nation building and political development. . . . Good economic policy and careful planning are essential to political stability . . ." (pp. 316, 320). This is a rather curious conclusion, given Stolper's predilection for development planning based on operational criteria. It is an embarrassing fact that political scientists have not operationalized such concepts as political development and political stability. They have not met a necessary condition for testing the hypotheses implicit in Stolper's conclusion: *the specification of operational definitions in terms of concrete and explicit procedures*. Until those definitions are stipulated, it will not be possible to establish the precise relationship between economic policy—defined in terms of profitability or any other criterion—and political development and stability. For the moment, then, Stolper's conclusion appears to have passed but one "test," that of plausibility. Or has it?

Regrettably, Stolper's discussion of the two most important sociopolitical factors in Nigeria—regionalism and tribalism—is cursory. Chapter II surveys the socioeconomic character of the four Regions, their constitutional link with the central government in Lagos, and the Federation's planning framework. The question of the relationship between regionalism/tribalism and economic profitability is considered only briefly: "Geographic dispersal of new investments so as to benefit different parts of the country is a worthy aim" (pp. 164-165) insofar as it does not conflict with profitability.

That prescription hardly seems appropriate for the fragile political arrangement that is (was?) Nigeria. Could one reasonably expect that country, with its kaleidoscopic array of politically contentious peoples and Regions, to commit resources solely on the basis of the profitability criterion? Might the strict application of that criterion have favored—or be perceived as having favored—one Region or tribal grouping? If so, would it then be implausible to conclude that good economic policy—defined in terms of profitability—might contribute to the disintegration of Nigeria as a political entity? I think not.

In conclusion, this very stimulating, problematic book directs attention to the complex ramifications of the *total* development process. In doing this, it reveals the need for various disciplines to comprehend and participate in the management of that process.—Alvin Magid, *State University of New York at Albany.*

Planning and the Market in the U.S.S.R.: the 1960's. By Alexander Balinsky, Abram Bergson, John N. Hazard, and Peter Wiles. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1967. Pp. vi, 132. $4.00.)

On balance, this book attains its goal of illuminating for a "wider audience than . . . the Soviet specialist or professional economist" the complexities of the reforms of Soviet industrial management currently underway. The goal is reached, however, with no help and much hindrance from the theme of the original symposium: "Is the Soviet Economy Moving toward Capitalism?" Most of the clichés associated with that theme—for example, whether we should be "optimistic" about the market content of the reforms—are found in an overlong, confusing and not entirely relevant introduction by the symposium moderator, Alexander Balinsky. That this theme was chosen for a symposium in 1966 is a sobering reminder of how far Soviet studies are from being true social science rather than an arm of American Cold War propaganda.

Fortunately, Abram Bergson (who has done more than anyone else to make social science of the study of the Soviet economy) and John Hazard respectively contribute good papers on the economic and political aspects of the reforms. The third symposiast, Peter Wiles, enlivens the book generally and contributes a specific point here and there, even though saddled with the shopworn topic of the "convergence" hypothesis.

Professor Bergson's paper has three parts: the management reforms themselves, their origins, and their likely implications. He shrewdly avoids "profits," that reddest of herrings on this topic, stressing instead the greater enterprise initiative, the emphasis on sales rather than the mere volume of output, and the attendant financial and pricing arrangements. His conclusion is worth quoting (pp. 50-51):

> In sum, the Soviet government is scarcely dismantling wholesale its system of centralized industrial planning, as sometimes has been suggested in the West, but it is adapting this system measurably in the direction of decentralization and increased use of market-type controls.

Further than this, Bergson is appropriately noncommittal, leaving us with a question answerable only with time: To what extent will planning and market elements mix? More precisely, what proportion of each will prove viable under contemporary Soviet conditions, non-economic as well as economic?

Professor Hazard addresses himself to the non-economic conditions. Wisely spurning the tempting but treacherous subject of the role of "personal ambition," he examines instead three areas of key importance to the success of the reforms: Party-State relations; Union Republic-central government relations; and the emergence of enterprise directors as a potentially influential interest group. He finds the reforms at least in part a response to Brezhnev's desire to "re-Leninize" the Party into an elite, inspirational organ of leadership instead of the broad-based administrative organ shaped by Khrushchev. He also detects a new emphasis on Union Republics, rather than the All-Union government, in the ministerial structure which has replaced Khrushchev's territorial system of 1957-65; but he attributes the shift of emphasis more to economic logic than to any renascent nationalism among non-Russian minorities. Brezhnev and Kosygin are reversing yet a third Khrushchevian trend, Hazard believes, in enhancing the political power of enterprise directors, by reducing direct Party interference ("petty tutelage") in industry and increasing the directors' latitude in decision-making. But this political power should not be exaggerated, he cautions, for the directors will still be unorganized, and the trade unions are likely to assume more power in management decisions.

Professor Wiles makes the best of a bad job in assessing the possibilities of convergence. His most salient point concerns the erosion by social science of ideology, in which convergence *is* occurring, he thinks, if only slowly. Good Marxist that he is, Wiles sees the dialectical process in the midst of which Soviet leaders presently find themselves: forced to resort to modern social science for aid in governing Soviet society, yet impelled to recast the Party in a Leninist mold which provides its own all-embracing social science and tolerates no alternative sources of truth. (Wiles would very likely disagree with Hazard over the probable synthesis, if any, that will emerge from this dialectic.) One wonders if the closest Soviet-American convergence at the moment is not a common, or at least a similar, set of dialectical contradictions facing their top leaders.—ARTHUR W. WRIGHT, *Yale University and Oberlin College.*

Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union, 1962-1966. BY EUGENE ZALESKI. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 203. $6.00.)

Professor Zaleski's book is a patient and perspicacious description of Soviet efforts in recent years to develop a more effective form of economic organization. The explanations offered for the problems and motives of economic reform are more or less standard, but it is extremely useful to have available this comprehensive and coherent survey. Because of its extensive documentation, the book is very useful as a reference work to which one can turn for the details of institutional changes, the chronology of controversies, and the positions of protagonists of different points of view. The various experiments and the changes in legislation area analyzed concretely; and unlike some other treatments, this one covers the less well-known experiments in construction, lumbering, mining, trade, etc., as well as the more famous experiment with the Bol'shevichka and Maiak apparel factories. Zaleski's discussion of the various controversies is especially helpful for its careful analysis of the positions taken by various people and of the arguments for and against a given proposal.

A few elements in Zaleski's treatment seem distinctive and it is interesting to look for the special viewpoint which a man with his uniquely extensive knowledge of the whole history of Soviet organizational evolution brings to consideration of the problem of organization and administration in the Soviet economy. One such element is his patient consideration of the details of official explanations and rationalizations for any administrative change. It is easy to feel cynical about the official line, but Zaleski's treatment shows how useful this tedious work is. A second distinctive feature of the book is a detailed exploration of the roles of the republican Councils of Ministers and the republican Gosplans. We tend to think about planning in terms of the central planning apparatus only, but this book shows the important role of the lower level planning organs in the process. Third, Zaleski devotes much attention to the idea of continuous planning as one of the widely discussed reforms, though this emphasis is less easy to agree with. Since the Russians have not in fact done serious long-range planning, there seems little point in taking very seriously all the arguments about whether long-range planning should be done continuously or intermittently. Finally, Zaleski always considers the question of the rank of an official heading an agency—say, whether certain officials within Gosplan are given the assimilated rank of minister. This is one example of his general sensitivity to political issues in economic reorganization which is one of the strong features of the book.

One consequence of Zaleski's emphasis on political, institutional and pragmatic considerations is that there is some neglect of the theoretical-analytical revolution which has been taking place concurrently with the evolution of institutions. There is very little discussion in the book of the theory of optimal planning and its implications for such practical matters of economic reform as pricing. In the end this revolution in theory is bound to play an important role in economic reform even though its influence so far has not been great. For example, it is only on this theoretical-analytical level that the most momentous issue of all—the rate of investment—is being discussed. Although, as Zaleski notes, this issue has not yet been raised at the policy level, the theoreticians are discussing it under the Aesopean title of "the criterion of optimality in dynamic planning."

Overall, Professor Zaleski interprets the reform as a kind of stalling effort to postpone radical change in the institutions of Soviet-style planning. Certainly, as he shows, the leaders have been cautious in moving toward reform; but there is always some foot-dragging on social change and this may be a good thing. The Soviet leaders and even the proponents of reform do not know for sure where they are going. None of the various strands of reform thought which Zaleski describes has a coherent theory of how everything will hang together when reform is finished. This is even true of the optimal planners, the group which comes closest to such a vision. But I believe it is wrong to interpret this caution as a maneuver from which the leadership can retreat if they wish to. They have gone far enough already that retreat is no longer a feasible option.—ROBERT CAMPBELL, *Indiana University.*

Soviet Institutions, The Individual and Society. BY KAREL HULICKA AND IRENE M. HULICKA. (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1967. Pp. xviii, 680. $12.00.)

This lengthy and detailed book claims to be "an all-encompassing text and reference book" on all aspects of the Soviet political system. It claims also the benefit of an "interdisciplinary analysis" and the uniqueness of heavy, indeed preponderant, reliance on official Soviet sources. These claims are severely undermined by a fourfold failure: the book fails to provide functional equivalents for Soviet terminology and doctrine; it fails to account for political change; it fails to identify "the political" in any arena other than that which is explicitly political by Western standards; and it fails to avoid misleading oversimplification.

Each of the twelve chapters examines a familiar sector of the Soviet system (Communist Party, Youth Organization, Federalism, Agriculture, Economy, etc.), and in each the reader finds a lengthy presentation of the official Soviet position followed by the authors' analysis. In neither part have the authors succeeded in translating Soviet terminology into Western functional terms or sometimes, into adequate English. Thus, we find such literal Sovietese as: "brain worker and manual worker," "objective and ideological measures," "progressive advance," "highly divorced from reality," and "progress toward materialization of . . . tenets." These are only a few examples of a practice so pervasive in the book, that the student of Soviet politics, the non-expert to whom this book is addressed, would be baffled by the incomprehensible language and prevented from applying to the study of Soviet politics any of the multiform techniques of comparative politics. In fact, the authors stress the uniqueness of the Soviet political system, and processes which are found in most political systems are often characterized by them as uniquely Soviet: for example, we learn that the position of the First Secretary of the CPSU is attained "on the basis of a naked struggle for power," and that "lower level party officials are used as convenient scapegoats to account for failures which would, without scapegoats, be embarrassing for the infallible leaders." Such observations tend to raise needless barriers between the study of Soviet politics and an understanding of comparative political systems.

A much more damaging defect stems from the inability of the authors to account for *change.* With their highly oversimplified notion of a static, perhaps monolithic, unity, they seem to regard change as aberrant. In their chapter on the CPSU, the authors state: "The CPSU is a rigidly hierarchical organization, in which all subordinates are unconditionally obligated to carry out the policy directives and decisions which are the exclusive prerogative of the central command," and that the Communist Party "has preempted all power for itself. . . . The authority of the party over the lives of all Soviet citizens is virtually complete." Most of the recent studies in Soviet politics have attempted precisely to shatter this unreal image of the monolith party set off against society. The party itself is an ever-changing body, with aging leaders ensconced at the top and about three million people, or one-fourth of the entire membership with only three or fewer years' standing in the party. A generational problem of unknown magnitude obviously faces the party leaders: how to socialize new life into the old structure remains a thorny question. Further, there are social and economic differences within the party, and these present the possibility of division and dissatisfaction. According to the Hulickas, the rank-and-file carry out party directives. But as of October 1967, about half of the membership had not finished high school. How can the rank-and-file understand and articulate the complexities of national and international policies in a world of advanced technology? More importantly, how can they possibly identify themselves with this highly specialized future of economic development? The existence of a broad and highly differentiated network of party schools underlines the seriousness with which the central leadership regards the issue of party cohesion. As a Soviet official remarked, the party schools, with their emphasis on participation, tend to eliminate the "wild ideas" of party members.

The authors similarly fail to provide a framework of analysis for the major changes that have occurred at the top levels of the party. About the profoundly important origins and effects of de-Stalinization, the authors write: "although there has been some speculation that Khrushchev consciously decided to use the de-Stalinization issue as a convenient weapon through which he could divide and weaken opposition to his bid for supreme leadership of the party, it is more likely that he merely made after-the-fact use of *a situation which had developed on a somewhat unplanned basis*" (italics mine). In another use of the passive voice to avoid analysis, the authors write about Khrushchev's fall: "On October 13, Khrushchev, as the supreme leader of the CPSU and virtual dictator of the Soviet Union, probably wielded more personal power than any other individual being during the current era. By October 15, Khrushchev was stripped of his power, retired, cast aside, denied the role of the respected elder statesman . . ." Failure to investigate the processes of change leads surely to misunderstanding of the current reality.

One of the most potent sources of change in the Soviet Union, as in most states, is modernization, and the linking of modernization with Sovietization has been a major strength of the Soviet political doctrine, both internally and externally. The Hulickas seriously underestimate the political effects of modernization as dogma, and they virtually ignore the crucial debate currently claiming the attention of the top decision-makers in the Soviet Union: how to shake the economy out of the doldrums and carry out the thoroughgoing structural reforms that are so urgently needed, while maintaining political power. In fact, the very commitment to high growth rates is itself a political decision. Similarly, in the armed forces, the course of modernization has created a technocracy, for whom the party control and the political education systems are increasingly irrelevant. Many of the national minorities of the USSR represent a case of forced and rapid industrialization. The Hulickas assert that these minorities "attribute to socialism their improved economic and social status. . . ." They do not discuss in this context the obverse problem of the social cost of modernization, the disruptive effects: the breakdown of the family, the creation of urban poor, the destruction of traditional societal patterns.

This anachronistic volume appears at a time when many of its premises and certainly its methodology have been discarded. It does present an unusually large collection of official Soviet statements and directives, but in comparison with the many excellent works currently available, it cannot stand as an adequate analytic study of the Soviet political system.—Ellen Mickiewicz, *Michigan State University*.

Juggernaut: The Russian Forces, 1918-1966. By Malcolm Mackintosh. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. 320. $6.95.)

Western students of Communist societies frequently resort to monistic and deductive propositions when seeking to define the role of the military in these societies. The military is frequently characterized as the blind instrument of the political elite in the Party; or, the Marshals and Generals are described as the behind-the-scenes manipulators of public political leaders. This either/or approach to the "experts in violence," faceless soldateska or praetorian guard, has obscured the mounting evidence of the military's basic role and place in the Soviet Union, namely that of an institution whose spokesmen clearly embrace the broad political and policy objectives of the Party leaders, but who also retain a strong loyalty to and sense of identification with the military community.

This ambiguity in Western writings on the Soviet military was in part supported by a perceived vagueness in Communist statements on the role of their military. In charting the revolution of the proletariat, the Communist Party's assumption of power, and the creation of a Communist society, neither Marx nor Lenin came to grips with the problem of what would be the nature and the role of the military forces in such a society. Marx and Engels originally saw the successful revolution in Utopian terms of a massive uprising of the lower classes, led by a Communist vanguard. After the fiasco of the Paris Commune, they began to appreciate the need for a well-organized, well-armed, and well-directed military organization, but they never abandoned the view that standing professional armies were alien to a Communist state. Lenin, who so abundantly described most other aspects of the Communist society to be, remained vague on the role of the military in it. And even Trotsky, the creator of the Red Army, who consciously ignored the Communist tenets about the dangers of militarism, subordinating ideology to expediency, reverted to impractical Utopian views once the danger of further anti-Soviet military campaigns had passed. It was Stalin, the mediocre ideologue and ruthless pragmatist, who finally addressed this central problem of the rulers of any Communist society: what should be the role and place of the military in the one-party totalitarian state. He defined the military's role, its organization, its relations with the Party, and its social and political functions. The Red Army emerged from this process as an adjunct of the ruling Party elite; its officers were denied the full authority necessary to the practice of the military profession; they were kept in a perennial state of uncertainty about their careers; and the military community, which tends toward exclusiveness, was forcibly kept open through an elaborate system of control and indoctrination.

Malcolm Mackintosh, whose previous works on Soviet affairs are well known and widely respected, has chosen to describe the role and place of the Soviet military by means of a "traditional" historical rendition of the origins and developmental stages of the Red Army. Using both Soviet and Western sources, he skillfully describes the vital role played by emergent amalgam of revolutionary forces in cementing the Bolshevik's hold over Russia and in warding off counter-revolutionary thrusts from within and outside the collapsing Russian empire. Mackintosh proceeds to examine the early stages in the evolution of the Red Army from a quasi-revolutionary force, "a vast straggling, loosely-organized force with few common factors binding it together," which eventually became transformed into a "juggernaut." He describes this evolution as having been shaped and strongly influenced by a variety of factors: (a) Stalin's mounting concerns with potential threats to Soviet security, and his massive program for modernizing and "professionalizing" of the Red Army, (b) the devastating effects on the morale and effectiveness of the military caused by the purges, (c) "the lessons of Finland" which firmly reversed Stalin's distrustful policies vis-á-vis his military, (d) the Soviet-German war, which on the one hand, dramatically illuminated the Party's overwhelming dependence on the military establishment for its survival, and on the other, persuaded Stalin of the need to clearly assert the Party's supremacy over the military, once the major threat of German aggression was over, and finally (e) the profound changes brought about in the military's role in society and in its relations with the Party, both caused by the nuclear technology and the superpower role of the Soviet Union emerging from World War II.

Mr. Mackintosh is an authoritative writer who marshals his materials in a readable and informative manner. The *Juggernaut* provides an excellent introduction to the complex relations of the military and political elites and to the evolution of their respective roles in the Soviet Union. Two remarks, however, are in order, referring to the author's omission and commission: One would have liked to see a somewhat better balance in the treatment of the several historical periods. It is rather disappointing to see the whole post-war period treated in two slim chapters. Secondly, the author's generous use of rather obscure personalities and events may possibly tax the general reader's interest and attention. These, however, are minor points. Although he does not depart from traditional interpretations of historical facts, Mackintosh performed an extremely valuable service to the expert and the layman.—ROMAN KOLKOWICZ, *Institute for Defense Analyses & The University of Virginia.*

The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre. (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967. Pp. 180. $6.50.)

The Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre. (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967. Pp. 580. $11.00.)

In one sense, the three Moscow purge trials of 1936, 1937, and 1938 were only a tiny but visible part of a great terror which claimed perhaps nine million victims between 1934 and 1940. The dramatic questions they provoked at the time—were the defendants, many of them founding fathers of the Soviet Republic, actually guilty of terrorism, treason, and sabotage; and if not, why did they confess?—have been definitively answered. Western scholars and post-Stalin Soviet spokesmen agree that the defendants were innocent. They were forced to confess. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the transcripts of these discredited "frame-ups" the first two of which are reprinted here, are of any enduring interest or value. The answer is yes, in at least three general ways.

First, they contribute to establishing the "why" of the terror itself. A number of explanations—for example, that terror was a constituent dynamic of the "totalitarian" system, or that it played an episodically functional role in the party's modernizing effort—no longer seem to serve. Mass terror died with Stalin; the Soviet system continues. Further, the collectivization-industrialization "great leap" was over by 1933, well before the real terror began. Indeed, some members of the Politburo (not including Stalin) were strongly urging a course of "normalization." Today few students would disagree that the purges were dysfunctional and that they negated important economic and military gains of the 1928-33 period. A satisfactory explanation must instead begin with Stalin. His responsibility for the preparation and general conduct of the purges is beyond question. His motives are less clear. Here the transcripts, like several other "official" documents not bearing his name, are revealing. For Stalin's voice is present in the transcripts, particularly in the summations of the prosecutor Vyshinsky. The summations essentially tell of a world of masked conspirators, whose criminal machinations and hatred are directed "primarily towards *Stalin*." And it is partly for this quasi-autobiographical depiction of Stalin's imagined enemies as enemies of the state that the transcripts are important.

Second, the transcripts can throw light on the still unclear political history of the thirties. One example must suffice. The 1936 Zinoviev-Kamenev trial differed from the later two in that it was relatively free of judicial pretense; nor did the published record claim to be a verbatim report, only a summary of the proceedings. Its message seems to have been aimed less at the public than at a group within Stalin's own leadership, who since 1932 had contested his claim that former Bolshevik oppositionists were engaged in a terroristic conspiracy and who had resisted his attempts to execute the alleged criminals. The 1936 indictment was designed to demonstrate that such a conspiracy had existed since the early thirties, as "Comrade Stalin warned us." Vyshinsky concluded in his summation: "This trial has fully and distinctly proved the great wisdom of this forecast" (p. 119). The resisters, most of them Stalin's oldest supporters, remained unconvinced by the trial and themselves perished in its aftermath. As our knowledge of the secret struggles within the preterror leadership grows, the transcripts will provide further insights into the history of Stalin's rise to autocratic power.

Finally, the trials are central to one of the large unstudied questions of the October revolution: the transformation of old Bolshevism into Stalinism. Together the trials constituted a public spectacle celebrating the demise of the former and the coronation of the latter. The process which had begun in the late twenties with the distortion of Bolshevism's original programs, and ideals, and the political ouster of its greatest figures, now culminated in the physical destruction of those figures. Many passages in the transcripts speak literally or symbolically of this transformation, particularly in the 1938 trial in the dialogue between the main defendant Bukharin and Vyshinsky. But read as though through a distorted mirror, even the false charges reveal important truths. The final contention that an anti-Soviet, anti-Stalin "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" existed, for example, was not true; but it bizarrely reflected the fact that for all their profound disagreements, old Bolsheviks of the Left and the Right collectively had represented something quite different from that which succeeded them.—Stephen F. Cohen, *Columbia University*.

Soviet and Russian Newspapers at the Hoover Institution: A Catalog. Compiled By Karol Maichel. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, Hoover Institution Publications, 1966. Pp. x, 235. $6.50.)

German Periodical Publications. Prepared By Gabor Erdelyi in Collaboration with Agnes F. Peterson. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, Hoover Institution Publications, 1967. Pp. viii, 175. $5.00.)

Two new publications in the *Hoover Institution Bibliographical Series* will enhance the reputation of its library as one of the richest depositories of material for Russian and German regional studies in this country and simultaneously as a library diligently and unflinchingly doing a great public service by giving detailed information to the scholarly community about its holdings of original papers and those on microfilm.

I. The annotated checklist on Russian language newspapers—imperial Russian, Soviet and émigré—prepared by the Curator of the East European Collection, goes beyond the confines of the Hoover Library by including additional references to the holdings of the Columbia University Library and of the Library of Congress. This leaves the New York Public Library and Harvard University Library holdings of Russian newspapers as the principal untapped sources for Russian research based on newspaper holdings in American libraries.

Mr. Maichel points out that the present catalog contains only about 85 per cent of the Hoover Institution's holdings of Russian newspapers; among them seem to be a fair number of titles which started as newspapers and later became journals. Their titles will be found in a forthcoming catalog of Russian language journals which is as eagerly awaited as a promised list of Polish periodicals and journals.

The listings are of immaculate completeness; for one issue (of December 6, 1917) of *Nabat revoliutsii* 14 lines are needed; a certain lack of homogeneity in the entries has been pointed out in *College and Research Libraries* Vol. 28, No. 4, July 1967, p. 292. The bulk of the papers have been published after the turn of the century. Twenty-five titles in the list cover materials of the 1890's and only four titles are listed for the 1870's and 1880's. The enormous problem of preserving old newspapers is brought to the attention of potential users by the fact that in the rather strong collection of papers from the period of the First Russian Revolution (1905-1907) thirty-two titles are on microfilm.

The overwhelming impression in going over the list is, how extremely fragmentary the majority of the newspaper holdings are; indeed, of about 1,110 titles more than a fifth (263) are single issues, in other words, specimen copies. In addition 19 titles are rare items as "one day's newspapers" issued for special occasions; there are also (at least) three annuals listed which usually are not classed as newspapers. Only relatively few long runs of newspapers are listed.

There are several aspects which should be taken into consideration in preparing future similar listings. Unfortunately the items listed are not numbered which makes short hints to true gems among the "fugitive" materials well-nigh impossible, for instance to call attention to certain World War I items—papers published by the Russians during the short occupation of Galicia in 1915 (p. 81) or by the Germans in the Ukraine in 1918 (p. 103) or papers for Russian prisoners of war in Germany (p. 159) and Austria (p. 102).

Instead of lumping together all the titles of papers published in pre-revolutionary Russia, of those published after the revolutions of 1917 and by the Russian emigration, correspondingly the materials should have been divided in three large blocks. Between 191 titles from Tsarist times and 297 émigré newspapers, Russia since 1917 would comprise the largest group with outstanding materials for the early years of Bolshevism.

Indices should be provided for the convenience of users. Since the papers are alphabetically arranged, an alphabetical list of the countries and of places of publication would allow users to find out immediately which papers of particular regions of interest to them are represented in the list. A historian who wants to work about the Russian emigration in any particular country has now no choice but to comb through 235 pages to bring together, for instance, 47 titles of papers published in the United States, 57 for France, 23 for Germany, 14 for Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia each, 16 for Bulgaria, 11 for Poland, 34 for Manchuria, 27 for China, four for Mongolia, ten for Latin America, etc.

A topical index should be provided indicating party affiliations, issuing bodies (for instance, government agencies, trade unions or provincial and district branches of the Communist Party); also hints should be given as to which papers are primarily literary, religious, economic, military in content, etc. Wherever the entries give editors or main contributors, their names should also be indexed especially for the benefit of historians of journalism. Associations mentioned are, for instance, those of A. F. Kerenskii with *Dni,* Petr Struve with *Rossiia i Slavianstvo,* P. N. Miliukov with *Zveno* and *Posledniia Novosti,* V. V. Shul'gin with *Velikaia Rossiia,* and many others.

Such small improvements as indicated would greatly add to the serviceability of this type of catalog.

II. The checklist of German language serials and monographic series currently received in 30 Stanford University libraries is principally a tool to be used locally. It includes mainly German language continuations in all subjects published all over the world and gives an impressive picture of Stanford's range of collecting German materials with the Main Library and the Hoover Institution Library in forefront. Although it is not intended as a reference work for general purposes, a subject index greatly enhances the usefulness and usability of the volume outside Stanford.—Fritz T. Epstein, *Indiana University Library.*

Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism. By Olaf Caroe. 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Pp. xxxv, 308. $7.00.)

When Sir Olaf Caroe's work on Soviet Central Asia first appeared in 1953, it filled a void. We had lacked a comprehensive guide in English to this little-understood area of the USSR—the Kazak, Uzbek, Turkmen, Kirghiz, and Tadzhik republics. The main contemporary sources were in Russian and Turkish (particularly the writings of Zeki Velidi Togan, an exiled Central Asian leader). Caroe drew heavily but selectively on these sources. He wanted to set the record straight about Tsarist and Soviet rule of Central Asia, to cut through the jargon used by communists and anticommunists, and also to give the "Russians" just due for the economic and social progress they had brought to Central Asia. On the other hand, Sir Olaf left no doubt then or now where he stands. A distinguished member of the former Indian Civil Service, he obviously is sensitive to Soviet charges about Western imperialism. In the new edition he sees "no grounds for reviewing the conclusion (of the first edition) that the Russian presence in Central Asia remains today, more than ever, the primary example of imperial colonialism of an Asian or African territory by a European power."

The only changes for the second edition, reviewed here, are the addition of an "Introduction to the Second Edition" and a brief bibliography of significant works published from 1960-1965 (where is the period from 1953-1959?). Therefore, I will deal first with the main body of the book.

The main purpose of the book, Sir Olaf wrote in 1953, is "to weigh old influences with new, and estimate the part which these peoples (the Soviet Central Asians) are destined to play in the struggle between the communist world and the West." He begins with an excellent geographical survey of the area, which varies from the lush irrigated oases of the Vale of Farghana to the great deserts of Karakum and Kizilkum and the half-desert steppe called "The Plain of Misfortune." (The last three were very real barriers to invading Tsarist armies.) Next there are several chapters summarizing the history of Central Asia from 700 A.D. to the 1917 revolution. These constitute a necessary "essay," Caroe indicates, because a "popular and comprehensible analysis of the story of these lands in English does not exist." Because of the complexity of the forces at play, in what was for centuries a focal point of Asian history, these brief chapters are somewhat rough going.

Caroe next devotes two chapters to the 1917 revolutions and their complex and confusing repercussions in Central Asia, particularly the Basmachi rebellion and Enver Pasha's futile yet heroic attempt to do what the local revolutionaries at Bukhara could not do—unite the disparate anti-Soviet elements and set up an independent state in Central Asia. This part of the book is particularly valuable because it still is the first adequate account in English of the true nature of the Basmachi movement, which was much more than the simple banditry claimed by the Soviets. There also are some fascinating tidbits of conversations between Togan, then the nationalist leader of the short-lived Bashkurd government, and the Soviet leaders. (In May 1920, Stalin told Togan that Trotsky "cared nothing for nationalists." Stalin avowed he understood the "Eastern Turks" because he himself was the son of a Georgian nationalist. The future dictator nevertheless cautioned Togan to do his duty "in the spirit of Great Russia and not worry so much about governing a small tribe.")

The last half of the book describes developments in the five "republics" under Soviet rule, treating collectivization, industrialization, public works (contrasting the ambitious irrigation projects with actual accomplishments), and Soviet efforts to "Russify" and indoctrinate the indigenous population. The treatment up to 1953 of each of these themes is very well done and serves to remind us of significant points in the Soviet record. Using bare Soviet population statistics, Caroe indicates that one out of three Kazaks perished during the collectivization from hunger and terrorism. He calls this genocide. There also is an interesting chapter on the 180,000 Central Asians who fought for Germany during World War II. The tragedy is that these men fought valiantly for a lost cause: they wanted independence for their peoples; the Germans wanted them only to fight "communism."

These later chapters are the most disappointing section of the book because they were not revised for the new edition. Although the original emphasis was on the "Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism," the work would be a much more valuable guide to the contemporary situation if the story had been brought up to the present. Caroe attempts to update the material in his lengthy introduction to the second edition, and revises his population statistics, noting the salient fact that "European" Russians now outnumber Kazaks in Kazakistan and that "Europeans" may now constitute 40 per cent of the total population of the five republics. But a more thorough analysis of the period since 1953 seems in order. Caroe also touches only briefly on what he terms the two major developments in Asia since 1953 and their significance for Central Asia: the withdrawal of British power from the area and the resurgence of China under a "new dynasty."

Caroe's final judgment on perhaps the crucial issue—the impact on the indigenous peoples of Soviet rule—at one point is properly cautious. The "assimilative forces" of the Soviet system, says Sir Olaf, are "so overpowering that it remains an open question how far the older tradition can hope to survive as anything more than a nostalgic memory destined to fade sorrowfully into history." At the same time, Caroe calls the predominantly Muslim Central Asians "the least assimilable of all elements in the (Soviet) Union," and asserts that the Soviets would have to "torture and oppress these millions for centuries" to bring about their complete assimilation. "Never has anyone been able to force a religion or course of action," he states, "on the Turks." In 1966, Caroe predicts: "However strong the Russian nerve, the Russians will tire of ruling over others who see freedom all around them and will not willingly remain in thrall." Perhaps, but one could argue as did Geoffrey Wheeler (*Problems of Communism,* Vol XVI, No. 5) that a more likely outcome will be pressure of Muslim Central Asians for greater political, cultural and economic autonomy within the U.S.S.R.—Richard F. Rosser, *United States Air Force Academy, Colorado.*

The Unfinished Revolution: Russia 1917-1967. By Issac Deutscher. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. 115. $3.75.)

A series of lectures, even so distinguished a series as Cambridge University's Trevelyan Lectures, is at best a questionable vehicle for the systematic analysis of any reasonably complex subject. Perhaps most lectures should never be published in anything resembling the form in which they were given. There is frequently no opportunity for deep analysis. It is impossible fully to support generalizations. Normally the focus is on a BIG QUESTION. In short, the lecture medium is suited to the initial airing of stimulating ideas, not to their careful and rounded presentation. These are the eternal and unavoidable limitations of the medium, no matter how distinguished the lecturer.

On this basis, then, one might simply dismiss this book by saying that it is a 115-page volume of lectures about fifty years of Soviet power and that in it the late Issac Deutscher has not and could not pull off the impossible. This will not be one of the books on which Deutscher's reputation will be based; it just does not compare favorably with any of his most important previous works, such as the controversial biography of Stalin and the three-volume analysis of Trotsky.

Still, the fact that it was written by the distinguished journalist and historian and that it was the last book published during his lifetime alone make such cavalier dismissal impossible. And, in all fairness, it must be said that Deutscher did as much as possible to overcome the limitations of the lecture format, and the result is a book that is both coherent and readable, if not highly stimulating.

Stalin's innate cautiousness, according to Deutscher, developed a tendency toward isolationism rather than internationalism—to the detriment of Soviet aims. This thesis stands out most clearly in his chapter on the Soviet Union and the Chinese revolution. By caution with regard to developments in China in 1927 and, particularly, in 1948, Stalin sowed the seeds of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The successors of Stalin, all products of a Stalinist Russia, were unable to abandon "their old search for security within the international status quo." Thus, Deutscher concludes, the "Khrushchevite revisionism" which Maoists denounce "is Stalinist in origin."

Deutscher's final chapter, "Conclusions and Prospects," lacks a close relationship to the rest of the book. The one possible connecting link—if one chooses to view it as such, is Stalin, still the villain of the piece, ruling the Soviet Union from the grave. While acknowledging the significance of developments since Stalin, he characterizes the present situation as a "half-freedom" which can be "even more excruciating than a complete and hermetic tyranny." At the heart of the malaise, he concludes, is the failure of de-Stalinization. The achievement of political maturity for the post-Stalin leadership during "decades of Stalinist falsification" made this task "uncongenial to them" and "went against the grain of their mental habits and interests." So only the limbo of partial de-Stalinization was achieved. Whether Duetscher believes the next generation of Soviet leaders capable of going further is not clear.

Two of Deutscher's basic motifs demand extended comment: his determinism and his conception of the consequences of the Stalinist idea of socialism in one country. In Deutscher's opinion the Bolshevik Revolution has been unique in history in maintaining a kind of continuity throughout the fifty years of the Soviet regime. And, as the title of the volume indicates, it remains unfinished, both in the sense that it "has by no means come to a close" and in that those who subsequently came to power turned their backs on the original revolutionary ideals. These straightforward and sketchily-supported assertions indicate to the reader that he is dealing with an author who takes a long and sweeping view of the historical process.

Even more characteristic of Deutscher is his emphasis on the inevitability of the revolution: social conditions dictated that it could not have been otherwise. Indeed, its direction was set over a period of "many decades, indeed of several epochs." Surely this is true, but it is also one of those deterministic statements that says everything and means nothing; it is a truism that purports to be an explanation.

More important for the interpretation of recent and current Soviet actions is Deutscher's second point. Much more than most other historians, he ascribes great significance to the shift from world revolution to socialism in one country. With the advent of the latter came the industrialization and the forced collectivization that exacted the human costs which still mark the Soviet social structure. Unquestionably, this "revolution from above" changed the face of the Soviet Union. That it had and, more important, still has as great an impact on Soviet relations with other countries has been less emphasized by other historians.—Donald D. Barry, *Lehigh University.*

The Politics of the European Communist States. By Ghita Ionescu. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. viii, 303. $6.75.)

Ionescu's theme is that dissent exists; it tends to coalesce and aggregate into "opposition" and seek an outlet for expression. The Communist system permits no opposition political party, and expression of dissent and opposition within the ruling Communist Party quickly reaches the limits imposed by Party necessity for unanimity and disciplined consensus. Therefore, the coalescing opposition seeks an institution outside the Party. "Parliament," by whatever name it may be called, provides the logical forum. But such a parliament in countries ruled by Communist Parties must be "inferior" in that it cannot hope to be based on a multi-Party system, free elections, and provider of executive power; it cannot hope to dissolve the government and supply a new one. But it can function as a debating society, and express dissenting and minority views. Even without such a parliament, however, dissent finds expression, and will continue to do so unless the ruling Party employs coercion. But coercion leads to "social and economic inertia," alienation, and also favors the development of a rival, political police, apparat, which might itself become a threat to Party hegemony. If force and the police are not used the expression of dissent is inevitable. And heterogeneous and scattered dissent tends just as inevitably to coalesce and aggregate into an opposition. If such opposition is coopted into the Party, factions result, also threatening the Party. Therefore, from the Party's own standpoint, and in its own interest, a forum for expression of dissent outside the Party is perhaps necessary. In the absence of coercive force, somehow in some way dissent will unite into opposition, and will find expression outside the Party if not inside it, and in non-parliamentary institutions if not parliamentary ones. Absence of parliament, and Party resistance to factionalism within the Party, mean only that dissent and ultimately opposition will coalesce around something else: the Church in Poland, for example; or in the universities; or through intellectual groups and publications; or around some personality, like Djilas in Yugoslavia; or even through the army.

All this appears as much applicable to the USSR as to Eastern Europe, and indeed Ionescu does not hesitate to apply it to the Soviet Union. But thereby he weakens his other major argument, that Eastern Europe is very different from the USSR, that the Soviet model is inapplicable to Eastern Europe, that the USSR cannot be analyzed in the same framework as Eastern Europe. He argues that Eastern Europe legitimately can be, and should be, analyzed *en bloc,* but not with the USSR. Most of Ionescu's points concerning differences between the USSR and Eastern Europe are certainly valid, but most of them are irrelevant or only marginally relevant to the political analysis he undertakes. Most disturbing is his assignment of Russia to a category of "Eurasian," "East-oriented," as opposed to an Eastern Europe which is "European" and "West-oriented": "These states (of Eastern Europe) belong geographically to the continent of Europe and have the deepest cultural links with the Western part of it . . ." My own judgment is closer to that of Ilya Ehrenburg: "To speak of western European culture as separate from the Russian, or of Russian culture as separate from the western European is, to put it plainly, a sign of ignorance." This Ionescu approach to Russia, combined with the great emphasis on parliament, gives the book an old-fashioned quality, in striking contrast to the modernity and sophistication of the general political analysis.

At any rate, a major intention of Ionescu is to rescue Eastern Europe from the USSR, and reintegrate it with Western Europe, to construct a new (or rather, reconstruct an old) pan-Europe without Russia and without the United States; he wants to get the superpowers out of Europe, although he clearly recognizes that simple simultaneous withdrawal of the USSR and the U.S. would be unlikely to bring about the democratic pan-Europe he ardently desires.

The recent removal of Novotny as First Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party in January 1968 illustrates the usefulness of Ionescu's approach. Here the particular aggregator of dissent was the Slovak Party organization, behind which Czech dissident elements rallied to form a coalition sufficiently powerful to change the top leader. Economic reformers, students and writers, opponents of anti-Semitism and neo-Stalinism, added their separate interests to Slovak dissatisfaction to gain a significant political result. This shows the way in which varying dissident groups come to unite in a coalition, within a Communist system. But it hardly illustrates any significance of parliament for expressing opposition.

Perhaps Ionescu underestimates the degree to which effective dissent can be expressed within the ruling Party apparatus, and overestimates the possibilities for non-Party political influence. But his warning that intra-Party opposition faces serious limitations is well-taken. Those who want to change the present system in Communist countries face a serious dilemma in deciding where to concentrate their offensive. As Ionescu indicates, the decisions will vary in each separate case, depending on where the strongest and best-placed opposition already functions. Other smaller and weaker opponents of the regime will gradually coalesce around that strongest group, hoping ultimately to constitute a coalition powerful enough for political effectiveness. The ruling group will attempt to frustrate such a coalition of dissent, but to do so effectively requires compromise and subtlety. Tough crackdown will only quicken the pace of unifying the various opposition groups, as Novotny apparently did when he arrested writers and undercut economic reform, as well as supporting the Arabs against Israel and refusing to recognize West Germany. He might well have survived the results of any one or some of these actions, but not all of them at practically the same time.

In a number of places, Ionescu over-rates the workers' alleged desire "to assume the responsibility and direction of the management of industry and the economy." Yugoslavia's experience with workers' councils suggests that workers are actually far more concerned with obtaining higher wages than with running factories. But opinions will differ on many of the specific points: the overall theme of dissent-aggregation should prove provocative and useful to all.—ROBERT A. RUPEN, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

The Federation of German Industry in Politics. BY GERARD BRAUNTHAL. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965. Pp. xx, 389. $7.50.)

Unlike many books about the Bonn Republic and the condition of the West German political psyche, Professor Braunthal's study is devoted to a precise investigation of one facet of contemporary West German politics. Its limitations of scope are conducive to the presentation of solid and detailed information on the structure and political activity of an important West German interest group.

The *Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie* is composed of federally structured associations of the various branches of industry, and through this arrangement is said to represent 98 percent of all West German industrialists. It does not enroll individual concerns as members, but Braunthal shows the heavy influence of the spokesmen of the large basic industries—coal, steel, chemicals, machinery, metalworking, and electrical construction—in its policies. Moreover since individual firms are represented only indirectly through their associations, oligarchical and centralist patterns are much in evidence in the BDI.

In the central portion of his work, Braunthal examines the "tactics and targets" of the BDI in the political arena. There are no startling revelations in this account of activities in the areas of public opinion, parties, and the federal legislative and executive structures. Braunthal concludes with the observation that "the executive is clearly the primary target of the BDI." The primary usefulness of the presentation lies in the wealth of detail arising from the author's access to internal BDI memoranda and minutes and from evaluation of interview materials.

Braunthal's major attempt to relate the activities of the BDI to general questions of the West German polity concerns the subject of the political power of the BDI in postwar Germany. He contrasts "neo-Marxist" and "pluralist" views, and rejects the former as an adequate frame of reference for an accurate understanding of the role of German industry in politics. He concludes, rather, that "there are countervailing powers in a pluralistic industrial order," and that "a multiple elite governs the nation." Chapters on the economic and foreign policies advocated by the BDI suggest that there is neither overwhelming consistency in the policy aims of the interest group nor unbroken success in influencing governmental decisions.

The reviewer confesses some dissatisfaction with these conclusions, not because of rejection of the impressive material which the author has compiled, but because of doubts about the meaningfulness of the chosen confrontation of "neo-Marxist" and "pluralist" viewpoints. Braunthal alludes briefly to the narrow base of elite recruitment in West Germany, but does not pursue this theme. He refers in the Preface to the pattern of bureaucratization of West German political life, and citizen indifference to political affairs, but he does not systematically discuss the impact of these phenomena on the pluralist thesis. One may realize, however, that such topics were not within the framework of the book. Indeed, one of the implicit conclusions of Bruanthal's work is that one must look at West German political life in additional ways beyond the frame of reference of interest group analysis to discover both its *modus operandi* and its dilemmas.

Braunthal's book was published before the formation of the "Grand Coalition," and before the open emergence of the "new Right" and the "new Left" in West German politics. The first event seemed to formalize the pattern of bureaucratic decision-making, while the second showed evidences of alienation in the public, based on the suspicion that the decisions being made were irrelevant to important issues. These events promise to reveal much about the character of West German political structures and political life. It is to be hoped that knowledgeable and careful observers such as Braunthal will make additional contributions to our understanding by examining in detail the significance of these events for the mode and substance of political decision-making in West Germany.—GEORGE K. ROMOSER, *University of New Hampshire.*

Staat, Wirtschaft und Politik in der Weimarer Republik, Festschrift für Heinrich Brüning. ED. BY FERDINAND A. HERMENS AND THEODOR SCHIEDER. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1967. Pp. vii, 507.)

This *Festschrift* honoring German ex-Chancellor Heinrich Brüning on his eightieth anniversary consists of some fifteen papers written by historians and political scientists and three memoirs contributed by former colleagues and personal friends.

Of the personal reminiscences, the essay by George N. Shuster on "Dr. Brüning's Sojourn in the United States (1935-1945)"—the one contribution written in English—is of special interest since it deals with a phase of Brüning's life and activities of which on the whole very little is known. Moreover, departing from the generally accepted impression, Shuster shows the ex-Chancellor as being less austere and withdrawn than he is usually pictured.

Among the important scholarly contributions, Ferdinand A. Hermens shows in a paper on "The Brüning Government and the Depression" that Brüning did not pursue a purposely deflationist policy during his chancellorship. The decline of prices during those years, as Hermens shows, was always greater than that of wages. If the contrary impression prevailed, this was due largely to the failure of the government to explain its policies properly to the country. Moreover, because of Germany's commitments under the Young Plan Brüning was unable to reinforce the effect of the price decline by a devaluation of the currency. Once the reparations burden had been eliminated, however, the Chancellor was prepared to initiate some pump-priming for which the plans were drawn up shortly before his dismissal.

Arnold Brecht presents some "Reflections on the Responsibility for Hitler's Appointment as Chancellor." Whatever the responsibilities of Hindenburg, Papen, Schleicher, and other individuals for that appointment, Brecht points out, it must be shared by the millions of Germans who voted for the Nazis and Communists in the Reichstag elections of 1932 and thus made impossible the formation of a constitutional parliamentary government.

Carl Joachim Friedrich contributes some "Thoughts on the Problem of Pathology in Politics." Since physical organisms produce poisons such as bile which in moderate amounts keep the body functioning, Friedrich wonders whether political organisms are not similarly dependent on such "poisons" for their proper functioning. He examines three such phenomena of political pathology—corruption, treason, and secretiveness. Under certain circumstances and within definite limits, he concludes, these practices may have a positive function and help the politician to loosen up structural rigidities in public life. Friedrich warns, however, that just as only a healthy body can absorb its self-generated poisons, only a political leader of strong character can safely cope with the dangers facing him in the swampland of political pathology.

Several convenient surveys of issues related to the Brüning era also deserve to be mentioned. Werner Conze provides a succinct summary of Brüning's chancellorship and points out the lack of choices the Chancellor had because of Hindenburg's unwillingness to work with the Social Democrats. Ulrich Scheuner traces the varied history of the application of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, and Gerhard Schulz surveys the evolution of Germany's agricultural aid programs during the 1920's and early 1930's.

Finally, mention must be made of a collection of contemporary documents assembled by Rudolf Morsey, "New Sources on the Background of Brüning's Chancellorship," which clear Brüning of any complicity in the fall of his predecessor, Chancellor Hermann Müller-Franken. In attesting once again Brüning's loyalty and integrity, the documents underscore the tragic fate of this honorable and sincere patriot who was not permitted to save his country from its impending downfall.
—Andreas Dorpalen, *Ohio State University.*

Annuaire Suisse de Science Politique—Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Politische Wissenschaft. (Lausanne: Association suisse de science politique, 1967. Volume VII. Pp. 151. $4.14.)

This seventh yearbook of the Swiss Political Science Association is devoted to the study of the Federal Council, the seven-man collegial body which serves as the national executive in Switzerland. The six articles devoted to this theme are written in the context of growing criticisms and demands for reform of this body, and are perhaps best viewed in this context, because with one important exception they are only remotely empirical.

For example, "De quelques problèmes concernant le Conseil fédéral," by former Federal Councillor Max Petitpierre, rejects suggestions that the Federal Council be elected directly by the people rather than by the legislature, raises questions about the wisdom of increasing the number of its members, and defends its "all major party" composition. The absence of opposition is not so unfortunate because of the existence of referenda and because of the mutual independence of legislators and parties on the one hand and Federal Councillors on the other. One suggestion for change is that a "question hour" procedure be established whereby the Council would respond to queries from the two legislative chambers.

"Le système gouvernemental suisse comparé à d'autres types de gouvernements," by Christian Dominicé, is not as explicitly and thoroughly comparative as one might hope, and is perhaps more of a defense of the Swiss system (for Switzerland) than anything else. Some of the comparisons are as follows. The selection of a Federal Councillor is not influenced so much by his capabilities for a particular function as in other countries. The number of top political posts is more fixed than elsewhere. The sources of recruitment are more restricted than elsewhere.

Kurt Eichenburger discusses "Organisatorische Probleme des Kollegiatsystemes." The collegial system is contrasted with the departmental and directorial systems. Difficulties in coming to a decision, time demands, coordination problems and the dependence on governmental departments are discussed, and the author concludes that the Swiss collegial system has really become a mixture of "collegial," "directorial" and departmental systems.

Somewhat more useful for comparative purposes is Leo Schürmann's "Probleme der Allparteienregierung." This article contends that the existence of direct democracy in Switzerland puts the problem of opposition in a different light than elsewhere. The process of presentation and discussion of alternatives takes place more between government and social groups than between government and parliament. Still more of such quasi-functional analysis of opposition in the context of different institutions would be useful.

The topic of "Le rapport des forces entre l'Assemblée fédérale et le Conseil fédéral de 1848 à nos jours," is taken up by Jeañ Francois Aubert. This article is more empirical than most of the studies in that it includes occasional hints about how empirical data would be relevant.

The one article that is directly relevant to political science as it is written and reported in this *Review* is Erich Gruner's "Freiheit und Bindung in den Bundesratswahlen." This thorough, quantitative discussion treats the process of recruitment to the Federal Council from 1848 to 1966. It discusses patterns of representation of cantons, languages, regions and parties; competition for election; and the source of candidacies and conflict in the recruitment process. While no explicit hypotheses are tested and the comparisons are almost all on a time dimension, this article can stand as one of the more thorough and useful treatments of executive recruitment available.

It is mainly this last article which makes the volume of interest to those who are not especially concerned with current reform issues in Switzerland. The book does contain a report on political science in Switzerland, a report of the activities of the Swiss Political Science Association for 1966 and a bibliography of Swiss political science for 1965, all by Roland Ruggieux. Also of interest is the previous volume which is a comprehensive summary of Swiss political issues and events in the preceding year.—WILLIAM R. KEECH, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

The Politics of Futility: The General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland, 1917-1943. BY BERNARD K. JOHNPOLL. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. xix, 298. $8.75.)

This is the first scholarly study of that steadfast group whose members never ceased to dream the impossible dream of creating on Polish soil a socialist order in which the Jews were to enjoy complete cultural autonomy and in which Yiddish—that curious polyglot tongue, German in sound, structure and origin but written in Hebrew characters—was to be an official and legal language.

The General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland, commonly called the Bund, like its forerunner in the Czarist empire, was, as its name indicates, a party that could not possibly aspire to governmental power, at least not by itself. The three and a half million Jews who lived in Poland prior to its partition by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, not quite ten percent of the general population, formed an obviously limited constituency. Even within that ethnically and religiously restricted electorate, the Bund was competing with other parties, the Poalei Zion (Workers of Zion), a forerunner of Israel's Mapai and Mapam, the non-socialist Jewish National Bloc and also the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partja Socjalistyczna (PPS), the only major Polish party which did not hesitate to nominate Jewish candidates for political office but was reluctant to grant the Jews national autonomy. The Bund was even prevented from forming an effective pressure group able to influence the policies of other major parties. For in a country in which long before the ascendancy of Hitlerism large segments of the population considered the Jews outsiders, in which the government's proposed solution for the "Jewish problem" was the organization of large-scale emigration, the Bund's official support of a position might easily have had the reverse effect and precluded its consideration.

Professor Johnpoll, who speaks of the Bund as an *ecclesia militanta,* observes that one result of the isolation of the Bund from the mainstream of Polish life was its devotion to abstract ideology. No question raised more debate within the membership of the Bund than the issue of its international affiliation. While even its right-wingers rejected Eduard Bernstein's revision of Marxism and, pointing to the examples of Italy and Hungary after the First World War, criticized the German Social Democrats and the PPS for their faith in democratic elections, the Bund never became a member of the Communist International. Already at the famous 1903 Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party in Brussels and London, the five delegates of the then General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland and Russia asked that their party be regarded as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat in all parts of Russia and withdrew from the Congress when both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks defeated the Bund's proposal. (Incidentally, it was the withdrawal of these five Bundists which allowed Lenin to gain control of the majority of the delegates.) The Twenty-one Points which the Comintern demanded as the price for affiliation were unacceptable to the Bund, not because they stressed relentless class struggle (which the Bund supported) but because of the Bund's belief in the need for an independent political existence for Jewish socialists in Eastern Europe and its lack of confidence in the genuineness of the socialist convictions of the non-Jewish workers. Moreover, but a few years after Lenin's *coup* in Russia, the Bund felt compelled to accuse the Communists of having turned working class rule into a dictatorship of the Central Committee of the Party over the proletariat and of having embraced Bakuninism rather than Marxism. The Moscow Trials in the mid-thirties ended whatever sympathy the Bund may have ever had with the Soviet system. With the words that Stalin's brand of Communism was but a return "to the unlimited power of the individual who stands above human and divine law, to the tradition of the Mongol Khan, Ivan the Terrible, and Peter the Great," Victor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich, the two best-known leaders of the Bund in the years from 1917-41, bid farewell to the former revolutionary position of the Bund. While in 1921, in opposition to both the Second (socialist) and Third Internationals, the Bund had joined the International Working Union of Socialist Parties (called the Two-and-a-Half International) which included the Austrian and Swiss socialists, the British Independent Labour Party and the Russian Mensheviks, and while in 1930 it had only reluctantly returned to the Second International and continued to attack its social reformism, it now considered itself a spokesman for social democracy and was willing to make common cause with the PPS. Like the PPS, it supported a genuinely independent Poland. Together with the PPS it had supported Pilsudski because of his old record as a socialist and only left him when he turned to authoritarian policies. But at the same time the Bund rejected the assimilation of the Jews into the Polish society as Poles of a Mosaic faith. Having no interest in the religious tradition of the Jews, it wanted the Jews to be recognized as one of the nationalities within Poland, with specific rights to cultural autonomy. Jews had lived in Poland since the end of the fourteenth century, and the Bund insisted that they were Europeans and not Middle Easterners, that their ties were with the countries in which they lived and not with a land where some of their ancestors had once lived. Zionism to the Bund was sheer escapism, and when the Arabs attacked the Jewish settlers in Palestine, the Bundists placed the blame on the Zionists who, they claimed, had intruded upon a foreign land and population. While the membership of the Bund probably never exceeded the eight thousand figure, in the elections to the Sejm (Parliament) of 1928 the Bund received about one hundred thousand votes, an indication of considerable strength if one compares this number with the total vote of little more than five hundred thousand for the candidates of all other Jewish parties.

In May 1933 the Bund warned the Polish government that Hitler's victory in Germany posed an immediate threat to Poland—but preached to deaf ears. When, following the Non-Aggression Pact between Hitler and Stalin, the German army invaded Poland, the Bund, together with the PPS, organized Warsaw's resistance. After the fall of Warsaw, when the Jews were forced into the ghetto and a high brick wall separated them from the non-Jewish community, the Bund, having gone underground in all of Poland, issued its proclamation for "A Free, Independent, Socialist Poland in a Voluntary Federation of Socialist Republics in Europe," rejected all talk of emigration, and, finally, when it became clear that the Warsaw ghetto was to be a death-trap for its four hundred thousand Jews, the Bund, with two Zionist youth groups, formed a Jewish army which fought against the Nazis for several weeks until the fires set to the ghetto ended all resistance. Despite the protests of William Green, then President of the AF of L; David Dubinsky, President of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union and a one-time Bundist; as well as labor leaders throughout the Western world, Alter and Ehrlich were accused by the Soviets of "active subversive work against the Soviet Union" and executed. Shmuel Zygelboym, who represented the Bund in the Polish government-in-exile in London, upon receiving the news of the fall of the Warsaw ghetto, committed suicide. Since the Jewish constituency in Poland had died out, the Bund's mission had ended.

Professor Johnpoll's book is packed with a wealth of information, well written and well documented. Its breadth of intellect and its historically grounded understanding of the forces which shaped Jewish life in Poland between the First and Second World Wars is a most welcome addition to the literature on political parties and the range of choices in their decision-making functions. The title of the book, *The Politics of Futility,* expresses, no doubt, the final verdict of the author's analysis of the Bund's career. This reviewer is inclined to accept Johnpoll's verdict provided it is confined to the specific historic situation of Polish Jewry in the interbellum period. But this reviewer remains mindful of the fact that just in these days, confronted with the Maoist challenge, the Soviet Communists and their friends abroad seem to be forced to revive the very political philosophy which formed the arsenal of the Bund in its opposition to the Stalinist regime.—JOSEPH DUNNER, *Yeshiva University.*

A Liberal State At War: English Politics and Economics During the Crimean War. BY OLIVE ANDERSON. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 306. $8.50.)

As the subtitle of this book indicates, the author set out to investigate the non-military aspects of the Crimean War. British domestic problems, political as well as economic, are discussed at length, while references to other European states are made only to clarify certain governmental actions of the 1850's. Negotiations with minor allies receive relatively more attention than do the other major belligerents, France and Russia. What is especially lacking is a systematic treatment of the French policies which shaped the course of the war and led to its abrupt conclusion in 1856.

British policies were dictated by the exigencies of the military situation. The lack of suitable recruits at home encouraged a search for foreign mercenaries. "Emigration and high wages had from the beginning seriously reduced the pool of human scum which the British Army was accustomed to rely upon" (p. 219). It was no longer possible to pay the smaller German states for corps of mercenaries, as the development of international law would have made this appear a breach of neutrality. Unofficial recruiting abroad for a foreign legion was slow, and harmful to British prestige. Finally, in 1855, important financial measures were negotiated with Sardinia and Turkey. The British would have preferred a subsidy, but the Sardinians insisted on a loan in return for 15,000 men, so as to be regarded as "des alliés et non des serviteurs" (p. 220). Gladstone's suggestion of an outright gift to Turkey because of doubt about the soundness of her credit did not materialize, and under public pressure Turkey was able to raise a large loan guaranteed by the British government.

Governmental economic policies showed evasive and inconsistent patterns of action, with results often contrary to original suggestions. Gladstone proposed meeting the expenses of the war entirely by taxation, as a salutary and moral check which "it has pleased the Almighty to impose upon the ambition and lust of conquest" (p. 195). Only six weeks later the Treasury raised funds by the sale of Exchequer Bonds. Governmental borrowing, resulting in higher prices, was defended by some as a way to make the poor pay their share of war expenditures. Although the Bonds were to constitute not a loan but a provision for the temporary raising of money to be repaid from the proceeds of taxation, they became part of the permanent floating debt in the following year.

The Crimean War created the modern war photographer and special correspondent at the front. It became the subject of unprecedented publicity and discussion, in which *The Times* commanded phenomenal attention, with a circulation ten times larger than that of any of its competitors. Press censorship was unknown, and letters from troops and sightseers to the front were extensively quoted and often printed in full.

In the outburst of patriotic excitement, traditional aristocratic virtues were acclaimed as necessary to carry the nation to victory. But the conduct of the war and military setbacks convinced the public that personal heroism and leadership were no substitute for practical experience, organization, and supply of material resources—typical achievements of the business world. The successful completion of the first military railway at Balaklava furnished tangible proof for the claim that the nation should rely on private commercial experience. The Administrative Reform Association advocated the reorganization of the Civil Service in the image of private enterprise, the use of civilian contractors, and the substitution of business experience for the academic preparation it considered irrelevant. The Association did not escape the criticism of John Stuart Mill, who suggested that "any public matter whatever, under the management of the middle class, would be as grossly, if not more grossly, mismanaged than public affairs are now" (p. 122). His suspicion was soon to be confirmed by a crop of war contractors' scandals, discoveries of patched mortars, defective boots, and profiteering in war material destined for the enemy. The export of saltpeter, an essential war chemical, increased so alarmingly by October 1855 that it was obvious that indirect British trade with Russia must have been quite extensive and that governmental export controls were ineffective.

The Crimean War lowered British prestige abroad, and at the same time discredited the ideas of constitutional liberalism and laissez-faire economic policy. Bitterness between the middle classes and the aristocracy was freely expressed. A new, petty bourgeois, pseudo-antiquarian and xenophobic radicalism emerged in Urquhart's National Movement, which preached that progress can be achieved only by going backwards. But the war also increased middle class self-confidence, and laid the groundwork for the cooperation between the middle class and working class political movements which characterized the post-Crimean generation.—Charles Mark, *Adelphi University*.

Mao Tse-tung in Opposition 1927-1935. By John E. Rue. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, Hoover Institution Publications, 1966. Pp. viii, 387. $10.00.)

This is an exceedingly important book about the early history of Chinese Communism. Although much that the author says already has been related in other works on this subject, his is the most lucid and comprehensive study that yet has appeared. Besides making exhaustive use of virtually every English-language work touching on Chinese Communism before 1936, the author also has consulted numerous Chinese language materials, as well as a number of works written in Japanese. The result is a book well suited for use as a text for a large part of a course on the history of Chinese Communism.

Although the author examines almost every significant aspect of Chinese Communist history during the period under consideration, he focuses his attention chiefly on the role played by Mao Tse-tung. There emerges an unusually clear image of not only Mao but likewise early Maoism, which, in Professor Rue's words, revolved about the thesis "that the Chinese Communist Party's most potent weapon in the coming revolution would be the

Red Army, recruited from the peasantry whose allegiance had been secured in the course of a genuine land revolution" (p. 205). Inevitably, this conviction brought Mao into conflict with Stalin and his Chinese proteges, who wanted to carry out in China a chiefly urban insurrection modelled after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Relying on his impressive knowledge of Soviet history, as well as the history of the Communist International, Professor Rue describes with remarkable clarity how developments in the U.S.S.R. having no intrinsic relevance with respect to China, nevertheless, determined the policies which Stalin tried to force on the Chinese Communists. Mao's consistent and tenacious resistance to these policies and his ultimate triumph over Stalin and his Chinese followers is the principal theme of Professor Rue's book. "Mao, I believe," writes Professor Rue, "would like to be recognized as the man who has moved Communism away from its European proletarian origins, applied the essential elements of Marxism to the mastery of another historical epoch, and restated its fundamentals in universal categories that can be applied in the analysis of any stage of human history and used to incite or inspire revolutionary change in any human society" (p. 291).

Yet, although he adhered stubbornly to his belief in the necessity of mobilizing the peasants through land reform so as to create an effective army, Mao otherwise was pragmatic and almost opportunistic. Examples of his flexibility are his lenient policy with regard to middle and even many rich peasants and his willingness to join forces with liberal minded non-Communist opponents of Chiang Kai-shek, such as the so-called "Third Party" and the Fukien rebels of 1933. Professor Rue portrays Mao as a moderate, who disliked violence within the Party and championed democratic dissent against both left and right-wing dogmatists. His description of Mao's struggle with the Stalinist-minded group known as "The Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks," which dominated the Party apparatus until 1935, and the impact of this conflict on Communist efforts to defeat Chiang Kai-shek's fifth so-called "extermination campaign" in South China is unusually informed and a major contribution to our understanding of Chinese Communist history. I suspect that Professor Rue has written what may become a classic work on the history of the Chinese Communist Party.—DONALD G. GILLIN, *Duke University*.

The Fall of Sukarno. BY TARZIE VITTACHI. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 192. $4.95.)
Indonesia. BY BRUCE GRANT. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967. Pp. xi, 247. $1.65.)

During most of the decade prior to the cataclysmic events of late 1965 and 1966 national Indonesian (that is, Djakarta elite) politics was an extremely complex, highly personalized, and to a considerable extent unstructured affair. The basic conformation of the Guided Democracy power structure is well known: it consisted of the Army, which possessed a near monopoly over the instruments of physical coercion; the Communist Party, which possessed the largest, best disciplined, most effectively led political organization in the country; and President Sukarno, who used and was used by but neither controlled nor was controlled by the other major elements in the system. Within and among these and other structures there developed labyrinthine and ever shifting patterns of clique and factional alliance and maneuver designed to maximize short- and long-run power positions.

The point of the foregoing is to suggest that the exploration of certain kinds of questions in Indonesian politics—in particular the nature of intra-elite relationships—requires an expertise and sophistication which few possess. It is unfortunate, then, that the American public's interest in Indonesia since late 1965 has been centered largely on the "whodunit" question, precisely the kind of question most difficult to answer satisfactorily. This emphasis is doubly unfortunate because the whodunit question is, by itself, not very interesting from the perspective of social science, that is, it can provide few payoffs for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of Indonesian social and political life.

Where scholars fear (or do not desire) to tread, journalists sometimes rush in, due in part, no doubt, to the nature of their craft. In the case of Ceylon-born journalist Tarzie Vittachi's *The Fall of Sukarno,* the result is a superficial account, full of the most elementary sorts of errors and profoundly misleading in its implications. For example: Prior to 1965, Indonesia was governed by "a monolithic structure of power, built through twenty years of whimsical dictatorship" (p. 7) (the structure of power was anything but monolithic and Sukarno did not even approach quasi-dictator status until the late 1950's); "The Indonesian Armed Forces . . . was the only truly disciplined organization in the country . . ." (p. 15) (this should produce a wry smile from Generals Suharto and Nasution, and is refuted by Vittachi's own arguments); "the *mahaenist* [*sic*] population of the villages was . . . the strongest repository of religious or spiritual faith. The *mahaenists* are the *santris,* the believers" (p. 53) (the term *Marhaen,* coined by Sukarno and used primarily by the Nationalist Party, refers to an idealized Indonesian common man and not to the devout Moslems); ASU is identified as the student organization of the Indonesian Nationalist Party, where in fact the initials stand for a faction within the party itself (p. 161).

Vittachi's reconstruction of the coup is neither particularly original nor wholly implausible. He argues that the major actors all had contingency plans prepared with regard to various possible scenarios. When, on the night of September 30, Sukarno fell ill during a speech, Lt. Col. Untung and the Presidential Palace Guard, abetted by Communist Party and Air Force elements, moved to immobilize the Army by destroying its top leadership, thus paving the way for a new government in which Communist influence would be increased.

There are many problems with this analysis, including the enigmatic role of Sukarno himself, the view of some writers that the President did not in fact become ill during his speech, the apparent unreadiness of PKI to defend itself against a countercoup, and so on. My purpose here, however, is not to find fault with Vittachi's account of the coup—one can punch holes in all of the present versions—but rather with his underlying assessment of the nature of the Indonesian political system and its relation to the society. For Vittachi, Sukarno was, at least in recent years, a charlatan leading Indonesia to hell in a handbasket, the Communists were evil schemers, and the "truly disciplined" Army, with the support and prodding of the students and the "people" or the "masses" (who, it is alleged, have always looked to the Army for protection) was the savior of the Republic, restoring Indonesia to the rule of law under the Constitution of 1945. This sounds very much like official propaganda, and neglects such important problems as the very real support which Sukarno enjoyed from a considerable segment of the population, the fact that PKI did, after all, have millions of members and supporters of its own, the not unblemished record of the Army as a partner in Sukarno's Guided Democracy, the meaninglessness of statements about the "masses" (who are divided along several dimensions into groups with differing points of view about political matters), the fact that the massacre of the Communists reflected a deeply rooted religion-based cleavage in Indonesian (particularly Javanese) society, and the fact that the Constitution of 1945 was reinstituted initially not in accord with accepted legal procedure but by (Sukarno's) Presidential fiat in 1959. In short Vittachi simply lacks the necessary qualifications to analyze either the coup itself or, what is much more important, the political and social system within which the coup occurred and upon which its consequences have been and will continue to be profound.

Bruce Grant (an Australian journalist) has produced a very different, and much better, book designed as a general introduction to Indonesian politics and society. Widely read, he combines some of the fruits of recent scholarly analysis with the freshness of personal experience and an observant eye for the nuances of Indonesian political behavior. Although the book inevitably contains errors of fact (mostly of minor significance) the accounts of the Colonial period, nationalism, the roles of Sukarno, the Communists, and the military, the problems of the economy and of Indonesia's foreign relations are generally accurate and cogently presented. The usefulness of the journalistic approach is demonstrated in the chapter entitled "The People," a more or less verbatim presentation of interviews with individuals of a variety of political persuasions.

For the general reader the principal fault of the book is that it is an apparently rather hastily revised version of the author's earlier *Indonesia* (Melbourne University Press, 1964). While several chapters contain new material, the basic format (and much of the original material) is unchanged. The result is a sense that one is reading two books at once, one describing the pre-coup and the other the post-coup situation. Hasty revision has also led to some curious imbalances, e.g., General Nasution gets several pages, General Suharto only brief mention. Despite these reservations, it remains true that the book is one of the better introductory efforts and the only one so far to incorporate recent events. From the perspective of the political scientist as teacher, however, it is not a very useful work, both because of the broad range of the discussion and because of the lack of any attempt to place the argument within the framework of development theory or, more broadly, systematic political analysis. This evaluation is not, of course, intended as a criticism of Grant, for his purpose was simply to provide a reasonably well-informed introduction to Indonesian political and social life. This he has done.—R. WILLIAM LIDDLE, *Ohio State University.*

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

The Islamic Law of Nations. BY SHAYBANI SIYAR. Translated, with an introduction, notes, and appendices by Majid Kadduri. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xviii, 311. $8.00.)

Mr. Khadduri forges here another link in his chain of studies of Islamic law and its capital texts. The volume under review is essentially a translation from Arabic (pp. 75-292) with a detailed introductory study (pp. 1-74). In a Foreword, Philip C. Jessup (International Court of Justice) welcomes "the opportunity for many of us to become acquainted" with a great Islamic jurist.

The author of the translated text, Shaybani

(750-804), was a disciple of Abu Hanifa (d. 768) and his lieutenant Abu Yusuf (d. 799), under Harun al-Rashid. Born in Iraq of probably non-Arabian stock, he spent most of his life in Kufa but visited the Hijaz and Syria. He was mostly a teacher but served as judge for several years, initially perhaps reluctantly. He wrote extensively but to date his writings are partially lost, partially unpublished. More than other jurists in Islam he paid attention to problems that might be classified as pertaining to international law, i.e., relations between the (then monolithic) Islamic polity and the infidel polities, or between the Islamic polity and its non-Muslim subjects. This became a section of Islamic jurisprudence and was known as *siyar*. The translation was made from manuscripts, the earliest of them of the 13th century. For the interpretation the translator could draw on an XI century very detailed commentary on a kindred work by the author, but he was careful to distinguish between the XI century concepts of the commentator and the original ones of the VIII century author.

The book opens with a chapter filled with reports (stories, *hadith*) about how the Prophet and his Companions dealt in precedent cases of raids, war, division of spoils. Prefacing a discussion on a subject with such pious examples (not yet fully canonized at the time) was just getting into vogue, and Shaybani followed therein the prevailing trend. But the following section of the book, the most substantial, is construed as a dialogue between the master (actually the school of) Abu Hanifa, and the inquisitive disciple. 'He' and 'I' trade remarks (hardly any is more than half a page long) about *cases*, "spcific situations, highly speculative and scholastic in nature, and bearing on every conceivable question that may have arisen, or was believed likely to arise, in the relationships between Islam and other nations" (p. 51). General principles are rarely formulated though they are clearly discernible.

The final section deals with taxation and status of the non-Muslims in the caliphate.

Islamic law is *personal*, but the school of Abu Hanifa perceived the *territorial* element, as well as the element of *reciprocity* (in granting special status to embassies, in the mutual exemption of traders from taxation). But the other schools of Islamic law did not follow Abu Hanifa in this area. Essentially the prevailing view was that there was a division into a pax islamica domain and a non-islamic domain, and the twain were never to meet but in perpetual fighting, for the glory of and till the victory for the true faith. Truce for ten years at most was the most peaceful prospect. And in a way such lucubrations reflected actual conditions, at least along the borders. It took centuries before coexistence was tacitly accepted. Realities and reversals were bound to force some change. The iconoclast Eobn Taymiya (d. 1327) is refreshing (p. 59). Writing at a time of the (by that time Islamized) Tartars' devastating invasions, he remarked that perpetual holy war contradicts the Koran with the latter's opposition to compulsion in religion (Koran II 257). However, whatever real conditions obtained, the schoolmasters continued to spin and weave their inherited theories based on the Islam-Non-Islam confrontation. Only in the XVI century did Ottoman contacts with Western powers begin to move into a different groove—of reciprocity and mutual interest, and since then Western concepts have increasingly influenced the thinking of Muslims. There were efforts to retain something of Islamic legal thinking or its religious and moral foundations for inter-Muslim relations, with questionable results (cf. pp. 67-70).

A century and a half ago it was suggested that Shaybani was the Hugo Grotius of Islamic law—in his attention to, interest in, writing on relations between the Muslim State and non-Muslims, both under conditions of war and peace. The analogy may be weak, but Shaybani is a jurist in his own right, and fully deserves the attention of the historian of legal tenets, and in particular in tracing the age-long struggle for the emergence of notions of co-existence of men and politics towards and in peace.

The school jurists' discussions, however, should be separated from the actual course of affairs. In the latter, Islam knew not only victories even in its first century, and had to make *deals* with the Byzantines. The first Umayyad "found it expedient to purchase (658 or 659) a truce from the Emperor . . . at the price of a yearly tribute" (Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, 5 ed., p. 199, p. 205). Later, embassies and treaties, even about tribute from the Byzantines (cf. ibid p. 204, year 782), exchange of prisoners, securing a Constantinople compound for Muslims (*ibid*),—all were realities to which the learned faqihs proved not responsive. This, of course, is of a piece with the largely academic character of Islamic jurisprudence.

Mr. Khadduri mentions that while religious doctrine may have been responsible for constant conflict in foreign affairs, "religion as a sanction for moral principles prompted Muslims to adopt a tolerant attitude toward non-Muslims and to observe humane principles" (p. 69). But the phenomenon of *toleration* (none of the monotheistic faiths developed much tolerance) is to be explained *historically:* the conquerors were few amidst conquered masses, were busy with taxation, wealth, etc., cared far less about religious matters, were unable to take over the administration of the huge territories the *Blitz* put under their control. Hence the reference to the favorable Koran passages concerning poll-tax and humiliation. The Prophet's own policy in Arabia has to be seen against the background of initial weakness coupled with his reverence for the scriptures, etc. This would be a somewhat more sombre but clearer interpretation of the fundamentals of the nôn-Muslims' status in Islamic society. (Cf. Cahen in the new ed. of the Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. Dhimma).—Moshe Perlmann, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Formosa, China, and the United Nations—Formosa in the World Community. By Lung-Chu Chen and Harold Lasswell. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Pp. xi, 428. $8.95.)

The future status of Formosa is a critical problem for the United States as well as the United Nations because it is the heart of the entire China problem. This book by an expatriate Formosan scholar and his Yale mentor, Harold Lasswell, is explosively controversial because it espouses an independent Formosa ruled by the island's 13 million inhabitants. Peking and Taipei denounce any such scheme as totally unacceptable to them, and their friends in the UN have blocked any "One China, One Formosa" proposal to break the perennial deadlock on Chinese representation. The logical argumentation of the book is most persuasive, although its organization and supporting evidence leave much to be desired.

Chen, the principal author, is a 33-year-old honor graduate of National Taiwan University who came to this country in 1960 to receive law degrees at Northwestern and Yale. It is unfortunate that his book does not contain more solid, factual data on postwar Formosa and the attitudes of his fellow-natives, instead of stressing theory throughout the work. Professor Lasswell, who once taught in Peking, is one of our most eminent political scholars whose breadth of expertise lends credibility to many statements in the book, but the reader is left in doubt concerning the extent of his contribution to the actual writing.

The book is divided into three major parts: the first dealing with "One China, One Formosa" as a viable alternative; the second, only one chapter, on the "Transition to Independence," and the final section of four chapters on "Independence and After." The UN is treated in depth only in the first chapter, and plays a relatively minor role in the remaining discussion. The authors claim that a UN decision to seat Communist China as the only China, with a native-ruled Republic of Formosa eligible for a separate membership, would either force the Nationalists to hand over power to the Formosans peacefully or inspire a revolt by natives and dissident mainlanders on the island. This involves two dubious assumptions, not adequately defended in the book, concerning the ease of obtaining a favorable UN decision and securing the cooperation of the 2 million *gaishojin* (mainlanders in Taiwan). The authors may have been aware of Urban Whitaker's study of UN delegations' attitudes toward their "One China; one Formosa" solution in the early 1960's, but did not cite it or other convincing evidence.

The rest of the book touches upon many topics, usually in a disorganized style only vaguely related to the chapter titles. The past history of Formosa before the Nationalists received the island, courtesy of the American defeat of Japan, followed by Nationalist misrule and suppression of the native majority's political freedom, can be found in several sections of the book. The reviewer concurs in all substantive statements made on these topics, but wishes they had been treated in a more organized and original fashion. The desire of the Formosan majority for an independent future separate from either present Chinese regime is asserted with some evidence, but this also requires far more treatment than the book provides.

What is the potential for revolt inside Formosa? The authors point to the 1947 rebellion, so brutally suppressed by Chinese troops, and the subsequent efforts of the Chiang regime to minimize unrest by economic carrots, police-state arrests, and extremely effective divide-and-rule tactics to separate dissident mainlanders from Formosans and various types of Formosans from each other. Chen acknowledges the wisdom shown by the Nationalists in permitting intellectuals to study abroad, thus ridding the island of many potential rebels (only about 5 per cent of the thousands of college graduates abroad ever return to Formosa). Chen equivocates, however, on the question of Formosan determination to suffer personal sacrifices in the "self-help" effort he considers so important. Based on seven years' study of this question in Formosa and among overseas refugees, the reviewer cannot be so sanguine. Formosans do constitute over 80 per cent of the Nationalist enlisted military forces; their elders are well-educated and anti-Nationalist; and many within the mainlander minority are bitterly dissatisfied, but few experts would predict either a militant uprising or an early evolution toward native rule. The authors, at various places in the book, recognize most of the deterrents to Formosan nationalism but they allow their commendable devotion to the ideal of self-determination to dim their view of the hard realities obstructing its fulfillment.

Perhaps the most original and valuable portion of the book deals with the authors' blueprint for a Formosan national polity after independence. Despite the air of unreality pervading these sections, the concrete suggestions for nation-building are fascinating to any student of developing nations.

One strong point, reiterated throughout the work, is the necessity for the Formosans to cooperate with the bulk of the mainlander minority to avoid a Cypriot-type continuing dissension. They urge, for example, that Mandarin Chinese be accepted as the national language rather than the less-developed Formosan dialect, and suggest legal ways to reassure the mainlanders of their welcome in a Formosan polity. The authors also propose continuation of a defensive alliance with the United States until mainland China, which they assume will remain under Communist rule, accepts the fact of a separate Formosa. Naturally, Quemoy and Matsu would be evacuated and all claims to "reconquer" the mainland renounced by the new regime on Formosa. Civil rights, especially the right to political dissent, would be guaranteed. Political prisons, where thousands of natives now languish, would be abolished, but no Communist party would be tolerated. The authors pledge more complete attention to the rational economic development of the island, after surplus military costs have been eliminated, and a greater emphasis on technical education and population control.

This reviewer cannot quarrel with the basic theme of the book that an independent Formosa is a viable alternative domestically and internationally to the present situation in which Formosans are pawns in the Chinese civil war. Moreover, this book is an excellent rebuttal to the pro-Nationalist work by Frank Morello, *The International Legal Status of Formosa* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). Its appendix, with the UN voting record on Chinese representation, and the bibliography of most English-language sources are helpful to the general reader.

Precisely because this reviewer agrees with the major theisis of the book, he finds it a painful duty to note its stylistic defects. The general reader will find it both informative and stimulating, but those familiar with the Formosan problem may wish for a tighter, less repetitive, and more original presentation of the authors' case.—DOUGLAS MENDEL, JR., *University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.*

The Quest for a United Germany. BY FERENC A. VÁLI. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 318. $8.50.)

A broad scope and careful research combine to make Ferenc A. Váli's study one of the most significant on the German question. The author, a professor of Government at the University of Massachusetts, has avoided polemics and produced a balanced, well documented analysis of one of the most intractable problems of world politics. In the philosophical tradition of Johann Gottfried von Herder that the only natural state is the nation-state, Professor Váli repeatedly assures his readers of the "natural desire" of the East Germans to achieve a political union with their kinsmen in the Federal Republic. The author attributes to the members of a nation a collective personality which causes them to draw together into a state? Accordingly, he regards national character as an "important determinant of state action" and writes of a "German psyche" which has demonstrated its ability to assume the historical responsibility for a state. Similarly, the policy of the Soviet Union emerges as a complex interplay between the "national temperament" of the Russian people and the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. The discussion of German sentiment directed toward a national revival is not presented in exclusively organic terms, for a chapter is devoted to analyzing West German opinion on the reunification issue. In this section the author's own extensive interviewing usefully supplements his utilization of reports from German public opinion research institutes. Such data serve to establish the depth of popular feeling for reunification, regardless of whether or not one accepts the interpretation that the division of Germany is "unnatural."

Unfortunately, certain of Professor Váli's generalizations are open to such serious questions that they weaken the impact of an otherwise strong work. Among these is the assertion that a majority of the postwar West German elite favored the founding of the Federal Republic as a step toward the goal of reunification. On the contrary, during the summer of 1948, General Lucius D. Clay had to overcome a pronounced lack of enthusiasm for the new state among German politicans by making it abundantly clear that their reluctance to act would occasion an early cessation of Marshall Plan aid and, above all, a reappraisal by the United States of its commitment in Berlin. Ernst Reuter, the Social Democratic leader in Berlin, responded to the hint that his city might be lost to the West with a plea for the restoration of German sovereignty outside of the Soviet Zone. A German initiative, he argued, would serve to overcome the lack of resoluteness characteristic of Washington's policy in Central Europe. With reference to this turning point in German-American relations, the author might profitably have examined *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik* (1966) by the University of Hamburg political scientist Hans-Peter Schwarz. We must also urge caution toward the statement: "Any communication between the United States and the Soviet Union is examined in Bonn from the point of view of its effect on reunification" (p. 248). Were this so, it would indeed be remarkable. Moreover, error exists in representing the policy of the Sudeten German Association whose former Speaker, Federal minister Hans-Christoph Seebohm, constantly reiterated the demand of his followers for a return to their

Bohemian and Moravian homeland and who (apparently unknown to the author) ruled out the necessity of changing frontiers to effect this return. Finally, the acceptance in the foreign ministries of the Warsaw Pact states of the stipulation that West Berlin be included in the area encompassed by trade agreements with the Federal Republic is not as uniform as the text would have one believe.

Professor Váli concludes that a relaxation of tension in Europe through a solution to the German question is now primarily dependent upon the willingness of Soviet policy-makers to support the German nation's right of self-determination. He warns that impatience over the continued existence of the Berlin Wall can lead to unrealistic proposals for direct negotiations between Bonn and Moscow in the hope that extensive German concessions will induce a conciliatory Soviet attitude. While far removed from a new Rapallo, the foreign policy of the Grand Coalition stresses unilateral German diplomatic overtures in Eastern Europe rather than a reliance upon American policy to alter the status quo. The call for an active German Eastern policy issued by Hans Kroll, one-time ambassador of Bonn in Moscow, and Rainer Barzel, chairman of the Christian Democratic parliamentary party, is worthy of more than the casual treatment given it in the book. In 1965, the Social Democratic member of parliament Wenzel Jaksch proposed that his government sponsor a "Marshall Plan" for Eastern Europe. It is well that the "Jaksch Plan" received, at least, bibliographical notice; for Jaksch, unlike Professor Váli, emphasized the need to improve relations among the states of Europe as a prelude to overcoming the division of Germany.—James H. Wolfe, *University of Maryland.*

Deutschlands Beziehungen zu Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Belgien sowie deutsche Entwaffung, Reparationen, Völkerbund und internationale Abrüstung, Dezember 1925 bis Juli 1926, Akten zur deutschen auswartigen Politik, 1918-1945, Serie B: 1925-1933, Band I, 1. Ed. by Hans Rothfels et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966. Pp. lxix, 799.)

This volume inaugurates a new series of documents on German foreign policy. It contains over 300 items under the headings Disarmament Belgian/Eupen-Malmedy, International Steel Cartel, Reparations, the Saar, Troop Reductions and the Evacuation of the Occupied Territories of Germany, the League, and more general questions pertaining to Germany's relations with England and France. It admirably fills the longest gap in the published record of German foreign policy. The publication of Foreign Office material began with *Die Grosse Politik* in the 1920's which is still the most important record of pre-1914 diplomacy. After World War II the United States and Great Britain commenced the printing of selected diplomatic records. At first the Anglo-American commission was committed to the publication of the sources from 1918 to 1945. But, because of the enormous problems involved in any such undertaking, the commission decided in 1954 to limit its scope to the Hitler period. By this time groups under the auspices of the American Historical Association and Saint Anthony's College, Oxford were microfilming large blocks of captured Foreign Office papers for all periods. These microfilms and the original papers, since returned to Bonn, have formed the basis for a thriving scholarship on Weimar foreign policy.

However officials and scholars of the Federal Republic still believed in the necessity of establishing the printed record; they initiated an agreement in 1960 with the American, French, and British governments to institute an international board for the sole purpose of editing and publishing the archival material from 1918 to 1933. Each volume is to be prepared by a team comprising one German and one non-German member under the supervision of the general editors—Hans Rothfels (Germany), Hajo Holborn (United States), Maurice Baumont (France) and Ronald Wheatley (United Kingdom).

Such a distinguished board would appear to guarantee a well-edited series, and the publication of this, the first volume, has done nothing to lower the expectation. The selection process has been careful and thorough; the editors have included more classes of documentation below the permanent secretary's files which are not customarily used in such publications. There are good explanatory notes and cross-indexing not only to published documents but also the unpublished microfilmed papers. While the documents themselves are ordered chronologically, a long subject index calenders the substance of each item. This chronological arrangement may sometimes cause erroneous impressions since the papers are drawn from many files and present an artificial order that was never seen by any decision-maker. However any alternate ordering would be just as flawed.

This leads to the question: why publish the documents in the first place? Unlike the papers of the Hitler era, these published Weimar Foreign Office documents contain few surprises. The microfilmed Stresemann *Nachlass* has been so well mined that the outlines of Weimar policy have been clear for a number of years. In addition, numerous monographs have used the far larger store of microfilmed Foreign Office files, and a great many more are in various stages of preparation. Russian and Polish relations have been especially well covered, but Western-oriented studies are gaining increasing attention. Even in this relatively overlooked field, these documents do not add any striking new evidence about the most important single event within their scope. Using the Stresemann *Nachlass,* Erich Eyck and Ludwig Zimmermann have already constructed perfectly satisfactory accounts of the struggle over Germany's entrance into the League.

Yet, despite such superfluity, this collection will become a valuable scholarly aid. Modern research in diplomatic history is the victim of the typewriter and carbon paper. There are simply too many documents in any modern archive for any single researcher to peruse, even with a lifetime at his disposal. If the history of Weimar foreign policy is to be written, much of the work will have to be based upon specialized monographs and published sources. Furthermore the publication of these documents allows the scholar to deal with relatively minor questions which shed light on the whole nature of the diplomatic process. For example, the relationship of German civilian aviation to the disarmament question is only tangentially relevant to any major study. Yet, perhaps more than any other set, the documents published on this issue illustrate the limits of Weimar policy as well as the tenacity with which both Briand and Stresemann pursued their goals.

Also the major issues of the 1920's often require research into the policy of more than one nation. With the Public Record Office now open for this period, with Austrian and Italian documents available for much of the 1920's, multi-archival research has now become possible. However even the most indefatigable scholar cannot visit all the archives. He must rely on published sources. Thus the publication of the German documents presents a welcome addition to this task of publishing, one already undertaken by the American, English and Italian governments.—STANLEY SUVAL, *North Carolina State University.*

Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Integration of Strategy and Politics. BY JAMES L. RICHARDSON. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 403, $8.95.)

Noting that while "military strategy is an integral part of foreign policy . . . most strategists and politicians inhabit different worlds," James L. Richardson, at present a member of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit of the British Foreign Office, examines the consequences of such a polarization of expertise in this study of the tension between the prevailing doctrines of NATO strategy and the realities of politics in Germany. His plan of presentation can be understood only in terms of his attempt to bring together two disparate universes of discourse. Part I surveys West German foreign policy from 1949 through 1963. Analyses of the Soviet challenge to the West and of Soviet strategic doctrines follow (Part II) and then a more ramified and factual consideration of NATO strategy (Part III). Thereupon the author reverts to a chronological account, this time of "The Berlin Crisis" as intensified in 1958-60 and continued in 1961-62, albeit in a drastically altered nuclear power context (Part IV). It is thus that the stage is set for a concluding appraisal of West Germany's relations with its Western allies and policy suggestions designed to allay the tension between the abiding concern of the Germans with reunification and the Anglo-American desire for détente.

Here the argument can be summarized only sketchily. Adenauer's foreign policy was consistently determined by security considerations due to the exposed position and war-weariness of the German people. Reunification, always secondary to avoidance of war and paradoxically ill-defined in the popular mind in regard to the land east of the Oder-Neisse line, became in the fifties and will remain a politically irrelinquishable goal for the Federal Republic. While variations in intensity have occurred, the ideological commitments and political objectives of the USSR and the USA remain unchanged. The fundamental changes have taken place in the nature and relative scope of the striking power of these two super-powers. Whereas in the first post-war decade the Soviet Union was in a position to over-run Western Europe with conventional forces and the Americans depended for response on a monopoly and then a preponderance of nuclear weapons, the ensuing years found the USSR able to threaten Europe with nuclear destruction and even to bring the USA within the range of its nuclear striking power.

As a result of these developments, the issue context within which Western responses to the threats and challenges of the late fifties and early sixties were discussed was such that, particularly in NATO circles, considerations of nuclear strategy seemed at least to take priority over reunification and even over German security. The Federal Republic, which alone among the Western allies has formally committed itself to refrain from the manufacture of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and to accept full NATO command over its armed forces, found itself in the position of a pressure group rather than that of a full partner in the semi-public debates over matters involving the future form of existence and even the physical survival of the German people. Political leaders and public alike came to be affected mainly by the fall-out from these discussions most often in the form of leaks and rumors. In particular, plans for disengagement which eroded confidence in deterrant power of American military support and strategies which contemplated a conventional war in Europe as a kind of cushion to delay or even to evade a resort to nuclear exchanges impinged drastically on the sensibilities of a highly exposed people.

In the context of the situation as he saw it at the end of 1963, Richardson concluded that the balance of advantage for the Western powers lay in maintaining West Germany's willing partnership in the Atlantic community and that continued support for German reunification was a necessary, even though not a sufficient, means to that end. While questions may be raised as to his interpretation of the evidence available to him when he made his study, even more important are those as to whether subsequent events have undermined his assumptions and rendered his proposals obsolete. But, even if his book may be judged as only an epilogue, his effort to bring together the divergent universes of political and strategic discourse merits attention from the inhabitants of both worlds.—CHARLES B. ROBSON, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

The Politics of the Common Market. BY W. HARTLEY CLARK. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Pp. xi, 180. $4.95.)

However muddy the waters of European integration may appear, the institutions of the European Communities have continued to develop and the political patterns surrounding them have grown in complexity. Recent decisions have influenced not only the policies of the European Economic Community, the European Coal Community and Euratom, but also the structure and role of these organizations and their component elements. Change of even greater importance can be expected in the next few years. These events are of immediate interest to political scientists concerned with European politics and with theories of integration. A number of books and articles are available to provide a background for observing this shifting pattern. To take a few examples, Leon Lindberg's excellent study *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration,* published in 1963, is still highly relevant and has been made more valuable by Lindberg's more recent articles; Miriam Camps' several works in this area all serve to clarify positions taken by actors as they moved toward major decisions; and the articles in the April-July 1967 issue of *Government and Opposition* highlight various aspects of politics and decision making in the Communities.

In addition to works such as these, books of a more basic nature have appeared. These are largely directed toward courses on international relations and European government and are designed to provide a brief descriptive introduction to the structure and politics of the Communities. Although varying greatly in quality, the books in this category face similar problems. Their brevity works against a nuanced and detailed exposition, and they run the risk that certain specific information will be rapidly outdated.

It is in this context that Professor Clark's book is to be considered. Writing before the Treaty fusing the executive of the three Communities was ratified, he attempts to introduce not only the formal structure of the E.E.C., but the relationships between its component elements as they have developed. He presents a chapter on each of the components—the Council, the Commission, the Commission's growing administration, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. These are complemented by chapters on interest groups and public opinion in the Communities, on relationships between the E.E.C. and other states and on implications for world and European politics. Within the limitations which he has set for himself, Professor Clark has provided a useful introduction; many of the criticisms one could make would be directed more toward the limitations than what was done within them.

Yet there are criticisms to be made. Many statements in the book are too strong or potentially misleading, even when accompanied by qualifications. One is struck by such assertions as, "The Council has done more to unify Europe than any other institution in the history of the Continent." In other places Professor Clark presents good material in such a manner as to lessen its effect. For example, the discussion of public opinion contains valuable information, but could easily confuse students; and in concluding that E.E.C.'s economic regulations may have broad effects on attitude, Professor Clark makes a meaningful point; but the conclusion is scarcely strengthened by the statement, "Women's fashions and the format of women's magazines is already 'unified,' for instance, as is the European taste in toys." There are also statements of questionable relevance to the current situation. For example, in view of the fact that the Parliament has never exercised its power to remove the Commission, and is unlikely to do so in the near future, Professor Clark is not directing students toward central political problems when he says, "There is a crying need for at least some provision for the dissolution of Parliament by the Commission if the removal power is used too often."

More seriously, discussions of certain points are less complete than they need be, even in a brief book. Disproportionate attention is given relatively unimportant subjects to the detriment of more important matters. By drastically reducing such sections as the four-page discussion of the location of a permanent European capital, the author could give more attention to other problems. The book would benefit from a clearer picture of the actual politics of the Communities. One possibility would be a more extensive discussion of the Commission's power base. In this, the various references to the 1965-66 crisis could be drawn together to illustrate better the interactions between the Commission and the member states. (And with regard to the crisis one might question Professor Clark's tendency to minimize its effects.) One could make a similar request for more focus in discussions of all the Community components and better integration of the parts.

In conclusion, *The Politics of the Common Market* does not say anything particularly new about the European Communities and does not provide as much information as it could and it should. However it is a useful introduction and is better than other attempts of its kind. It serves to illustrate the need for more and better classroom materials dealing with the substance of politics in the European Communities.—Robert L. Peterson, *The University of Iowa.*

Arms Control for the Late Sixties. Ed. By James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr. (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967. Pp. xlvii, 265. $8.50.)

The publication in book form of the papers delivered at a symposium invariably involves problems of focus, coherence, and differential quality. When the topic is arms control, additional questions arise, such as whether the book is already fatally dated and who is supposed to find the book useful. This book, which is the product of a symposium held in April 1966, manifests these problems in a conspicuous manner.

As for focus, there is little. Five complicated topics are discussed: NATO and arms control; ballistic missile defense (BMD); arms control in Soviet and Chinese strategy; nuclear proliferation; and limited war and international peacekeeping. However interrelated arms control issues may be, this is an ambitious undertaking and one wonders how much any mortal is supposed to absorb and retain about, for example, such an abstruse conundrum as BMD when his attention is turned shortly thereafter to the equally murky problem of nuclear proliferation. These topics offer nearly unlimited opportunities for such fecund minds as contributors Edward Teller, Hedley Bull, and Herman Kahn, but I would relish the opportunity to give an examination on just who said what and why to a group of professional political scientists or strategists who had just read the book or heard the papers. It is, in my opinion, just too huge a canvas for either a symposium or a book.

Of course, it is possible to attend only part of a conference or read only selected chapters of a book, especially one of this sort. But are the topical chapters coherent? That is, do the various contributors to a given chapter address the same basic questions or do they merely speak past each other? The chapter on BMD comes off fairly well in this regard, the one on nuclear proliferation slightly better, and the rest hardly at all. With a few exceptions, the papers were quite obviously prepared without reference to each other. There apparently was a felt need for more coherence because the last three articles come under the heading of "Comments on Preceding Papers." But of those assigned this unenviable task, only Klaus Knorr made any serious effort to accomplish it.

In the field of arms control, standards of appraisal regarding quality vary as much or more as in any other field of political studies; and any reviewer's judgments are bound to be somewhat arbitrary. By nearly any respectable standard, however, there are some excellent articles among the 29 in this book. Moreover, they do not reflect any particular approach or set of assumptions. There was an obvious and successful effort to bring together different—sometimes radically different—perspectives and sets of assumptions. The contributors range from Kenneth Boulding to Edward Teller; most of the categories defined in Robert A. Levine's brilliant *The Arms Debate*[1] are represented. (Whatever its merits, however, this eclecticism contributes significantly to the problems of focus and coherence noted above.) On various and conflicting sides of the BMD debate, Joseph I. Coffey, Richard B. Foster and Jeremy J. Stone argue brilliantly; James R. Schlesinger's well-known position on nuclear proliferation is cogently presented and contrasted explicitly with that of Hedley Bull; Herman Kahn puts on still another dazzling display, complete with the expected scenarios, policy desiderata, sweeping assertions and audacious presciptions; and Lincoln P. Bloomfield contributes a thoughtful, tentative essay on the control of local conflicts. It could also be argued that while their contributions were, of course, not designed to be scholarly contributions, the politicized speeches of a retired French Colonel, a German politician, and an Indian diplomat add a welcome reminder of the harsh political world with which the learned essays are allegedly dealing. Similarly, William Kintner sets forth in a clear and forceful essay what is almost certainly a set of dominant attitudes in the American military today.

Perhaps all arms control essays should be published as magazine articles or pamphlets. Technology and policy march inexorably on and the only kind of arms control writing that remains fresh after publication between hard covers is of the rather more abstract, speculative sort. Not long after this book was published, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union each began to move with apparent determination toward the deployment of a BMD, there was a Soviet-American agreement on a non-proliferation treaty draft, and it became known that the United States would very likely develop an anti-satellite missile system. A new symposium would have plenty to talk about, but it is less clear that its deliberations would look especially good in print a couple of years later.

---

[1] Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963.

Finally, there is the question of whom this book is designed for. Most specialists will have read the more important of the articles long ago. Other prospective readers will run into the problems noted above. In a profession surfeited with unread books, this one will probably join the majority despite the importance of its subject matter and the high quality of many of its articles.—WILLIAM P. GERBERDING, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

The Quest for Peace Through Diplomacy. BY STEPHEN D. KERTESZ. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Pp. x, 182. $4.95.)

This short book by the distinguished diplomat and scholar Stephen D. Kertesz is a review of some of the recent post-World War II developments in the practice of diplomacy. After two short introductory chapters, the author analyses certain aspects of Soviet diplomacy and while revealing a subtle attachment to the notion of "protracted conflict," he does hold out the hope that "Soviet diplomacy might adopt a more cooperative policy."

In the main portion of the book, Dr. Kertesz attempts to describe and to analyze what he calls "the new forms and methods of diplomacy." There is much helpful material in these chapters. Students uninitiated to a study of international organizations can learn the basic composition of the specialized agencies of the UN, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community and the various European parliaments. A fairly extensive analysis of the organization, structure and operation of NATO occupies two chapters of the book.

Overall, the approach reveals a distinctly European bias. From this analysis one would have to conclude that non-Western diplomats have nothing to add to the study of post-World War II diplomacy. Even the implications for Western diplomacy of the present revolutionary environment are not fully explored. The author has chosen to concentrate his effort on the new forms of diplomatic activity which have emerged in Western Europe. A full analysis of post-war diplomacy would demand far more than this. The difficulty with the book, on its own terms, is that there is too much description and too little analysis. There is no explicit theoretical framework which would allow the student to generalize new hypotheses or conclusions about the nature of such new diplomatic activity. Some questions worth exploration in respect to the activity of diplomats in various European organizations would be—What is the impact of these new environments on the attitudes and actions of the diplomats themselves? What means are used by governments in dealing with each other in the context of international organizations? and How do these means differ from those used traditionally? Neither is there any concerted effort to build on the work of other theorists such as Morgenthau, Ilke and others. Further, an analysis of the way in which the use of force as a means of advancing national interests has been affected by the existence of such international organizations would have been worthwhile.

Professor Kertesz firmly believes that NATO is still essential to the West. He says at one point "the Soviet threat to all NATO members is the primary reason for the alliance." He writes of the French disenchantment with NATO but argues for a revived and strengthened organization, concluding "the time has come for European states to make a decision about their aspirations, a choice about their role in world affairs. No outside nation can decide the issues for them."

The book, in summary, is a description of some of the basic structures and procedures of a variety of Western-oriented international organizations. The implication seems to be that certain new diplomatic techniques learned in these contexts might be transferred to a more universal context. However, this is never argued explicitly, nor is there any effort to generalize about these new techniques. Professor Kertesz at times seems to imply that traditional diplomacy is on the way out and that the diplomacy of the international organization is the wave of the future, and yet this point is not clearly developed at the conceptual level. The chief thrust of the book seems to be from a traditional cold war perspective. On the other hand, in the final chapter, the author does call for a common attack on common problems by all governments. It would appear that if valid patterns of interaction among Western powers are established, then the Communist world will inevitably be won over to the view that, in unity, men can achieve a more peaceful world.—LOUIS F. BRAKEMAN, *Denison University.*

Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. ED. BY HERBERT BUTTERFIELD AND MARTIN WIGHT. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. 227. $6.25.)

This volume of essays on the theory of international politics will receive a mixed but predictable reaction from American scholars. Those who seek to discern through the study of history patterns of international relations, who believe that normative considerations are appropriate in the study of international relations, and who are not singularly devoted to the establishment of broad gauge theories of international relations will find the volume fruitful and stimulating. Those who are interested in the "scientific" study of international relations and the systematic development and verification of explanatory and predictive theories will find the volume does not measure up to their goals. In other words the authors pursue a traditional or classical approach to the study of international relations. This approach is highlighted by M. Wight in his provocative essay, "Why is There No International Theory?" with his statement that he perceives "international theory" to mean ". . . a tradition of speculation about relations between states, a tradition imagined as the twin of speculation about the state to which the name 'political theory' is appropriated." There is no mention in the essays of general systems theory, game theory, simulation, or the quantification of international activities.

In its origin and purpose, the volume is the British companion to *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations* edited by William T. R. Fox. Unlike some contemporary American scholars, the six essayists discuss theories of international politics and not theories about international relations as a discipline of study. Their primary concern is the analysis of the nature of the international society and the theories that attempt to explain the behavior of that society. This analysis involves the study of international law and the study of diplomatic history.

Although their conceptual approach will be challenged, the authors have produced a stimulating volume with the essays maintaining a consistently high level of quality. The essay by M. Wight, "The Balance of Power," is a valuable analysis of the notions of the balance of power and the analytical ambiguity that attends the use of the concept. The two essays by Hedley Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations," and "The Grotian Conception of International Society," and the one by M. Wight, "Western Values in International Relations," are solid discussions of the inter-relation between international law and international society. Bull concentrates on the question, found in many classical writings in international law, whether the international society tends toward an international community or whether it is a Hobbesian state of nature. M. Wight discusses the maintenance of order in the international society and the phenomenon of intervention as a means for the maintenance of that order. Of the essays only two do not concentrate on historical material. Of these, the essay, "Threats of Force in International Relations," written by G. F. Hudson in 1961 provides, with the advantage of hindsight, a brilliant forecast of Khrushchev's rationale for the missile venture in Cuba.

Within the framework of their analysis, the authors present quality contributions to the study of international relations. That some may not fully agree with the framework does not deny the quality of the contributions.—DON C. PIPER, *University of Maryland.*

The Politics of American Foreign Aid. BY MICHAEL KENT O'LEARY. (New York: Atherton Press, 1967. Pp. 172. $5.95.)

One ordinarily expects that a foreword written by someone other than the author of a book will be quite laudatory, but a reviewer could scarcely improve on the prefacing tribute by Professor Harold Karan Jacobson in pointing toward the strong points of this book by Professor O'Leary: "Even if it did not fill such an important need, the book would deserve commendation for its grace and humor, its obvious scholarship, its skillful blend of quantitative and nonquantitative techniques of analysis." O'Leary capped diligent and imaginative research with a refreshingly light literary touch. As Jacobson noted, he endeavored to combine traditional and newer analytical perspectives within a single framework. I especially admired his effort to show how recent American foreign aid policies stem in part from what O'Leary indicates as deep-seated "general traits in the American political culture" (p. 9) going back to the origins of the nation. Yet, the end result was somehow not altogether satisfying, and here it ought to be conceded immediately that disappointment is always a function of expectations. Therefore, the perceived problems are probably a consequence of this reviewer's unfulfilled hopes rather than any inadequacies on the author's part. Perhaps, too, the problems are associated with the fact that O'Leary was allowed only 135 pages of actual text in which to treat an enormously complex subject. Finally, there may be yet another partial explanation for the nature of the overall result, but I will hold that for my concluding comment in order initially to suggest why certain aspects of the emphases in this book in the absence of other considerations present a somewhat troublesome picture of the large subject indicated by the book's title.

The first problem which one might cite is an implicit model of the American political process with the Congress as an almost exclusive focal point. O'Leary devotes the first 88 of his 135 pages to an analysis of public opinions and moods—or, more broadly, "the perceptions and judgments of broad elements of the public" (p. 9)—and how all of these may conceivably be related to "congressional responses." When on page 89 he turns to the Executive Branch and says that the "history of foreign aid is principally the history of policy initiatives taken by the President and his advisers," it makes one wonder whether the history of foreign aid is something wholly apart from the politics of foreign aid. In any case, the title of the chapter beginning on page 89 is "The Executive as Organizer of Attitudes," and the emphasis quickly shifts back to Congress as the focal point around which are configurations of forces the most important of which are public opinions to some extent shaped by presidential actions. It may be useful, in light of the many studies in recent years emphasizing the President and the Executive Branch as the key focus of the political process from which American foreign policy emerges, to have a study that puts the spotlight on the Congress. Yet, even in this connection one might have hoped for somewhat more explicit linkages between the empirical findings of this book and some of the theoretical models of the legislative process formulated in the past decade, not to mention linkages to models of Executive Branch behavior and to models which attempt to relate domestic and international politics.

A second and related problem has to do with an occasional gap between data and conclusions. For example, all of the earlier pages devoted to ways in which public opinion polls and congressional votes can be cut, dried and assessed suddenly appear to have been a diverting but essentially irrelevant playing around with numbers when one finally reads on page 125 that "Until 1963, the chief opponent of foreign aid, Congressman Passman, was so well entrenched in his subcommittee that attempts at political persuasion were a waste of time."

A third difficulty is the relative inattention to trend data. For example, a parenthetical aside on pages 7-8 notes that "the magnitude [of foreign aid] has declined from about 2 per cent of the Gross National Product in 1946 to about one-half of one per cent of the GNP in 1966," but this item of information is not mentioned again nor related to any of the other data or conclusions. In a paragraph on page 23 there is first a reference to a poll in 1959, then back to a poll in 1949, and then forward again to a survey in 1965, as if bits of evidence were picked up wherever they could be found and then scrambled into a conclusion. On page 116 we learn that "Between 1959 and 1963, five special studies of foreign aid were requested by the President," and on page 117 it is noted that the U.S. foreign aid agency has been reorganized and renamed eight times since World War II, but neither of these sets of time-sequential events is further explored with an eye toward suggesting whether they embodied any trends or changes in the politics of American foreign aid.

One is left with the overall impression that American foreign aid policy and politics since World War II is a crazy-quilt subject about which one can say a great deal but from which one can conclude very little in the way of clearcut sets of interrelated patterns. O'Leary himself seems to concede as much when he writes in his conclusion (p. 128): "The twenty-year record of postwar American foreign aid policy is sufficiently vast and complex to provide the observer with evidence for almost any verdict he desires. . . . Judgment of American performance depends upon a baffling calculus . . ." But perhaps it was precisely O'Leary's purpose to reveal this baffling set of circumstances, to hold up a mirror to the events of two decades and to reflect how little sense a pattern-searching behaviorial scientist can make of them. If this was in fact his purpose, he succeeded admirably, and this book is strongly recommended for use as a text in undergraduate and graduate courses for at least three purposes: (1) first, for the wealth of data and bibliographical references; (2) second, for a demonstration of the limits of presently available analytical techniques; (3) third, as a challenge to new generations of students to improve on these techniques. Professor O'Leary in the judgment of this reviewer is one of the ablest younger political scientists at work today, and perhaps what one really ought to say in conclusion here is that any perceived shortcomings in this book are primarily an indication of continuing inadequacies in our arsenal of analytical techniques rather than a criticism of the author. —VINCENT DAVIS, *University of Denver.*

Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy. BY GEORGE LISKA. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 115. $2.25.)

In this second of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research's Studies in International Affairs, George Liska calls for a fundamental change in our view of the international system and provides, for those who accept his conceptualizations, an attractive blueprint for American global domination.

He has developed a theory of a unifocal empire-oriented international system—unifocal in that it centers on the United States as the world's pre-eminent imperial power, and empire-oriented in that no effective world organization exists. With only one dominant power, the unifocal system is bipolar or multipolar in appearance only, but it does possess multistate and multipolar characteristics.

Liska first outlines the characteristics and aspects of imperial systems. He draws from a wide range of past empires and his abundant, albeit cryptic, historical references. The contemporary world is analyzed within this framework. Imperial America has its conceptual roots, not in recent colonial endeavors such as the British Empire, but in historic superstates, especially the Roman Empire.

In these terms, an empire "is a state exceeding other states in size, scope, salience, and sense of task." This is Liska's America—indeed, a superstate, but certainly more than a great power in a state system. It is an empire in an imperial system whose interests are coterminous with the international system. It is both globally paramount over all other states and primarily responsible for maintaining at least a minimum world order.

In this unifocal system, world order or equilibrium is to be maintained, not by any simulated balance between the superpowers, but rather by diverse U.S. policies toward regional areas. The United States would progressively reduce its military, economic and political involvement in Europe. It also would encourage a reformation of this sub-system under Soviet Union domination.

America could not delegate leadership in Afro-Asia or in the Western Hemisphere, where, in contrast with Europe, military force still is the critical instrument of influence and control. A regional balance system is not operative in these areas nor do the involved nations recognize a paramount regional power (not even China in Asia). As a result, America must undertake carefully calculated policies, not designed to achieve domination or containment, but to maintain international order. Extreme forms of local behavior which have external implications would be curbed. A wide spectrum of intervention may be necessary, ranging from intimation of intent to direct, but non-excessive, military sorties. To achieve its objectives, the U.S. would use a variety of instruments—access into friendly lands, traditional statecraft, multilateral associations, economic aid, political-military alliances, and military force.

Liska contends that the world now is moving into this "newly emerging constellation of power and order." Vietnam, which he calls America's first imperial war, is given as a dramatic example. The conflict is not to be justified in the usual official way, e.g., preserve independent peoples or contain Chinese communism. Rather Vietnam is merely one unpleasant aspect of America's role as global, imperial policeman. Liska views Vietnam as a police action which may have to be repeated in comparable situations until another imperial or universal power appears. He believes that Vietnam still may prove to have been an ideal operation for training our new imperial-type political-military establishment and in educating the American people to the hard facts of the new American-dominated unifocal system.

Liska is not a conventional interventionist or imperialist; he is far too wise to succumb to such American phobias as the anti-communist crusade or to the traditional Pax Americana. In this book, he enhances his reputation as one of the brightest commentators on international politics. If one accepts his imperial, unifocal theme, it is difficult to conceive of a more articulate and tightly-reasoned analysis.

Still, a successful imperial America must adhere to Liska's well-defined guidelines and must accept his goal of world order (not expanded empire). Is such wisdom to be found among Washington imperialists? However, a more basic criticism centers on the validity of his premise of American imperial supremacy.

It would be unfair to say that Liska looks upon America as a global messiah, the Lord's agents on earth. Yet, his imperial America assumes an American mission and supremacy which critics may find not only chilling but illusory and based on assorted misconceptions. A few questions illustrate this point. In the nuclear age, is not the Soviet Union functionally on a competitive superpower level with the United States? Does not geography alone place China, though no military giant, in the position of No. 1 Asian power? Would not the Afro-Asian and Latin American lesser powers be restive recipients of imperial largesse? Can the United Nations be summarily dismissed? Is Vietnam really more than a tragic blunder? Could not global order be best achieved through developing cooperation by diverse centers of policy and power?

The core question is whether world order really depends on the U.S. as global empire policeman. Liska's book should be read for the affirmative argument and for its contribution to the expanding dialogue on the nature of the international system and of America's role in the operation of that system.—Clifton E. Wilson, *University of Arizona.*

Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries. By Harry G. Johnson. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. xvi, 279. $6.75.)

This book is a product of both the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held at Geneva and the author's long experience as an international economist. Its purpose, which unfortunately is not defined before the final chapter, is to "survey the major issues raised by UNCTAD for U.S. policy toward the less developed countries, and to explore the various policy alternatives open to the United States" (p. 241). The book is focused almost exclusively, however, on the role of international trade, and hence the trade policies of the U.S. and other developed nations, as a means to foster economic growth in the developing world. Only minor attention is directed to other economic policy issues.

Professor Johnson is successful in his attempt to write for an audience expanded beyond professional economists in terms of the clarity of his analysis, but non-economists may be discouraged by his failure to define this problem early in the book and to outline his pattern of attack. Political scientists accustomed to the current literature of comparative politics will be struck by the limited reference to individual nations and perhaps either impressed or concerned with economists' ability to treat the economic growth patterns of developing nations as a single variable. He does recognize that planning is ultimately a political process where economic decisions are often made on other than economic grounds (p. 69). Yet, an inclination to ignore political realities crops up throughout the book: "If the United States is to maintain its leadership and fulfill the responsibilities it has assumed to both the developed and the less developed countries, it *must evolve some positive new approach* to the problems aired at UNCTAD" (p. 238, italics are mine).

UNCTAD provided a ready platform for the developing nations to voice their general dissatisfaction with the system of international trading relationships that has grown under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, leaving the U.S. in an almost isolated position when other developed nations tended to abstain on many votes. We were, Professor Johnson notes, "a lone voice of negation confronting a chorus of hopeful positive suggestions" (p. 7).

Following two introductory chapters on economic growth and development, the book concentrates on barriers to expanded trade imposed by both the developed and the less developed countries. The latter have often contributed to their own plight through the consequences of nationalistic economic policies, their preference for centralized economic planning, an exploitative attitude toward traditional agriculture, a commitment to import substitution, policies of inflation and currency overvaluation, and a general hostility to private investment by foreigners.

The developed nations, on the other hand, erect barriers by their provision of aid in its present bilateral and project-tied forms, their limitations on commodity trade, their tariff and non-tariff restrictions on manufacturers, and their immigration policies. Subsequent chapters explore ways to reduce or mitigate the effects of the barriers erected by the developed nations. Considered are (1) proposals for action within the existing framework, increasing levels of assistance, substituting multilateral for bilateral aid, private foreign investment, and enlarged opportunities within the GATT framework, (2) possible arrangements for trade in primary products, for example the use of international commodity agreements which are not particularly favored by "most" international trade experts, and (3) the possibility of preference in the markets of developed countries for the manufactured goods of the developing nations.

Professor Johnson then jumps to a discussion of international monetary reform, perhaps a more controversial issue than when the book was written. He argues that the less developed countries would benefit from an international monetary system providing a better combination of liquidity and adjustment mechanisms, preferably an internationally controlled central bank. The author concludes his examination of the role of trade in economic development with a series of questions for future research. Apparently economists, like political scientists, have a few mountains yet to climb.—George M. Platt, *The University of Iowa.*

American Foreign Policy Beyond Utopianism and Realism. By Donald Brandon. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Pp. 295. Paper, $2.95.)

This book is a temperate, well-balanced and on the whole impartial discussion of the political and intellectual driving forces that have shared in shaping the programs and images of United States foreign policy from the unsteady, early years of the post-revolutionary period to the frustrated years of Southeast Asia's trials and tribulations. It is a chronological analysis, with enough glances both forward and backward to keep the text interesting and meaningful for the reader—whether he is a beginning student or a reasonably well-read layman on American diplomatic thought, practices and history. Professor Brandon writes, so he tells us (and demonstrates), from the viewpoint of "what has been called the Grand Tradition in political philosophy." The basic premise states that the classical and humanist values of the Judae-Christian seeding rather than the "discredited" Utopian and Realist programs which have plagued our previous history form the relevant foundation of our state's participation in world politics today. Hence his appeal to those who make the final choices for direction is first to test their approaches by broad Western philosophic considerations and then to apply these moral and intellectual reflections to the practical international affairs of the moment.

His Utopian analysis is a factual, lively, articulate discussion in the first few chapters, the last two under the rubric of America's first and second crusades. And, as one would surmise, President Woodrow Wilson and his friends, while treated fairly, are nevertheless outside the Great Tradition. Captain Alfred Mahan's theories and Theodore Roosevelt's sympathetic actions are too realistic for current consideration. The opposite dominant political philosophies are equally analyzed and found wanting for today's needs. A reflection of mood and pace in Brandon's book is demonstrated when he suggests that "Utopian scholars" urged a naive government to be branded "an example of American innocence" without suggesting the application at Nuremberg of the object of scorn, the Pact of Paris of 1927.

The author, in his treatment of America's inescapable problems following World War II, including the heroic attempts in Europe by America to curb the Soviet drive toward its revolutionary goals, reveals more than a dash of latent personal political realism. He concedes that "Realists have performed an invaluable service to the nation by their emphasis upon the reality of power in world affairs. They have done much to overcome the sentimentalism and starry-eyed Utopianism . . ." Nonetheless the United States, in or out of Realism, must recognize that a *Pax Americana* is out of the question. Without advocating the late Pope John's *Pacem in Terris* Professor Brandon makes a vigorous but not passionate call for the United States to recognize the continuum of the search for world stability. It means a never-ending search for international cooperation through law and order. He is Aristotlian—he seeks the middle ground. He is a guide to that high ground.

In a book well-written and well-manufactured, Brandon calls not so much for a plague on both extremes, but for prudential doses of each making a blend which will differ problem by problem and era by era. And he offers guidance towards finding the formulae. It is a worthy book for practitioner and student alike.—JOHN T. HOLDEN, *University of New Hampshire.*

Between Two Worlds. BY JOHN HOHENBERG. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. Pp. xiii, 507. $8.95.)

This is an important book, especially for those of us who believe that a political system derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. As the subtitle indicates, the main thrust of the book is upon "Policy, Press, and Public Opinion in Asian-American Relations." The author, John Hohenberg, who is now a professor of journalism at Columbia University, was a professional newsman for some twenty-five years. In 1963, he and his wife spent six months traveling more than 12,000 miles through seven Asian countries, and everywhere they went they talked more or less informally with many different people about the role of the press (including radio and television) in forming public opinion and influencing public policy. In 1964, Hohenberg and his wife returned to Asia to conduct a more systematic survey, interviewing over a period of four months more than 300 persons, including heads of state, foreign ministers, American diplomats, foreign correspondents, university professors and students. They also collected nearly a hundred questionnaires from American reporters in Asia that provided a miscellany of information about the work of foreign correspondents; on their return to the states they circulated similar questionnaires among Asian, British, French, and other foreign correspondents in the United States. In 1965 and 1966, under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, and with the assistance of various organizations interested in the dissemination of news to and from Asia, including the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, and members of the Washington press corps, Hohenberg amassed an impressive amount of data on the conduct and content of communications "between two worlds."

The author regards the exchange of news ("which includes ideas and opinions") between the United States and Asia "a political act." He is not, however, an empirical political scientist; methodology is not his primary consideration nor his forte; he makes no pretensions to scientific inquiry and does not even claim to be objective. To the contrary, he freely expresses his own opinions and offers his personal value judgments throughout the text; but this is precisely what makes his analysis both authentic and authoritative. He is deeply involved and concerned with the relevance of foreign correspondence to foreign policy, particularly as it affects American-Asian relations. He describes his work as "a study in argument and diversity, in the sometimes frightening cacophony of a democratic society." As he perceives it, the interaction of journalism and diplomacy takes place in a framework of "historic conflict." Although he treats the contestants on both sides with sympathy and understanding, quite obviously he has more sympathy and more understanding for the journalists than for the public officials.

The book is difficult to review, for its scope includes all of Asia, with specific chapters on "The Restless Japanese," "Red China's Shadow," "Along the Asian Perimeter" ("Korea: The Forgotten Front," "Okinawa: The Billion Dollar Base," "The Changing Philippines," "The Voices of Taiwan"), "South Asia" (India and India's neighbors), and, of course, "The War in Viet Nam." The chapter on Viet Nam stands out, perhaps because it is the most timely; it is a detailed and devastating critique of "public diplomacy," management of the news not only by government officials, high and low, by also by publishers and editors, who largely determine what Asian peoples know about the

United States and what the American people know about Asians. Significantly, the chapter on Viet Nam opens with a cautiously critical discussion of the President's role as "newsmaker"; but the chapter ends with an accolade for the Viet Nam correspondents on whose reports the American people depend for information and for "a true interpretation of the course of events."

A great many names, more American than Asian, clutter the text; the index is virtually a roll call of the newsmen, newspapers, and public officials who have had some part in weaving the tangled web of communications between Asia and the United States since World War II. (The Appendix includes a tabulation of specific information about nearly a hundred foreign correspondents, age, nationality, organization, education, language facility, overseas experience, etc.) Despite too much detail, too many undigested and sometimes irrelevant statistics, and too much repetitious trivia, the overall analysis comes through quite clearly: the obstacles newsmen encounter in getting adequate and accurate information from public officials; the problems foreign policy-makers experience in securing cooperation of the press in engineering consent of the governed; the difficulties both face in persuading publishers and editors, especially in the hinterland, to let the people know what is going on in the world; and the credibility gap which leaves the people anxious to get at the truth but skeptical of even the most reliable sources. As we said, this is an important book, contributing to our understanding of the nerves of public diplomacy that stimulate the messages and convey the responses "between two worlds" which in effect constitute Asian-American relations.—Marian D. Irish, *American University*.

Hacia America Latina Democratica e Integrada. By Romulo Betancourt. (Caracas, Venezuela: Editorial Senderos, 1967. Pp. 212.)

Since retiring from the presidency of Venezuela early in 1964, Romulo Betancourt has spent most of his time in Europe. There he has been working on a series of books setting forth his ideas on a wide range of subjects and recounting the history of Venezuela's experience with social reform and rapid economic development under the aegis of political democracy over which he presided for five years. The present volume is the first of these several volumes to appear in print.

Betancourt is best known as a doer. However, he is also a thinker, a man of ideas, with a notable capacity for expressing these ideas in sharp and readable prose. The volume under review is evidence of this fact.

This book is concerned principally with two of the major problems facing Latin America: the conflict between democracies and dictatorships, and the need of the area for economic and eventual political unity. Betancourt has long been an advocate of both democracy and Latin American unification.

In the first part of this book, Betancourt goes into considerable detail to defend the policy established by his government in 1959-64 of not extending diplomatic recognition to any Latin American government which had come to power through unconstitutional means, a policy which has been continued by his successor, Raul Leoni. He presents interesting details of correspondence which he had as President of Venezuela concerning this problem with chiefs of state of other American countries, including the presidents of Argentina, Costa Rica and Mexico, and President John F. Kennedy. He also defends the policy against various kinds of criticism to which it has been subjected.

Betancourt also deals with other aspects of the problems facing democracy in the hemisphere. These include a discussion of the Fidelista campaign to foment guerrilla wars against democratic regimes, and an essay on the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The latter includes interesting details, hitherto unpublished, on an attempted mediation of the Dominican civil war by Betancourt Jose Figueres and Luis Munoz Marin.

Betancourt is also concerned with united Latin American efforts for economic development of the area. In one chapter, he deals with the goals and accomplishments of the Alliance for Progress; in another he argues in favor of economic unity of Latin America as well as trade preferences for the area by industrial countries and international price stabilization agreements for key Latin American exports, as part of the answer to the region's economic problems.

This book is valuable not only for the arguments presented in the body of the volume. It is also of interest because it reprints several key speeches on Latin American affairs which Betancourt has made during the last two decades, and because of the publication for the first time of important private correspondence between Betancourt and other leading hemispheric figures when he was President of Venezuela.—Robert J. Alexander, *Rutgers University*.

Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia. By Edwin O. Reischauer. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1967. Pp. 242. $4.95.)

Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi. By Donald S. Zagoria. (New York: Pegasus Press, 1967. Pp. xiv. 278.)

Both these books are interesting and thought-provoking. Reischauer quickly claims that his book is not about Vietnam, but is more generally concerned with American-Asian relations. This is true if one is accustomed to thinking in mail-slot terms, but false in the larger sense, for the book places Vietnam in its proper Asian setting. Though Reischauer, former American Ambassador to Japan, escapes from the geographic confines of Vietnam, one soon comes to realize that any such escape is academic, for what has happened in Vietnam colors the acts, thoughts and decisions of America, as well as those of Asian nations. Well along in the book the author acknowledges that American frustrations coming from Vietnam could create a new "occident-centered neo-isolationism," which he sees as a disaster second only to a nuclear war itself.

In pointing out the choices facing the United States in Vietnam Reischauer, reflects an admitted gloom. Honest negotiations cannot be counted on, and the alternatives are major escalation, which would wreck our relationship with most of the rest of Asia, and withdrawal, which would be a defeat that would have catastrophic psychological and political effects in the other Asian nations and intensify the already existing instability throughout the area. The remaining alternative is to continue, if in a more flexible manner, the present policy. Historical hindsight is used to present the argument that the present situation need not have developed, but that it resulted from a series of decisions by four presidents. The always present alternative has been the acceptance of a united nationalistic, Communistic Vietnam. Acceptance earlier is shown as not having been a threat to our international interests, possibly even enhancing it. A point of no return was reached in 1965 when massive troops were committed by the United States. That the four presidents had academic and theoretic choice is true, but whether they had real choices is debatable. For though Reischauer constantly points out what would have been the results in the international sphere if certain decisions had been taken, he does not apply the same approach to the domestic scene. A weakness in this book is the failure to properly develop the effects of various alternatives on domestic politics.

Healthy references are made to the vastness of United States power. This vast power is a handicap, for any sudden change in attitude would have serious effects upon other, friendly, nations. We can only change gradually. Analogies between contemporary Asia and an earlier, less developed Europe are challenged and pointed to as a major source of misconceptions about Asia. America must also begin to think of long-term solutions, and not merely of day-to-day policies. These long-term problems facing us in Asia reflect the disproportionate emphasis upon Vietnam; America must think through its goals in Asia and create the appropriate plans for accomplishment, and we must escape from much of the present oversimplifications. To accomplish this, meaningful coordinating mechanisms must be developed, starvation of the State Department must end, and freedom from traditional concepts of diplomacy must be achieved. In reality, the solution to the world problem, as well as to its Asian aspect, lies in re-education, re-thinking, and the development of a greater appreciation of the world as a whole.

Reischauer's book has a detailed table of contents and several excellent maps. There is no bibliography, and much of the material is based upon his personal experience of the diplomatic world. Due in part to the organization of the book one finds a degree of repetition. This, however, tends to reinforce certain themes which may well need repetition. On the whole, the book is invaluable both to the average person who has not already irreversibly made up his mind on the area and to those perhaps more astute, who will find themselves re-evaluating certain aspects of their Asian views. It gives good, but blessedly short, historical data, and avoids the fruitless legalistic arguments. I strongly recommend this book.

Zagoria's book is a scholarly work which is easy and pleasant to read. The five chapters total 136 pages, and the remaining 142 pages consist of extensive appendixes, sources, and a short index. The main purpose of the work, admirably carried out, is to give the reader a real grasp of the complexities and differences between the three Communist protagonists in relation to the Vietnam struggle. Conflicting elements, especially within Peking and Hanoi, are clearly brought forward, and the constant interrelation with Washington is most valuable. Zagoria's approach utilizes "Kremlinology"—the reading of various pronouncements of the Communist leaders and comparison thereof. This is connected to the global relationship of the three nation states. While admitted disadvantages are noted by the author, one cannot but help be impressed by the way in which he has handled the materials. What could have been a dull, lifeless work turns out to be rather fascinating and dynamic in both scope and approach. The thought, reasoning processes and evidence are impressive. In addition, Zagoria gives a very interesting analysis of the relationship between Hanoi and the National Liberation Front, explaining why Hanoi is not over-anxious to negotiate, and criticizing the policy of escalation. The author's position is moderate, rational, and well thought out, resulting in a worthwhile book.—GEORGE G. BAUROTH. *St. Vincent College.*

Abuse of Power. BY THEODORE DRAPER. (New York: The Viking Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 244. $4.95.)

American policy in Vietnam from 1945 to the present is the subject of this volume, which is both an analysis and pointed critique of a war we never intended to fight. Theodore Draper's handling of this subject is uniformly good. He is at his best when assessing the Vietnam conflict within the framework of contemporary American foreign policy. If this book has any drawback, it is that recent preoccupation with this issue inevitably imparts a sense of *déjà vue* to some of Draper's factual account and criticism of Administration policy.

Based on the assumption that the main instrumentalities of a nation's foreign policy are political, economic, and military, Draper's main thesis is that recent years have witnessed "the suppression of political by military instrumentalities in the conduct of American foreign policy." This point is substantiated by a comparison of U.S. policy in Cuba (1961), the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam, where in each case military force was resorted to following a political failure. This failure in each country resulted from overtly supporting the wrong leader, and particularly in not being sufficiently astute to recognize why he was the wrong man. In Vietnam this pattern of failure is compounded, and "our military position has been strengthened every time the internal political situation has weakened." That the author sees a general pattern existing in the U.S. response to these three policy crises is thought-provoking, although one wonders whether he might have added perspective to his proposition by examining an instance of a successful use of the political instrumentality, such as the relatively flexible and sophisticated policy of the United States in the extended Congo crisis of 1960-63.

The book has a two-sided appeal, polemical and analytical. A committed partisan on the Vietnam issue, Draper has presented a penetrating rebuttal to the Administration's defense of its Southeast Asian policy. The author documents and criticizes the Administration's inability to tolerate ambiguity with regard to issues of nationalism and communism. The "foreign aggression vice civil war" theory, and the gamut of aborted negotiation attempts, are critically evaluated. The Administration's argument that China is the "real" enemy receives predictably rough treatment. On this score Draper documents the rising rate of Russian aid to Vietnam, and can only view in bemused wonder a Government which claims that the "real" enemy has no intention or capability of getting into the war, while at the same time it painfully ignores the main source of Vietnam's support.

However, Draper is more than a polemicist and his policy study suggests insights for the student of international bargaining and conflict behavior. The book offers a good empirical examination of escalation. Not only does it capture the flavor of the policy pronouncements and rationale that accompany the increasing stakes, but it explores the relationship between theory and force, war costs and war aims which occurs as the expenditure of force rises. Theory, says the author, is necessarily escalated with force, which transforms the image of the war into a final confrontation between the West and the proponents of wars of "national liberation." The main effect this has is to reduce flexibility and capacity for policy-making, both on our part and on the part of our opponents.

Most students of public policy today would agree with Senator Richard Russell's pronouncement that "we have made every conceivable blunder" in Vietnam. Let us hope that this unfortunate situation continues to receive the calibre of analysis that Draper's *Abuse of Power* represents. —GILBERT R. WINHAM, *McMaster University*.

Arms Control Arrangements for the Far East. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, Hoover Institution Publications, 1967. Pp. xi, 215. $5.00.)

This is a report produced under contract for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by a Hoover Institution Arms Control Project headed by Yuan-Li Wu. The report aims at an objective analysis of arms control and disarmament (ACD) measures and uses the Far East to test a regional approach. The region is defined to include Japan and Taiwan and countries around the Asian rim to India and Pakistan. Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam, along with the United States and the Soviet Union, as interested powers, are "extraregional."

Positions of the major outside powers are considered first as a basis for examining regional positions. The basic data are developed from announced positions of the various countries, and are broken down analytically to form charts of considerable length in the appendices. One appendix presents a matrix with 215 analytical items as related to 82 rows of proposals. Small black squares are used to show major power proposals chronologically, and to compare proposals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Another appendix plots bigger black squares for regional attitudes according to degree of enthusiasm for different proposals. Using the matrix, the Hoover team states that 439 questions were answered hypothetically for each of the fifteen countries (Australia and New Zealand being combined as one), giving a total of 6,585 responses. Since this was unmanageable, and slight differences of interpretation might exist, and some countries "if actually put to the test, would probably not take the position we have attributed to them," the questions were grouped and boiled down to 87 (p. 76).

The Hoover team conclude, after the exercise of developing matrices and applying tests to them, that "previous nonregional proposals, regional responses, and regional proposals, give little insight into the content, application, or efficacy of possible ACD arrangements for the Far East," and thus, "the Far East will have to start from scratch" (p. 16). For the Far East, the conclusion is that instead of attacking the most difficult problems, i.e., actual ACD, "it might be better to work for the acceptance and implementation of ACD arrangements that would be relatively simple to achieve" (p. 120). The hope would be that from minor measures would develop positions producing actual ACD.

The text contains material on the region and groupings and a survey of conflicts and tensions, the latter being the basis of a very simple final chart. A final chapter considers the implications for the national interests of the United States.

The charts, upon which the report bases so much of its substance, although simple in form, are not easy to manage. It seems doubtful whether the methodological breakthrough goes beyond playing games on a matrix. A casual remark with respect to the military regimes which exist in almost one half of the regional countries must be noted. They are described often as "one of the best overall tools for reform and progress available to the nation" (p. 114). That would be a breakthrough, if substantiated.—Dale Pontius, *Roosevelt University.*

Harry S. Truman and the Russians 1945-1953. By Herbert Druks. (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1966. Pp. xii, 219. $7.50.)

This study of the evolution of containment is a useful contribution to the current debate about the origins of the Cold War. Herbert Druks has had access to the papers of most of the principal decision-makers of the Truman administrations and some classified documents of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Additionally, he has canvassed nearly all of the published sources that are relevant to President Truman's statecraft. The resulting treatment is a carefully documented narrative of Truman's major foreign policy decisions during his tenure. Professor Druks' conclusion is that "by raising American foreign policy to a mature level of responsibility, Harry S. Truman became one of the greatest presidents of the United States of America."

Unfortunately the author's conclusion does not follow from his purpose which is to refute partisan charges that President Truman was an "appeaser" or a "warmonger." In this way the reader is provided with two straw men who nearly collapse under their own weight. The book's primary focus is upon the labeling of Truman as an appeaser, and the account of the hypocrisy and unrealism of Republican unilateralist charges from 1948 to 1952 is a familiar and dreary tale.

Nor are there many revelations in the discussion of the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, or President Truman's conduct of the Berlin Blockade and the 1948 campaign. In these instances Harry Truman is characterized as combative, decisive and blessed with competent advisers. Contrarily, Stalin is presented as imperialistic, treacherous and a cunning statesman whose "suspicion" of Anglo-American collaboration was a pretext for his diplomatic intransigence. Hence, most of the book is merely a defense of President Truman's risky and costly decisions to contain the Soviet Union and its proxies from 1947 to 1952. The treatment mirrors the conventional American historiography of that phase of the Cold War.

However, the revisionists argue that the Cold War antedates the Truman Doctrine and was prompted by the American principle of self-determination and President Truman's truculent diplomacy borne of the awesome novelty of atomic capability. Gar Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy* is the most persuasive of the revisionist theories.

Happily, Professor Druks' third chapter, "From Roosevelt to Truman," is the most thoroughly researched section of his book. Although the author concludes that Truman's statecraft of 1945 was a mixture of conciliation, pressure and deterrence with respect to the Russians, much of the evidence cited lends credence to Alperovitz's interpretation. It becomes clear that in spite of the President's initial determination to continue Roosevelt's policy of "friendly firmness" towards the Soviets, there was a shift towards coercion in 1945 as Truman (1) learned of the atomic project the night he became President, (2) was buoyed by the unexpected degree of success of the first atomic test during the Potsdam Conference and (3) realized the psychological efficacy of the use of these weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It also is evident that the abrupt cancellation of lend-lease to Russia was an attempt to pressure Stalin into accepting the American version of the vague Yalta agreements about the governments of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, President Truman admitted in an interview with Druks in 1962 that the imminent development of the atomic bomb was the rationale for delaying the Potsdam Conference in spite of British protestations. The author supports the assertion that one reason for dropping the first atomic bomb was to end the war before the pledged Soviet intervention on August 8th. The author also notes that many American military leaders were averse to the new weapon's use because it would be immoral or unnecessary. Finally, President Truman fired Secretaries Byrnes and

Wallace primarily because by the end of 1945 he believed that dissuasion and coercion were the appropriate techniques for dealing with the Soviets.

But here ends this book's evidence for Alperovitz's rather Procustean thesis. As Druks points out, President Truman did not reverse Roosevelt's Russian policy. Rather, the new President acted upon Admiral Leahy's account of Roosevelt's growing disenchantment with the Soviet Union's desire to be ringed with Communist regimes. It was not until the stupendous results of the atomic test were known that Truman and his closest advisers decided that Russian intervention in Asia was an unnecessary, rather than a necessary evil. Until that time the President had been counseled to rely upon conventional aerial bombardment and blockade of Japan and a Russian declaration of war that *might* obviate or cut short the invasion of Kyushu. Furthermore, President Truman bowed to American public opinion in seeking unconditional surrender until the Japanese overtures after the second atomic raid.

Professor Druks' candid account reveals, as one might expect, that there was no prolonged administration conspiracy to demonstrate atomic power to the Soviets no matter the course of the war with Japan. Instead, the atomic bomb became, after July 21, 1954, the *deus ex machina* that might cause the Japanese to surrender unconditionally before the Soviets intervened and especially before an invasion of Japan. President Truman's early Soviet policy was a series of improvisations and a combination of accommodation, recalcitrance, and threats that have continued to the present. In his brusque way, Harry S. Truman may have hastened the Cold War. But given the American national style, any United States President would have become angered at Soviet perfidy and repression sooner or later and would have led or been led by domestic opinion leaders to resist Soviet expansionism.

Of course the definitive analysis of the Cold War must await the opening of both the American and Soviet archives. Then fuller explanation must be placed within the framework of the national styles, perceptions and objectives of the decision-makers of both states and the interaction of their respective initiatives and capabilities. In the meanwhile, Professor Druks has made an important addition to our understanding of the epochal decision to use atomic weapons and the development of the Cold War.—LEE DENSON, *United State Air Force Academy.*

Soviet Foreign Aid. BY MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. xiv, 265. $8.50.)

As we learn from our first introduction to the treatment of the subject, Dr. Goldman prefers to define Soviet foreign aid rather broadly. In keeping with this preference, he has chosen to include in his geographically oriented survey not only the economic aid extended by the Soviet Union to the countries of the "third world" but also its development assistance to the less industrialized communist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia. He has chosen this particular approach, Dr. Goldman informs us, partly in order to provide some perspective on the evolution of Soviet attitudes and policies toward economically less developed nations since the end of World War II, and in part because, in his words, "certain patterns that were first established in Eastern Europe and China continue to be of significance in the Soviet aid program today."

In the material covered by the first two chapters, which deal with the communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, the reader is presented with detailed information on the specific branches of industry in which the Soviet Union had developed particular capabilities by the end of World War II. He is, therefore, disposed to agree readily with the author that the experience gained in dealing with client countries in the communist camp was in fact indispensable to the future development assistance activities of the government agencies as well as the individual specialists of the U.S.S.R. This previous experience was helpful, first of all, in the sense of providing Soviet personnel with the needed confidence that they will be able to tackle the rather difficult job of transplanting productive capacity of their own manufacture, and the range of operating skills associated with it, into an alien environment and to untrained people speaking a foreign tongue.

In the chapters dealing with the main body of his material, namely the newly developing countries outside the communist camp, Professor Goldman has provided the reader with another useful perspective. He has chosen to examine the record, as well as the impact, of the economic aid programs of the U.S.S.R. in a comparative setting, namely in juxtaposition to the development assistance projects supported by the United States in some of the same countries. To this end, he has introduced into the individual chapters, each devoted to a major recipient area of Soviet economic aid, a judicious amount of economic data, and interpretative comment related to U.S. activities in support of specific development projects in these countries.

Once he has immersed himself in these richly factual and highly readable chapters, the interested reader will continue to be enormously impressed by the industry and patience which Dr. Goldman has brought to his task. In particular, he will find that the author has painstakingly recorded the details of the economic operations which the U.S.S.R. has undertaken in the case of two major recipients, the U.A.R. and India, to whom it has assigned a special place of honor in its foreign aid program. In several instances, in fact, the author has succeeded in enlivening his account by means of a short personal visit to the Soviet-financed projects which he has described. On occasion, too, he has interviewed key officials who play an active role in guiding the assistance programs, or in supervising enterprises under construction.

While unfolding before the reader the record with respect to the two leading client-countries Professor Goldman has chronicled with great patience, and with a degree of dramatic flair, the evolution of some of the more publicized credit transactions between the U.S.S.R. and the recipient countries, detailing the size and capacity of the installations to be erected, and the psychological impact created by the completed enterprise both at home and abroad.

What this reviewer finds somewhat less satisfactory in Dr. Goldman's treatment of the complex subject of Soviet foreign aid is the fact that he has manifested little interest in synthesizing the material he has laboriously assembled into some meaningful analytical findings. As a rule, of course, we are no more justified in quarreling with a man's interest than with his taste. There are, nevertheless, in a study of this importance, a number of points on which the reader has a right to expect the author to confront some of the issues which he himself has raised in the course of positioning his own generalizations. Dr. Goldman has not tried, for example, to offer a valid rationale for the Soviet venture into the costly and unpredictable enterprise of dispensing development aid to non-communist countries that would be sufficiently persuasive to the careful reader. The reader finds himself quite puzzled by the whole massive Soviet undertaking, especially in light of Dr. Goldman's own opinion to the effect that "a successful aid project that strengthens and stabilizes the economy" in a newly developing country is not very helpful to the cause of revolution (p. 199); or that the cause of "communism does not flourish or spread in countries that seem to be solving their economic problems."

On balance, however, this may be a secondary count on which to cavil with a useful book that contains between its two covers a vast amount of factual material on the actual operations of the program of external financial and technical assistance which the Soviet Union has consistently supported since the mid-fifties.—LEON M. HERMAN, *Library of Congress.*

The Soviet Union in the World Communist System. BY VERNON V. ASPATURIAN. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, Hoover Institution Publications, 1966. Pp. 96. $1.50.)

Aspaturian's monograph is part of a comprehensive project inaugurated at Stanford University in 1963 to study integration and community building among the fourteen ruling communist-party states. Its predominant ideas may be summarized as follows.

1. After the Bolshevik success in 1917, the accomplishments of the Soviet Union and the pronouncements of its leaders were widely regarded as oracular and infallible, and the strategy and tactics of the CPSU came to be a model for successful revolutionary action outside the Soviet Union.

2. Lenin and Stalin envisioned their multinational federation as the beginning of a global communist federation. Although subservient relationships between the CPSU and non-ruling parties ensued under Comintern auspices, in time new ruling-party states with particularistic national traditions demanded a rejection of the Soviet Union's Russified Marxism. Perhaps surprisingly, the trend was heralded by Stalin's own failure to sever the Soviet state from its Russian moorings. But in fact, none of Lenin's successors have resolved the special problem of the U.S.S.R. as an arrested universal state, or the contradiction which resulted from "the necessity to be both ethnocentric and ecumenical simultaneously." Thus, instead of being the nucleus of a world communist federation, the U.S.S.R. by 1965 had become "little more than a Russianized socialist multinational state, controlling an East European empire of dependent states."

3. Never in history has a state assumed so many "masks." Institutionalized identities include state, party, nation (Russia), and multiple nation (multi-national federation), all of which have led to "political schizophrenia" and more generally to an uncommonly ambiguous Soviet personality. The four identities in turn operate in five political environments: the Soviet social order; the Soviet multinational order; the communist party-state; the general interstate system; and the world communist movement. The result is a "spectrum of internal and external social, political, and ideological constituencies, whose interests impinge upon and influence the behavior of the Soviet Union in its "multiple political roles."

4. Not only do Great Russian interests predominate as the chief national input into the Soviet system, but those of the other Soviet nationalities are arranged in an informal hierarchy of priorities. (Here the study would be measurably enhanced if it were to argue and statistically demonstrate this point, rather than assume it. A number of conclu-

sions about preferential treatment are drawn, but without convincing evidence.)

Professor Aspaturian's study is clearly a provocative supplementary piece for college courses. As part of an effort to illuminate integration and community building among Marxist-Leninist states, however, it has a fundamental weakness: it gives much attention to the multinational character of the Soviet Union, and surprisingly little to the roles of Eastern Europe. Even a slight shift in emphasis would help considerably.

For historical, geographical, and political reasons, Eastern Europe is today the only international context amenable to ideological confirmation in support of the Soviet Union—a situation which is somewhat paradoxical in that, faced with system-wide conflicts, the Soviets must ultimately rely upon East European allies where national particularism began in the first place. Significantly, the old one-way relations have long been replaced by an organizational subsystem (COMECON and the Warsaw Treaty Organization), harboring multiple transactions in an atmosphere of mutual dependence and value sharing. Whatever the dynamics of Soviet identities in various operational environments, the primary virtues of the Soviet revolutionary model have really become the promotion of welfare at home, the support of revolution abroad (or in its contemporary form, wars of national liberation), and the development of Marxist-Leninist solidarity among the most advanced ruling-party states of the system. All this means a monumental effort to impart fresh legitimacy to withered dogmas through a trifold policy which assigns high priorities to what in the Soviet purview are ideologically progressive relationships with East European allies.

Among the study's more controversial assertions (p. 65) is that "since the Cuban missile crisis, the credibility of the Soviet Union's willingness to protect its allies under certain conditions has been undermined." It can be argued convincingly that quite the contrary may be true and that the Soviet Union proved its willingness to confront the United States until presidential assurances were given that Fidel Castro's precarious regime would not be destroyed. The same imperative underpins unswerving Soviet support to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam against the odds that a Marxist-Leninist regime might not survive cumulative American military pressures. The withdrawal of missiles from Cuba might have been a *tactical* defeat; and the Soviet Union's less than all-out defense of Hanoi may be questionable. But it should not be surprising if history records both policies as significant *strategic* victories—i.e., an unassailable base for communist promotions in Latin America, and carefully measured low-risk logistical support for the DRV, the effect of which is to mire the United States in Southeast Asia and direct attention from Europe where America's increasingly nominal allies sense an important shift in U.S. defense priorities.

The heart of the study lies in what it does not do after presenting a whole range of heuristic insights. Themes and themes are paraded in tantalizing fashion before the reader, and after a few glancing blows dropped without adequate exploration. In this sense, the monograph is a skeletal effort deserving of a full-length definitive work on Soviet foreign policy over a half century, a task for which few are better qualified than Aspaturian.
—Nish Jamgotch, Jr., *University of North Carolina at Charlotte.*

Israel on the Road to Sinai, 1949-1956. By Ernest Stock. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 284. $6.50.)

Dr. Stock has handled his main theme in a meticulous and objective fashion. He observes piquantly that the sale of French arms to Israel, which made possible Israel's success in the 1956 Sinai campaign, had been approved by the Eisenhower administration which, apprehensive about the effect on the Arab states if American arms were to go to Israel in quantity, referred the Israeli shopping-list to France and gave its "blessing" to the transaction (p. 184).

A smoke-screen of Israeli censorship still surrounds the abortive sabotage operation of 1954 that was apparently designed to damage Egypt's improving relations with the U.S. and Britain. Dr. Stock treats the "mishap" briefly in a section entitled "Ambivalence and Illegitimate Force" (pp. 117-26); but would not its Defense Ministry authors argue that, facing an Egypt that continually claimed to be legally at war with Israel or at least insisted on its "belligerent rights" (pp. 100-102), such a sabotage operation was (subject to the eleventh commandment, Thou shalt not be found out) a legitimate *ruse de guerre?*

The author frankly tells us (p. 217) that he had written in a concluding paragraph of the book composed some months before May 15, 1967, "The combination of circumstances which made Sinai possible . . . is not likely to recur"; but before these words went to the press, circumstances obliged him to add a "Sequel on the Six-Day War, 1967." Dr. Stock's casual dismissal of the Anglo-French motives for taking seriously Nasser's expropriation of the Suez Canal, with the remark that it "was no longer a matter of vital interest to the West but one of prestige" (p. 215), likewise contrasts with his admission in his *Sequel: 1967* that by now "without a doubt, the Soviet Union exerted the most forceful influence on events in the Arab-Israel area" (p. 230). This is precisely what Sir Anthony Eden foresaw and feared in 1956 while Dulles and Eisenhower, preoccupied with their election campaign, chose to pass by on the other side. If indeed the Cold War has "subsided" (p. 232), the present maneuvers of Soviet naval vessels between the Arab ports of the Mediterranean suggest an interim Soviet victory.—GEORGE KIRK, *University of Massachusetts.*

Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries: Objectives and Alternatives. BY BELA BALASSA. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967. Pp. 246. $7.95.)

It would be difficult to overstate the value of this book to students of international politics and economics. In about 150 lucidly and authoritatively written pages of text, Professor Balassa reviews the postwar history of trade liberalization; describes, with measures of the protective effect of tariffs calculated by himself, the system of protection in the industrial countries; evaluates the static and dynamic effects of trade liberalization (including an evaluation of the effects of liberalization on international direct investment patterns); and weighs the relative costs and benefits of alternative groupings of countries between which complete liberalization might proceed.

Implications about the trade stance of groups and industries—their success in winning protection or their stake in expanded trade—can be drawn from tables reporting rates of effective protection by-industry by-country, and export-import ratios by-industry by-country.

With the basic data and some simplifying assumptions, Balassa offers several estimates of the effects of trade liberalization, for example, the per cent increase (from 1960 values) of exports and imports of industrial materials and manufactured goods, by country, that might accompany the formation of an Atlantic free trade area (North America, E.E.C., E.F.T.A., and Japan). In this case, the expected changes generally run from 10 to 15 per cent, and the adverse balance of trade effects are small.

The value of this and similar exercises in the book is not that they offer solid predictions. The protective system basically alters the composition and characteristics of industry within countries, and estimates of the effects of suspending protection must necessarily employ the only data available, which are tariff-distorted. And such exercises neglect gains from intra-industry specialization, widening the field of choice for consumers, and stimulating innovation. The value of the exercises is that they provide quantitative benchmarks, the best available with the state of the art, against which discussion of alternative arrangements (e.g., Atlantic free trade area vs. 50 per cent across the board tariff reduction) can be organized, and to which the consideration of less quantifiable effects can be added. Balassa uses the estimates appropriately. The student who follows their derivation will not be misled, but will acquire an understanding of effects of trade liberalization.

Essays on the dynamic effects of liberalization, direct investment and liberalization, and a summary discussion of alternatives, encompass both political and economic considerations.

Complete appendices record data and describe the method and rationale of the computations. There is no bibliography, but there is an adequate index and Balassa conscientiously cites the literature—including some very recently published—in the text and notes. The student attempting to organize a research project, or seeking a grasp of this area, would profitably start with this book.—DAVID S. BALL, *North Carolina State University.*

The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations. BY OBED Y. ASAMOAH. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Pp. 274.)

The most significant aspect of international development is the development of international organizations and, correlatively, the development of a so-called "new" international law. This law, derived from a growing corpus of resolutions and declarations, saliently those of the United Nations General Assembly, promotes the identification of political and legal acts in the context of international organizations and obviates the popular arguments that international organizations lack the legislative and executive authority to formulate and to compel adherence to decisions independently of States: thus embodying one form of problem-anticipating or initiatory developments in international politics.

In *The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations,* Obed Y. Asamoah documents that development. Among relatively few such studies, this analysis focuses upon the role of the General Assembly, as the UN's chartered law-making organ, in modifying legal relations between States; it further suggests that the State practice of presenting declarations in that body has broader implications for customary international law—that the practice arising from political as opposed to contractual pressure is law in all arenas, inter-organizational as well as inter-State. Asamoah's thesis has been affirmed in three recent sessions of the UN General Assembly, in 1963, 1965, and 1966 when it constituted and subsequently reconstituted the Special Committee on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. (See, for example, Chapter III under Legal Questions in the *Yearbook of the United Nations 1965.*)

Asamoah is concerned less with the formal aspects of authority described by sovereignty and the drafting of treaties than with the informal aspects of the observance and enforecement of international law propounded in organizations originating in treaties. In an introductory functional analysis of the constraints imposed upon the United Nations in the initiation and application of international law, the author holds that the validity of law does not depend upon its observance and that over-emphasis on enforcement obscures the qualitative differences between national and international legal systems, the latter achieving a degree of regularity proportionate to the growing corpus of international practices as binding customary rules. The layman's view (that breaches of international law and the lack of instituted means to prevent or to sanction such breaches indicate that there is no international law *qua* law) ignores the actual political bargaining integral to the behavior of States in international organizations as expressed in recommendations and the quasi-legislative decisions of which declarations are frequently composed. The element of irreversibility in the development of international customary rules is examined implicitly in this analysis and it is hoped that the author, obviously unable to pursue that subject in the present short monographic context, will soon undertake a close study of the junctures beyond which practice can only become rule.

Without attempting to scale the several types of recommendations and binding decisions obtaining in the General Assembly in terms of their significance for the evolution of rules, Asamoah distinguishes among several of them with detail sufficient to provide the political scientist insight into which practices originating in or confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly are more or less capable of initiating legal and political development within and outside that arena. Binding decisions are narrowly identified with the operation of the UN system itself, pertaining, for example, (1) to admissions to certain relations with non-members, (2) to its subsidiary agencies, and (3) to agreements between States delegating legislative competences upon the Assembly. It is in the first of these, in particular the admission of new members, expulsion, and the control of the UN over non-members, that international organizational development may occur with relatively great frequency and intensity. The question of the irreversibility of membership by expulsion or withdrawal has received attention by policy scientists in several disciplines.

Assembly recommendations lack the legislative competence and enforcement procedures latently characteristic of binding decisions, which have an internal base in the Charter. But recommendations may embody assertions of principle observed by the international community as legally binding; thus by reformulating a norm, an assertion extends the boundaries of both norm and UN legal presence. As Asamoah clearly indicates, the decisions of international organizations, though protean in scope and origin, are institutionally defined by the membership of States, as in the UN. Hence, it is valid and analytically fruitful to term as unique the rules emanating from international organizational practice not circumscribed by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. This consideration obviates specious comparisons between municipal law and organizational authority with regard to structure and process. Asamoah distinguishes further between the historical influence of the presence of international organizations upon the substance and rate of accumulation of international custom, and the emergent development of an international law internal to the organizations themselves.

Asamoah does not establish an undifferentiated sphere of organizational law; the implicit catalyst if not the aim of the present volume is to isolate a variety of emergent types of organizational law typical of at least one organization and one medium—declarations. What forums exist beyond the Secretariat, but within the UN, which do or could promote *de facto* the development of international law? Has the signal rule-making role assumed by the General Assembly through declarations lent both that body and its declarations a long-range dominance in international customary practice? Without analyzing the unique attributes of the General Assembly as a rule-making arena or defining its declarations as qualitatively different political processes from those obtaining in other international organizations narrower and more specialized namely, the European Community—the author encourages those exercises by his historical examination of the characteristics of declarations, his categorization of Assembly declarations, and his reference to the interrelationships between declarations and the contexts in which they are promulgated.

Asamoah's categorization may assist analyst and policy-maker in discerning where, in time and in space, the constitutional development of organizations ends and the evolution of practice begins. By delineating Assembly declarations as those (1) positing principles of international law; (2) claiming in quasi-legislative form to create new principles of international law; (3) supporting programs authorized under the UN Charter, the monograph provides the basis for models by which to test the relevance of specific boundaries of organizational constitutions for international legal development.

Assembly declarations have manipulative value according to the modifications they are capable of dictating at any point for such constituted UN behavior as decision-making. As the structure, authorized through evidently flexible norms by the Charter to introduce law, the General Assembly is a delimiting environment for declarations only in that Charter provisions outline the decision-making processes giving initial definition of outcomes. But the Charter is subject to particular opportunistic interpretations of such principles as those of "domestic jurisdiction" and "sovereign equality" in instances which include the Soviet Union's simultaneous endorsement of the intervention in South Africa on behalf of the Indians and refusal to allow examination of the violation of human rights perpetrated in Eastern Europe.

As the author suggests, this contextual analysis of the influence of declarations as an available political instrument in the UN might valuably be extended to other phases and aspects of diplomatic method currently outside the gambit of organizations. The utility of declarations as media of communication, as between States members of the UN and participants in treaty systems perceived by those States as imposing incompatible demands, in establishing coherence among a community of treaty commitments has not been explored as initiatory development.

In this respect as in several others cited above, it is hoped that Asamoah's study of General Assembly declarations will serve as the basis for future collaboration between lawyers and politicians, scholars of the law and political scientists, in seeking new ways to use existing international organizations rather than in encouraging the multiplication of constitutional structures to solve new problems.—A. R. HEADLEY, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

World Politics: The Global System. HERBERT J. SPIRO. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1966. Pp. xx, 345. $6.75.)

World Politics: The Global System by Herbert J. Spiro is a useful undergraduate textbook that also endeavors to make a contribution to a systems analysis of international politics. After dispensing with power approaches to international politics by demonstrating their ambiguities and deficiencies, Professor Spiro uses a systems approach in which many original concepts are offered to define the growth of community in the international system. In doing this, he makes a plea that if the new institutions of international politics are to develop adequately, they must be used in a variety of contexts.

The book contains an interesting discussion of political styles as they have changed over time in the course of which Spiro provides an adequate background for the student of the course of international politics since 1898. Spiro enters a plea against the use of misleading analogies and metaphors although it is doubtful whether he provides any criteria by means of which insightful and useful metaphors can be distinguished from misleading or harmful metaphors.

Professor Spiro defines the political system in such a way that it is broader than the social system, a definitional peculiarity to which he is entitled but which this reviewer finds inutile. He includes a discussion of the role of international law in the system of international politics that the student will find informative and enlightening. In the course of this, the student is confronted with Roman Law and Common Law traditions and various theories of law, a refreshing contrast with the usual textbook approach.

Undergraduate texts necessarily cover many more areas of human knowledge than any one political scientist can be competent in. Spiro's major weakness is in the area of strategic theory. It is not true that nuclear weapons cannot be used to acquire some future good. And it is not true that the international politics of the seventeenth century was a zero-sum game although Spiro is right in believing that many writers of the time conceived it as such (although they used a different terminology, of course). The doomsday machine was invented by strategists as a *reductio ad absurdum,* not as a preferred strategy. The discussion of strategic doctrine is based upon gross misunderstanding of the literature. Professor Spiro is not to be blamed for this, but it is a comment on the Dorsey Press that they could not afford proper critical help to the author for a book being offered as an undergraduate text.—MORTON A. KAPLAN, *University of Chicago.*

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Managing Editor and printers regret that work stoppages and other production difficulties have caused the delayed publication of this issue of the REVIEW.

1968 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1968–69

The 1968 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 4–7 at the Washington-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D. C. Professor Joseph LaPalombara, Yale University, is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting of the Association, to be held at 8:00 p.m. Wednesday, September 4, in the Grand Ballroom, Washington-Hilton Hotel, the Nominating Committee (comprised of Aaron B. Wildavsky, University of California, Berkeley, Chairman; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester; Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan; Harry Eckstein, Princeton University; Leon D. Epstein, University of Wisconsin; and William S. Livingston, University of Texas) will propose the following officers for 1968–69:

President Elect: Karl W. Deutsch, Harvard University
Vice Presidents: James W. Fesler, Yale University
Hans J. Morgenthau, University of Chicago
Vernon Van Dyke, University of Iowa
Secretary: Bernard L. Kronick, University of Santa Clara
Treasurer: Francis E. Rourke, Johns Hopkins University
Members of the Council for two years:
Gordon E. Baker, University of California, Santa Barbara
Samuel DuBois Cook, Duke University
Josephine E. Milburn, Simmons College
Joseph L. Nogee, University of Houston
A. F. K. Organski, University of Michigan
Frank J. Sorauf, University of Minnesota
Herbert J. Spiro, University of Pennsylvania
Frederick M. Wirt, Denison University

NOTICE

RESOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AT THE ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

In accordance with the Constitution of the American Political Science Association, the attention of members of the Association is hereby directed to the provisions of the Constitution that:

"All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting." (Article VIII)

"Amendments to this Constitution shall be proposed by the Council and adopted by a majority vote of the members present at any regular or special meeting of the Association.

"Ten members of the Association may propose amendments to this Constitution. Such proposed amendments shall be referred to the Council for consideration, and by them referred to the Association for its action thereon at the next Annual Business Meeting with such recommendations as the Council may see fit to make." (Article IX)

The Council of the Association will meet during the afternoon of Monday, September 2, and all day Tuesday, September 3, 1968, in the Thoroughbred Room, Washington-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D. C.

The Constitution of the Association is printed in both the 1961 and 1968 editions of the Association's Biographical Directory.

PROGRAM COMMITTEE: 1969 ANNUAL MEETING

The 1969 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held in New York City at the Commodore Hotel, September 3–6. Suggestions for papers to be presented at the 1969 Annual Meeting are earnestly solicited. As before, the program will be divided into sections, each of which will have a number of panels, with each panel providing an opportunity for one or more papers. All of the sections will include some cross-cultural comparisons. No Section Chairman can possibly be familiar with all of the work going on in his domain; thus it becomes necessary for scholars whose work is just coming to fruition to make this work known to the relevant Section Chairmen. This is particularly true when the research forms part of a dissertation currently under way.

Please advise the Section Chairmen (listed below) of research which, either now or within a year, will very likely form the basis for a high quality research report at the meetings. Since the program is currently being shaped, it is not too early to anticipate events more than a year in the future. Proposals should be submitted preferably by October 15, 1968, but not later than December 1, 1968. Members of the Committee are:

Chairman, Robert E. Lane, Yale University
Empirical Theory—James G. March, University of California, Irvine
International Relations, Organization and Bargaining—Harold Guetzkow, Northwestern University
Legislative Roles, Recruitment and Decision-Making—Samuel C. Patterson, University of Iowa
Mathematical Applications to Political Research—Gerald H. Kramer, Yale University
Normative Political Theory—Christian Bay, University of Alberta
Political Socialization in Cultural Context—Jack Dennis, University of Wisconsin
Urban Politics and Problems—J. David Greenstone, University of Chicago
Political and Social Change—Frederick W. Frey, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Political Science as a Policy Science—H. Mark Roelofs, New York University, University Heights
Computer Technology and Political Research—Warren E. Miller, University of Michigan
Multi-Ethnic Communities—Aristide R. Zolberg, University of Chicago
Legal and Judicial Behavior—David J. Danelski, Yale University
Parties and Elections—H. Douglas Price, Harvard University
Administration and Organization—C. Dwight Waldo, Syracuse University
Political and Social Indicators: Development and Use—Bertram M. Gross, Syracuse University
Civil Disorder: Cross-Cultural Analysis and American Implications—Ivo K. Feierabend, San Diego State College
Political Personality and Leadership—Alexander L. George, Stanford University

ERRATUM

In Robert A. Dahl's Presidential address published in the issue of December, 1967, line 2 in footnote 11, p. 964, should read: "another county since 1955. . . . "

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

September, 1968

Robert Alford, University of Wisconsin, "Voting Turnout in American Cities"

Richard Ashcraft, University of California, Los Angeles, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?"

Edward N. Beiser, Williams College, "The Reapportionment Cases: A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior"

Moshe M. Czudnowski, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, "A Salience Dimension for the Study of Political Culture."

Jerome M. Gilison, Johns Hopkins University, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent"

A. James Gregor, University of California, Berkeley, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis"

Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, University of Michigan, "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States"

Michael Leiserson, University of California, Berkeley, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Explanation Based on the Theory of Games"

Milton G. Lodge, University of Iowa, "Soviet Elite Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Era"

Martin C. Needler, University of New Mexico, "Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America"

Robert A. Schoenberger, University of Michigan, "Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism"

Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, "Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union"

J. David Singer, University of Michigan, Bruce M. Russett, Yale University, and Melvin Small, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List"

Jack E. Vincent, Florida Atlantic University, ' National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations"

Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University, and Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University, "The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting"

December, 1968

Paul R. Brass, University of Washington, "Indian Party Systems: Coalition Politics and the Formation of Non-Congress Governments in North India"

M. Margaret Conway, University of Maryland, and Frank B. Feigert, Knox College, "Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization"

Ernest A. Duff, Randolph-Macon Women's College, and John F. McCamant, University of Denver, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability"

H. D. Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, Princeton University, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling"

Michael P. Gehlen, University of California, Berkeley, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis"

Ted Gurr, Princeton University, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices"

Allan Kornberg, Duke University, and Hal N. Winsborough, University of Wisconsin, "The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons"

Michael Lipsky, University of Wisconsin, "Protest as a Political Resource"

Allan G. Pulsipher, Texas A&M University, and James L. Weatherby, Jr., University of Minnesota, "Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures"

Harry M. Scoble, University of California, Los Angeles, and Robert Alford, University of Wisconsin, "Sources of Local Political Involvement"

Ira Sharkansky, University of Wisconsin, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislation"

Gordon Tullock, Rice University, "A Note on Censorship"

March, 1969

Stephen J. Cimbala, University of Wisconsin, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area: An Exploratory Analysis"

Arthur S. Goldberg, University of Rochester, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification"

Arthur L. Kalleberg, University of Minnesota, "Concept Formation in Normative and Empirical Studies"

Lawrence B. Mohr, University of Michigan, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations"

Douglas W. Rae, Yale University, "Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Collective Choice"

R. J. Rummel, University of Hawaii, "Indicators of Cross-National and International Patterns"

---

* Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

Professional Placement Service at 1968 Annual Meeting

(September 3-7, 1968)

A professional placement service will again be available to members of The American Political Science Association attending the Washington, D.C. meeting. The placement service will be provided by the U. S. Employment Service. The primary purpose is to provide an efficient means for employers to meet prospective employees and vice versa.

The Professional Placement Service is entirely separate from the APSA's Personnel Service and requires separate registration. There is no fee for use of the Professional Placement Service by employers or applicants at the Convention.

All State Employment Service local offices accept orders and applications in the field of political science on a year-round basis as a regular part of their professional service.

If you plan to attend the Conference and utilize the Placement Service, please mail the form below as soon as possible, *but not later than August 3, 1968*. Application and/or employer order forms will be forwarded to you upon receipt of the following information.

Name: ....

(Organization or Institution) ....

....

Address: ....

....
(City) (State)

☐ Employer
(check either)

☐ No. of Vacancies

☐ Prospective Candidate

☐ No. of Area(s) of Specialization

Will you be available for interviews during the Annual Meeting?
☐ Yes ☐ No

Fill in appropriate blocks and mail to: Miss Wareteen Smith, USES-DC Professional Career and Information Center, 1111 20th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

SEATS STILL AVAILABLE

APSA SUMMER FLIGHT B

August 3 to September 3 New York to Paris

Round trip $265

For further information write to the Director of Summer Flights, American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Beam in on U.S. domestic and foreign affairs

Here is a remarkable series of audio tapes — recorded right in the nation's capital by men involved at the highest levels of government — that will give political science students extraordinary insights into the workings of U.S. national and international affairs.

WASHINGTON TAPES are not excerpts. They are original, 15-minute recordings with a broad sweep of topics covering such subjects as government structure, political power, controversial issues, and U.S. foreign policy — each discussed in depth by an expert in his field.

A Teacher's Guide accompanies each WASHINGTON TAPE. It includes an outline of the subject matter, suggested topics for further study, and a biographical resume of the speaker.

Write today for detailed, descriptive brochure listing all of the more than 50 tapes currently available.

WASHINGTON TAPES®*

*exclusive trademark of Washington Tapes, Inc.

distributed by
Educational Systems Division
Doubleday & Company, Inc.
Garden City, L. I., N. Y. 11530

AMERICA'S POLITICAL DILEMMA

From Limited to Unlimited Democracy

By GOTTFRIED DIETZE Has the American Dream of democracy and equal rights come true? Professor Dietze's thesis is that the march of democracy has actually made government less reasonable, has eliminated constitutional checks, has jeopardized the rights of men, and has resulted in a foreign policy that allowed the present Soviet threat to American security. *$7.95*

FRANCE, DE GAULLE, AND EUROPE

The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent

BY SIMON SERFATY In this concise, closely-reasoned analysis of French policy toward Europe since World War II, Dr. Serfaty discusses French efforts to regain internal security and a position of world power. His study also includes a critical evaluation of present French European policy, polycentrism in Europe, and French dissensions with her Western allies. *$6.95*

ALLIANCES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

BY ROBERT E. OSGOOD What changes have occurred in alliances since World War II, and what effect will these changes have on U.S. policy in the future? In answering these questions the author suggests that alliances in the future may be more concerned with conducting diplomacy and interallied politics and that our commitments will tend to be more limited, diversified, and informal. *$6.50*

NEW JOHNS HOPKINS PAPERBACKS

Huey Long's Louisiana

State Politics, 1920-1952

BY ALLAN P. SINDLER What has been the effect of Longism in Louisiana politics? In an objective analysis of Huey Long and the politics of the state, the author discusses the origins, development, and continuing importance of Longism. "A monumental achievement in political science. . . . Seldom if ever have a state and its leaders been so completely taken apart to see what made—and makes—them tick."—*New York Times Book Review* JH-44/$2.25

Nations in Alliance

The Limits of Interdependence

BY GEORGE LISKA In a brilliant analysis George Liska interprets the structure and dynamics of alliances, drawing freely on contemporary and historical events. "[It] is a major work which brings diplomatic history and rich insight to bear on many aspects of international politics; indeed, no book in recent years has so many strikingly original interpretations of so many . . . problems."—*American Political Science Review* JH-42/$2.25

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

Baltimore, Maryland 21218

harper torchbooks

New and forthcoming

LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, Editor

American Ethnic Politics

"The articles . . . were picked as exemplars of political analysis. [They] concentrate on questions of issues and ethnicity and the distribution of power."—LAWRENCE H. FUCHS. The contributors: Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Leon D. Epstein, Lawrence H. Fuchs, Benton Johnson, Dwaine Marvick, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Joseph Schafer, Harry M. Scoble, James Q. Wilson, and Raymond E. Wolfinger.

(*July*) TB/1368 $2.45

HANS KOHN

The Age of Nationalism

The First Era of Global History

New Introduction by the Author.

"A compact and illuminating guide to the clash of ideals in today's world."—GEOFFREY BRUUN. "It gives us a view of the subject that is fresh in many ways . . . with Kohn's accustomed vigor and authority."—A. P. WHITAKER, *The American Historical Review*

(*August*) TB/1380 $1.45

GORDON K. LEWIS

Puerto Rico

Freedom and Power in the Caribbean

"By far the best general survey of Puerto Rico ever written. . . . Always stimulating and probing."—FRANK OTTO GATELL, *The American Historical Review.* "An essential item for the bibliography of almost any social science inquiry or enterprise dealing with the Caribbean or any of its parts."—ROBERT A. MANNERS, *The American Anthropologist* TB/1371 $2.95

RITCHIE P. LOWRY

Who's Running This Town?

Community Leadership and Social Change

"An intriguing and penetrating study of the effects of accelerated urban change upon the hybrid suburban city. . . . The legend of grass roots democracy in a small town is effectively shattered."—EDWARD SOFEN, *The American Political Science Review*

(*September*) TB/1383 $2.25

CONYERS READ, Editor

The Constitution Reconsidered

Revised Edition with a New Preface by Richard B. Morris.

"It was an excellent idea to gather together in a single volume these papers. . . . The larger part consists of essays of high interest, and there are a few, notably those of Professors Salvemini, Hamilton, Lerner, and Commager, which are of outstanding value."—H. J. LASKI, *The American Historical Review* (1939)

(*September*) TB/1384 $3.75

RENZO SERENO

The Rulers

"In significance of subject matter—both for political science and for an understanding of major political problems—in analytic acuteness, and in breadth and profundity of human insight, Professor Sereno's study stands in the very first rank of creative contemporary works in political theory."—F. H. WILLHOITE, *The American Political Science Review*

A Harper Colophon Book. CN/126 $1.45

KALMAN H. SILVERT

The Conflict Society

Reaction and Revolution in Latin America

"[Includes] case studies covering a long period, theoretical dissertations and brilliant essays based on the author's personal experience." —*International Review of Social History* (Amsterdam). "Provides authoritative and lucid discussion of political development in the Latin American countries."—*The Book Exchange* (London). *A Harper Colophon Book.*

(*August*) CN/130 $2.25

RICHARD S. WECKSTEIN, Editor

Expansion of World Trade and the Growth of National Economies

The contributors: Alexander K. Cairncross, Charles A. Cooper, Gottfried Haberler, Harry G. Johnson, Staffan B. Linder, Benjamin F. Massell, Gerald M. Meier, Gunnar Myrdal, Ragnar Nurkse, Raúl Prebisch, and Hans W. Singer.

(*July*) TB/1373 $2.75

1817

Complete catalog of Harper Torchbooks [653 volumes now in print] available on request from Dept. 51, HARPER & ROW, *Publishers*, 49 E. 33rd St., New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

PRAEGER

Outstanding new paperback texts in political science

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II
Third Revised Edition

JOHN W. SPANIER. To account for significant post-1965 developments, Professor Spanier (author of the recent *World Politics in an Age of Revolution*, also a Praeger Paperbound Text) now provides an extensively revised edition of the popular historical analysis long required in American government and foreign policy courses. Among the highlights of this largely reorganized and rewritten edition are a penetrating new chapter on "The Third World and the American-Soviet Competition" and a detailed analysis of "The American Empire and Vietnam." *ca. 300 pp. June.*
A Praeger Paperbound Text/$2.95

REPUBLICAN POLITICS
The 1964 Campaign and Its Aftermath for the Party

Edited by BERNARD COSMAN and ROBERT J. HUCKSHORN. "With the approach of the 1968 Presidential election this analysis . . . should be of special interest to students of government. . . . A necessity for the political scientist in understanding the Republican side of the picture in the 1964 Presidential campaign and its post-electoral results."—*Library Journal. 320 pp. (Examination copies available now; bookstore orders to be shipped in August.)*
U-649/$2.95

EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE
The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67

ADAM B. ULAM. The distinguished Harvard historian and political scientist Adam B. Ulam provides scholars and students with an authoritative history of the diplomatic, political, and ideological factors that have shaped Soviet foreign policy since 1917. Professor Ulam's absorbing narrative includes a brilliant analysis of the major diplomatic confrontations of today—and a penetrating look at changing U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in the 1960's.
ca. 768 pp. August. A Praeger Paperbound Text/$4.95

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE CITY
A Survey of Urban Research

Edited by LEO F. SCHNORE. This unparalleled evaluation of the postwar literature of urban affairs in each of the traditional disciplines originally appeared as Part I of *Urban Research and Policy Planning* (edited by Schnore and Henry Fagin). Upon publication of the original work, in 1967, *Choice* wrote: "A praiseworthy series of original articles. . . . Excellent bibliography. Should be of considerable value . . . to all social scientists interested in urban affairs." So that the material may now be made more accessible to the growing number of scholars and students of urban affairs, this invaluable survey will be published in an inexpensive paperbound edition in June. *ca. 324 pp.*
A Praeger Paperbound Text/$3.95

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, 111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10003



You mean I can get $50,000 of TIAA Life insurance for less than $100?

That's what an Assistant Professor asked us when he heard about TIAA's low life insurance costs.

It's true. At his age 30 the annual premium for a 20-Year Home Protection policy providing $50,000 initial amount of insurance is $159.00. The first year dividend, based on our current dividend scale, is $61.00, making a net payment of $98.00. Dividends, of course, are not guaranteed.

The Home Protection plan is level premium Term insurance providing its largest amount of protection initially, reducing by schedule each year to recognize decreasing insurance needs. This is just one example of the many low-cost TIAA plans available. If you need more protection for your family, ask us to mail you a personal illustration with figures for a policy issued at your age. We'll also send the Life Insurance Guide describing other TIAA policies.

ELIGIBILITY FOR TIAA INSURANCE is limited to faculty and staff members of colleges, universities, private schools, and other nonprofit educational or scientific institutions that qualify for **TIAA** services.

tiaa

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION
730 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

aG

Please mail the new Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration.

Name__________ Your Date of Birth__________

Address__________ ZIP__________

Dependents' Ages__________

Nonprofit Employer__________
college, university, or other educational or scientific institution

Oxford University Press

Non-Violence and Aggression

A STUDY OF GANDHI'S MORAL EQUIVALENT OF WAR

By H. J. N. HORSBURGH, *University of Glasgow.* Starting from familiar premises about the ineffectiveness of war as an instrument of policy in a nuclear age, the author examines the claims of Gandhian satyagraha as a morally preferable and comparably efficient method of achieving the ends to be obtained by warfare. He relates, in some detail, what a non-violent defense system would be like, and how to adapt the methods Gandhi used against internal oppression to the resistance of external aggression. $5.60

The Life of Eleanor Marx, 1855-1898

A SOCIALIST TRAGEDY

By CHUSHICKHI TSUZUKI, *Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo.* This first full-scale biography of Eleanor Marx, youngest daughter of Karl Marx, explores her inherited wealth of socialist ideas and sentiments which enabled her to play an important part in the introduction of Marxian Socialism and Internationalism in Britain. The book also discusses her absorption in drama, literature, and acting during an exciting era of new plays and ideas in England; and by drawing from her letters, reveals the personal tragedy of the woman who personified the Marxian legacy. *3 halftones.* $7.20

The Notion of the State

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL THEORY

By ALEXANDER PASSERIN d'ENTREVES, *University of Turin.* This concise analytical survey, including some linguistic analysis of the different concepts of the State, discusses some of the most significant versions of politics put forward in the past and held at present by scientists, lawyers, and philosophers. The author delves into the problems of political obligation and shows that much more is explained and understood if the State is viewed in terms of the relations of both law and human values. *Cloth,* $5.60. *Paper,* $2.95

The Inequality of States

A STUDY OF THE SMALLER POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By DAVID VITAL, *University of Sussex.* This book is the first systematic consideration of the problems which face the small state in its international relations. Dr. Vital analyzes the primary problems faced by small powers as a result of their limited resources, considering their implications for foreign and defense affairs. He then examines the possibilities of national policy which are open to such states: passive, active, and defensive. $4.80

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

Origins of the Fifth Amendment

By LEONARD W. LEVY, *Brandeis University.* "A work of meticulous scholarship, which makes the experience of centuries past relevant to the legal process of today. It is done with Professor Levy's characteristic scrupulousness and insight, and it illuminates a highly important area of our constitutional law."—PAUL A. FREUND, Harvard University $12.50

The Pendergast Machine

By LYLE W. DORSETT, *University of Southern California.* "An excellent job, well conceived and sensitively executed. His careful account of the rise and fall of a political dynasty should be of great value to historians. . . . The whole book is good, from first page to last, it certainly maintains a high standard for what is becoming one of the most important series in the field of American history."—A. THEODORE BROWN, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. *Maps.* (*Urban Life in America series.*) $6.00

Government and Revolution in Vietnam

By DENNIS J. DUNCANSON. "Scholarly and fascinating presentation of an elusive subject matter . . . an intensely instructive and gripping narrative."—ROBERT D. MURPHY, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. "Without a doubt the most impressive and enlightening thing I have read on this painful subject."—FRANCIS X. SUTTON, The Ford Foundation. *Map.* $9.50

Woodrow Wilson and World Politics

AMERICA'S RESPONSE TO WAR AND REVOLUTION

By N. GORDON LEVIN, JR., *Amherst College.* Mr. Levin presents an original thesis stating that America's foreign policy from her entry into World War I to the Paris Peace Conference reflected a conscious effort by Wilson to use America's moral and material power against the imperialism of prewar Europe and the revolutionary socialism of Lenin and Soviet Russia. The argument finds implicit in Wilson's program and goals the terms in which American foreign policy is now being conducted. $7.50

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

from Lippincott in '68

Second Edition . . .

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE

W. W. KULSKI, Duke University

A thoroughly revised, completely reset edition which presents a comprehensive view of the trends and tensions that are currently reshaping international politics. The author probes the ruptures within the communist system, the growing Western conviction that a Soviet military move in Europe is unlikely, and the feeling that the Cold War is over. Professor Kulski details the growing independence of the Soviet satellite states, and the moves toward closer economic and political ties between Eastern and Western Europe. The widening gap in living standards between the advanced nations and the Third World is vividly described.

768 Pages **$7.95**

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION

An Introductory Reader

Edited by RICHARD A. FALK, Princeton University, and
WOLFRAM F. HANRIEDER, University of California,
Santa Barbara

Moving beyond traditional emphasis on legalistic and formalistic aspects, the editors project the study of international law and organization into the wider setting of international relations. The distinctive features of a decentralized legal system are stressed. The result is an approach that is highly compatible with International Relations courses at all levels. The selections, together with the editors' commentaries, provide students with an introduction to the important questions that bear on the character of contemporary international order.

368 Pages **Paperbound** **$3.95**

THESE LIBERTIES ***Case Studies in Civil Rights***

ROCCO J. TRESOLINI

Unlike many existing casebooks intended for advanced students and specialized audiences, this new book—a virtual text in civil liberties—is designed for students at freshman and sophomore levels. The author has selected thirty-eight cases that have contributed to the growth of our fundamental freedoms. Each case is preceded by a brief introduction which defines the issues in question; describes the social, political, and economic circumstances surrounding those issues; and gives pertinent facts about the life and career of the Justice rendering the decision.

320 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY

College Department

East Washington Square *Philadelphia, Pa. 19105*

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

New Political Non-Fiction From Washington

THE NATIONAL PRESS INC.

128 C Street N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

VIETNAM FOLLY, by Senator Ernest Gruening and Herbert W. Beaser. Here for the first time under one cover is a definitive, comprehensive work on Vietnam by distinguished, authoritative authors. Popular style, plus appendix of pertinent, historical documents, source notes, index, illustrations. Senator Gruening and Mr. Beaser set forth a "third alternative" (as opposed to military victory or abandonment) which may result in peace in Vietnam. 664 p., Cloth, $8.95.

THE ACHIEVING GHETTO, by Eugene P. Foley. C. Sumner (Chuck) Stone says "Gene Foley is the only white man who understands the economic frustrations of the black man in the ghetto." Foley, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Development, cuts through the inflammatory oratory of the extremists and the patronizing prose of the do-gooders to lay bare the social and economic problems of the ghetto. Proves by analysis of experience that the American Negro is as capable of achievement as any race, any place. Sets forth a plan for massive economic rehabilitation of ghettos. 155 p. Cloth, $4.95. Paper, $2.45.

COMBAT SOLDIER, by James C. Fry, with introduction by General Mark Clark and jacket endorsement by General James Gavin. An account of the Italian campaign by a brilliant troop commander. General Clark's introduction ties it to Vietnam and current problems of military tactics and leadership. General Gavin praises the author and its authenticity. The publisher sees it as a devastating commentary on the nature and savagery of men in combat, and a heart-rending revulsion against war. 359 p. Cloth, $7.50.

WHERE ARE THE VOTERS? by Jerry W. Friedheim with research assistance and introduction by Richard Scammon. Proves by statistics and sprightly text where American voters are located by age, occupation, race, sex, education, religion, and political preference. Gives professional advice on how to get them to vote for your party or candidate. "Votefinder" charts show how many votes a presidential candidate needs in each State and where he and his partisans can find them and how to get their votes. 332 p. Cloth, $5.95. Paper, $2.95.

THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF WORLD POWER, by Senator Gale McGee. Here at last is an authoritative, scholarly presentation of the Johnson Administration's foreign policy. With some 50 books preaching the other side of the story, this one will be sought by partisans as well as students and concerned citizens. GALE McGEE is eminently qualified by education and experience to be the spokesman. He was professor of History and chairman of the Institute of International Affairs at the U. of Wyoming before election to the Senate where he now serves his second term. 276 p. Cloth, $6.95.

HOW TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE, AND WIN! by Senator Hugh Scott. Millions of young Americans anticipate public service who, a generation or even a decade ago, might never have entertained such thoughts. HUGH SCOTT ran for and won election to the U. S. House of Representatives seven times before running for and winning election and reelection to the Senate. His book tells how to do it. 192 p. Cloth, $5.95. Paper, $2.95.

CROSSROADS U. S. A., by Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. Many authorities believe domestic issues today are more dangerous and threatening than Vietnam. This book discusses the causes, present status, and future solutions of such problems as riots, poverty, education, housing, and civil rights. HARRISON WILLIAMS, as a ranking member of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, has studied these things and has handled as much New Frontier and Great Society legislation as any man in Congress. Poignant photographs complement the text. 208 p. Cloth, $6.95.

AMERICA, I-LOVE-YOU, by Ralph de Toledano with annotations by Karl Hess. Something for the Conservatives, by one of their most respected and popular writers—his first book since **RFK, The Man Who Would Be President.** A collection of controversial reports on subversion, espionage, and international politics. Slashing attacks on the Liberal Establishment in the great style of American journalism. KARL HESS, Goldwater's former speech writer, ties it all together with incisive comments. 272 p. Cloth, $7.50.

New from Bobbs-Merrill

CHERRYHOLMES and SHAPIRO

Representatives and Roll Calls: A Computer Simulation of Voting in the Eighty-Eighth Congress

by Cleo H. Cherryholmes and Michael J. Shapiro

The simulation attempts to postdict voting outcomes, to identify the processes and determinants of legislative voting, and to approximate the results of those choices for both domestic and foreign policy roll calls.

(forthcoming in Jan. 1969) 256 pages $7.50 clothbound, on approval

CRAIN, KATZ, and ROSENTHAL

The Politics of Community Conflict: The Fluoridation Decision

by Robert L. Crain, Elihu Katz, and Donald B. Rosenthal

A study of the politics of fluoridation, with emphasis on effectiveness of community leadership structures, using the methodology of survey research.

250 pages $2.95/$6.50

JANDA

Information Retrieval: Applications to Political Science

by Kenneth Janda

". . . an excellent, practical, case study approach to important retrieval problems for political science."—Ralph L. Bisco

350 pages $4.50/$8.50

MOSHER

Governmental Reorganizations: Cases and Commentary

Edited by Frederick C. Mosher

Published jointly with the Inter-University Case Program, Inc.

Thirteen studies of cases of governmental reorganizations, and an extended theoretic essay summarizing their implications.

750 pages $12.00 clothbound, on approval

RIESELBACH

The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy

by Leroy N. Rieselbach

The author moves beyond the empirical generalizations to speculate about ways in which the Executive and Legislative branches interact in the making of foreign policy. 280 pages $2.95/$7.50

SPRAGUE

Voting Patterns of the United States Supreme Court: Cases in Federalism, 1889-1959

by John D. Sprague

A statistically imaginative and sophisticated study, evaluating two common descriptions of Supreme Court decision-making against data extended in time.

256 pages 77 tables $6.50 clothbound, on approval

STEWART

Political Power in the Soviet Union: A Study of Decision-Making in Stalingrad

by Philip D. Stewart

An analysis of the structure of influence in decision-making at the regional level of the Soviet Communist Party.

217 pages $2.95/$7.50

College Division

THE **BOBBS-MERRILL** COMPANY, INC.
A SUBSIDIARY OF HOWARD W. SAMS & CO., INC.
4300 WEST 62nd STREET • INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46268

NEW from ST. MARTIN'S

New Approaches to International Relations

Morton A. Kaplan, Editor

This volume is the product of the June 1966 Conference of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation at the University of Chicago. The contributions represent definitive statements of the new approaches to which the profession of political science has so far given recognition, and the contributors are the recognized leading proponents or critics of these approaches. Contributors: *Kaplan, Wohlstetter, Golden, Kahn, Deutsch, Alker, Burns, Guetzkow, Galtung, North, Falk, Hsi-shen Chi, Franke, and Reinken.*

August 1968 534 pp. $10.00

Political Theory

Its Nature and Uses

George Kateb

This latest study in *St. Martin's Series in American Politics* is both a rationale and a description of political theory, defining it in its traditional moral role and demonstrating its importance in the field of political theory. The author discusses how the political theorist generalizes from what he observes of political practices and how he makes use of the classical political theorists. June 1968 100 pp. $1.75

The New Urbanization

Scott Greer, Dennis C. McElrath, David W. Minar, and Peter Orleans, Editors

The papers in this volume are the result of ten years of interdisciplinary research and collaboration among a group of scholars mainly concentrated around the Center for Metropolitan Studies at Northwestern University. The articles examine the complex and interrelated facets of the urbanization process that is transforming the older social and physical forms. June 1968 386 pp. $10.00

Now published:

Manual of Public International Law

Sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Max Sørensen, Editor 1968 976 pp. $12.50

Send for our 1968 Political Science catalog

College Department
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

Already a landmark in its field

THE UNIVERSAL REFERENCE SYSTEM PRESENTS:

A continuing series of computerized bibliographies for political and behavioral scientists.

The 10-volume series on Political Science, Government, and Public Policy cites significant material (books and articles) appearing in social and behavioral sciences, annotated and indexed in depth.

SUBJECT FIELDS:

I. International Affairs
II. Legislative Process, Representation, and Decision Making
III. Bibliography of Bibliographies in Political Science, Government, and Public Policy
IV. Administrative Management: Public and Private Bureaucracy
V. Current Events and Problems of Modern Society
VI. Public Opinion, Mass Behavior, and Political Psychology
VII. Law, Jurisprudence, and Judicial Process
VIII. Economic Regulation, Business, and Government
IX. Public Policy and the Management of Science
X. Comparative Government and Cultures

UPON SUBSCRIPTION:

10 library-bound CODEXES covering 10 subject fields of Political Science. IN THE FIRST YEAR: 40 quarterly, cumulative, new-literature Gazettes — 10 each quarter in the subject fields. IN THE SECOND YEAR: 40 quarterly, cumulative, new-literature Gazettes.

FOR DESCRIPTIVE LITERATURE & PRICES:

Please write to Dept. C, Princeton Research Publishing Co., 32 Nassau Street, Princeton, N. J. 08540.

LOOKING FOR A BOOK PUBLISHER?

It is no secret that publication is regarded as the foundation stone of a scholar's career. In order to gain recognition, prestige, and advancement, the scholar must seek publication.

Here at Exposition Press, we offer scholars a complete publishing service, under our special academic imprint, "Exposition-University Books." Though the proportion of scholarly publications in the lists of the trade houses is shrinking, due to economic pressures, many of our recent titles in the academic fields have gained popular reviews, professional recognition and steady sales. These books are the result of a publishing plan that is bringing a steady flow of scholarly writers to Exposition Press. They reflect the high editorial standards and quality of design and production which have won the respect of libraries, schools, book-sellers and critics. Ask for free catalogs.

FREE! The behind-the-scenes story of book publishing revealed in two fact-filled, illustrated brochures, containing a detailed description of our subsidy plan including a breakdown of contract terms and typical costs (in print for the first time). Copies are available on request. Your inquiries and manuscripts are invited. An editorial appraisal will be furnished promptly without obligation. References upon request.

Please write to Dept. 93C

EXPOSITION PRESS INC., *50 Jericho Turnpike, Jericho, New York 11753*

United Nations Publications

Recent United Nations studies and reports

Planning of Metropolitan Areas and New Towns

Twenty-nine papers delivered by a UN expert group on the definitions of the technical and human problems of urban development and presenting a broad review of existing programmes. Photographs, charts. $3.50

Handbook of Civil Service Laws and Practices

A guide giving the basic elements of effective merit systems and their authority, structure, methodology and practice. $4.00

Inducing Social Change in Developing Countries

A study of the opinions of 445 national and foreign experts on the development projects in these specific fields: agriculture, health, nutrition, adult education, home economics, and community development. Cloth $5.00/Paper $3.50

Incomes in Postwar Europe

A study of policies, growth, distribution and redistribution in European market economies, centrally planned economies and Yugoslavia. $6.50

World Economic Survey 1966

A comprehensive review of world economic conditions intended to stimulate interest in international economic problems. Contents include current economic developments and aspects of the problems and experience in the implementation of development plans. Cloth $5.00

Foreign Trade Statistics 1960–1963

Statistical tables for selected Middle East countries classified according to the SITC, Revised, by the UN Economic and Social Office in Beirut.

Iraq	$4.00	Lebanon	$4.50
Jordan	$4.00	Saudi Arabia	$2.00
Kuwait	$2.00	Syria	$3.50

The Growth of World Industry 1953–1965: National Tables

Measures changes in the level of production and employment in various branches of the industrial sector in the economy of eighty countries. Cloth $10.00

African Agricultural Development

Reflections on the major lines of advance and the barriers to progress in the development of agriculture in Africa. $3.50

The Process of Industrial Development in Latin America

Starting with the period before the depression of the 1930's this study reviews the production of some major industries and presents new industrial development requirements, and industrialization aims and strategies. $4.00

Industrial Development in Asia and the Far East

Selected documents presented to the Asia Conference on Industrialization, Manila 1965.

Vol I	Progress and problems of industrialization $5.00
Vol II	Country Reports $5.75
Vol III	Country Reports $5.00
Vol IV	Development of Key Industries $7.00

Export Credits and Development Financing

Part One: Current Practices and Problems
Part Two: National Export Credit Systems

A review of existing national systems and international arrangements regarding the granting of export credit insurance and export credits. $2.50

Studies in Petrochemicals

Includes the majority of the techno-economic studies which were presented at the Interregional Conference held in Tehran to examine in depth the development of the petrochemical industries in developing countries. Two volumes, clothbound $25.00

United Nations Publications, ***Room 1059, New York, N. Y. 10017***

UNIVERSITY of
PENNSYLVANIA
PRESS

Coming next month

A book that makes a positive contribution
to solving the problems of the elderly in our cities

RELOCATION: From Obstacle to Opportunity in Urban Planning

by Paul L. Niebanck and Mark R. Yessian

The first volume in the important new Environmental Studies Series, this book describes the elderly population which is subject to displacement and evaluates their ability to meet the rigors of urban life. Including a comprehensive statement of recommendations for national relocation policy, this book should be of great value to policy-makers, administrators, practitioners, and researchers. **150 pages $4.95**

New by Sam Bass Warner, Jr.

THE PRIVATE CITY: Philadelphia in Three Periods of its Growth

Why Philadelphia? Because this big, messy, industrial city built on centuries of violent change is a city whose history has been repeated again and again, with only minor variations, in the urban network of the entire United States. Typifying the growth and decay of all American urban areas, Philadelphia demonstrates an enduring tradition of the conflict between private and public functions. **208 pages illustrated $4.95**

Reprinted

FOUR CITIES: A Study in Comparative Policy Making

by Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian **$6.00**

SUBURBAN DIFFERENCES AND METROPOLITAN POLICIES:

A Philadelphia Story, by Oliver P. Williams, et al. **$6.00**

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA PRESS
Philadelphia 19104

Cornell University Press

LOBBYING IN LONDON

A Rope of Sand

The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the American Revolution

By Michael G. Kammen. Quoting freely from the correspondence of America's colonial agents—Edmund Burke, Benjamin Franklin, and dozens of less prominent men—as well as from manuscripts, documents, newspapers, and pamphlets, Professor Kammen presents a detailed account of this lobby, its successes and failures, and the drift toward the war. *Illus. 376 pages.* $10.00

NEW IDEAS AND THE LAW

American Legal Realism

Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process

By Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr. Here is the first full-length work to focus on realist views of the judicial process. Beginning with the movement's origins and nature between the two world wars, the author goes on to describe and evaluate the famous notions of rule- and fact-skepticism, as well as other realist positions. He concludes that despite their limitations, the ideas of the realists possessed a high degree of validity. *268 pages.* $6.75

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

Religion and the Public Order, Number Four

An Annual Review of Church and State, and of Religion, Law, and Society

Edited by Donald A. Giannella. The latest book in this outstanding series contains a comprehensive survey of recent political and legal developments in church-state relations and a review of recent books on religion, law, and society. Contributors include Ralph Potter, William S. Ball, Edward Duff, S.J., Thomas Love, Dennis O'Brien, Robert Rodes, and John Wilson. *320 pages.* $6.00

PARTNERS IN TRADE

Reciprocity and the North Atlantic Triangle, 1932-1938

By Richard N. Kottman. This diplomatic and political analysis of the economic rapprochement between the U.S., Canada, and the United Kingdom shows how the Triangle functioned. From private papers and government documents, the author uncovers the motivations behind the three major trade agreements and develops interesting new perspectives on America's foreign policy during the thirties. *298 pages.* $7.50

Cornell University Press
ITHACA, NEW YORK 14850

FROM CAMBRIDGE

The Emergence of Indian Nationalism
ANIL SEAL

This is the first of five volumes to be published in a series, **Political Change in Modern South Asia,** prepared by J. A. Gallagher of Oxford and Anil Seal of Cambridge. The aim of the series is to analyse the interplay between imperialism and nationalism in what were to become the states of India and Pakistan.

In *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism* Dr Seal studies the social roots of the stirrings toward political organization in the 1870s and 1880s which brought about the foundation of the Indian National Congress. $11.50

The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism
HOWARD L. ERDMAN

Dr Erdman examines the background, emergence and growth of Swatantra within the framework of conservative politics in India. *(Cambridge South Asian Studies No. 5)* $9.50

Sir William Jones and British Attitudes to India in the Eighteenth Century
S. N. MUKHERJEE

A study of Jones's thought and work, assessing the nature of his far-reaching influence on India and British attitudes toward her. *(Cambridge South Asian Studies No. 6)* $8.50

Locke's Two Treatises of Government
Second Edition

Edited by PETER LASLETT

Mr Laslett's feat of scholarship in producing a definitive text of this major work of political philosophy is well known. For the second edition he has brought the bibliography up to date, revised the introduction, extended the index and the appendices. $11.50

Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics

The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx

SHLOMO AVINERI

Dr Avineri believes that no gap existed, as is commonly supposed, between the young Marx – considered to be a humanist thinker – and the older Marx, held to be a determinist with little concern for anything outside his theory of historical materialism. He supports his claim in this detailed study. $8.50

The Conscience of the State in North America

E. R. NORMAN

Dr Norman traces the movements toward the formal separation of church and state since the mid-eighteenth century in Great Britain, Canada and the United States. $6.50

Previously published:

1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution

MAURICE COWLING $13.50

Liberty, Equality, Fraternity

JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN Edited by R. J. WHITE $7.50

Cambridge Latin American Studies

The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914

PETER CALVERT

A study of the development of the revolution and the associated diplomatic conflict which arose between Britain and the United States. For the first time the British side is thoroughly examined from original documentary sources. $9.50

Previously published:

Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence, 1808-1833

SIMON COLLIER $11.00

Church Wealth in Mexico: A Study of the Juzgado de Capellanias, 1800-1856

M. P. COSTELOE $5.50

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

MILTON KATZ

THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION

Dealing primarily with post-war conflicts within the experience of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, the former chief of the Marshall Plan in Europe explores whether and to what extent decisions by international tribunals have been significant, or may yet be significant, for the settlement of international disputes. $4.95

HELIO JAGUARIBE

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

A Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study

Mr. Jaguaribe provides a theoretical discussion of the political requirements of economic development and a detailed analysis of the development process in Brazil from the colonial phase until today, then compares Brazil's experiences with those of other Latin American countries. $5.75

ISAAC KRAMNICK

BOLINGBROKE AND HIS CIRCLE

The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole

Mr. Kramnick revises traditional interpretations to show that Bolingbroke's political attitudes can be regarded as a product of his economic and social position, and in the process presents an enlightening analysis of English thought in the Augustan Age. *Harvard Political Studies.* $6.95

FREDERICK GRIMKE

John William Ward, *Editor*

THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS

First published in 1848, Grimke's book, says the editor in his informative introduction, "deserves comparison with Tocqueville's . . . *Democracy in America*, and is in certain ways superior. It is the single best book written by an American in the 19th century on the meaning of our political way of life." *The John Harvard Library.* $12.50

In Canada/Saunders of Toronto, Ltd.

HARVARD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967

F. Roy Willis

Revised and Expanded Edition. First published in 1965, covering the period 1945-1963. "[Willis'] history of the events leading up to Franco-German cooperation and his detailing of the problems faced are thorough and scholarly. In fact, if one is looking for a work that has the mark of excellence on its every page he need look no farther. . . . This is a superb book."—*World Affairs.* $12.50

Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America

Victor Alba

A comprehensive history of the Latin American labor movement with emphasis on the political factors, both national and international, that have so largely shaped and been shaped by the movement's course. The original Spanish text, published in 1964, has been corrected, reorganized, updated, and edited for this English edition, and the author has added a chapter on the probable future of the Latin American labor movement. $12.50

Social Welfare in the Soviet Union

Bernice Q. Madison

Based on over ten years of research and observation, this is the first comprehensive study of Soviet welfare policies and practices from 1917 to the present. It includes an analysis of the relationship between Soviet welfare policies and Marxist theory, a description of the institutional framework of the Soviet welfare system, and several case studies providing illustration of present policies. August. About $8.50

The Uniting of Europe

POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FORCES, 1950-1957

Ernst B. Haas

A Reissue, with a new Preface. "It is a pleasure to say without equivocation that this work . . . is not only by far the richest book on the unification movement in Western Europe . . . but also a significant theoretical contribution to the study of community formation across national boundaries. The book represents a most impressive combination of meticulous empirical and imaginative theoretical effort."—*The Annals.* $12.50

Order from your bookstore, please

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

New

California's Prodigal Sons

Hiram Johnson and the Progressives, 1911-1917

Spencer C. Olin, Jr.

The years 1911-1917—the span of Hiram Johnson's governorship—were among the most exciting and important in the political history of California. Mr. Olin examines Johnson's role as a popular and effective reform governor whose policies were significant in shaping the content of California politics and government for years to come. The book stresses the entrepreneurial aspects of Progressivism and places a special focus on what might be called the "scientific management" of state social and economic problems. A subsidiary theme is the intense battle between conservatives and progressives—a battle that culminated in the fateful Hughes campaign of 1916. Mr. Olin has been able to draw on manuscript materials —including the Hiram Johnson Papers—that were unavailable fifteen years ago. **$6.95**

The Problem of Restoration

A Study in Comparative Political History

Robert A. Kann

In this major work, a distinguished historian discusses the implications of the replacement of an established socio-political system by a revolutionary one and its subsequent re-establishment. Can such a system be restored without having to adjust to the social change that accompanied the intermediate revolutionary period? And if such adjustment is feasible, will it not destroy the relationship between the original and the re-established system and thus put genuine restoration beyond reach?

Professor Kann, in his examination of these and related questions, gives a series of penetrating case studies ranging from the return of the Jews to their homeland after the Babylonian captivity to the establishment of the second German empire under Bismarck.

$15.00

Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, 1947-1964

D. R. SarDesai

In this analysis of India's attitude toward the states of former French Indochina, an area of crucial interest to the world's powers, Mr. SarDesai provides us with important insights into Nehru's policy toward neutralized Laos, non-aligned Cambodia, West-allied South Vietnam, and Communist-allied North Vietnam. Of particular interest is the treatment of the change in India's policy after the outbreak of hostilities with China in 1962 and of India's position as Chairman of the International Control Commission.

SUMMER **$10.00**

from California

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS · Berkeley 94720

THE

ATLANTIC

(a body of water with land on each side)

COMMUNITY

(a body of nations having political, economic and social interests in common)

QUARTERLY

(a publication issued four times a year)

THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY QUARTERLY: a publication whose articles represent the best current thought on both sides of the Atlantic concerning the problems and prospects of developing a true Community.

A PARTIAL LISTING OF THE CONTENTS OF THE SPRING ISSUE:

NATO and a Changing Europe by Lester B. Pearson . . . Relations Between Europe and America—A French Viewpoint by Leo Hamon . . . Soviet Security and the West by Altiero Spinelli . . . The high Price of Europeanism by Douglas Jay plus others as well as source material, letters to the editor and bibliography of important books.

THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY QUARTERLY

1616 H Street, Northwest—Washington, D.C. 20006, U.S.A.

Please enter my subscription as checked below:

☐ 1 year $5 ☐ 2 years $9 ☐ 3 years $12

(Add $1 per year for delivery outside the United States, its possessions and Canada)

☐ Payment Enclosed ☐ Bill me

Name

Address

NEW & RECENT POLITICAL SCIENCE TEXTS from PERGAMON

GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICS
N.C. Dexter and E.G. Reyner
An unusual stimulating and up to the minute survey of the British political scene. This text explains the ideas and methods of operation of democratic government. It sketches in the aims and policies of the four main parties, adopting the dialogue approach.
"This is a rewarding book on British political scene."—*Professor I.H. Khan,* Skidmore College, New York
1966 *332 pp.* *flexi-covered* $3.95

THE EMERGENCE OF
THE EASTERN WORLD
Seven essays on political ideas from 1200 to 1500
G.L. Seidler
This text will meet the need for an authoritative survey and assessment of Eastern political thought and ideas between the 13th and 16th centuries. The author describes the ideas against the broad socio-economic background and explains their effect on history. The book should produce a greater insight and understanding of the problems now facing Eastern countries.
1968 *280 pp.* $11.00

WESTMINSTER WORKSHOP
A Student's Guide to the British Constitution
Second Edition
R.K. Mosley
This is a completely revised and enlarged edition of a work which has quickly become established as a textbook for British Constitution students. It has been recommended by several authorities and adopted by many universities.
1967 *230 pp.* *flexi-covered* $4.00

ASPECTS OF BRITISH POLITICS 1904-1919
D. Collins
1966 *372 pp.* *flexi-covered* $5.00

TOWARD
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
S. Lewis
1966 *332 pp.* *flexi-covered* $4.50

THE UNITED NATIONS
AND WORLD REALITIES
M.J. Lee
1966 *255 pp.* *flexi-covered* $3.95

PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
A.J. Anthony Morris
1967 *200 pp.* *flexi-covered* $3.50

For copies on approval write:
College Division
PERGAMON PRESS, INC.
44-01 21st Street
Long Island City, N.Y. 11101



"What relevance, if any, does the 2,000-year heritage of political theory have today?"
—from the Foreword to *Contemporary Political Science*

Published in Cooperation with the American Political Science Association . . .

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE: Toward Empirical Theory
Edited by **Ithiel de Sola Pool,** Massachusetts Institute of Technology. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.*

The state of the art in political theory is discussed in this important collection of statements by the country's outstanding political scientists. The following papers delivered at the 1966 Plenary Session of the American Political Science Association explore the relevance of the heritage of political theory for modern political science and illustrate how modern behavioral political research has illuminated some of the great questions which political theorists have posed over the centuries. **Gabriel A. Almond,** Political Theory and Political Science; **Robert A. Dahl,** The Evolution of Political Systems; **Karl Deutsch,** Nation and World; **Harry Eckstein,** Political Science and Public Policy; **Heinz Eulau,** Changing Views of Representation; **Ithiel de Sola Pool,** The Public and the Polity; **Lucian W. Pye,** The Formation of New States; **Edward Shils,** Privacy and Power; **Herbert A. Simon,** The Changing Theory and Changing Practice of Public Administration.

Also From McGraw-Hill . . .

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: Perspectives and Analysis
By **William P. Gerberding,** University of California, Los Angeles. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.*

ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, Seventh Edition
By **John H. Ferguson,** The Pennsylvania University; and **Dean E. McHenry,** University of California, Santa Cruz.

METHODOLOGY IN SOCIAL RESEARCH
Edited by **Hubert M. Blalock,** University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; and **Ann B. Blalock.**



"These four volumes contain the most important documents for studying the present worldwide network of international relations between local sovereign states." —*Arnold Toynbee*

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY in association with CHELSEA HOUSE PUBLISHERS is proud to announce the publication of a truly significant reference work . . .

THE MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY: 1648-1967
Edited by **Fred L. Israel,** with Commentaries by **Emanuel Chill**
Introductory Essay by **Arnold Toynbee**

4 volumes, over 3000 pages, 103 treaties, 40 pages of full-color maps, fully indexed, $110.

Compiled for the first time in one complete reference source — every significant international document of peace signed during the past 300 years . . .

The coverage provided by these books is exceptional in two important ways. First, the full texts of so many essential peace documents have never before been brought together in one convenient source. Secondly, of the treaties presented here, seventeen have never appeared before in English, and the majority can be found only in the State Papers of the participating nations. For example, the full text of the 1954 Geneva Accord which terminated French involvement in Vietnam has not been generally available until its inclusion in this comprehensive reference.

Covers the development of international relations from Westphalia to Tashkent . . .

From the decline of Hapsburg power and the ascendancy of France to the current division of world power between the United States and Russia, this detailed reference presents more than three centuries of international relations. It examines the modern epoch in terms of the treaties which embody its political evolution.

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, 330 WEST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, 10036

NEW BOOKS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS —

CONFLICT AND PEACE IN THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

EVAN LUARD, ST. ANTONY'S COLLEGE, OXFORD

The author, a British M. P., systematically surveys the types of behavior that cause international conflict, with emphasis on the period after World War II; and he analyzes the principal methods used to secure peace: disarmament and arms control. He then evaluates the various contemporary means for dealing with conflict: the United Nations, international law, and public opinion. An earlier version of the book was published as *Peace and Opinion* in 1962.

Paperbound 352 pages 5⅜ x 8¼

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL CRISIS

AN ANALYTIC CASEBOOK

LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN AND DAVID WILKINSON, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

This is a book of penetrating case studies of six modern international crises: The Berlin Blockade, The Kashmir Dispute, The Suez Canal, Indonesia's Campaign to Crush Malaysia, The Cuban Missile Crisis, The Dispute over Financing the United Nations. Eight experts explore the relationship between international legal norms and eventual state action and analyze how law is actually used by states.

Paperbound 273 pages 5⅜ x 8¼

INTERNATIONAL REGIONALISM

READINGS

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., HARVARD UNIVERSITY

This important collection of articles deals with the role, value, and future of today's many international regional organizations. The articles emphasize the variety of problems regionalism poses for current policy and for contemporary political theory. An incisive introduction, maps, and listings of major non-military groupings will help the student clarify the issues.

Paperbound 432 pages 5⅜ x 8¼

LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY
34 BEACON STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02106

POLITICAL THEORY: A Conceptual Analysis

By JOSEPH S. MURPHY, *Office of Educational Opportunity*

This book is not a chronological record of political thinkers and political movements, and it does not suppose that the study of political theory necessarily involves or requires a parallel consideration of political events and historical institutions. It *is* written from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy and it construes political theory as an activity whose purpose is the clarification, analysis, and explication of political concepts. *June.*

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM

By JAY A. SIGLER, *Rutgers, The State University*

The author launches what he believes is a rescue operation for the study of public law. It is believed essential since an understanding of legal processes is central to the problems of social control and authoritative decision making. Emphasis is not on methodology; but on a clear and direct approach to the legal system. *July*

EXPLANATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
A System Paradigm

By Eugene J. Meehan, *Brandeis University*

Paperbound / 139 pages
Text price: $1.95

PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY
Models of Political Linkage

By Norman R. Luttbeg, *Temple University* / May
Paperbound

INTERNATIONAL LAW
A Text, Revised Edition

by H. B. Jacobini, *Southern Illinois University* / 471 pages
Text price: $8.50

COMPARATIVE POLITICS
Notes and Readings, Third Edition

by Roy C. Macridis, Brandeis University, and Bernard E. Brown, City University of New York / Paperbound
June

Published in the Dorsey Series in Political Science
Consulting Editor: NORTON E. LONG,
Brandeis University

THE DORSEY PRESS

Homewood, Illinois



POVERTY AND POLITICS

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Sidney Baldwin

Inspired history of a controversial New Deal agency. This meticulously documented case study captures the essence and passions of the era when the agency's bold innovations in behalf of chronically poor sharecroppers and tenant farmers rubbed many political nerves raw. Subjected to bitter and unremitting attack the agency was an important symbol of the period and provides interesting analogies to the problems of poverty today. 400 pages. Illustrated with photographs by famous photographers of the period.

448 pages *$10.00*

THE DYNAMIC OF MEXICAN NATIONALISM

Frederick C. Turner

After a thorough study of the hundred years before the Revolution the book focuses on the effects of the Revolution on social groups, the manifestations of a nineteenth-century xenophobia, and the ways in which literature and the arts promoted the Mexican nationalistic spirit which has deeply influenced the country's society, economy, and political system.

344 pages *$8.50*

THE POLITICS OF EXILE

PARAGUAY'S FEBRERISTA PARTY

Paul H. Lewis

This behavioral analysis of party organization illuminates the process of institutionalizing a revolutionary ideal. The workings of the party, its ideology, its formal organization, and the patterns of relations among its leaders are explicated and related to the more general literature on political parties.

200 pages *$6.00*

NORTH CAROLINA POLITICS

AN INTRODUCTION

Jack D. Fleer

A comprehensive, concise analysis of the structure and nature of North Carolina politics. Delineating the complexities of a rapidly evolving political structure the book is a model study of a state's political workings.

168 pages *cloth, $4.95—paper, $2.45*

NEW from Chapel Hill

At bookstores or from the publisher

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514

ATHERTON PRESS

70 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10011

Available this Summer

POLITICS AND SOCIETY

ROBERT M. MacIVER

Edited by DAVID SPITZ *Ohio State University*

This carefully integrated selection of essays represents the most significant statements MacIver has made on ethics and politics, society and the state, government and political change, war and peace, and the conditions of a viable international order. Here for the first time are a number of unpublished and highly important works on the passions and their relation to morals, the social and political ideas of Bertrand Russell, *Mein Kampf,* the art of contemplation, as well as the striking exchange of letters between MacIver and Bernard Bosanquet on political theory. In his introduction, David Spitz assesses the importance of MacIver's teachings and relates each essay within the broad context of his political and social thought. The total work serves to dramatize the astonishing versatility and incisiveness of the mind of a great social scientist over a period of sixty years. $11.50

THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY

Concepts and Controversy

ROBERT S. HIRSCHFIELD *Hunter College of the City University of New York*

The essence of the American Presidency is its power. How powerful is the President? Does he have sufficient power to meet today's needs, or do the problems of the nuclear age demand a more powerful executive? Is there a danger of dictatorship in the growth of presidential authority, or will it remain an office of constitutional democratic leadership? The scope, limitations, accomplishments, and possibilities of the most important political office in the world are viewed from a variety of contemporary and historical standpoints. The result is a highly topical, lively, and provocative approach to one of the most critical issues of our time. $8.95

THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND MODERN SOCIETY

GEORGE FISCHER *Columbia University*

This book presents a serious challenge to prevailing theories of modernization throughout the world. The notion that non-Western countries may well become fully modern without adopting a pluralist model of society is examined in the context of the Soviet Union. The author's conclusions are relevant to many aspects of social change in communist, authoritarian, and emergent nations. $7.50

A 20% PROFESSIONAL DISCOUNT and free postage and handling on all orders accompanied by payment. Write Department R, Atherton Press, Inc., 70 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10011.

FORO INTERNACIONAL

Revista trimestral publicada por El Colegio de Mexico

Vol. VIII **Núm. 1**

INDICE

Artículos

Ruy Mauro Marini y Olga Pellicer de Brody, *Militarismo y Desnuclearización en América Latina. El Caso de Brasil.*

Wolfgang König, *América Latina y la Cooperación Monetaria Internacional.*

Peter Sturm, *El Crecimiento Económico en Alemania Occidental y Oriental.*

César Sepúlveda, *Reflexiones sobre la Alianza Para el Progreso.*

Crítica de Libros

Libros Recibidos

Suscripción anual: US $5.00
(franqueo incluido)
Ejemplar suelto: US $1.25
(franqueo incluido)
Colección completa
Vols. I-VII US $35.00

Suscripciones y correspondencia a:
FORO INTERNACIONAL
EL COLEGIO DE MÉXICO
GUANAJUATO 125 • MÉXICO 7, D. F.

Checklist of SOUTHEAST ASIAN Serials
Southeast Asia Collection, Yale University Library
Estimated 5,000 cards reproduced in 1 volume
Prepublication price: $25.00; after January 31, 1969: $30.00

Catalog of the AFRICAN COLLECTION
Northwestern University Library, Evanston, Illinois
28,300 cards reproduced in 2 volumes *Price: $120.00*

Index to
LATIN AMERICAN PERIODICAL LITERATURE, 1929-1960
Compiled in the Columbus Memorial Library of the
Pan American Union, Washington, D.C.
Estimated 45,000 cards reproduced in 2 volumes *Price: $105.00*

10% additional charge on orders outside the U.S.

Descriptive material on these titles and a complete catalog of publications are available on request.

G. K. HALL & CO. 70 Lincoln Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02111

Peace

ARMS CONTROL FOR THE LATE SIXTIES

Edited by James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr., both of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania. 1967, 312 pages, $8.50.

Student Edition also available in paperback.

The editors have selected essays written by twenty-seven of the world's leading authorities on the technical, strategic, and political aspects of disarmament negotiation and arms control policies.

People

ISLAM IN AFRICA

James Kritzeck, University of Notre Dame and William H. Lewis, Division of Research and Analysis for North and East Africa, Department of State and George Washington University. Fall 1968.

Islam in Africa is a general survey of the remarkable success that the Islamic religion is registering in Sub-Saharan Africa. Extensive attention is devoted to the contemporary scene in selected countries, particularly Nigeria, Uganda, the Congo, and Cameroon. Various sects and religious fraternities are also examined.

Politics

CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM,
Third Edition

Edited by William G. Andrews, State University College, Brockport, N. Y. Fall 1968, about $1.95 (paper).

A new statistical appendix and the first English translation of the 1966 amendments to the Statutes of the CPSU are among the additions to this forthcoming Third Edition. Also, the texts of the French, West German, and Soviet constitutions incorporate all amendments enacted by April 15, 1968. This is an ideal text for courses in comparative government and comparative law.

CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS:
The Conflict of Interest Issue

Robert S. Getz, Kent State University. 1967, $1.95 (paper).

New Perspectives in Political Science—16

Recommended Use: Courses in American Government, Political Parties, Legislative Process, American Political Behavior, Congress, Introduction to Political Science—an ideal supplementary text.

AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR:
Selected Readings

Edited by Samuel C. Patterson, University of Iowa. Fall 1968, about $5.95 (paper).

Some of the best research from professional political science journals on legislative behavior in the United States have been selected and organized with introductory notes by the editor.

Van Nostrand Political Science Series
Franklin L. Burdette, General Editor

Send for your on-approval copies. Write College Department

Van Nostrand
120 ALEXANDER STREET
PRINCETON, N. J. 08540

indispensable for the coming elections . . .

NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1964

THIRD EDITION

compiled by Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson

Here is the only complete collection of American political party platforms in existence. The compilers of the volume have made it possible to answer virtually any question about national party platforms, from their beginning through the 1964 elections, by assembling authenticated copies of all the platforms of the major parties—and of the principal minor parties. They have taken account of the size of the group, its relative permanence, and its historical significance. All parties which have seemed to be of consequence by these standards are included in this unique barometer of opinion in American political history.

698 pages. $10.75.

Reviewers' comments about this and previous editions include:

"This is an important and indispensable reference volume . . . important data for the social scientist is encapsulated in these campaign documents despite our well-known impatience with platform equivocation in national political life."—*The American Political Science Review.*

"For students of American politics in general, and of the minor parties in particular, this is an important service."—*Political Science Quarterly.*

"In no other single reference work are the authenticated platforms of both the major and minor political parties available. The political researcher and writer will welcome this volume."—*Human Events.*

"There is a little something for every political researcher in this book, be he Democrat, Republican, Communist or Greenback."—*Washington Post and Times Herald.*

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS
URBANA · CHICAGO · LONDON

Just published . . .

The Information Machine

The United States Information Agency
and American Foreign Policy

Robert E. Elder

An examination in depth of the purpose, function, organization, and operation of USIA, its role in and relation to American foreign policy, and its decision-making processes, this pioneer study covers the period from 1963 to 1967 and USIA under three directors, Edward R. Murrow, Carl Rowan, and Leonard Marks. *$10.00*

Toward Strategies for Public Administration Development in Latin America

John C. Honey

Preface by Fred W. Riggs. Commentaries by Peter D. Bell, Richard A. Fehnel, James R. Himes, and George Sutija

Examining the problems faced by Latin American countries in their efforts to improve their administrative capabilities, the author stresses the relation of administrative development to the modernization process and makes concrete proposals for programs to be undertaken by individual countries or by regions.

The commentaries relate the proposals to the situations in Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. *$5.75*

International Organization in the Western Hemisphere

Edited, with Introduction, by Robert W. Gregg

A former U.S. ambassador to the Council of the OAS, a British historian, a Mexican economist, and an American political scientist explore many aspects of inter-American organization—its development, its relation to peace and security and to Latin-American political, economic, and social development, and the impact of U.S. dominance in inter-American relations. Texts of major treaties and agreements are included in this thoughtful and timely study. *$6.95*

From your bookseller or Syracuse University Press
Syracuse, New York 13210

Book News from Macmillan

A Bill Becomes A Law:
Congress Enacts Civil Rights Legislation, Second Edition
By the late Daniel M. Berman, The American University

The way in which a bill proceeds through Congress to become law is the subject of this revised edition, illustrated by the Civil Rights Acts of 1960 and 1964. The student is able to compare the factors that resulted in a weak bill of 1960 with those that contributed to the strong 1964 bill. 1966, 146 pages, paper, $1.95

The Consent of the Governed, Second Edition
By John C. Livingston and Robert G. Thompson, both,
Sacramento State College

The Second Edition of this successful text has been sharpened and clarified by establishing—in the first four chapters—the democratic frame of reference needed before proceeding to an examination of American practices and institutions. The authors then pose questions about the nature of democracy and present their answers as well as those propounded by liberal, conservative, and "brokerage" theory.
1966, 591 pages, $7.95

The Dynamics of International Politics, Second Edition
By Norman J. Padelford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
and Colonel George A. Lincoln, United States Military Academy

Shifting relationships within the power blocs, accelerated technological change, the mounting world population, agitation for nationhood and economic betterment, the slow progress toward larger community —these and other vital elements of the international political environment receive detailed consideration in the extensively rewritten and updated Second Edition of a successful and widely adopted text.
1967, 617 pages, $8.95

The Soviet State
By Ellsworth Raymond, New York University

This new text provides a thorough analysis of the economics, politics, government, and history of the Soviet Union from the revolution to the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. The author discusses Soviet political and economic geography, administration of foreign policy, non-governmental mass organizations, and many other subjects. Lively details, personal anecdotes and unusual photographs highlight the text. Each chapter contains a list of suggested readings.
1968, 462 pages, $7.95

Write to the Faculty Service Desk for examination copies.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
866 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022
In Canada, write to Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 55 York Street, Toronto 1, Ontario

Books of Interest

Forging World Order: The Politics of International Organization

By Jack C. Plano, Western Michigan University, and
Robert E. Riggs, University of Minnesota

This textbook investigates modern international organization by drawing upon a process and an institutional and problems approach to political behavior. This synthesis of approaches reveals to students the interaction of political institutions and the individuals who shape them. Emphasizing the problems and institutions of the 1960's, the authors discuss the setting for the contemporary scene, the international organization as a political process, and the problem-solving aspect of global and regional organization. 1967, 600 pages, $8.95

Politics, Economics, and Power: Ideology and Practice Under Capitalism, Socialism, Communism, and Fascism

By Nathaniel Stone Preston, The American University

"A real contribution to the teaching literature, for both comparative government and comparative economic systems courses."
—Professor Michael D. Reagan, University of California, Riverside

This well-written book analyzes the major politico-economic systems which dominate the world today: capitalism, socialism, communism, and fascism. The author begins by providing a brief history of the development of political and economic forces in Western civilization. Chapters which follow describe the four major ideologies, each beginning with a review and then proceeding to contemporary objectives and operating principles of the ideology under discussion.
1967, 242 pages, paper, $2.95

Politics U.S.A.: Cases on the American Democratic Process

Second Edition

By Andrew M. Scott and Earle Wallace, both, University of North Carolina

Each selection in this book represents the study of a given case in the democratic process and provides the student with insight into the actual working of American politics. 1965, 576 pages, paper, $4.75

The United Nations: International Organization and Administration

Edited by Maurice Waters, Wayne State University

"Though addressed to students this collection of speeches and papers topically arranged will also appeal to the general reader who would like varied views on the U.N." —*Booklist, September 15, 1967*

This valuable collection contains readings, sources, speeches, and documents relating to all phases of the United Nations. Set in the context of the historical development and the theoretical considerations of international organizations, the material is structured to show both the external and internal features of the U.N. 1967, 583 pages, paper, $4.95

Write to the Faculty Service Desk for examination copies.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
866 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022
In Canada, write to Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 55 York Street, Toronto 1, Ontario

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Vol 35 no 1 Spring 1968

SOCIAL RESEARCH

An International Quarterly

FOCUS—TRENDS AND ISSUES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Behavioral Movement in Political Science: A Personal Document	*Heinz Eulau*
Systems Theory and Political Science	*Morton Kaplan*
On the Use of Functional Analysis in American Political Science	*Martin Landau*
The New Political Economy	*William C. Mitchell*
Political Socialization and Political Theory	*James Steintrager*
A Critique of Current Studies on Political Development and Modernization	*Chong-Do Hah and Jeanne Schneider*
Social Science and Political Reality: The Problem of Explanation	*John G. Gunnell*
The International Scene—Current Trends in the Social Sciences Economic Systems in Search of Nations	*Jahangir Amuzegar*

EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS OFFICE
New School for Social Research
66 West Twelfth Street, New York 10011, N. Y.

Subscriptions. $10.00 a year, domestic and foreign
Single copies—$2.50

SOCIAL RESEARCH is published quarterly by the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research, and appears in Spring, Summer, Autumn and Winter issues. All correspondence concerning manuscripts should be addressed to Dr. Peter L. Berger.

March, 1968

COMMUNIST CHINA

The Domestic Scene: 1949-1967

by

Peter Tang and Joan Maloney
cloth, $10.00

Also Available:

C. Y. Cheng, Communist China's Economy, 1949-1962
cloth, $5.00

Mandarin Chinese Dictionary Series
English-Chinese
Chinese-English paper. $5.50 ea.

Chinese Language Textbook Series
Three Sets, Twelve Volumes

SETON HALL UNIVERSITY PRESS, SOUTH ORANGE, N. J.

Four studies, timely and penetrating . . .
. . . inaugurating a new series on

INTEGRATION AND COMMUNITY BUILDING IN EASTERN EUROPE

The unifying theme of the series is the relations of the communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe with other communist party states.

Written by an authority on the individual country treated, each study assesses the degree, rate, and direction of integration of the country with other communist countries. Each author carries his analysis through five historical periods:

- the pre-communist background
- the period of the communists' consolidation of power after World War II
- the repression and rigid controls of the Stalin era
- the period of relaxed controls following Stalin's death
- the last ten years.

The historical, geographic, social, economic, and political characteristics of the country are described and analyzed. Periods and events are emphasized which have the greatest significance for the country examined.

Though published in a series, each book is complete in itself, a full and penetrating analysis of the subject country.

General Editor: Jan F. Triska, Professor of Political Science, Stanford University, and Director of the University's program of Studies of the Communist System.

THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., University of Oregon $6.00 cloth / $2.45 paper

THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
James F. Morrison, University of Florida $6.50 cloth / $2.95 paper

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA
M. George Zaninovich, University of Oregon $6.50 cloth / $2.95 paper

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
Nicholas C. Pano, Western Illinois University $6.50 cloth / $2.95 paper

Additional studies, coming early in 1969, will focus on BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, and RUMANIA.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21218

Scott Foresman College Division

Forthcoming

Securing the Blessings of Liberty

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

Revised Edition

By Arthur N. Holcombe, Emeritus, Harvard University
Introduction by Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey

Written by one of the nation's foremost authorities on the genesis and development of the American constitutional system, this book focuses upon the crucial need for preserving and enhancing the benefits of a living Constitution within the context of a swiftly changing and complex world. Discussions on the activity of Congress, the decisions of the Supreme Court, and the increasing authority of the Executive, are both timely and provocative. Scott, Foresman American Government Series. *Ready in August, approx. 207 pages, softbound: $2.25, hardbound: $4.25*

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND POLITICS

Conflict and Consensus

Edited by C. Peter Magrath, University of Nebraska

The nature of a living constitution is explored in readings which emphasize the influence of Federal Supreme Court and judicial decisions, the President, Congress, parties, administrative bureaus, interest groups, and shifting public opinion on the historical development and evolving interpretation of the United States Constitution. Scott, Foresman American Government Readings Series. *Ready in August, approx. 208 pages, softbound, prob. $2.95*

THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC POLICY

Edited by Martin M. Shapiro, University of California, Irvine

This reader presents the Supreme Court as a political institution. It utilizes court decisions, scholarly writings, and empirical research to provide a carefully balanced view of the institution and its historical background. Inner operation and its relationship to the general public and to other political institutions are emphasized. Scott, Foresman American Government Readings Series. *Ready late Fall, approx. 192 pages, softbound, prob. $2.25*

SCOTT, FORESMAN AND COMPANY College Division

Glenview, Illinois Atlanta Dallas Palo Alto Oakland, N.J.

Legal Order in a Violent World

RICHARD A. FALK

Professor Myres S. McDougal of the Yale Law School calls this examination of the relation of law and violence in contemporary international society ". . . a profound, perceptive, and eloquent contribution to the most important problem of our time." Professor Falk places great emphasis on two distinctive challenges to world order—nuclear weapons and civil strife. *Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.* *$15.00*

West Bengal and the Federalizing Process in India

MARCUS F. FRANDA

Professor Franda deals with the complexities of India's federalizing experience by analyzing the politics of center-state relations as they affect one Indian state, West Bengal. He explores the various ways in which central and state leadership groups in India and West Bengal have developed working relationships and examines the effect of state and regional political, economic, and social conditions on the evolution of center-state behavior patterns. *$7.50*

Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843

JOHN ANTHONY PETROPULOS

Three foreign oriented political parties, Russian, French, and English, emerged during the Greek Revolutionary period from 1821-1827 and played a prominent role in Greek politics until the 1850's. The author seeks to determine the membership and role of the parties under a nonconstitutionalist regime at a time when the basic structure of the Greek state was being created. *$17.50*

Princeton University Press

Princeton, New Jersey 08540

Coming in June, 1968 . . .

THE STUDY OF POLICY FORMATION

Edited by Raymond A. Bauer, *Harvard University,* and
Kenneth J. Gergen, *Swarthmore College*
Foreword by Robert C. Wood

Professors Bauer and Gergen have made a major contribution to the study of a complex social process—policy formation—by bringing together nine original, empirically oriented papers. The essays provide critical reviews of approaches to the subject, consider the methodology of research in policy-making, and examine a number of areas of decision-making. Together, they provide a synthesis of past study and a ready reference to modern techniques of examination.

CONTENTS

The Study of Policy Formation: An Introduction—*R. A. Bauer.* Public Policy and Normative Economic Theory—*R. Zeckhauser* and *E. Shaefer.* Descriptive Decision Theory from the "Administration" Viewpoint—*J. L. Bower.* The State of the Art in Policy Studies—*E. C. B. Schoettle.* Assessing the Leverage Points in the Process of Policy Formation—*K. J. Gergen.* Methodology in the Study of Policy Formation—*K. J. Gergen.* Urban Mass Transportation: A Survey of the Decision-Making Process—*L. M. Schneider.* The Problem of Technology Transfer—*E. E. Furash.* The Role of Information in Decision-Making on Foreign Aid—*T. Geiger* and *R. D. Hansen.* Index.

June, 1968 416 pages $9.95 tent.

THE AGE OF INDUSTRIALISM IN AMERICA

Essays in Social Structure and Cultural Values
Edited by Frederic Cople Jaher, *University of Chicago*

With the response to industrialism as a basic perspective, this interdisciplinary collection of twelve critical essays analyzes various facets of American life from the post-Civil War years to the present.

CONTENTS

Introduction. Economic Growth and Change in the United States Under Laissez Faire: 1870-1920—*H. Ross.* Industrialism and Political Leadership: A Case Study of the United States Senate—*A. Hoogenboom.* Immigration and Political Life—*M. Parenti.* The Negro's Response—*A. Lane.* Atlanta in the Progressive Era: A Dreyfus Affair in Georgia—*L. Dinnerstein.* Metropolism and Urban Elites in the Far West—*G. Barth.* The Boston Brahmins in the Age of Industrial Capitalism—*F. C. Jaher.* Class, Status, and Community Power in Nineteenth Century American Industrial Cities. Paterson, New Jersey: A Case Study—*H. G. Gutman.* Career Leadership and American Trade Unionism—*D. Brody.* Horatio Alger, Jr., and the Response to Industrialism—*R. Weiss.* America on Display: The World's Fairs of 1876, 1893, and 1933—*J. G. Cawelti.* Protestantism's Response to Social Change: 1890-1930—*D. Reimers. Index.*

June, 1968 approx. 410 pages $8.95

Just Published . . .

Fp

THE KOREAN DECISION
June 24-30, 1950
By Glenn D. Paige, *University of Hawaii*
Introduction by Richard C. Snyder

This hour-by-hour case study of a crucial decision documents seven days of deliberation that led to three years of war and the death of more than 33,000 Americans in Korea. It includes a wealth of new material drawn from extensive interviews with President Truman and other United States policy makers. In addition, the author discusses earlier East-West confrontations and provides the first application of the decision-making approach to the study of foreign policy as presented in *Foreign Policy Decision Making,* edited by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (The Free Press, 1962).

Just Published 419 pages cloth, $6.95
paperbound text edition, $3.95

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
A Reinterpretation of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers
By Paul Eidelberg, *North Carolina State University, Raleigh*
Foreword by Herbert J. Storing

Virtually every major controversy in American politics involves the Constitution. This *philosophical* reconstruction of the debates of the Constitutional Convention portrays the Founding Fathers' hopes for the nation and demonstrates the relevance of their thought to the problems of our times. Through an original application of multi-level analysis Professor Eidelberg portrays the regime envisioned by the Founders, the kind of men intended to be its leaders, and the purposes they were intended to serve.

Just Published 355 pages cloth, $6.95
paperbound text edition, $2.95

THE ACTIVE SOCIETY
A Theory of Societal and Political Processes
By Amitai Etzioni, *Columbia University*

An *active* society is master of its technology and lives with and through perpetual change. Describing today's conflicts between society and its tools, this provocative volume reveals how societies and basic human values can be preserved in the post-modern period. Professor Etzioni depicts an active society as one that is responsive to its changing membership and is engaged in intensive and perpetual self-transformation. In presenting his theory he combines political and sociological analytic perspectives with an historical approach. From these viewpoints he offers postulates and hypotheses which serve as the basis for a theoretical framework within which additional propositions can be formulated and data codified.

Just Published 723 pages $11.95

more from The Free Press ▶

Fp *An Original Paperbound Series . . .*

THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE

General Editor: Samuel Krislov, *University of Minnesota*

Designed as a general introduction to the political, social, and economic consequences of Supreme Court decisions, *The Supreme Court in American Life* series illuminates the nature and scope of the highest court in the United States. Each volume examines and clarifies the Court's role in one well-defined area of American life, and highlights the far-reaching political, economic, and human implications of the Court's work.

THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL FREEDOM

By Samuel Krislov, *University of Minnesota*

The freedom of *political* expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment is the subject of this volume. In addition to discussing specific cases and legal approaches, the study is placed in a philosophical and historical context.

CONTENTS: Introduction. An Elite Instrumentality of a Democratic Society. Liberty in the Views of Historians and the Works of Judges. Constitutional Developments and Political Freedom. Issues and Dilemmas. The Power of the Court. The Court and the Public. A Note on Further Reading. Table of Cases. Index.

1968 249 pages $2.95

THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM

By Arthur Selwin Miller, *George Washington University*

Professor Miller's study examines how the Supreme Court has handled questions concerning American capitalism in the past, and how it is likely to proceed in the future. Major attention is accorded the rise of the "Positive State" and the growth of multinationalism in corporate affairs.

CONTENTS: Preface. Corporate America. Constitutional Doctrine and the Consolidation of Corporate Power. Constitutional Revolution Consolidated: The Rise of the Positive State. The Need for a New Constitutional Theory. An Industrial America in an Industrial World. The Desuetude of the Supreme Court? Epilogue. A Note on Further Reading. Table of Cases. Index.

1968 271 pages $2.95

THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

By Martin Shapiro, *University of California, Irvine*

Here is an analysis of the relations between the Supreme Court and the federal administrative agencies. The author disputes the traditional view that courts and agencies are inherently different types of institutions with different roles.

CONTENTS: Introduction. Courts and Agencies. Administrative Law. The Supreme Court and the Patent Office. The Supreme Court and the Federal Power Commission. Conclusion. A Note on Further Reading. Table of Cases. Index.

1968 298 pages $2.95

THE FREE PRESS
A Division of The Macmillan Company
866 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022

New and recent

POLITICS IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: The Challenge of Change in Asia, Africa, and Latin America

Edited by HARVEY G. KEBSCHULL, *North Carolina State University at Raleigh.* "Excellent"—"Well-organized"—"The best paperback of readings in comparative politics of the developing nations"—are among early comments on this fine volume.

March 1968 435 pages 3 maps paperback $4.95

WORLD TENSIONS: Conflict and Accommodation

ELTON ATWATER, KENT FORSTER, *and* JAN S. PRYBYLA, *all of The Pennsylvania State University.* "A remarkable compilation"—"Outstanding"—"Important, objective, timely"—sum up reaction to this recent book, already in wide use.

July 1967 396 pages illustrated paperback $3.95

CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3rd Edition

Edited by ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, *National Historical Publications Commission; and* ROBERT F. CUSHMAN, *New York University.* Completely revised, reset, and reorganized. The most thoroughgoing and up-to-date casebook available today.

August 1968 1104 pages $10.00 (tent.)

CASES IN CIVIL LIBERTIES

Edited by ROBERT F. CUSHMAN. An inexpensive paperback version of the second part of Cushman and Cushman's *Cases in Constitutional Law, 3rd Edition.*

August 1968 500 pages paperback $4.95 (tent.)

REMEMBER: Two annual Cushman supplements—*1964-1966* and *1966-1967*—already are in print. *Each $.95.* Also ready for fall use, a third supplement, *1967-1968.*

Appleton-Century-Crofts
DIVISION OF MEREDITH CORPORATION
440 Park Avenue South, New York 10016

RUTGERS
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

*“an obscure new book”**

THE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF AMERICANS:

A STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION

by Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril

*“Considerable attention at Nixon’s headquarters has been devoted to an obscure new book by Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril. Using public opinion samplings, Free and Cantril conclude that Americans may be opposed to the welfare state in concept but accept it in fact. That is, they are ‘ideological conservatives’ but not ‘operational conservatives.’ ”—ROWLAND EVANS and ROBERT NOVAK, *Inside Report*

“I am extremely enthusiastic about the book. It provides an entirely new insight into the political orientation of Americans, especially into why some are conservatives and some are liberals. . . . A book every student of politics should read and ponder.”—GEORGE GALLUP, Founder, The Gallup Poll

“A very useful audit. . . . It probably gives in brief compass the most comprehensive picture of American public opinion as it is related to government and politics that we have today.”—HARWOOD L. CHILDS, Editor, *Public Opinion Quarterly*

“ . . . provides anyone concerned with politics an understanding of the patterns of political thought since the New Deal days which must be taken into account . . . in estimating public opinion trends in the present and forecasting them in the future.”—WILLIAM E. ROBERTS, Spencer-Roberts & Associates, Los Angeles

“The most useful book in showing how opinion research can chart the mainstreams of the public’s political thought.”—PAUL LAZARSFELD, Professor of Sociology, Columbia University

“Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril . . . approach the study of public opinion with the dispassionate intrigue of first-class meteorologists surveying the elements. . . . The questions they are examing . . . are specific in application, but they go beyond tactics. They have to do with the relation of national policy to national purpose, with the cohesion and conflicts of debate, accommodation, and momentum within a society that prides itself on both diversity and unity. They have to do with the very nature of the American system.”
—BILL D. MOYERS

Hadley Cantril is Chairman of the Board and Lloyd A. Free is Director of the Institute for International Social Research.

240 pages, tables, appendices, notes $10.00

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY PRESS
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

Federation of the West Indies
by Sir John Mordecai, C.M.G.

This history of federation in the British West Indies offers an incisive analysis of the reasons why federations have proved so unstable in the postwar world. The author brings into focus the years of negotiation and compromise leading to creation of the Federation in 1958, its collapse, and the resulting predicament of the islands. 476 pages $13.75

Russian Peasants and Soviet Power
by Moshe Lewin

The years 1928 and 1929 form a particularly significant period in Soviet history, one marked by tremendous forward thrust in industrialization, as well as by the mass collectivization of the peasantry. This study analyzes the problems of the period from the view of both the politician and the peasant. 556 pages $11.50

The Supreme Court and the News Media
by David L. Grey

Beginning with an analysis of the Supreme Court as a news source, the author traces the problems of the news media in reporting the facts and significance of Court opinions to various legal and lay publics. 194 pages $5.95

Northwestern University Press
1735 Benson Avenue Evanston, Illinois 60201

ANNOUNCING

NEWLY REORGANIZED:

AFRICA TODAY

EDITORS:
GEORGE SHEPHERD
EZEKIEL MPHAHLELE

EXPANDED CONTENT
ENTIRELY NEW FORMAT

AFRICA TODAY

SUBSCRIPTIONS:

Student Rate	$3.00
3 Years	$13.95
2 Years	$9.50
1 Year	$5.00

EDITORIAL BOARD:
Robert Browne
Fred Burke
Kenneth Carstens
Stanley Diamond
William H. Friedland
Collin Gonze
George Houser
Betsy Landis
Tilden Lemelle
John Marcum
Robert I. Rotberg
James Scaritt
W. A. E. Skurnik
Richard Stevens
Sheldon Weeks
Peter Weiss
Immanuel Wallerstein

AFRICA TODAY
c/o Grad. School of Int'l Studies,
University of Denver,
Denver, Colorado 80210

☐ Pay Now ☐ Bill me

Name
Street
City
State Zip Code

Law Without Sanctions

Order in Primitive Societies and the World Community

by Michael Barkun

Drawing on the resources of jurisprudence and political science and on sociology, anthropology, and social psychology as well, Mr. Barkun proposes that primitive "stateless" societies and the contemporary international community—each without the sanctioning forces of police and courts deemed essential to municipal law—may well possess legal systems encompassing "law-with-order," although not necessarily "law-with-justice." $6.50

The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, 1943-1956

by Stéphane Bernard

This monumental case study of decolonization traces in detail the history of the Franco-Moroccan conflict and analyzes the sociological mechanisms involved in the severance of the protectorate from the mother country. A translation of volumes 1 and 2 of the 3-volume French edition, the work is published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as one of its Case Studies of International Conflicts. Fall $15.00

Peasant Communism in Southern Italy

by Sidney G. Tarrow

Offering programs of land reform and regional rebirth, the Communist Party experienced a mixture of success and failure among the backward peasants of Southern Italy. Mr. Tarrow's analysis illuminates important elements of Italian society and politics but goes beyond this to examine problems of political development similar to those of Asia and Latin America. $8.75

Party Democracy

Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation

by Samuel H. Barnes

Through an intensive empirical study of a single political party in an Italian province, Mr. Barnes investigates some broad theoretical questions of participation and democracy in political parties. The author brings to data analysis both the statistical tools of contemporary social science and the perception of a sensitive, informed scholar, providing in this book many leads for future research in political science. $7.50

Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change

by Robert H. Dix

The central fact of political life in the developing nations is the process of modernization—the manner in which hierarchical social patterns and a narrow political base are altered by the demands of industrialization and urbanization. Mr. Dix characterizes the various regimes which have evolved in Colombia to meet the challenges of modernization, beginning with Alfonso Lopez' "revolution on the march" of 1934. $10.00

YALE

Yale University Press New Haven and London

1908 1968

New from
the University
of Chicago Press

China in Crisis

Volume I: China's Heritage and The Communist Political System
Edited by Tang Tsou and Ping-ti Ho

Perhaps more than any other modern country, China offers a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between tradition and modernity, between continuity and change in political and social institutions. This two-volume major work explains both traditional and contemporary China as well as her position in the current crisis in international affairs. The papers assembled here were presented at the inaugural conference (1966-67) of the Center for Policy Study at the University of Chicago. With a foreword by Charles U. Daly.

1968 LC:68-20981 Volume I, 2 books $20.00

China in Crisis

Volume II: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives
Edited by Tang Tsou

The continuing debate in the United States over policies toward China and Vietnam provides a compelling occasion for re-examining the objectives and capabilities of Communist China and her relations with major countries in Asia. This second volume of papers presented at the Center for Policy Study conference discusses China's military strength; her diplomatic opportunities, capacities, and constraints in Asia; her growing contacts with Japan; and three alternative American policies toward China.

1968 LC:68-20981 $10.00

As A Tale That Is Told

The Autobiography of R. M. MacIver

One of America's foremost social scientists tells of his long, zestful life. Born on the Scottish island of Lewis, MacIver became Lieber Professor of political philosophy and sociology at Columbia. He has always been an opponent of the tendency to make sociology too scientific, to reduce the essence of human behavior to statistics. His views on people and governments, and controversies he engaged in are part of this narrative, together with tales of boyhood, student days, and teaching.

1968 LC:68-15632 264 pages, illus., $7.50

Angels in Marble

Working Class Conservatives in Urban England
Robert McKenzie and Allan Silver

In a brilliant blend of historical analysis and sociological research, the authors have defined the roots of British working class conservatism—the belief that men of wealth and position are best fitted to serve "the national interest." The work will be of special interest to political scientists and sociologists concerned with Britain but will have wider appeal as a study of the very nature of democratic politics.

1968 LC:67-30555 304 pages, $11.00

Machine Politics

Harold F. Gosnell

This 1968 edition of the history of Chicago machine politics during the depression contains a new foreword by Theodore J. Lowi and a postscript by the author. Lowi looks at Gosnell's Chicago through the contemporary experience of New York. Gosnell's postscript gives a review of the main political events in Chicago since 1937. Both contend that Chicago's political system has undergone relatively few changes and that the basis for machine strength still exists.

1968 LC:68-16692 288 pages, $7.95 Paper, $3.45

University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER

A Set of Materials edited by

RICHARD FALK, Princeton University, and **SAUL MENDLOVITZ,** Rutgers Law School

Vol. I: Toward a Theory of War Prevention
Foreword by Harold D. Lasswell

Vol. II: International Law
Foreword by Wolfgang Friedmann

Vol. III: The United Nations
Foreword by Oscar Schachter

Vol. IV: Disarmament and Economic Development
Foreword by J. David Singer

"Professors Falk and Mendlovitz have planned and executed a program designed to shape an academic discipline oriented toward the principal policy question of the epoch. It is entirely appropriate that such a program should spread among professional and graduate schools, and ultimately permeate college and pre-college years.
The tone is sternly professional. It is responsible, scholarly, scientific, predictive, inventive, and critical."
From the Foreword to Volume I by Harold D. Lasswell

Projected for 1968 publication: Volumes V and VI supported by The Carnegie Corporation.

Vol. V: Regionalism and World Order

Vol. VI: The Role of the Individual and World Order

Four volume set, paperbound $10.00; Hardcover $14.00; Volumes I and II, $2.50 each; Volumes III and IV $3.50 each. 2,296 pp.

WORLD LAW FUND 11 West 42nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10036

Cornell University Press

READINGS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Bill of Rights Reader

Leading Constitutional Cases—4th Edition

Edited by MILTON R. KONVITZ. "A noteworthy contribution to modern constitutional thought . . . indispensable to those who desire currency in their comprehension of rights, obligations, and powers of individuals and authorities," said the *California Law Review* in commenting on an earlier edition of this well-known book.

The fourth edition includes thirty new cases, some decided as recently as 1967. Many of these concern civil rights demonstrations, the right of privacy, censorship, the administration of criminal justice, and voting rights. The opinions of the court, together with concurring and dissenting opinions, have been skillfully chosen and edited for the light they shed on the significance of the controversies.

Cornell University Press
ITHACA, NEW YORK 14850

Book Reprints in Political Science

CHAMBERLAIN, LAWRENCE H. **Available**

Loyalty and Legislative Action

A Survey of Activity by the New York State Legislature 1919-1949. Ithaca, 1951.

(Cornell Studies in Civil Liberty) .... *cloth $10.00*

COUNTRYMAN, VERN. **Available**

Un-American Activities in the State of Washington.

The Work of the Canwell Committee. Ithaca, 1951.

(Cornell Studies in Civil Liberty) .... *cloth $15.00*

KAHN, ALFRED E. **Available Summer 1968**

Great Britain in the World Economy.

New York, 1946.

(Reprints in Government and Political Science) .... *cloth $12.50*

LASKI, H. J. **Available Summer 1968**

The Dangers of Obedience and Other Essays.

With a new introduction by Glenn R. Negley, Duke University.

(Reprints in Government and Political Science) .... *cloth $15.00*

MOWRY, ARTHUR MAY. **Available**

The Dorr War;

or, the Constitutional Struggle in Rhode Island. With an Introduction by Albert Bushnell Hart. Providence, 1901. .... *cloth $17.50*

PHILLIPS, PAUL CHRISLER. **Available**

The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution.

Urbana [1913].

(Illinois. University. Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences. Vol. 2, no. 2/3) .... *cloth $10.00*

REIFF, PAUL FRIEDRICH. **Available**

Friedrich Gentz, An Opponent of the French Revolution and Napoleon.

Urbana-Champaign, Ill., 1912.

(Illinois. University. Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences. Vol. 1, no. 4) ...... *cloth $6.00*

THOMPSON, CHARLES MANFRED. **Available**

The Illinois Whigs before 1846.

[Urbana, 1915].

(Illinois. University. Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences. Vol. 4, no. 1) .... *cloth $6.00*

U. S. CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. **Available**

Secret Journals of Acts and Proceedings of Congress,

from the first meeting thereof to dissolution of Confederation by adoption of Constitution of United States. Boston, 1821.

4 vols. .... *cloth $100.00*

WRIGHT, QUINCY. **Available**

The Enforcement of International Law through Municipal Law in the United States.

[Urbana, 1916].

(Illinois. University. Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences. Vol. v, no. 1) ...... *cloth $10.00*

Many other titles in production or preparation. Please send for our detailed brochure, REPRINTS IN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE.

JOHNSON REPRINT CORPORATION
111 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10003

JOHNSON REPRINT COMPANY LTD. Berkeley Square House, London W.1, England

COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

THE LATIN AMERICAN TRADITION

CHARLES WAGLEY

A collection of essays on the unity and diversity in Latin American society. The author discusses the set of traditions, institutional values, and patterns of behavior which are shared by most Latin Americans, stressing the persistence of traditional ways of thought and behavior patterns and their tenacity in the face of the dynamic social and economic changes now underway in Latin America. By describing the regional and internal subcultures of Latin America (such as the tribal Indian, the peasant, the metropolitan middle class) as well as seeking the universal or common denominator in Latin American culture, the author presents a framework for the understanding of Latin America as a distinctive culture area in the modern world. $6.75

SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

WILLIAM A HANCE, Editor, with LEO KUPER,
VERNON McKAY, and EDWIN S. MUNGER

In this book four of the foremost authorities on Africa assess the factors which bear upon United States relations with southern Africa (including the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portuguese Angola and Mozambique) in the light of changing circumstances and attitudes in the U.S., in southern Africa, and in independent black Africa. Some of the topics discussed are the case for and against United States disengagement from South Africa; the sharp dichotomy which exists between the races in South Africa; and the complex international relations which affect the confrontation between black Africa and those parts of southern Africa under white domination. $6.50

POPULATION AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN TROPICAL AFRICA

ROBERT F. STEVENSON

This is a reply to the claims set forth in the classic *African Political Systems* of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard that, on the basis of African data, no relationship could be determined between population density and political organization in a given area. Historical materials here supplement the original synchronic approach to demonstrate a strong relationship between population density and political complexity in tropical Africa. $10.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
440 West 110th Street
New York, N. Y. 10025

COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

COLUMBIA **COLUMBIA**

NEW PAPERBACKS FROM COLUMBIA

SPACESHIP EARTH

BARBARA WARD

"... although her diagnosis is painfully realistic, her conclusions are not those of a pessimist. . . . Her vision, although necessarily speculative, is compelling."—*The Times Literary Supplement* $1.95

MARXISM IN MODERN FRANCE

GEORGE LICHTHEIM

"Mr. Lichtheim presents us here with a solid and provocative exegesis . . . the book has some important conclusions not only for historians but for economists, philosophers, and sociologists as well.—*American Historical Review* $2.25

POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN THE USSR

Second Edition

MYRON RUSH

"His thesis . . . is that the nature of Soviet society, with its lack of a defined procedure for political succession, must produce a succession crisis. . . . Rush's point may well be debatable, but it is argued with considerable force and conviction; to date, history has not contradicted him."—*Journal of Modern History* $2.75

THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE: HOW THE VOTER MAKES UP HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

Third Edition

PAUL LAZARSFELD, BERNARD BERELSON,
and HAZEL GAUDET

The authors were among the first to use a now accepted method of social research—the panel, or repeated interview technique, to achieve a step-by-step account of how representative voters arrived at final vote decisions in the 1940 elections. The present edition explores questions which arose after the initial study. $2.25

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
440 West 110th Street
New York, N. Y. 10025

COLUMBIA **COLUMBIA**

Important titles from RONALD

GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Webb S. Fiser, State University of New York at Albany;
Stuart Gerry Brown, University of Hawaii;
and **John S. Gibson,** Tufts University

Recently Published—This text surveys concisely but comprehensively the framework of the American governmental system. Intergovernmental relations are developed as cooperative action between levels of government rather than as compartmentalized treatments of federal, state and local systems. Going beyond discussion of politics, parties, and pressure groups, this book shows how the political process unfolds around concrete policy issues in the context of changing historical developments. Particular attention is given to such currently important problems as urban renewal, metropolitan areas, poverty, race relations, law enforcement, agriculture, and education. Instructor's Supplement available. *1967. 803 pp.* *$8.50*

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Paul Buckholts,
Eastern Michigan University

Provides a systematic approach to political geography for students of geography or related fields. It focuses on the need for stressing relationships within a state before attempting a meaningful exploration of the international aspects. References to history disclose views of the subject which emphasize both its continuity and the variety of approaches taken to it. Main theme is how man, as a political animal, controls and affects, or is influenced by, his environment—never alone but in relation to differing environments. *1966. 534 pp., illus.* *$9.00*

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Russell M. Ross, University of Iowa;
and **Kenneth F. Millsap,**
Assistant City Manager, Iowa City, Iowa

This text provides a thorough treatment of the governmental activities of the 50 states and their local governmental units. Although predominant emphasis is on administrative aspects of state and local government, the book also presents material on the structure of governmental units below the national level. The role of counties, the position of the municipalities and special districts, and the peculiar problems of metropolitan areas are examined in detail. The importance of intergovernmental coordination is stressed, as is the growing relationship between the national and local governments. *1966. 705 pp., illus.* *$8.50*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

John M. Pfiffner,
University of Southern California; and
Robert Presthus,
York University, Toronto

The Fifth Edition of this famous text examines administration at all levels of government. It integrates descriptive-institutional materials of administrative science with behavioral analyses of administration in action. It analyzes such aspects as the historical and institutional framework, separation of powers, role of executives (particularly that of the modern specialist), and the problem of obtaining superior talent. Covers decision-making and the data-processing revolution, and incorporates recent research into group behavior, individual motivation, and leadership dynamics. *5th Ed., 1967. 567 pp.* *$8.00*

ESTABLISHED 1900

The Ronald Press Company

79 Madison Avenue • New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

INDEX TO ADVERTISERS

Africa Today	741
Appleton-Century-Crofts	739
Atherton Press	725
Atlantic Community Quarterly	719
Bobbs-Merrill & Company	708
University of California Press	718
Cambridge University Press	714, 715
University of Chicago Press	743
Columbia University Press	746, 747
Commentary	Cover II
Cornell University Press	713, 744
Dorsey Press	723
Exposition Press	710
Foro Internacional	726
Free Press	736, 737, 738
G. K. Hall & Company	726
Harper & Row Publishers	421
Harper Torchbooks	701
Harvard University Press	716
University of Illinois Press	728
Johns Hopkins Press	700, 733
Johnson Reprint Corp.	745
J. B. Lippincott	706
Little, Brown & Company	722
McGraw-Hill Book Company	720, 721
Macmillan Company	730, 731
National Press	707
University of No. Carolina Press	724
Northwestern University Press	741
Oxford University Press	704, 705
University of Pennsylvania Press	712
Pergamon Press	719
Frederick Praeger	702
Prentice-Hall	424
Princeton University Press	735, Cover IV
Ronald Press	748
Rutgers University Press	740
St. Martin's Press	709
Scott, Foresman & Company	734
Seton Hall University Press	732
Social Research	732
Stanford University Press	717
Syracuse University Press	729
TIAA	703
United Nations Publications	711
Universal Reference System	710
D. Van Nostrand	727
Washington Tapes	699
World Law Fund	744
Yale University Press	742

From Prague After Munich

Diplomatic Papers, 1938-1940

GEORGE F. KENNAN

EPILOGUE BY FREDERICK G. HEYMANN

When Germany occupied Czechoslovakia, most Western observers left; George Kennan stayed on. His diplomatic papers, letters, and notes from Prague illuminate fully a period discussed in his best-selling memoirs. With profound insight he conveys the political and personal effects on Czechoslovakia of Munich and the German occupation. His record depicts the attempts at Germanization of Czech life, the cynical exploitation of various native organizations, the German insistence on a program of anti-Semitism, the take-over of Czech business and industry, and the problems of currency and inflation. *$6.50*

France in the Age of the Scientific State

ROBERT GILPIN, JR.

The author of *American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy* examines France's leadership in the battle against United States and Russian scientific hegemony in Europe. He warns that if Europe remains disunited in its administration of scientific policy and continues to be "the main world importer of discoveries and exporter of brains," it may become steadily weaker in international affairs. *Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.* *$12.50*

Princeton University Press

Princeton, New Jersey 08540